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  • SECTION 281 INCOME TAX ACT 1961
  • Rule 11(4) of the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act,
  • provisions of section 281 as well as rule 16(1)
  • Officer.Sub-section (1) of section 281
  • provisions of Order XXI, Rules 58
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • SECTION 281 INCOME TAX ACT 1961
  • Rule 11(4) of the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act,
  • provisions of section 281 as well as rule 16(1)
  • Officer.Sub-section (1) of section 281
  • provisions of Order XXI, Rules 58
Smart Summary

Summary of the Opinion (Per Honourable Mr. Justice Akil Kureshi)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners purchased shops in a constructed building called Mazda Estate (constructed by Mazda Estate and Finance Pvt. Ltd. — "Mazda"). Construction was completed in 1991 or 1992 and the petitioners were put in possession in 1991–92. The petitioners executed separate sale deeds with Mazda on 17/18 May 1995. Mazda had unpaid income-tax dues of Rs. 19.88 lakhs arising from various assessment orders and the matter was referred to a Tax Recovery Officer (TRO), Mumbai. Under instructions from TRO, Mumbai, the property in question was attached on 22 May 1995. TRO, Valsad, by an order dated 8 November 1995, declared the sales (including those in favour of the petitioners) void under section 281 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The petitioners objected on 20 December 1995, contending that they had not been given notice and that the TRO had no jurisdiction to declare transactions void; there was no response. Further correspondence seeking withdrawal of the order was sent in 2003 and 2004, and the department indicated intention to proceed with auction in February 2004. The petitioners then filed the present petition challenging the TRO's order dated 8 November 1995.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a Tax Recovery Officer has jurisdiction under section 281 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 to declare transfers (sales) as void, or whether the Revenue must file a civil suit seeking a declaration that a transfer is void under section 281.
  2. Whether the impugned order dated 8 November 1995 was valid when it was passed without giving notice to or hearing the transferees (the petitioners), particularly in light of the proviso to section 281(1) which protects transferees who acquired property for adequate consideration and without notice.
  3. Whether the factual background in this case (timing of notices to the defaulter, timing of transfer and attachment) justified declaring the transfers void by administrative order of the TRO.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The Tax Recovery Officer had no jurisdiction under section 281 of the Act to declare transactions void; if the department sought such a declaration it had to file a civil suit.
  • The petitioners purchased the properties for adequate consideration and without notice of Mazda's tax dues; they could have relied on the proviso to section 281(1) if they had been heard.
  • The impugned order was passed without giving any notice to the petitioners, depriving them of the opportunity to be heard and to place material showing adequacy of consideration and absence of notice.
  • Relied on precedents supporting the absence of TRO's jurisdiction (notably TRO v. Gangadhar Vishwanath Ranede and Ms. Ruchi Mehta v. UOI).

Department's Arguments

  • Section 281 renders the impugned transactions void and the TRO was entitled to declare them void in view of the statutory provision.
  • The defaulter (Mazda) had been duly served with demand/recovery notices for the years 1989–1994 prior to the transfers; hence the transfers were hit by section 281.
  • Relied on precedents (Abdul Jamil v. Secretary, Income-tax Department and Palani Gounder v. I.T. Revenue Department) where courts upheld the transactions being void under section 281 in the factual matrices of those cases.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
T.R.O v. Gangadhar Vishwanath Ranede, 234 ITR 189 (SC) The Tax Recovery Officer does not have power to declare a transfer void under section 281; if the Department seeks a declaration that a transfer is void under section 281, the Department (as creditor) must file a civil suit for such a declaration. TRO's role is limited to examining possession under rule 11(4) of the Second Schedule and raising attachment if transferee is in possession in his own right. The court followed this Supreme Court authority as dispositive: TRO lacks jurisdiction to declare transfers void, and therefore struck down the TRO's order of 8 November 1995 as to the petitioners.
Gangadhar Vishwanath Ranade v. T.R.O, 177 ITR 176 The opinion quotes and relies on the reasoning in this reported decision to support the conclusion that the TRO cannot declare transfers void and that the Department must seek civil remedy; used as binding support in the analysis.
Ms. Ruchi Mehta v. UOI, 294 ITR 614 (Bom) Followed the Supreme Court's view that TRO has no jurisdiction to declare a transfer void; emphasized that such an order has civil consequences and the affected parties must be given an opportunity of hearing. The court relied on this decision (Bombay High Court) as confirming the lack of jurisdiction of the TRO and as additional ground that the impugned order was invalid because the petitioners were not heard.
Sancheti Leasing Company Ltd v. Income Tax Officer, (2000) 158 CTR (Mad) 190 Held (following the Supreme Court in Gangadhar Ranade) that the ITO/TRO had no jurisdiction to declare a sale to be void under section 281. Noted by the court as consistent authority supporting the proposition that revenue authorities lack jurisdiction to declare transfers void under section 281.
Abdul Jamil v. Secretary, Income-tax Department, (1998) 102 Taxman 332 (Madras) In civil proceedings, the court found the vendor had sold the property after issuance of certificate under the Act; the transaction was held to be hit by section 281 and rule 16(1) of the Rules. The court distinguished this decision on factual grounds, noting it arose in a different factual background (civil proceedings and sale after issuance of certificate) and therefore did not control the present case.
Palani Gounder v. I.T. Revenue Department, 229 ITR 59 Arising from a civil suit where plaintiffs sought declaration of validity of their purchase; the civil court found breach of section 281 and refused the plaintiffs' prayer; appellate courts upheld that finding in that factual context. The court treated this authority as arising on different facts (civil suit resolution) and distinguished it from the present matter, where the TRO attempted to declare transfers void administratively without the transferees being heard.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the factual chronology and the statutory provision relied upon by the Revenue (section 281(1) of the Income-tax Act). It observed that:

