Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • SECTION 45 PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING ACT 2002
  • Sub Section (1) of Section 45 of the PMLA Act.
  • Section 45 read with Section 3 and 4 of the the Prevention of Money - Laundering Act, 2002
  • Section 45 of the PMLA Act, 2002,
  • Finance Act, 2018,
  • Section 45(1) of the PMLA. Para 30
  • Section 45 of the 2002 Act.
  • Section 439 of Cr.P.C,
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • SECTION 45 PREVENTION OF MONEY LAUNDERING ACT 2002
  • Sub Section (1) of Section 45 of the PMLA Act.
  • Section 45 read with Section 3 and 4 of the the Prevention of Money - Laundering Act, 2002
  • Section 45 of the PMLA Act, 2002,
  • Finance Act, 2018,
  • Section 45(1) of the PMLA. Para 30
  • Section 45 of the 2002 Act.
  • Section 439 of Cr.P.C,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion by P.K. Jaiswal, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

An ECIR/INSZO/02/2014 was registered by the respondent on 31.03.2016. By a provisional attachment order dated 31.03.2016, properties worth Rs. 8,93,50,085/- belonging to the applicant (Dr. Vinod Bhandari) and his family were provisionally attached; that provisional attachment was confirmed by the adjudicating authority on 31.03.2016. An appeal against the attachment order is pending before the PMLA Tribunal.

The applicant was associated with investigations for both the predicate offence(s) and under the PMLA, and attended as and when called by the investigating agency; he was not arrested during investigation. After investigation, a charge-sheet was filed in the PMLA case, listing 231 witnesses and a prosecution complaint of 2,430 pages. At the time the charge-sheet was filed the applicant appeared before the Special Court. An earlier application for bail was rejected on 16.08.2018 and the applicant was taken into judicial custody.

The present application under Section 439 Cr.P.C. seeks grant of bail in Special Sessions Trial No. 1924/2018 for alleged offences under Section 45 read with Sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the applicant is entitled to bail in a PMLA prosecution (Special S.T. No. 1924/2018) in view of the Supreme Court's decision in Nikesh Tarachand Shah v. Union of India declaring Section 45(1) (insofar as it imposed twin conditions) unconstitutional, and subsequent amendment(s) to Section 45(1) by the Finance Act, 2018.
  2. Whether the 2018 amendment (adding words "under this Act" to Section 45(1)) has the effect of reviving or resurrecting the original Sub‑section 45(1)(ii) and thereby re‑imposing the twin conditions for grant of bail that the Supreme Court struck down.
  3. Ancillaryly, whether facts of the case (cooperation with investigation, health, age, residence, prior compliance with bail conditions in related scheduled offences, and the nature of prosecution case) warrant grant of bail in the present case.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

  • The applicant relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Nikesh Tarachand Shah v. Union of India (2018) 11 SCC 1, which declared Section 45(1) of the PMLA void insofar as it imposed twin conditions for bail as violating Articles 14 and 21, and directed remand of affected matters to respective courts for fresh consideration without applying those twin conditions.
  • The applicant submitted that Rohit Tandon v. Union of India (2018) 11 SCC 46 did not decide the constitutional validity of Section 45(1), and that the Special PMLA Court erred in treating Rohit Tandon as deciding constitutionality of Section 45(1).
  • The applicant emphasised his full cooperation during investigation, non-arrest during investigation, presence when the charge-sheet was filed, and that prosecution had listed 231 witnesses and 83 accused meaning trial will be protracted; thus indefinite custody would deny his Article 21 rights.
  • He pointed out he is on bail in the scheduled offences arising from the predicate cases (ten cases) and had not misused bail; he also relied on his age (62), medical conditions (hypertension, diabetes, unstable angina, triple vessel disease, varicose veins) and settled residence in Indore to argue there was no risk of absconding or tampering.
  • Reference was made to Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar (2014) 8 SCC 469 and the maximum punishment of seven years for the PMLA offence, to support entitlement to bail.

