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  • Mr. Satyabrata Sinha
  • Mr. Dibyendu Bhusan Dutta, JJ.
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  • Mr. Satyabrata Sinha
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This set of four appeals arises from a common Single Judge judgment in writ petitions (C.O Nos. 3109(W)/93, 4067(W)/93, 5241(W)/93 and 3617(W)/93). The writ petitioners were unemployed candidates whose names had been sponsored by the Employment Exchange for recruitment to the post of "Junior Operative Trainee" (JOT). Historically, recruitment to the JOT post had been conducted by interview pursuant to a bipartite settlement from 1967. In 1993, the management introduced a written test for selection. The petitioners received two days' notice to appear for the written test (scheduled 21.2.93), participated without protest and did not qualify to be called for interview. A result/list of 500 candidates was displayed that did not include the petitioners.

The writ petitions sought directions (in the nature of mandamus) (a) not to give effect to the results/list of the written examination and (b) to set aside the entire written test. The Single Judge held the selection of 200 candidates was bad in law for various reasons (including change from requisitioned 70 candidates to 200, no qualifying marks declared before test, and alleged absence of proper managing director approval for the written test) and directed absorption/appointment of the petitioners (thirteen petitioners across cases), while noting three posts had already been kept reserved for some petitioners in one file. The employer (appellant) appealed.

The Division Bench heard the appeals together and set aside the Single Judge's direction to appoint the petitioners, allowed the appeals and made no order as to costs. The Court examined prior litigation and administrative background (including an order dated 13.8.92 directing further interviews) and analysed legal principles such as estoppel, the limited nature of the right to appointment under Articles 14 and 16, and the necessity of impleading affected successful candidates.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the writ petitions could lawfully seek direct appointment of unsuccessful candidates who had been sponsored by the Employment Exchange and who had participated in the written test without protest.
  2. Whether the management's change of selection procedure from interview to a written test (and the conduct of such written test) was unlawful, arbitrary or without jurisdiction, and therefore justiciable.
  3. Whether the Single Judge could direct the respondents to appoint the petitioners despite their not having succeeded in the selection process.
  4. Whether the writ petitions were maintainable in the absence of impleading the successful candidates who would be affected by a direction setting aside selection and ordering appointments.
  5. Whether petitioners who took the written test without objection are estopped from challenging the selection process thereafter.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments (as presented in the record)

  • The petitioners were unsuccessful in the written test and therefore had no right to appointment; they were estopped from challenging the selection after voluntarily participating.
  • The employer (appellant) was at liberty to change the recruitment process; an employer can adopt a new recruitment policy, particularly in light of past litigation and administrative difficulties.
  • In absence of allegations of discrimination, arbitrariness or procedural impropriety, the writ petition was not maintainable; selection processes are generally not justiciable unless illegal, irrational or procedurally improper.
  • The Selection Committee's function is neither judicial nor quasi-judicial; as no statute required reasons to be recorded, only procedural fairness was necessary.
  • Non-impleadment of successful candidates was a vital defect in the writ petitions.
  • Counsel relied on a number of precedents to substantiate the above contentions (see Table of Precedents Cited).

Writ Petitioners-Respondents' Arguments (as presented in the record)

