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  • Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short the Code)
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  • Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short the Code)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This petition under Section 482 CrPC was filed to quash the summoning order dated 06.09.2013 and the proceedings in Complaint Case No. 1120 of 2016 (Rajesh Kumar Vats v. Smt. Madhu Thapa) under Sections 420, 406, 506 IPC before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Haridwar.

Brief chronology and salient facts (as recorded in the opinion):

  • The respondent alleged that the petitioner and her son demanded Rs. 1,50,000 for securing a job for the respondent's son; payments of Rs. 1,00,000 and Rs. 35,000 were made but the job was not secured and money not returned. Later, deposits were made into the respondent's son's account on specified dates but the total amount was not returned.
  • The respondent filed an application under Section 156(3) CrPC and an FIR (No. 206 of 2012) under Sections 420, 506 IPC was lodged; police ultimately submitted a final report closing investigation on the ground that the petitioner had earlier filed a Section 156(3) application against the respondent's son which was rejected and an original civil suit (OS No. 426 of 2012) was pending on the same subject matter, so two proceedings should not be proceeded with concurrently.
  • After receipt of the final report, the Magistrate proceeded under Chapter XV of the Code: the respondent was examined under Section 200 CrPC and witnesses were examined under Section 202 CrPC. On 06.09.2013 the Magistrate summoned the petitioner under Sections 406, 420, 506 IPC. The petitioner challenged that summoning order by the present petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the summoning order dated 06.09.2013 and the complaint proceedings should be quashed under Section 482 CrPC on the ground that the criminal proceeding was instituted and conducted with mala fide motive (a counter-blast) when a civil suit on the same subject-matter was pending and a final police report had closed investigation?
  2. Whether the Magistrate, having received a final report and with knowledge (or on available record) of a pending civil suit on the same subject-matter, was required to notice and record reasons for ignoring the final report and for summoning the accused?
  3. Whether the concealment by the complainant and his witnesses of the existence and pendency of the civil suit (and the final report) amounted to evidence of mala fide institution of criminal proceedings warranting quashing under Section 482 CrPC?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner earlier filed an application under Section 156(3) CrPC (23.11.2011) alleging that the respondent's son had taken money for securing a job; when no investigation was directed, the petitioner filed a civil suit (OS No. 426 of 2012).
  • The respondent thereafter filed an application under Section 156(3) CrPC against the petitioner (05.06.2012) as a counter-blast to the petitioner's civil action; the respondent's actions were mala fide and instituted to wreak vengeance.
  • Reliance was placed on the principles in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) — particularly paragraph 102(7) concerning proceedings manifestly attended with mala fide — and on Ahmad Ali Quraishi v. State of U.P. (2020 SCC OnLine SC 107) which reiterates Bhajan Lal.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent submitted that the petitioner had filed her Section 156(3) application on 23.11.2011 and the civil suit was filed on 08.08.2012, whereas the respondent's Section 156(3) application was filed on 05.06.2012; therefore, the respondent claimed he had no knowledge of any action taken by the petitioner before filing his application and it was not a counter-blast.
  • The respondent argued that pendency of a civil suit is not an impediment to criminal proceedings where there is an element of criminality, and that after submission of the final report the Magistrate had the lawful option to proceed under Chapter XV treating the application as a complaint; no specific error was shown in the impugned order to warrant interference under Section 482 CrPC.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 Scope of Section 482 CrPC; paragraph 102 categorises situations where extraordinary power may be exercised, including where proceedings are manifestly attended with mala fide (para 102(7)). The petitioner emphasised paragraph 102(7). The Court applied these principles to assess whether the criminal proceedings were maliciously instituted with ulterior motive (mala fide) and concluded that concealment and conduct indicated mala fide, warranting quashing.
Ahmad Ali Quraishi v. State of U.P., 2020 SCC OnLine SC 107 Reiteration of the principles laid down in Bhajan Lal regarding exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC. The Court noted that Ahmad Ali Quraishi reiterates Bhajan Lal; this supported the legal framework for assessing mala fide and abuse of process in the present petition.
H.S. Bains v. State, (1980) 4 SCC 631 On receiving the police report the Magistrate may take cognizance under Section 190(1)(b) and is not bound by conclusions of the police; Magistrate may issue process even if police recommend no sufficient ground for proceeding. The Court acknowledged H.S. Bains to observe that the Magistrate had the jurisdiction to proceed under Chapter XV after final report; however, the Court faulted the magistrate for not recording reasons for ignoring the final report and not considering pendency of the civil suit.
Rakesh v. State of U.P., (2014) 13 SCC 133 Further reiteration of the principle that magistrate's procedural options after police report are not constrained by police conclusions. The Court cited Rakesh to indicate that the procedural power of the Magistrate was not in question in this case.
State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma IAS, 1992 SCC (Cri) 192 Concept of mala fide: definition, what constitutes mala fide, and the requirement that mala fide must be demonstrated by facts and circumstances and not by bald assertions (paras 49–51). The Court relied on these principles to hold that mala fide must be proven by facts; it found that concealment of the pending civil suit by the complainant and witnesses and related circumstances supported a finding of mala fide in this case.
Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate, (1998) 5 SCC 749 Summoning an accused is a serious matter; magistrate must apply mind to facts and evidence, scrutinise the evidence, and may question complainant/witnesses before summoning (para 28). The Court used Pepsi Foods to emphasise that the Magistrate should have applied mind to the record, including the final report and pendency of the civil suit. The Court found the Magistrate did not advert to the final report and did not record reasons for summoning despite the limited preliminary evidence.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded by first recounting the timeline and documents on record: the petitioner's earlier Section 156(3) application and subsequent civil suit (OS No. 426 of 2012), the respondent's later Section 156(3) application and lodging of FIR, the police investigation and final report recommending closure because of pendency of the civil suit on the same subject-matter, and the Magistrate's decision to proceed under Chapter XV, examine the complainant and witnesses, and summon the petitioner.

