AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2020 INSC 46
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Judges
Acts
  • Section 439 of the Code, Criminal Original Petition No. 1618 of 2019
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • CrPC (Code of Criminal Procedure)
  • Code (CrPC)
  • Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “the Code”)
  • Section 482 of the Code, Article 226 of the Constitution of India
  • Section 439 of the Code, Section 482 CrPC
  • Article 32 (under the parameters which govern a nuanced exercise of judicial power)
  • Code (with no specific section mentioned)
  • Section 439 of the Code, Witness Protection Scheme, 2018
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2020 INSC 46
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Judges
Acts
  • Section 439 of the Code, Criminal Original Petition No. 1618 of 2019
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • CrPC (Code of Criminal Procedure)
  • Code (CrPC)
  • Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “the Code”)
  • Section 482 of the Code, Article 226 of the Constitution of India
  • Section 439 of the Code, Section 482 CrPC
  • Article 32 (under the parameters which govern a nuanced exercise of judicial power)
  • Code (with no specific section mentioned)
  • Section 439 of the Code, Witness Protection Scheme, 2018
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The impugned order arose from Criminal Original Petition No. 1618 of 2019, a bail application under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. On 18-2-2019 the Madras High Court granted bail to the accused. Instead of closing the matter, the Single Judge retained the file, called for statewide data on criminal cases, and on 24-4-2019 constituted a multi-member committee to recommend systemic reforms for investigation, reformation, rehabilitation and reintegration of offenders. The State of Tamil Nadu appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that the High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court, after finally granting bail under Section 439 CrPC, could retain seisin of the matter and issue wide-ranging directions unconnected with the accused’s bail.
  2. Whether the High Court could invoke inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC to constitute a committee and mandate systemic reforms in the criminal justice system.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar (2011) 14 SCC 770 Once a matter is disposed of, the court cannot entertain new issues or applications in that proceeding; inherent powers are limited. Used to show that the High Court erred in passing further orders after deciding the bail application.
Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee (1990) 2 SCC 437 Section 482 CrPC cannot be used to do what the Code expressly bars; powers are not unfettered. Cited to underline that inherent powers could not justify the impugned directions.
Kurukshetra University v. State of Haryana (1977) 4 SCC 451 Inherent powers must be exercised sparingly and with circumspection. Reinforced the necessity for judicial restraint under Section 482.
State of W.B. v. Sujit Kumar Rana (2004) 4 SCC 129 Same limitation on exercise of inherent powers. Quoted in support of the above principle.
Lalit Mohan Mondal v. Benoyendra Nath Chatterjee (1982) 3 SCC 219 Inherent jurisdiction cannot bypass statutory procedure. Applied to show the High Court’s directions were procedurally improper.
Rameshchandra Nandlal Parikh v. State of Gujarat (2006) 1 SCC 732 Exercise of inherent powers is exceptional. Supporting citation on limits of Section 482.
CBI v. Ravi Shankar Srivastava (2006) 7 SCC 188 High Court must act within statutory confines. Used to fortify the argument of jurisdictional overreach.
Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal (2007) 12 SCC 1 Sparingly use inherent powers to prevent abuse of process. Cited to emphasize restraint.
Pankaj Kumar v. State of Maharashtra (2008) 16 SCC 117 Scope and limits of inherent jurisdiction. Applied in the same context.
Gangadhar Janardan Mhatre v. State of Maharashtra (2004) 7 SCC 768 Alternate remedy of complaint under Section 200 CrPC is available. Illustrated that remedies exist outside inherent powers.
Divine Retreat Centre v. State of Kerala (2008) 3 SCC 542 Courts should not direct how investigation is to be conducted. Used to demonstrate that investigation policy directions were impermissible.
Sangitaben Shaileshbhai Datanta v. State of Gujarat (2019) 14 SCC 522 While deciding bail, courts must not convert the proceeding into a mini-trial or order intrusive investigative steps. Analogous authority showing the impropriety of the High Court’s approach.
RBI v. Coop. Bank Deposit A/C HR. Sha (2010) 15 SCC 85 Far-reaching directions cannot be issued in the limited context of a bail application. Relied on to highlight that systemic orders in bail matters exceed jurisdiction.
Santosh Singh v. Union of India (2016) 8 SCC 253 Courts should refrain from framing or enforcing broad social policies lacking a legal framework. Cited to stress that judicial process is not a remedy for every social ill.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court, per Hemant Gupta J., held that the High Court’s authority under Section 439 CrPC ends once the bail application is decided. By retaining the file, collecting statewide crime data, and constituting a committee to suggest criminal-justice reforms, the Single Judge exercised a jurisdiction that did not exist in a bail proceeding.