  • The requisition sent to the Employment Exchange indicated selection by interview only; therefore the management had no power to unilaterally replace interview by written test.
  • The General Manager lacked power to adopt such a policy decision; the management was required to adhere to conditions mentioned in the requisition/advertisement.
  • It was impermissible for the appellant to disclose qualifying marks for the first time in an affidavit-in-opposition.
  • A decision which is fundamentally illegal cannot be permitted to continue merely because it was not protested at the time.
  • Counsel relied on earlier decisions and on the factual record (including prior orders of this Court) to support these contentions.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court (as stated in the opinion)
Muninder Kumar v. Rajiv Govil ((1991) 3 SCC 368 : AIR 1991 SC 1607) Illustrates that unsuccessful candidates who "took a chance" by participating with knowledge of selection rules cannot automatically claim appointments; in modulating relief the conduct of unsuccessful challengers and equities of selected candidates are relevant. The Court relied on this decision to support the proposition that petitioners who participated in the process cannot demand appointments and that equitable considerations may prevent setting aside selections which would prejudice already selected candidates.
Madanlal v. State of J & K ((1995) 3 SCC 486) Authority relating to modulating relief in selection matters; cited in argument and by the Court. The Court referenced this decision alongside Muninder Kumar to reinforce that relief must be modulated and that taking a chance in a selection process limits consequent relief.
Om Prakash Shukla v. Akhilesh Kr. Shukla (1986 Supp SCC 285) Cited by counsel as authority in the context of maintainability/estoppel in selection matters. The opinion notes the citation by counsel but does not record a separate specific reliance beyond inclusion in the body of authorities considered.
State of U.P. v. Rafiquddin (1987 Supp SCC 401 : AIR 1988 SC 162) Distinction between cases of appointment and admission; cited by counsel for the proposition that different principles apply. Cited by counsel and noted in the list of authorities; the Court treated the broader principle that selection is generally not justiciable unless illegal.
Maharashtra Board for Secondary and High Secondary Education v. Paritosh Bhupesh ((1984) 4 SCC 27 : AIR 1984 SC 1543) Authority on procedural fairness in selection and discretion of selection authorities. Cited by counsel to support the submission that procedural fairness (not reasons) may suffice; the Court included it among authorities considered on the general non‑justiciability of selection processes.
Ashoke Kumar Jadav v. State of Haryana ((1985) 4 SCC 417 : AIR 1987 SC 454) Authority on selection/appointment jurisprudence (procedural fairness, discretion of selection bodies). Cited by counsel and considered by the Court as part of the body of case law on justiciability and procedural fairness.
National Institute of Mental Health and Neuro Science v. Dr. Kalyano Raman (1992 Supp (2) SCC 481 : AIR 1992 SC 1806) Authority on selection/procedural requirements. Cited by counsel; the Court treated it as part of the authorities supporting the general principle that selection is not justiciable unless illegality or procedural impropriety is demonstrated.
Parveen v. State of Haryana (1993 (2) Labour Law Journal 710) Authority cited by counsel regarding selection processes. Included among the authorities relied upon by counsel; the Court treated it within the broader proposition regarding the limited scope of judicial interference in selection matters.
Government of Andhra Pradesh v. P. Dilip Kumar (JT 1993 (2) SC 138) Authority on selection/appointment issues. Cited by counsel and noted by the Court among the decisions forming the backdrop for the principle that selections are not lightly interfered with.
D.V. Bakshi v. Union of India (JT 1993 (4) SC 180) Authority relevant to recruitment/selection jurisprudence. Cited by counsel and included among the examined authorities; the Court treated it as part of supporting precedent for limited judicial interference.
V.K. Sood v. Secretary, Civil Aviation (1993 Supp (3) SCC 9 : AIR 1993 SC 2285) Authority concerning selection/appointment and administrative discretion. Cited by counsel and noted by the Court; relied upon to underscore the limited grounds for interfering with selections.
Asif Hameed v. State of J & K (1989 Supp (2) SCC 364 : AIR 1989 SC 1899) Selection/appointment jurisprudence cited by counsel. Included in the list of precedents relied upon by counsel; the Court regarded it as part of the body of authorities on selection reviewability.
R.S. Das v. Union of India (1986 Supp SCC 617 : AIR 1987 SC 593) Authority concerning selection/administrative decisions. Cited by counsel and noted by the Court among decisions setting limits on judicial intervention in selections.
Prabodh Verma v. State of Uttar Pradesh ((1984) 4 SCC 251 : AIR 1985 SC 167) Persons affected by a judgment should be impleaded; where numbers are large, some of them should be impleaded in representative capacity. The Court applied this precedent directly to hold that persons who would be affected by the judgment (successful candidates) should have been impleaded; it found Prabodh Verma applicable "in all fours" and used it to hold the writ petitions were not maintainable without impleading affected successful candidates.
S. Jaffar Sahib v. Secretary, A.P.P.S.C ((1996) 11 SCC 753) Authority on impleadment of affected parties in selection matters. Cited by counsel; the Court referenced the citation in support of the point that affected persons ought to be impleaded.
Jagadamba Coal Manufacturing Enterprises v. Union of India (AIR 1989 Cal 337) Authority cited by petitioners on limits of administrative power to adopt policy decisions. Cited by petitioners' counsel (Mr. Basu) to support that the General Manager had no power to adopt the policy; Court recorded the reliance but primarily examined facts and prior orders in reaching its conclusion.
Prakash Vir v. State of Haryana (1992 (1) SCT 700) Authority relied upon for the proposition that the employer must stick to conditions mentioned in advertisement/requisition. Cited by petitioners' counsel; Court observed that the decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Prakash Vir did not have application in present facts (paragraph 29).
Surinder Singh v. State of Punjab ((1997) 8 SCC 488 : AIR 1998 SC 18) Filling up of more posts than advertised may be invalid; relief depends on facts and circumstances. The Court considered Surinder Singh (and Prem Singh) to note that filling more posts than advertised can be invalid but that the appropriate relief depends on facts; it found the present case fell within exceptional circumstances due to the prior order dated 13.8.92.
Hoshiar Singh v. State of Haryana (1993 Supp (4) SCC 377 : AIR 1993 SC 2606) Selection Board cannot recommend more names than requisitioned; appointments based on such excess recommendations are unsustainable. The Court distinguished Hoshiar Singh on facts, observing the factual matrix here was different (paragraphs 30–32).
Shyam Sundar Rathi v. The Addl. District Magistrate, Bankura (AIR 1975 Cal 58) Authority on estoppel and application of particular statutory/regulatory scheme; cited and considered by Court. The Court examined and distinguished this decision, finding it inapplicable to the present factual matrix (paragraph 28).
Prem Singh v. Haryana S.E.B ((1996) 4 SCC 319) Authority relating to validity of filling additional posts and the scope of relief; relied upon in Surinder Singh. Referred to as a precedent relied upon in Surinder Singh; Court noted the line of authority and applied its principles to the factual context.
Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. Sri Niranjan Mendel (FMAT No. 1218/94) This case name appears as the factual context for the set of petitions before the Court (reference to the matter itself). Used at the outset to frame the factual background; the opinion treats it as part of the case history rather than as independent precedent.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's reasoning proceeds from the facts and prior litigation history and rests on a combination of legal principles: (i) the difference between a right to be considered for appointment and a right to appointment; (ii) the doctrine of estoppel where a candidate participates in a selection process without objection; (iii) limits on judicial interference in administrative selection processes; and (iv) procedural requirements such as impleadment of persons affected by a judgment.