The Court recognised settled law (H.S. Bains and Rakesh) that a Magistrate may proceed under Chapter XV and is not bound by police conclusions. However, the Court then examined whether the Magistrate had properly applied his mind to the record and evidence in the context of summoning (relying on Pepsi Foods).

Key analytical steps taken by the Court:

  • Observed that the police final report recorded that an original civil suit was pending on the same subject-matter and thus two proceedings ought not to be initiated; that final report was on record before the Magistrate's proceedings.
  • Noted that when the respondent was examined under Section 200 CrPC (27.07.2013), he was aware of the pending civil suit and of the final report on record, yet he did not disclose this in his statement; witnesses examined under Section 202 CrPC also did not mention the civil suit. The Court highlighted that the respondent is a practising advocate and that the record shows efforts to transfer the case on this ground.
  • Found that the Magistrate did not advert to the final report or record reasons for disregarding it when choosing to proceed and summoning the petitioner. The Court emphasised that summoning requires application of mind and careful scrutiny of evidence (Pepsi Foods).
  • Applied the test for mala fide (State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma) and Bhajan Lal’s category 102(7) to assess whether concealment and conduct showed that the criminal proceedings were maliciously instituted as a counter-blast or to wreak vengeance.
  • Concluded that the concealment by the complainant and his witnesses of the pending civil suit and the failure of the Magistrate to note or record reasons for ignoring the final report reflected malafide conduct by the respondent and amounted to abuse of the criminal process.

Based on these findings of concealment, failure to disclose material facts, and the Magistrate's lack of recorded reasons for proceeding despite the final report and pending civil suit, the Court held that interference under Section 482 CrPC was justified.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

DISPOSED OF: The petition is allowed.

Specifically, the Court quashed the summoning order dated 06.09.2013 and the entire proceedings in Complaint Case No. 1120 of 2016 (Rajesh Kumar Vats v. Smt. Madhu Thapa) under Sections 420, 406, 506 IPC pending before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Haridwar.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The criminal proceedings and the summoning order challenged in this petition have been quashed; the petitioner will no longer be proceeded against in Complaint Case No. 1120 of 2016 as a result of this order.
  • Broader precedent: The opinion applies established Supreme Court principles (Bhajan Lal, Pepsi Foods, H.S. Bains, State of Bihar) to the facts and does not purport to lay down new law; the decision is an application of existing legal principles to the recorded facts, particularly focusing on concealment of material facts and lack of reasoned consideration by the Magistrate.