Drawing extensively on Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar and a line of precedents delimiting the scope of Section 482 CrPC, the Court reasoned that inherent powers are not a “Pandora’s box” for launching inquiries unrelated to the pending case. Even under its writ jurisdiction, a High Court cannot dictate how investigations should be conducted; at most, it can ensure observance of due process.

Analogous cases such as Sangitaben Datanta and RBI v. Coop. Bank illustrated prior instances where expansive directions in bail matters were struck down. The Court acknowledged the laudable objective of improving the criminal-justice system but emphasised that systemic reforms must come through appropriate forums, not through orders in a concluded bail matter.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Allowed – Impugned order dated 24-4-2019 of the Madras High Court is set aside.

Immediate Effect: The committee constituted by the High Court ceases to exist and all ancillary directions are nullified.

Broader Implication: The judgment reaffirms strict limits on the exercise of inherent powers and underscores that bail jurisdiction under Section 439 CrPC cannot be used as a vehicle for wider policy directives. No new legal test was created; the Court reinforced existing precedent on judicial restraint.

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    State Rep. By The Inspector Of Police (S) v. M. Murugesan And Another (S).

    Hemant Gupta, J.— The State is aggrieved against an order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras on 24-4-2019 2019 SCC OnLine Mad 12414 constituting a heterogeneous committee of named persons to give its recommendations on the reforms that can be brought into practice for reformation, rehabilitation and reintegration of the convict/accused person to society and best practices for improving the quality of investigation. The committee was mandated to submit report within eight weeks and that the State was directed to furnish data for each district. The committee was to scrutinise the same and submit the final data separately along with the report. The State was directed to provide office room for the committee to conduct its meetings and to keep the documents and other materials in safe custody.

    2. Such directions came to be passed in a matter pertaining to grant of bail under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “the Code”). The High Court had admitted the accused to bail on 18-2-2019 Criminal Original Petition No. 1618 of 2019 subject to certain conditions but passed an order to call for the details of the cases registered by the police, final report filed, trial conducted and the result of such cases. The details were to bring to light the manner in which the entire criminal justice system is operating in the State. In pursuance of the directions so issued and the data provided, the impugned order 2019 SCC OnLine Mad 12414 was passed by the learned Single Bench.

    3. The High Court after collecting the data in respect of the criminal cases registered, convictions and acquittals in each district proceeded to write a thesis on how the criminal justice system should function in the State. It was observed that the central aim of the criminal law is to reform the offender and to rehabilitate him in a bid to render him useful to society. The Court held 2019 SCC OnLine Mad 12414 as under: (M. Murugesan case 2019 SCC OnLine Mad 12414, SCC OnLine Mad paras 18-19 & 22)

    “18. The situation calls for a thorough revamping of the criminal justice system in this State. It looks like the police are caught into this vicious cycle. That shows on the poor record of convictions in serious crimes. Instead of finding a complete cure for the disease, police seem to be looking for temporary solutions without curing the disease. Unless we agree that there is a serious problem, there is no scope for change/improvement.
    19. “Once a criminal always a criminal” is the result of the present system prevailing in this State. We have forgotten the fundamental purpose of criminal justice system which is reformation, rehabilitation and re-integration of the convict into society. If an accused is pushed to the extremes by this system where he finds that even if he wants to turn a new leaf in his life, this system will not allow him, he will rather surrender to his fate and turn out to be a hardened criminal. A welfare state can never stoop down to such a level.
    ***
    22. It goes without saying that the quality of investigation has come down drastically and the data provided by the police, referred supra, makes it evident. The alacrity shown by the police in registering FIR and effecting arrest, is not seen in investigating the case, laying final report and taking the case to its logical end. The recent circular dated March 20 issued by DGP states that all the police stations will henceforth have exclusive investigation wing. As per the directions, the investigation wing will be responsible for investigation and prosecution of all cases registered in the station, including cases identified by the law and order wing. Further, the police officers attached to the investigation wing shall not be diverted to any bandobast work except with the prior approval of the zonal IG or Commissioner of Police. This is a step on the right direction. A conscious effort should be made by the investigating wing in every police station with the active coordination of the directorate of prosecution to take every criminal case to its logical end. The police should not be under the impression that their work gets over with registering FIR and effecting arrest. One of the main challenges for the prosecution in serious crimes is the witness turning hostile due to various reasons. Witness Protection Scheme, 2018, which has now become the law of the land in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mahender Chawla case (2019) 14 SCC 615, (2019) 1 MWN (Cri) 340, must be implemented effectively. The investigating officers must be updated on a regular basis on the march of law. Cybercrimes have reached monumental proportions and criminals committing these offences are clearly having an upper hand since these criminals are intelligent crooks and police officers require regular training and exposure to tackle these crimes. A complete overhaul is required to enhance the quality of investigation.”