Key analytical steps taken by the Court (based solely on the opinion):

  1. Right to appointment vs. right to be considered: The Court emphasised that Articles 14 and 16 guarantee equality of opportunity and a right to be considered for public employment, not an absolute right to appointment. The petitioners did not possess a fundamental right to appointment.
  2. Conduct of petitioners and estoppel: The petitioners had sat the written examination "without any demur whatsoever" and therefore they "took a chance" and could not turn around afterwards to challenge the mode of selection. On the facts, the Court found that the rule of estoppel applied and barred the petitioners from challenging the process.
  3. Background and administrative necessity: The Court examined the administrative backdrop, noting earlier litigation and a previous order of this Court dated 13.8.92 directing additional interviews. Difficulties arising from that order and related suits led the employer to review recruitment methodology (a meeting on 19.8.92) and to adopt the new procedure. The Court treated these facts as material in upholding the management's action as falling within exceptional circumstances.
  4. Scope of judicial review of selection: Citing a number of precedents and the submissions of counsel, the Court reiterated that selection processes are not ordinarily justiciable unless there is illegality, irrationality or procedural impropriety. In such contexts judicial review does not extend to a roving enquiry into the merits of selection decisions.
  5. Illegality of Single Judge's appointment direction: The Court held the Single Judge's direction to appoint the petitioners to be "wholly illegal and without jurisdiction" because the petitioners had not succeeded in selection and had no right to appointment. The Court further held that even empanelled candidates have no assured right to appointment.
  6. Failure to implead affected successful candidates: The Court applied Prabodh Verma and related authorities to hold that persons who would be affected by a judgment should have been impleaded; in the presence of a large number of affected persons, representative impleadment is required. The writ petitions were therefore non‑maintainable on this ground as well.
  7. Distinguishing authorities: The Court considered and distinguished precedents relied upon by both sides (for example, it distinguished Shyam Sundar Rathi and found that the facts of Hoshiar Singh did not obtain here), and it observed that certain High Court decisions relied upon by petitioners had no direct application to the facts.
  8. Relief and modulating consequences: While the Court accepted that the selection process may be open to scrutiny if illegal, in the present case the factual background (including prior orders and administrative constraints) and the conduct of petitioners led the Court to modulate relief by setting aside the Single Judge's appointment direction rather than awarding any appointments.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