Respondent's (Non‑applicant's) Arguments

  • The learned ASG for the Directorate of Enforcement opposed bail, emphasizing the grave nature of the offence and the prima facie evidence available against the applicant.
  • He submitted that though the Supreme Court in Nikesh Tarachand Shah struck down the twin conditions in Section 45(1), Parliament amended Section 45(1) by the Finance Act, 2018 (effective 19.04.2018) inserting the words "under this Act" into Sub‑section (1), which, he argued, had the effect of reviving the original Sub‑section 45(1)(ii) so that the twin conditions must now be applied in bail proceedings under the PMLA.
  • Accordingly, the ASG contended the Nikesh Tarachand Shah judgment has been rendered ineffective in respect of PMLA bail applications due to the amendment, and the court must consider bail in the light of the amended provision.
  • On those bases, the ASG prayed for rejection of the bail application.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rohit Tandon v. Union of India, (2018) 11 SCC 46 Referenced as a decision that did not examine the constitutional validity of Section 45(1) of the PMLA; followed principles in Gautam Kundu regarding scheduled offences. The court observed that Rohit Tandon does not decide the constitutional validity of Section 45 and therefore is not determinative of the constitutional question; it relied on the Supreme Court's own characterization (in Nikesh Tarachand Shah) that Rohit Tandon proceeded on the footing that Section 45 was constitutionally valid.
Nikesh Tarachand Shah v. Union of India, (2018) 11 SCC 1 Held Section 45(1) of the PMLA unconstitutional insofar as it imposed two additional conditions for grant of bail, as violative of Articles 14 and 21; struck down Section 45 as a whole for those purposes and remanded affected matters for fresh consideration without applying the twin conditions. The court treated Nikesh Tarachand Shah as authoritatively declaring that the twin conditions in Section 45(1) are unconstitutional and that Section 45(1)(ii) has been struck down; it relied on that holding to conclude the twin conditions do not apply unless and until Parliament validly revives them (which, the court held, did not happen by the impugned amendment/notification).
Gautam Kundu (referenced) Described as a judgment relating to an offence under the SEBI Act, a scheduled offence; its approach was followed in Rohit Tandon. Mentioned in the opinion (via the Supreme Court's discussion in Nikesh Tarachand Shah) to explain that Rohit Tandon and Gautam Kundu proceeded on the assumption of Section 45's constitutional validity and thus are of limited assistance on the constitutional question.
Gorav Kathuria (referenced) Discussed in Nikesh Tarachand Shah regarding the 2012 Amendment Act and interpretation of Part A/Part B of the schedule to explain how monetary thresholds and Section 45(1) application were to be understood. Quoted in the opinion (from Nikesh Tarachand Shah) to illustrate the Supreme Court's interpretive approach to the schedule and the 2012 amendment; the present court relied on the Supreme Court's reasoning as part of the authoritative backdrop.
Arnesh Kumar v. State Of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 469 Invoked in relation to principles applicable where maximum punishment is up to seven years (as cited by applicant to support bail entitlement). The opinion records the applicant's reliance on Arnesh Kumar and the maximum sentence point as a factor in the prayer for bail; the court considered the applicant's submissions including this reliance in its overall assessment.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court set out the statutory and factual matrix: ECIR registered, provisional attachment confirmed, charge-sheet filed with a large number of witnesses, previous bail denial and subsequent judicial custody. The legal focal point was the interplay between the Supreme Court's decision in Nikesh Tarachand Shah (which had struck down Section 45(1) insofar as it imposed twin conditions for bail) and the subsequent legislative amendment effected by the Finance Act, 2018 (inserting the words "under this Act" into Section 45(1), effective 19.04.2018).

The court examined the ASG's contention that the 2018 amendment revived the original Sub‑section 45(1)(ii) (i.e., reinstated the twin conditions for grant of bail). The court noted:

  • That the Supreme Court in Nikesh Tarachand Shah in express terms had declared Section 45(1) (insofar as it imposed twin conditions) unconstitutional and had struck down Section 45 for those purposes.
  • That the 2018 amendment merely added the words "under this Act" to Sub‑section (1) of Section 45, but did not expressly revive or resurrect the original Sub‑section 45(1)(ii); both counsel (for applicant and ASG) conceded that the original Sub‑section 45(1)(ii) has not in fact been revived by the amending statute.
  • The notification that purportedly effected the amendment (dated 29.03.2018, effective 19.04.2018) is silent on retrospective applicability; there is no indication in the text that Parliament intended to revive the struck-down twin conditions with retrospective effect.

Based on these factual and textual observations, the court concluded that the ASG's contention that the twin conditions were revived could not be accepted. The court therefore held that "as of today there is no rigor of said two further conditions under original Section 45(1)(ii) of PMLA Act for releasing the accused on bail under the said Act."