Note: This summary is confined to the content and citations contained in the provided opinion and does not add information beyond the text of that opinion.

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    Smt. Madhu Thapa v. Rajesh Kumar Vats

    Ravindra Maithani, J. (Oral):— Instant petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “the Code”) has been filed for quashing the summoning order dated 06.09.2013 and Complaint Case No. 1120 of 2016, Rajesh Kumar Vats v. Smt. Madhu Thapa, under Sections 420, 406, 506 IPC, pending in the court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Haridwar, District Haridwar (its old number is Criminal Case No. 612 of 2013, Rajesh Kumar Vats v. Smt. Madhu Thapa, in the court of learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Laksar, District Haridwar) (for short “the case”).

    2. Facts necessary for decision of the instant petition, briefly stated are as hereunder:—

    Respondent filed an application under Section 156(3) of the Code in the court of learned Judicial Magistrate, Laksar, District Haridwar. According to it, the petitioner and her son demanded Rs. 1,50,000/- from the respondent for securing a job to his son. On 11.01.2009, the respondent gave Rs. 1,00,000/- and subsequently, Rs. 35,000/- were given. But, the petitioner did neither secure the job nor returned the money. When contacted, the petitioner asked the account number of the son of the respondent and deposited various amounts in his account on 20.06.2010, 27.01.2011 and 17.09.2011. But, the total amount was not returned by her. Therefore, application was moved for investigation. The Court directed for investigation. Pursuant to it, FIR No. 206 of 2012, under Sections 420, 506 IPC was lodged at Kotwali Laksar, District Haridwar. After investigation, the police closed the matter on the grounds that earlier, the petitioner had filed an application under Section 156(3) of the Code, against the son of the respondent, which was rejected, as it did not disclose any cognizable offence. Thereafter, the petitioner filed an Original Suit No. 426 of 2012, which was pending. The IO concluded that for the same subject matter, two cases should not be proceeded and accordingly, closed the investigation. Now, here onwards, proceedings of the case were instituted. What the court did was, it proceeded under Chapter XV of the Code, examined respondent as complainant under Section 200 of the Code, on 22.07.2013 and also examined witnesses Sanjay Kumar on 07.08.2013 and his son Nishant Pandit and Ichcharam on 27.07.2013, under Section 202 of the Code. Thereafter, on 06.09.2013, the court summoned the petitioner and others to answer accusation under Sections 406, 420, 506 IPC. It is this order and proceeding of the case which are under challenge.

    3. Learned counsel for the petitioner would argue that, in fact earlier, an application under Section 156(3) of the Code was filed by the petitioner on 23.11.2011, on the ground that the son of the respondent had taken various amounts from her for securing a job to her brother, but, he neither secured the job nor returned the money. The Court called a report from Police Station and subsequently found that the matter is civil in nature, therefore, did not direct for investigation. Subsequent to it, the petitioner filed a civil suit. It is argued that as a counter blast to it, the respondent filed an application under Section 156(3) of the Code against the petitioner. The actions of the respondent is mala fide, as a counter blast to the action taken by the petitioner to the same cause, therefore, the summoning order and proceedings of the case deserve to be quashed.

    4. In support of his contention, learned counsel placed reliance upon the principles of law, as laid down in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, and Ahmad Ali Quraishi v. State of Uttar Pradesh 2020 SCC OnLine SC 107.

    5. In the case of Bhajan Lal (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court discussed the scope and ambit of Section 482 of the Code and in paragraph 102 of it, illustrated certain categories under which this jurisdiction may be exercised. It is as hereunder:

    “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

    (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

    (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

    (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

    (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

    (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

    (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

    (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”

    6. In the case of Ahmad Ali Quraishi (supra), the principles of law as laid down in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra) has been reiterated.