THE APPEALS ARE ALLOWED; the judgments and orders of the learned Single Judge directing appointment/absorption of the petitioners are set aside.

Implications (direct effect on the parties):

  • The directions of the Single Judge ordering absorption/appointment of the petitioners are overturned; the petitioners are not entitled to appointment by virtue of the writ petitions as adjudicated in the Single Judge's order.
  • The Court held that the petitioners had only a right to be considered for appointment, not a right to appointment; because they failed in the written test and participated without protest, they are estopped from challenging the selection to obtain appointments.
  • The writ petitions were declared not maintainable in part because successful candidates who would be affected by granting the relief had not been impleaded, a requirement stressed by Prabodh Verma.
  • The Court allowed the appeals but made no order as to costs.

Broader precedent impact: The opinion applies and reiterates existing principles (limited scope of judicial review in selection matters; distinction between a right to be considered and a right to appointment; requirement of impleading affected parties). The Court did not purport to lay down a new legal principle; it applied established authorities to the facts and modulated relief accordingly.

Dated as reflected in the opinion: Division Bench judgment (Sinha, J. delivering the principal judgment; Dutta, J. concurring).

Show full summary ...

    Steel Authority Of India Ltd. v. Nayan Kumar Roy & Ors.

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    Sinha, J.:— All these four appeals arising out of a common judgment passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in C.O No. 3109(W)/93, C.O No. 4067(W)/93, C.O No. 5241(W)/93 and C.O No. 3617(W)/93 were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment.

    2. The Tact of the matter may be noticed from the case of (1) Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. Sri Niranjan Mendel, (FMAT No. 1218/94). All the writ petitioners being unemployed got their names registered in the Employment Exchange. A requisition was made by the respondent No. 2 for recruitment in the category of Junior Operative Trainee. On 10.2.93 they received a letter for appearing at a written test on 21.2.93 According to the petitioners a bipartite settlement in the year 1967 was entered between the management and the Union in respect of recruitment of Junior Operative Trainee, in terms whereof, the selection was to be conducted by interview only and the said process continued till 1992. However, in the year 1993 the management introduced the system of written test for the recruitment in the post of Junior Operative Trainee. Admittedly, the writ petitioners participated in the said written examination without any protest. They were to sit in four subjects, namely, English, General Knowledge, Arithmatics and General Science carrying 50 marks each. Allegedly, no pass mark had been declared and the results were not published but a list of 500 candidates were hanged up wherein the petitioners' name had not been mentioned. The petitioners, inter alia, questioned the process of recruitment of holding the written examination and contended that as their names had been sponsored by the Employment Exchange, they have a right to be considered for employment. In the aforementioned background the writ petition was filed praying for the following reliefs:—

    “(a) Writ of or in the nature of Mandamus directing the respondents, their men, agents, or servants not to give effect or further effect to the purported result or the examination or the purported list of successful candidates published on 24.2.93

    (b) A writ of or in the nature of Mandamus directing the respondents, their men and agents to set aside the entire written test held on 21.2.93”

    3. The appellants, inter alia, in their affidavit-in-opposition contended that each of the writ petitions were unsuccessful in the written test and as such they had not been called for interview. In the writ petition despite the fact that the names of successful candidates were notified, neither they nor same persons representing the successful candidates had been impleaded in the writ application. The learned trial Judge having considered the rival contentions, inter alia, held:—

    1. The petitioners are not estopped from questioning the system of examination and, thus selection of 200 candidates by the respondents authorities are bad in law as the original requisition was sent to the Employment Exchange for selection of 70 candidates. No qualifying marks before holding of the written test having been final, the selection process is bad in law. It was also held that the process of written test was introduced not with the proper approval of the Managing Director but at the behest of some officials of Durgapur Steel Plant and as such the same Cannot get legal sanction. Competitive selection is normally held for selection in higher post.