    4. The matter before the High Court was as to whether the accused are entitled to be admitted to bail, that is, the jurisdiction conferred on the court in terms of Section 439 of the Code. Before granting bail, the High Court is enjoined upon an obligation to issue notice of an application for bail to the Public Prosecutor, if a person is accused of an offence which is triable exclusively by the Court of Session or which, though not so triable, for punishment of imprisonment for life.

    5. We find that the Hon'ble Single Bench has committed grave illegality in retaining the file after grant Criminal Original Petition No. 1618 of 2019 of bail to the accused on 18-2-2019. The jurisdiction of the High Court came to an end when an application for grant of bail under Section 439 of the Code was finally decided.

    6. In State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar (2011) 14 SCC 770, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana after deciding a criminal appeal continued to pass order in respect of offenders in other cases not connected with the matter which was dealt with by the High Court. This Court deprecated the invocation of jurisdiction in a matter not connected with the appeal and that too after passing of the final order. The Court held as under:

    “86. In view of the law referred to hereinabove, the Bench was not competent to entertain the said applications and even if the same had been filed in the disposed of appeal, the court could have directed to place the said applications before the Bench dealing with similar petitions.
    ***
    91. There could be no justification for the Bench concerned to entertain the applications filed under Section 482 CrPC as miscellaneous applications in a disposed of appeal. The law requires that the Bench could have passed an appropriate order to place those applications before the Bench hearing Section 482 CrPC petitions or place the matters before the Chief Justice for appropriate orders.”

    7. This Court in Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar (2011) 14 SCC 770 referred to a case Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee (1990) 2 SCC 437, wherein the Court observed that inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code cannot be exercised to do something which is expressly barred under the Code. It was held that inherent powers cannot be exercised assuming that the statute conferred an unfettered and arbitrary jurisdiction, nor can the High Court act at its whim or caprice. The Code does not confer unlimited/unfettered jurisdiction on the High Court as the “ends of justice” and “abuse of the process of the court” have to be dealt with in accordance with law and not otherwise. The High Court has not been given nor does it possess any inherent power to make any order, which in the opinion of the court, could be in the interest of justice as the statutory provision is not intended to bypass the procedure prescribed. It was also held that the High Court can always issue appropriate direction in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India at the behest of an aggrieved person, if the court is convinced that the power of investigation has been exercised by an investigating officer mala fide or the matter is not investigated at all, but even in such a case, the High Court cannot direct the police as to how the investigation is to be conducted but can insist only for the observance of due process as provided in the Code. The Court held (2011) 14 SCC 770 as under: (Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar case (2011) 14 SCC 770 & 800, paras 51-53 & 64)