    7. On the other hand, learned senior counsel for the respondent would submit that whole argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner has no basis, because the application under Section 156(3) of the Code was filed by the petitioner on 23.11.2011 and original suit was filed by her on 08.08.2012. The respondent filed application under Section 156(3) of the Code on 05.06.2012. Learned senior counsel would argue that till then the respondent had no information about any action that was taken by the petitioner against him. Therefore, it is argued that it is not a case of counter blast. Learned senior counsel would further argue that on behalf of the petitioner no error is indicated in the impugned order, therefore, it is not a case which may warrant any interference under Section 482 of the Code.

    8. During the course of arguments, this Court posed a question to the learned senior counsel for the respondent that in the case, final report on record revealed that earlier the parties were in dispute and an original suit was also pending between them for the same subject matter, then why it was not enquired into by the learned Magistrate and why the respondent or his son did not speak about it in their statements under Section 200 & Section 202 of the Code respectively? To it, learned senior counsel for the respondent would argue that pendency of civil case is no impediment to proceed with the criminal case. He would argue that once final report is submitted, the Magistrate has options, either to order further investigation or to proceed under Chapter XV of the Code. In the instant case, it is argued that the proceedings were initiated under Chapter XV of the Code, after receipt of final report which is in accordance with law.

    9. There is no doubt that pendency of a civil case is no impediment for proceeding with the criminal proceedings, if it has an element of criminality. It is also settled law that once after investigation final report is submitted, the Magistrate has various options including further investigation as well as proceedings under Chapter XV of the Code, treating original application as a complaint and the law on this point, as laid down in the case of H.S. Bains v. State, (1980) 4 SCC 631.

    10. Suffice it to say that after considering the law on the subject, the Court in the case of H.S. Bains (supra) inter alia, held that “on receiving the police report the magistrate may take cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(b) and straightaway issue process. This he may do irrespective of the view expressed by the police in their report whether an offence has been made out or not. The police report under Section 173 will contain the facts discovered or unearthed by the police and the conclusions drawn by the police therefrom. The magistrate is not bound by the conclusions drawn by the police and he may decide to issue process even if the police recommend that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding further. The magistrate after receiving the police report, may, without issuing process or dropping the proceeding decide to take cognizance of the offence on the basis of the complaint originally submitted to him ……..” (para 6)

    11. The principle has been further reiterated in various cases including in the case of Rakesh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 13 SCC 133. This question of law need no further deliberation. The procedure is not in question in the instant case.

    12. Emphasis in the instant case is laid down on behalf of the petitioner in para 102(7) of the judgment in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra) which speaks that in case criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge, an interference is warranted.

    13. What is prima facie case? Taking cognizance is not a routine act. It is a conscious decision. After all a person is called to face the trial. Proving malafide or establishing malafide is not something which may conveniently be done. A reference may be made to the judgment of State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma IAS, 1992 SCC (Cri) 192, in para 49, 50 and 51 of it, the concept of malafide has been discussed, which is as hereunder:—

    “49. The focal point from the above background is whether the charge-sheets are vitiated by the alleged mala fides on the part of either of the complainant R.K. Singh or the Investigating Officer G.M. Sharma. (3 edn. at p. 293) stated that:

    “The concept of bad faith … in relation to the exercise of statutory powers … comprise dishonesty (or fraud) and malice. A power is exercised fraudulently if its repository intends to achieve an object other than that for which he believes the power to have been conferred. His intention may be to promote another public interest or private interest. A power is exercised maliciously if its repository is motivated by personal animosity towards those who are directly affected by its exercise … The administrative discretion means power of being administratively discreet. It implies authority to do an act or to decide a matter a discretion……………….”

    “50. Mala fides means want of good faith, personal bias, grudge, oblique or improper motive or ulterior purpose……….”

    “51. The action taken must, therefore, be proved to have been made mala fide for such considerations. Mere assertion or a vague or bald statement is not sufficient. It must be demonstrated either by admitted or proved facts and circumstances obtainable in a given case. If it is established that the action has been taken mala fide for any such considerations or by fraud on power or colourable exercise of power, it cannot be allowed to stand.”