    4. However, keeping in view the fact that all the 200 candidates had been given appointment, the learned Judge directed:—

    “Therefore, it would be better for this Court to direct the respondents to absorb the writ petitioners in these writ petitions, who are 13 in number.

    It appears from the records in C.O No. 3109(W/1993, that 3 posts have been kept reserved for the writ petitioners of the said writ petition; namely, Nayan Kumar Roy, Rathin Jowardar and Rajib Bhattacharya, by the orders of this Court and, an such, the respondents are directed to absorb the rest 10 (ten) writ petitioners, namely, Abhijit Debnath, Sarup Dasgupta, Debashis Gayen, Niranjan Mondal, Kamaljit Dhibar, Biswadip Mondal, Kenaram Ruldas, Ranjit Kumar Das, Md. Ashikul Haque and Chanchal Fouzdar, within 4 weeks from communication of operative part of this judgment.

    It is made clear that the writ petition is allowed in respect of the present writ petitioners and confine to the present writ petitioners only.”

    5. Mr. Chatterjee, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners submitted that in view of the fact that the petitioners were unsuccessful candidates, they are estopped from filing the writ application. Reliance in this connection has been placed in (2) Madanlal v. State of J & K reported in (1995) 3 SCC 486 and (3) Om Prakash Shukla v. Akhilesh Kr. Shukla reported in 1986 Supp SCC 285.

    6. The learned Counsel contended that the policy adopted by the appellant was not unfair and the same had to be taken recourse to in view of the earlier litigations. The employer is always at liberty, contends the learned Counsel, to change the recruitment process. It was urged that in absence of any allegation of discrimination or arbitrariness on the part of the authorities of the appellant, the writ application is not maintainable. It is also not the case that the procedure adopted had been deviated from or had not been followed and in that view of the matter too, the writ petition is not maintainable. It is submitted that a distinction has to be made between a case of appointment and a case of admission. Reliance in this connection has been placed on (4) State of U.P v. Rafiquddin reported in 1987 Supp SCC 401 : AIR 1988 SC 162.

    7. It has further been submitted that the function of the Selection Committee being neither judicial nor quasi judicial, no reason is required to be recorded in absence of any statutory provision. What is necessary is only to show procedural fairness. Reliance in this connection has been placed on (5) Maharashtra Board for Secondary and High Secondary Education v. Paritosh Bhupesh reported in (1984) 4 SCC 27 : AIR 1984 SC 1543; (6) Ashoke Kumar Jadav v. State of Haryana reported in (1985) 4 SCC 417 : AIR 1987 SC 454; (7) National Institute of Mental Health and Neuro Science v. Dr. Kalyano Raman reported in 1992 Supp (2) SCC 481 : AIR 1992 SC 1806; (8) Parveen/ v. State Of Haryana reported in 1993 (2) Labour Law Journal 710; (9) The Government of Andhra Pradesh v. P. Dilip Kumar reported in JT 1993 (2) SC 138; (10) D.V Bakshi v. Union of India reported in JT 1993 (4) SC 180; (11) V.K Sood v. Secretary, Civil Aviation reported in 1993 Supp (3) SCC 9 : AIR 1993 SC 2285; (12) Asif Hameed v. State of J & K reported in 1989 Supp (2) SCC 364 : AIR 1989 SC 1899 and (13) R.S Das v. Union of India reported in 1986 Supp SCC 617 : AIR 1987 SC 593.

    8. In any event, contends the learned Counsel, non-impleadment of the successful candidates is vital. Reliance in this connection has been placed on (14) Prabodh Verma v. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (1984) 4 SCC 251 : AIR 1985 SC 167 and (15) S. Jaffar Sahib v. Secretary, A.P.P.S.C reported in (1996) 11 SCC 753.