    “51. The inherent power of the court under Section 482 CrPC is saved only where an order has been passed by the criminal court which is required to be set aside to secure the ends of justice or where the proceeding pending before a court, amounts to abuse of the process of court. Therefore, such powers can be exercised by the High Court in relation to a matter pending before a criminal court or where a power is exercised by the court under CrPC. Inherent powers cannot be exercised assuming that the statute conferred an unfettered and arbitrary jurisdiction, nor can the High Court act at its whim or caprice. The statutory power has to be exercised sparingly with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases. (Vide Kurukshetra University v. State of Haryana (1977) 4 SCC 451 and State of W.B. v. Sujit Kumar Rana (2004) 4 SCC 129.)
    52. The power under Section 482 CrPC cannot be resorted to if there is a specific provision in CrPC for the redressal of the grievance of the aggrieved party or where alternative remedy is available. Such powers cannot be exercised as against the express bar of the law and engrafted in any other provision of CrPC. Such powers can be exercised to secure the ends of justice and to prevent the abuse of the process of court. However, such expressions do not confer unlimited/unfettered jurisdiction on the High Court as the “ends of justice” and “abuse of the process of the court” have to be dealt with in accordance with law including the procedural law and not otherwise. Such powers can be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice as the courts have been conferred such inherent jurisdiction, in absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, or such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in the course of administration of justice as provided in the legal maxim quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest. However, the High Court has not been given nor does it possess any inherent power to make any order, which in the opinion of the court, could be in the interest of justice as the statutory provision is not intended to bypass the procedure prescribed. (Vide Lalit Mohan Mondal v. Benoyendra Nath Chatterjee (1982) 3 SCC 219, Rameshchandra Nandlal Parikh v. State of Gujarat (2006) 1 SCC 732, CBI v. Ravi Shankar Srivastava (2006) 7 SCC 188, Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal (2007) 12 SCC 1 and Pankaj Kumar v. State of Maharashtra (2008) 16 SCC 117.)
    53. The High Court can always issue appropriate direction in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution at the behest of an aggrieved person, if the court is convinced that the power of investigation has been exercised by an investigating officer mala fide or the matter is not investigated at all. Even in such a case, the High Court cannot direct the police as to how the investigation is to be conducted but can insist only for the observance of process as provided for in CrPC. Another remedy available to such an aggrieved person may be to file a complaint under Section 200 CrPC and the court concerned will proceed as provided in Chapter XV CrPC. (See Gangadhar Janardan Mhatre v. State of Maharashtra (2004) 7 SCC 768 and Divine Retreat Centre v. State of Kerala (2008) 3 SCC 542.)
    ***
    64. An inherent power is not an omnibus for opening a Pandora's box, that too for issues that are foreign to the main context. The invoking of the power has to be for a purpose that is connected to a proceeding and not for sprouting an altogether new issue. A power cannot exceed its own authority beyond its own creation. It is not that a person is remediless. On the contrary, the constitutional remedy of writs is available. Here, the High Court enjoys wide powers of prerogative writs as compared to that under Section 482 CrPC. To secure the corpus of an individual, remedy by way of habeas corpus is available. For that the High Court should not resort to inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC as the legislature has conferred separate powers for the same. Needless to mention that Section 97 CrPC empowers the Magistrates to order the search of a person wrongfully confined. It is something different that the same court exercising authority can, in relation to the same subject-matter, invoke its writ jurisdiction as well. Nevertheless, the inherent powers are not to provide universal remedies. The power cannot be and should not be used to belittle its own existence. One cannot concede anarchy to an inherent power for that was never the wisdom of the legislature. To confer unbridled inherent power would itself be trenching upon the authority of the legislature.”
    (emphasis in original)

    8. This Court in a judgment Sangitaben Shaileshbhai Datanta v. State of Gujarat (2019) 14 SCC 522 was examining a question where a court after grant of bail to an accused ordered the accused and their relatives to undergo scientific test viz. lie detector, brain mapping and narco-analysis. This Court held that direction of the court to carry out such tests is not only in contravention to the first principles of criminal law jurisprudence but also violates statutory requirements. The Court held as under:

    “6. Having heard the counsel for the parties, it is surprising to note the present approach adopted by the High Court while considering the bail application. The High Court ordering 2018 SCC OnLine Guj 2153, (2019) 60 (2) Guj LR 1310 the abovementioned tests is not only in contravention to the first principles of criminal law jurisprudence but also violates statutory requirements. While adjudicating a bail application, Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is the guiding principle wherein the Court takes into consideration, inter alia, the gravity of the crime, the character of the evidence, position and status of the accused with reference to the victim and witnesses, the likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice and repeating the offence, the possibility of his tampering with the witnesses and obstructing the course of justice and such other grounds. Each criminal case presents its own peculiar factual matrix, and therefore, certain grounds peculiar to a particular case may have to be taken into account by the court. However, the court has to only opine as to whether there is prima facie case against the accused. The court must not undertake meticulous examination of the evidence collected by the police, or rather order specific tests as done in the present case.
    7. In the instant case, by ordering the abovementioned tests and venturing into the reports of the same with meticulous details, the High Court has converted the adjudication of a bail matter to that of a mini trial indeed. This assumption of function of a trial court by the High Court is deprecated.”