    14. In the case of Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate, (1998) 5 SCC 749, the Hon'ble Supreme Court discussed the act of summoning by a criminal court. In para 28 of it, the Hon'ble Court held as hereunder:—

    “28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence both oral and documentary in support thereof and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing charge home to the accused. It is not that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before summoning of the accused. Magistrate has to carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused.”

    (emphasis supplied)

    15. Facts may be revisited a little further in the instant case. As stated, petitioner had filed an application under Section 156(3) of the Code alleging that it is the son of the respondent, who had taken money from her under the promise of securing a job for her brother and when Magistrate did not direct for investigation, she filed a civil suit. It is much relevant. The civil suit OS No. 426 of 2012 was filed on 08.08.2012 in the court of Civil Judge (Junior Division) Dehradun, in which, summons were issued on that date.

    16. The respondent filed application under Section 156(3) of the Code on 05.06.2012. Apparently, the record does not say that this application under Section 156(3) of the Code of the petitioner is filed as a counter blast, because it may rightly be said that till then, in fact, neither in any criminal case, nor in the civil case respondent was ever summoned. But, the things did not stop here. When FIR was lodged on the application under Section 156(3) of the Code, filed by the respondent, it terminated in submitting the final report by the Investigating Officer and what he records is that since an original suit is pending with regard to the same subject matter, two proceedings should not be initiated. This is very important factor. The jurisdiction of Magistrate cannot be questioned that he may proceed under Chapter XV of the Code and record the statement under Section 200 of the Code and conduct inquiry under Section 202 of the Code, that is what the Magistrate did. But, can on mere production of two witnesses summoning order should be passed in such a case, when final report is submitted on the ground that on the same subject matter a civil suit is pending. It is interesting to note that the transaction in the application filed by the petitioner under Section 156(3) of the Code relates to dated 20.06.2010, 27.01.2011 and 17.09.2011 and in his application under Section 156(3) of the Code, the respondent admits these transactions, but what he says is that it was as repayment of the money which was taken by the petitioner from the respondent under the promise of securing a job to his son. So, the subject matter was definitely same.

    17. The respondent was examined under Section 200 of the Code on 27.07.2013. On that date, he knew that a civil suit was pending between his son and the petitioner on the same subject matter. The final report was on record on that date, but not a single word was stated by the respondent about the civil suit.

    18. This Court cannot ignore the fact that the respondent is a practicing Advocate at Laksar. The case was sought to be transferred from Laksar to Haridwar court in C407 No. 27 of 2014 on this ground and it was transferred. The respondent knew that an original suit is pending on the subject matter. But, as stated, he did not state it, in his statement recorded under Section 200 of the Code. None of the witnesses examined under Section 202 of the Code tell about it. The son of the respondent, Nishant Pandit has also been examined under Section 202 of the Code but he also did not reveal even a single word about the civil suit pending between him and the petitioner on the same subject matter. Strangely, the learned Magistrate did not avert to the final report. Learned Magistrate did not even see as to why after investigation, final report is submitted. Whether the conclusion is right or wrong? At the cost of repetition, it may be said that the jurisdiction to proceed under Chapter XV of the Code by the Magistrate is not in question. But, the reasons for ignoring the final report have not been recorded. The fact that civil suit is pending between the parties has not been considered. The fact that the respondent and his son concealed it reflects that the action was to wreak vengeance. It reflects that the action of the respondent was malafide and therefore the summoning order as well entire proceedings are entitled to be quashed. Accordingly, this Court is of the view that the petition deserves to be allowed.

    19. The petition is allowed. The summoning order dated 06.09.2013 and entire proceedings of the Complaint Case No. 1120 of 2016, Rajesh Kumar Vats v. Smt. Madhu Thapa, under Sections 420, 406, 506 IPC, pending in the court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Haridwar, District Haridwar are quashed.

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    Smt. Madhu Thapa v. Rajesh Kumar Vats
    (Aug 12, 2020)