    9. Mr. Basu, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the writ petitioners-respondents submitted that from the requisition sent by the respondent authority it would appear that the procedure for selection as notified was only for interview. It is further stated that the General Manager had no power to adopt a policy decision. Reliance in this connection has been placed on (16) Jagadamba Coal Manufacturing Enterprises v. Union of India reported in AIR 1989 Cal 337. It was submitted that the appellants were required to stick to the conditions mentioned in the advertisement and in support of the aforementioned contention reliance had been placed on (17) Prakash Vir v. State of Haryana reported in 1992 (1) SCT 700. It is stated that it was not permissible for the appellant to disclose the qualifying marks in the affidavit-in opposition for the first time. In any event, posts higher than notified is the said advertisement could not have been filled up and in support of the aforementioned contention reliance has been placed on (18) Surinder Singh v. State of Punjab reported in (1997) 8 SCC 488 : AIR 1998 SC 18 and (19) Hoshiar Singh v. State of Haryana reported in 1993 Supp (4) SCC 377 : AIR 1993 SC 2606. It is submitted that in any event a decision which is basically Illegal cannot be allowed to continue just because it was not protested. Reliance in this connection has been placed on (20) Shyam Sundar Rathi v. The Addl. District Magistrate, Bankura reported in AIR 1975 Cal 58.

    10. Before adverting to the questions raised at the Bar, we may observe that the direction of the learned trial Judge to the effect that the petitioners be appointed must be held to be wholly illegal and without jurisdiction. The petitioners do not have any fundamental right to be appointed. They had merely a right to be considered therefor. Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India do not guarantee any appointment but merely guarantees a right to be considered therefor. The appellant is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and in order to maintain a writ application it is obligatory on the part of the petitioner to show that the appellant has violated any of the provisions contained in Part-III of the Constitution of India.

    11. The petitioners had not succeeded in the written examination and, thus, they were not called for at the interview. The right to be appointed, if any, is conferred only on a person who is eligible therefor. Even an empanelled candidate has no right to be appointed. Assuming that there had been a change in the mode of recruitment, the petitioners had appeared at the written test without any demur whatsoever. The petitioners in no uncertain terms admitted that they appeared at the written examination without any protest. They, thus, took a chance by silting on the fence and thus, could not have been permitted to turn round and the question the mode of selection itself.

    12. In (21) Muninder Kumar v. Rajiv Govil reported in (1991) 3 SCC 368 : AIR 1991 SC 1607, the Apex Court has held:—

    “10. The next question which arises for consideration is as to what direction would be just and proper in the circumstances of this case. We do not agree with the High Court to quash the entire selection made by the Board for the posts of Assistant Engineers (civil). It may be noted that Rajeev Govil, Vivek Aggarwal and Gyanendra Srivastava who remained unsuccessful had filed the writ petitions after taking chance and fully knowing the percentage of marks kept for interview and group discussion. It is no doubt correct that they cannot be estopped from challenging the rule which is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, but in modulating the relief, their conduct and the equities of those who have been selected are the relevant considerations. The appellants have joined the post on 28th December, 1989 and after completing the training are discharging their duties at different places. It has been submitted on their behalf that some of them had left their earlier jobs and have also become overage. Thus we do not consider it proper in the interest of Justice to set aside the selections of the appellants………………”

    13. Similar view has been taken by the Apex Court in Munindra Kumar v. Rajiv Govil reported in (1991) 3 SCC 368 and Madanlal v. State of J & K reported in (1995) 3 SCC 486.

    14. The learned Trial Judge, in our opinion, was not correct in holding that the appellant was not free to change the mode of selection. It failed to take into consideration the background for such a decision inasmuch as in view of a decision in an earlier writ application each candidate had to be called for interview although the normal procedure is that the employer has a right to short list the candidates. By way of logical corrollary it must also be held that they cannot question the right of the management to short list the candidates.

    15. The appellants in their affidavit-in-opposition stated that although for 70 posts, names of 490 candidates were invited from Employment Exchange but owing to some unavoidable circumstances the recruitment could not be made. When the Department was is a position to recruit and fill up the posts, it once again requested the concerned Exchange to sponsor suitable candidates pursuant where to 4 lists containing the names of 490 candidates had been sent which was replies of the earlier list. It has been stated that in the earlier order keeping in view the scheme, which was prevailing then, a higher weightage was to be granted to certain candidates and following the same 158 candidates were called for interview out of 402 candidates, resulting in institution of various suits in Civil Courts and writ applications before this Court. This Court in one of the writ applications by an order dated 13.8.92 in C.O No. 5202(W)/92 directed:—

    “This writ petition is disposed of by directing the Steel Authority of India to allow the remaining candidates to appear at the interview within a period of two months from the date of communication of this order and fill up the vacancy in the post of ‘Junior Operative Trainee’ as on date under the said organisation immediately in accordance with the Recruitment Policy existing on the date of sponsoring after completion of the interview and in accordance with law.”