    9. In another judgment RBI v. Coop. Bank Deposit A/C HR. Sha (2010) 15 SCC 85, Reserve Bank of India challenged an order passed on an application under Section 439 of the Code, wherein an argument was raised that the poor depositors are not paid by the Bank out of the amount which has been received by the Bank. The Court issued directions that the Bank should start distributing the amount which is so far recovered by them from the accused. The Bank was directed to furnish details of the money paid to the poor depositors. The accused as well as the investigating officer and the Administrator of the Bank were directed to remain present in the Court. This Court found that such directions are beyond the scope of an application for bail filed by the accused under Section 439 of the Code. The Court held as under:

    “6. We are of the opinion that the far-reaching consequences of the directions of the High Court 2003 SCC OnLine Guj 387, (2004) 45 (4) Guj LR 3002 are in a way beyond the scope of an application for bail filed by an accused under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the High Court, as much as anyone else, must stay confined to the issues relevant to the matter before it. It was thus not open to the High Court to pass orders which could affect the working of banks all over the country.”

    10. In Santosh Singh v. Union of India (2016) 8 SCC 253 while dealing with a public interest litigation petition filed by a petitioner who was deeply distressed with the rapidly degrading moral values in the society touching every aspect of life where making money has become the sole motto of society, this Court held as under:( & 23-24)

    “18. While there can be no dispute about the need of providing value-based education, what form this should take and the manner in which values should be inculcated ought not to be ordained by the court. The court singularly lacks the expertise to do so. The petitioner has a grouse about what she describes as the pervading culture of materialism in our society. The jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 is not a panacea for all ills but a remedy for the violation of fundamental rights. The remedies for such perceived grievances as the petitioner has about the dominant presence of materialism must lie elsewhere and it is for those who have the competence and the constitutional duty to lay down and implement educational policies to deal with such problems.
    19. There is a tendency on the part of public interest petitioners to assume that every good thing which society should aspire to achieve can be achieved through the instrumentality of the court. The judicial process provides remedies for constitutional or legal infractions. Public interest litigation allows a relaxation of the strict rules of locus standi. However, the court must necessarily abide by the parameters which govern a nuanced exercise of judicial power. Hence, where an effort is made to bring issues of governance before the court, the basic touchstone on which the invocation of jurisdiction must rest is whether the issue can be addressed within the framework of law or the Constitution. Matters of policy are entrusted to the executive arm of the State. The court is concerned with the preservation of the rule of law.
    ***
    23. It is unrealistic for the court to assume that it can provide solutions to vexed issues which involve drawing balances between conflicting dimensions that travel beyond the legal plane. Courts are concerned with issues of constitutionality and legality. It is difficult to perceive how matters to which solutions may traverse the fields of ideology, social theory, policy-making and experimentation can be regulated by this Court such as by issuing a mandamus to enforce a scheme of instruction in a particular subject in school education. Should a subject be taught at all? Should a set of values or a line of enquiry and knowledge be incorporated as a separate subject of discourse in an educational system? Would a horizontal integration of a given set of values across existing subjects better achieve a desirable result? Is it at all desirable to impose another subject of study upon the already burdened school curriculum?
    24. These are vexed issues to which more than one solution may appear just. That is exactly the reason why a resolution of such matters must rest with those who have the responsibility to teach and govern over matters of education. Every good that is perceived to be in the interest of society cannot be mandated by the court. Nor is the judicial process an answer to every social ill which a public interest petitioner perceives. A matter such as the present to which a solution does not rest in a legal or constitutional framework is incapable of being dealt with in terms of judicially manageable standards.”

    11. We find that the learned Single Judge 2019 SCC OnLine Mad 12414 has collated data from the State and made it part of the order after the decision Criminal Original Petition No. 1618 of 2019 of the bail application, as if the Court had the inherent jurisdiction to pass any order under the guise of improving the criminal justice system in the State. The jurisdiction of the court under Section 439 of the Code is limited to grant or not to grant bail pending trial. Even though the object of the Hon'ble Judge was laudable but the jurisdiction exercised was clearly erroneous. The effort made by the Hon'ble Judge may be academically proper to be presented at an appropriate forum but such directions could not be issued under the colour of office of the court.

    12. In view of the above, we find that the order passed by the High Court on 24-4-2019 2019 SCC OnLine Mad 12414 is not sustainable in law and the same is set aside. Consequently, the appeal is allowed.

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    State Rep. By The Inspector Of Police (S) v. M. Murugesan And Another (S).
    (Jan 15, 2020)