Heard learned counsel for the petitioner.
The petitioner is challenging the order dated 25.10.2005 by preferring this writ petition as petitioner has been removed from services in disciplinary proceedings which was initiated on account of his absence from duty without any leave.
The petitioner was granted leave for a short period from 13.11.2004 to 17.11.2004, but thereafter, he did not report. Then ultimately after holding a preliminary inquiry and departmental inquiry vide order dated 25.10.2005 he has been removed from service.
To explain the delay, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court delivered in the case of Shibha Shanker Mohapatra v. State of Orissa reported in AIR 2010 SC 706 and submits that delay of 3-4 years is reasonable period for challenging the order. Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court delivered in the case of Jai Shanker v. State of Rajasthan reported in AIR 1996 SC 492 and also relied upon the judgment of this court delivered in the case of Bhanwar Singh v. State of Rajasthan reported in 1999 (2) WLC (Raj.) 30 wherein the punishment of removal from service on account of absence from duty was declared to be disproportionate.
I considered the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the facts of the case as well as the judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner.
The petitioner was in service of the armed force and admittedly he remained absent from duty for a good long period from 17.11.2004 and ultimately he was removed from service vide order dated 25.11.2005 So far as the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that reasonable period to challenge the order of such nature can be three years in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court delivered in the case of Shiba Shanker Mohapatra (supra) is concerned, is absolutely misplaced argument. The Hon'ble Supreme Court clearly held that in a matter of challenging the seniority list, 3-4 years is reasonable period as after that it may result into settling the position. That fact situation is entirely different from the fact situation which is in the present case. A person's removal from service has serious consequence and in that situation he cannot say that he has right not to pursue the remedy for three years so as to get the order of removal set aside if it is illegal. The order of suspension cannot be equated with the order of removal from service. Be it as it may be, even if it is examined then the order dated 25.10.2005 has been straightway challenged by preferring the writ petition without preferring any appeal and this fact is not in dispute that petitioner remained absent from duty for such a long period in armed force. Whether the punishment on account of absence of duty is disproportionate depends on all circumstances which includes the nature of the post one is holding and the reasonable reason for his absence. In this case, the petitioner has not placed on record any reasonable reason for not appearing before the disciplinary authority and also further failed to show any reason for taking a lenient view by this Court in writ jurisdiction.
In view of the above reasons, the judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner on quantum also has no relevance. The case of Jai Shanker (supra) was of a case where there was provision for automatic termination of services on over staying of the employee. Said is not the fact situation here and here the departmental inquiry was conducted and thereafter, order of removal from service has been passed. Therefore, the said judgment has also no application to the facts of the present case.
In view of the above, there is no merit in this writ petition and the same is hereby dismissed.