    16. Again a suit was fried by the candidates whose names had not been sponsored and an order of injunction was passed which was ultimately stayed by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. Having felt difficulties in giving recourse to the aforementioned procedure a meeting was held on 19.8.92 to review the then Recruitment Procedure and after a detailed discussions the methodology therefor was formulated as mentioned in Paragraph 23 of the affidavit-in-opposition.

    17. It is not the case of the respondents that without prior notice the bipartite agreement could not have been changed. In any event, it was for the Union to question the same and not for the candidates concerned. In any view of the matter a bipartite agreement cannot be sought to be enforced in a writ proceedings. In the stay petition in respect of the writ petition filed by Sanjib Kumar Boral and (4) Ors., the appellant has stated the factual aspect which is in the following term:—

    “In or about 1988 DSP desired to recruit 70 JOTs and required the concerned Employment Exchange to send names of eligible candidates having minimum qualification of Higher Secondary Pass in the ratio of 1:7 in response thereto, the concerned Employ-moat Exchange sent/sponsored 490 candidates. According to DSP's the then policy of recruitment, out of 490 candidates DSP short listed 158 candidates for being interviewed. The said 158 candidates were interviewed out of which 70 candidates were being selected for being appointed in the meantime, by an order dated 13th August, 1992, the Hon'ble High Court at Calcutta directed DSP to hold interview for all the remaining candidates meaning thereby the candidates who had not been selected. As out of 158 candidates interviewed 70 candidates had already been selected, only 88 candidates remained there. In view of the order dated 13th August, 1992, all the 490 candidates (i.e 88+332) were called for interview. These 88 candidates had the opportunity of being selected in interview twice—first at the time when the original 158 candidates were interviewed and second when they were called again for interview by reason of the order dated 13th August, 1992, 332 candidates however, had one opportunity only of being interviewed. Out of the 490 candidates, as more manpower was required by DSP, the appellant selected 73 candidates. In the month of September 1992 DSP with the desire to appoint further JOTs (about 184) required the concerned Employment Exchange to send names of candidates who is response sent/sponsored 1323 candidates (more than 7 times of 184). Out of 1323 candidates only 1119 candidates including the writ petitioners sat for the written test and out of 1119, 527 candidates were called for interview. Out of 527, 208 candidates were appointed. On 1st March, 1993 a writ petition was moved by one Sanjay Sarkar and some others when an order of status quo was passed by this Hon'ble Court. There were es many as 21 petitioners in the said writ petition. Sanjib Boral and others move the writ petition on 15th March, 1993. On 18th March, 1993 Nayan Kumar Roy and two others filed another writ petition and other writ petitions were also filed. The aforesaid are the reflection of the records which were produced before the learned Trial Court. The learned Trial Court, however, misread the records.”

    18. The writ petitioners had also not questioned the validity of the aforementioned resolution dated 19.8.92 The only ground which has been urged before this Court is that only two day's time had been granted for appearing at the written examination and for which no syllabus had been prescribed. However, only at the time of argument it has been submitted that no approval therefor had been taken. Furthermore, a copy of the said procedure was handed over to the candidates. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of this case we are of the opinion that as the rule of estoppel applies in all fours in the instant case, the petitioners cannot question the same in the writ application.

    19. In Shyam Sundar Rathi v. The Addl. District Magistrate, Bankura reported in AIR 1975 Cal 58, Chittatosh Mookerjee, J. (as His Lordship then was) was considering the Provisions of West Bengal Land Reforms Act. In that decision an application for grant of mining lease was made under West Bengal Minor Minerals Rules, and not in terms of Rules 3-A and 3-B of the West Bengal Land Reforms Rules and thus, the petitioners was not estopped by renson of filing objection against the notice issued by the Addl. District Magistrate to show cause why he shall not be prosecuted under Section 4(2-B) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 and why steps shall not be taken against him for realization of damage/compensation. The said decision wan rendered on the ground that Section 4(2-B) does not lay down that such show cause shall be issued. Secondly, the petitioner in his communication to the respondents did not admit that he was required to obtain a permission in terms of Section 4(2-A)(b) of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act or that he was liable to pay damage or compensation. The said decision has no application in the fact of the present case.