The court then considered personal and case‑specific factors: applicant's age (62), medical ailments (hypertension, diabetes, unstable angina, triple vessel disease, varicose veins), permanent residence in Indore, professional background (MBBS doctor with medical institutes), his prior compliance with bail conditions in related scheduled offences, cooperation during investigation, absence of arrest during investigation, and absence of any recent interrogation since being remanded to custody. On these material facts the court found no reason to presume risk of absconding, tampering with evidence, or influencing witnesses.

The court explicitly stated that it was allowing bail "without expressing any opinion on merits of the case" and imposed conditions to mitigate risks.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The application for bail is allowed.

The court ordered that the applicant (Dr. Vinod Bhandari) be released on bail in Special S.T. No. 1924/2018 on executing a PR bond of Rs. 5,00,000 with two local sureties of like amount. Pending compliance with surety formalities the applicant may furnish cash bail of Rs. 5,00,000 and shall complete surety formalities within six weeks of actual release. Additional conditions were imposed: submission and update of residential address, surrender of passport (if not already surrendered), appearance before the Special PMLA Court on fixed dates (unless medically prevented), prohibition on tampering with evidence or pressurizing witnesses, and liberty to the respondent to take legal recourse if conditions are violated.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the applicant is released on bail subject to the enumerated conditions.
  • The court found that the Finance Act, 2018 amendment did not, on the material before the court, revive the twin conditions of original Section 45(1)(ii) struck down by the Supreme Court in Nikesh Tarachand Shah; consequently, those twin conditions were not applied in deciding this bail application.
  • No broader or novel precedent was announced by this opinion beyond applying the Supreme Court's decision and a textual analysis of the amendment: the decision operates to grant bail to this applicant on the facts and legal analysis recorded; the opinion does not state that it establishes a new rule of general application beyond the immediate case.

Disposition: With the conditions specified in the order, the application for bail is allowed and the application is disposed of.

    Dr. Vinod Bhandari v. Asstt. Director

    P.K. Jaiswal, J.:— Heard.

    2. An ECIR/INSZO/02/2014 was registered by the respondent on 31.03.2016. By a provisional attachment order dated 31.3.2016, arising out of ECIR No. 2 of 2014, properties worth Rs. 8,93,50,085/- belonging to the applicant (Dr. Vinod Bhandari) and his family were provisionally attached. The said provisional attachment was confirmed by adjudicating authority by order dated 31.3.2016. The appeal preferred by the applciant is pending before the PMLA Tribunal.

    3. The applicant was duly associated with the investigations both for the predicate offence as well as PMLA and was present as and when called by the respondent agency, but neither he was arrested nor he was ever taken in custody. After investigation charge sheet has been filed by the non-applicant. As per charge sheet filed in PMLA case, total number of witnesses are 231. The prosecution complaint running into 2430 number of pages. At the time of filing of the charge sheet, applicant was present before the learned Special Court. The application for grant of bail filed by the applicant has been rejected on 16.08.2018 and he has been taken into the judicial custody.

    4. This application under Section 439 of Cr.P.C, for grant of bail has been filed by the applicant in special Sessions Trial No. 1924/2018, for an offence under Section 45 read with Section 3 and 4 of the the Prevention of Money - Laundering Act, 2002 (herein after referred as ‘PMLA Act’).

    5. Learned counsel for the applicant has submitted that the Apex court in case of Rohit Tandon v. Union of India, (2018) 11 SCC 46 dated 10.11.2017, did not examine the Constitutional validity of Section 45(1) of the PMLA. Para 30 of the order dated 10.11.2017 reads as under:—

    “30. For the time being, it is not necessary for us to examine the issues arising from the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court or the rejection of criminal appeal by this court against that decsion. The constitutional validity of Section 45 of the 2002 Act will have to be examined by this court in the Writ Petition on its own merits. The summary dismissal of the criminal appeal will not come in the way of the considering the correctness of the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in view of the conflict of opinion with the other High court ……”

    6. He further submitted that subsequently, the constitutional validity of Section 45(1) of PMLA has been adjudicated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Nikesh Tarachand Shah v. Union of India, (2018) 11 SCC 1, declaring that Section 45 of PMLA, 2002 is manifestly arbitrary and thus contravenes Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Para 52 and 54 of order dated 23.11.2017 reads as under:—

    “52. In Gorav Kathuria (supra), the 2012 Amendment Act was read down having regard to the object sought to be achieved by the amendment, namely, that Part B of the Schedule is being made Part A of the Schedule, so that the provision of a monetary threshold limit does not apply to the offences contained therein. The High Court concluded:

    “33. Guided by the aforesaid principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court regarding statutory interpretation and the duty of the Court to secure the ends of justice, we have no hesitation in holding that in 2013, Part B of the Schedule was omitted and the Scheduled Offences falling thereunder were incorporated in Part A with the sole object to overcome the monetary threshold limit of Rs. 30 lakhs for invocation of PMLA in respect of the laundering of proceeds of crime involved in those offences. No substantive amendment was proposed with express intention to apply limitations on grant of bail as contained in Section 45(1) in respect of persons accused of such offences which were earlier listed in Part B. Therefore, twin limitations in grant of bail contained in Section 45(1) as it stands today, are not applicable qua a person accused of such offences which were earlier listed in Part B.”

    54. Regard being had to the above, we declare Section 45(1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, insofar as it imposes two further conditions for release on bail, to be unconstitutional as it violates Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. All the matters before us in which bail has been denied, because of the presence of the twin conditions contained in Section 45, will now go back to the respective Courts which denied bail. All such orders are set aside, and the cases remanded to the respective Courts to be heard on merits, without application of the twin conditions contained in Section 45 of the 2002 Act. Considering that persons are languishing in jail and that personal liberty is involved, all these matters are to be taken up at the earliest by the respective Courts for fresh decision. The writ petitions and the appeals are disposed of accordingly.

    7. His submission is that the learned Special PMLA Court has made an error in holding that the constitutional validity of Section 45(1) of PMLA was decided in the case of Rohit Tandon v. Union of India (supra). The learned court failed in appreciating that the case of Rohit Tandon v. Union of India (supra) was cited before the Hon'ble Supreme Court hearing the case of Nikesh Tarachand Shah v. Union of India, (supra) and the same has been dealt with as under:—

    “42. The learned Attorney General then relied strongly on Gautam Kundu (supra) and Rohit Tandon (supra). Gautam Kundu (supra) is a judgment relating to an offence under the SEBI Act, which is a scheduled offence, which was followed in Rohit Tandon (supra). In Rohit Tandon (supra), Khanwilkar, J., speaking for the Bench, makes it clear that the judgment does not deal with the constitutional validity of Section 45 of the 2002 Act. Both these judgments proceed on the footing that Section 45 is constitutionally valid and then go on to apply Section 45 on the facts of those cases. These judgments, therefore, are not of much assistance when it comes to the constitutional validity of Section 45 being challenged.

    “44 …… We are of the opinion that, even though the Punjab High court Judgment appears to be correct, it is unnecessary for us to go into this aspect any futher, in view of the fact that we have struck down Section 45 of the 2002 Act as a whole ……”

    8. He also submitted that in the present case, the prosecution has cited total 231 witnesses and there are in all 83 accused persons. The trial of the PMLA case would take considerable time to conclude and thus, keeping in view the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Nikesh Tarachand Shah's case (supra), applicant cannot be kept in custody for an indefinite period to deny his right to defend themselves in accordance with postulates of our constitution especially Article 21 thereof. Applicant is on bail in the concerned Scheduled offences. The bail orders have attained finality and the concerned investigating agency viz. ACB have acquiesced into the same.

    9. In the present PMLA case, the applicant was duly cooperating with the investigation and no prayer was ever been made by the non-applicant to arrest him during the investigation. It is also pointed out that in terms of ratio Nikesh Tarachand Shah's case (supra) various under trial prisoners in PMLA offence have already got bail from various court across the country. The entire case of the prosecution is based on Section 50 of the statement and banking trial and there is no question of hampering and tampering with the same. No interrogation whatsoever has been conducted since the applicant has been sent to the judicial custody and, therefore, no purpose will be served by keeping him in custody.

    10. The PMLA cases is only an off-shoot of the main case from which alleged proceeds of crime has been driven and allegedly projected as untainted. The applicant is on bail in all the said Scheduled offences (ten cases). The maximum punishment in PMLA offence is seven years and, therefore, in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Arnesh Kumar v. State Of Bihar . reported as (2014) 8 SCC 469, it is prayed that the applicant is entitled for grant of bail.