    20. In the instant case there had been no advertisement. Only the Employment Exchange was asked to sponsor the names of the candidates concerned. There has been no relaxation in qualification, and in that view of the matter the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Prakash Vir v. State of Haryana reported in 1992 (1) SCT 700 cannot be said to have any application.

    21. In Hoshiar Singh v. State of Haryana reported in 1993 Supp (4) SCC 377 : AIR 1993 SC 2606, upon which Mr. Basu relied upon, the recommendations had been made by the Selection Board in respect of a particular number of posts. In the said case the persons whose appointments were under challenge had been impleaded as parties. On fact it had not been shown that any requisition was made by Director General of Police for a large number of posts although initially the Board was requested to send its recommendation for 8 posts. The Apex Court observed:—

    “The Board, on its own, could not recommend names of 19 persons for appointment even though the requisition was for eight posts only because the selection and recommendation of larger number of persons than the posts for which requisition is sent. The appointment on the additional post on the basis of such selection and recommendation would deprive candidates who were not eligible for appointment to the posts on the last date for submission of applications mentioned in the advertisement and who became eligible for appointment thereafter of the opportunity of being considered for appointment on the additional posts because if the said additional posts are advertised subsequently those who become eligible for appointment would be entitled to apply for the same. The High Court was, therefore right in holding that the selection of 19 persons by the Board even though the requisition was for 8 posts only was not legally sustainable.”

    22. Such is not the position here.

    23. It may be noticed that in Surinder Singh v. State of Punjab reported in (1997) 8 SCC 488 : AIR 1998 SC 18, the Apex Court relied on an earlier decision in (22) Prem Singh v. Haryana S.E.B reported in (1996) 4 SCC 319 and held that although filling up of more posts not advertised may be invalid, but what relief should be granted would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The Apex Court also held that a waiting list cannot be used as perennial source of recruitment. It was held that it was only in rare and exceptional circumstances and in emergent situation that the rule can be deviated from. However, on analysing the facts the Apex Court held that as the appellant could not claim to fall within first 2461 posts for which advertisement was issued, no interference was made in the matter so as to set the clock back.

    24. In the instant case such an issue had not been raised in the writ application at all and is now being sought to be raised. In the instant case the appellant has made out such an exceptional case and particularly in view of the order dated 13th August, 1992 passed by this Court.

    25. In view of the several decisions cited by Mr. Chatterjee which has been noticed hereinbefore, there cannot be any doubt that the process of selection is not justiciable unless there exists any illegality, irrationality or procedural impropriety. In such a matter even the principles of natural Justice is not required to be followed nor any reason is required to be recorded. The writ Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would not also take recourse to a roving enquiry.

    26. The writ petitions were also not maintainable and the direction given by the learned trial Judge could not have been granted in view of the fact that no successful candidate had been impleaded as a party.

    27. In Prabodh Verma v. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (1984) 4 SCC 251 : AIR 1985 SC 167, the Apex Court clearly held that the persons who would be affected by a judgment should be impleaded as a party and where numbers of such persons are high some of them should at least be impleaded in representative capacity. The decision of the Supreme Court in Prabodh Verma (supra) applies in all fours in the present case. Mr. Basu, however, submitted that this Court may now issue a direction that the cases of the writ petitioners may be considered by the appellant only upon taking interview. No such direction can be issued as this Court cannot direct relaxation of the Rules. The cases of the petitioner would certainly be considered if they are eligible therefor in the event any vacancies arise in future along with other eligible candidates.

    28. For the reasons aforementioned the judgments and orders passed by the learned trial Judge cannot be upheld which are accordingly set aside. The appeals are thus, allowed but in the facts and circumstances of this case there will be no order as to costs.

    29. Dutta, J.: I agree.

    30. S.K.G

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