    11. Per contra, Shri Deepak Rawal, learned ASG for the non-applicant (Directorate of Enforcement), opposes the prayer on the ground that the offence is grave in nature. He has also drawn my attention to the amended provisions of PMLA Act and submitted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Nikesh Tarachand Shah (supra) strike down Section 45 of the PMLA Act, 2002, so far as it imposes further two conditions for release on bail, to be unconstitutional is concerned, the same relates to Scheduled offences or predicate offences. He submitted that now the Government has brought an amendment in the Finance Act, 2018, which has come into effect from 19.4.2018 to Section 45(1) of the PMLA Act, thereby inserting words ‘under this Act’ in Section 45(1) of the said Act. He submitted that in view of the said amendment, the original Sub-section (ii) of Section 45(1) which imposes the said twin conditions automatically stands revived and the said condition therefore, remained on statute book. He submitted that in view of the amendment in Section 45(1) PMLA Act, which came into effect from 19.4.2018, the original Section 45(1)(ii) has to be inferred and treated as it still exists on the statute books and hold the field even as of today for deciding the application for bail by an accused under PMLA Act and the judgment delivered by the Apex Court in the case of Nikesh Tarachand Shah (supra) has become ineffective and, therefore, the prayer for bail of the applicant has to be considered in view of the amended provision of Section 45(1) of the PMLA Act. He lastly submitted that looking to the prima facie evidence available against the applicant, he is not entitled for grant of bail and prayed for rejection of the bail application.

    12. The Supreme Court in the case of Nikesh Tarachand Shah (supra) has in unequivocal terms held in para 44 that ‘we have struck down Section 45 of the Act as a whole’. It is further held by the Supreme Court in para 45 that, we declare Section 45(1) of the PMLA Act in so far as it imposes two further conditions for release on bail to be unconstitutional as it violates Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.

    13. It is to be noted here that, after effecting amendment to Section 45(1) of the PMLA Act the words “under this Act” are added to Sub Section (1) of Section 45 of the PMLA Act. However, the original Section 45(1)(ii) has not been revived or resurrected by the said Amending Act. The learned counsel appearing for the applicant and the learned ASG are not disputing about the said fact situation and in fact have conceded to the same. It is further to be noted here that, even Notification dated 29.3.2018 thereby amending Section 45(1) of PMLA Act which came into effect from 19.4.2018, is silent about its retrospective applicability.

    14. In view of thereof, the contention advanced by the learned ASG cannot be accepted. It is to be further noted here that, the original Sub-section 45(1)(ii) has therefore neither revived nor resurrected by the Amending Act and, therefore, as of today there is no rigor of said two further conditions under original Section 45(1)(ii) of PMLA Act for releasing the accused on bail under the said Act.

    15. The applicant is 62 years of age and is an MBBS doctor by profession and is practicing and having number of medical institutes. He is permanent resident of Indore and in all other cases of Scheduled offences in which he was enlarged on bail, he never misused the terms and conditions of the bail. There is no reason to presume that applicant would abscond or temper or influence the witnesses.

    16. As per Annexure P/7, the applicant is suffering from high blood pressure and diabetes mellitus with unstable angina with triple vessel decease with advance vericos veins and on regular medical treatment.

    17. In view of the above, the applicant is entitled to be released on bail, without expressing any opinion on merits of the case, the application for grant of bail is allowed on the following terms:—

    (i) it is directed that applicant (Dr. Vinod Bhandari) shall be released on bail in Special S.T. No. 1924/2018, registered at police station — ED, pending before II Addl. Sessions Judge, (PMLA) Indore, on his executing PR bond in the sum of Rs. 5,00,000/- (Rs. Five Lacs) with two local sureties in the like amount.

    (ii) Till the applicant complies with the process of furnishing sureties, the applicant is directed to be released on his furnishing cash bail of Rs. 5,00,000/- (Rs. Five Lacs) and the applicant shall comply with formalities of furnishing sureties within a period of six weeks from his actual release from Jail.

    (iii) Applicant shall submit his residential address along with proof of his staying there to non-applicant and in the event of change of address, shall update the same;

    (iv) Applicant shall surrender his passport with the investigation agency, if not already surrendered;

    (v) Applicant shall remain present before Special PMLA Court, Indore (M.P.) on the fixed dates without fail unless and until prevented for medical reason;

    (vi) Needless to state that respondent shall be at liberty to take recourse as available under law, if applicant violates any of the conditions imposed as aforesaid;

    (vii) The applicant shall not tamper with the evidence and/or pressurize the prosecution witnesses.

    18. With the aforesaid, the application stands allowed and disposed of.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Dr. Vinod Bhandari v. Asstt. Director
    (Aug 29, 2018)