  1. Notices for recovery were issued to the defaulter (Mazda) in the years 1989–1994, and the taxes remained unpaid.
  2. Thereafter, Mazda executed sale deeds transferring properties to various persons (including the petitioners) around 17/18 May 1995. The department attached the property on 22 May 1995 and the TRO, Valsad, passed the order declaring the sales void on 8 November 1995 without any notice to the petitioners.
  3. The court set out the text of section 281(1) and its proviso, and explained the legal effect: transfers made during the pendency of proceedings or after completion but before the service of notice under rule 2 can be void as against claims for tax, but the proviso preserves transfers made for adequate consideration without notice or with the previous permission of the Assessing Officer.
  4. The court emphasized that the proviso's protection (adequate consideration and without notice, or AO permission) can be invoked by transferees and even by the assessee in appropriate cases; consequently courts have read into the statutory scheme the necessity of hearing transferees who claim protection under the proviso.
  5. Crucially, the court relied on Supreme Court authority (TRO v. Gangadhar Vishwanath Ranade) holding that the TRO lacks jurisdiction to declare a transfer void under section 281; the proper remedy for the Revenue, seeking a declaration that a transfer is void, is to file a civil suit. The TRO's role is to determine the nature of a third party's possession (claimant in his own right or in trust for the assessee) and, if appropriate, to raise attachment, not to adjudicate civil rights by declaring transfers void.
  6. The court also noted subsequent High Court decisions (including Ms. Ruchi Mehta and Sancheti Leasing) that followed the Supreme Court's view and emphasized the requirement of hearing transferees because the TRO's order produces civil consequences.
  7. The decisions the Revenue relied upon (Abdul Jamil and Palani Gounder) were held to arise on different factual matrices — both were civil proceedings or involved sales after issuance of certificate — and were therefore distinguished rather than followed.
  8. Applying these legal principles to the facts — specifically that the TRO declared transfers void without hearing the petitioners and that the matter is governed by binding Supreme Court precedent — the court concluded that the TRO's order dated 8 November 1995, insofar as it affected the petitioners, was without jurisdiction and invalid.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court's dispositive ruling is summarized as follows:

The order dated 8 November 1995 passed by the Tax Recovery Officer, Valsad, declaring the sales in favour of the present petitioners void under section 281 of the Income-tax Act is struck down qua the petitioners; the rule is made absolute.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The administrative declaration by the TRO that the petitioners' purchases were void is set aside as to these petitioners; the TRO's order of 8 November 1995 no longer stands against them.
  • Jurisdictional consequence: The opinion reiterates the principle — following the Supreme Court in TRO v. Gangadhar Vishwanath Ranade and subsequent High Court decisions — that the TRO does not have jurisdiction to declare transfers void under section 281; where the Revenue seeks a declaration of voidness of a transfer, it must proceed by civil suit.
  • Hearing requirement: Because the TRO's impugned order carries civil consequences, affected transferees must be given an opportunity to be heard, particularly where they may rely on the proviso to section 281(1) (adequate consideration and absence of notice), a point the court relied upon in invalidating the order.
  • Precedential note: The court indicated that the issue was squarely covered by earlier Supreme Court authority and followed those decisions; the decision in this opinion applies established precedent rather than creating new law.
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    Karsanbhai Gandabhai Patel Shop No. 7 & 3 Petitioner(S) v. Tax Recovery Officer (S)

    ORAL JUDGMENT

    (PER: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE AKIL KURESHI)

    Petitioners have challenged an order dated 8th November 1995 passed by the Tax Recovery Officer (TRO), Valsad under section 281 of the Income Tax Act 1961 (‘the Act’ for short). Facts are as under:

    The petitioners purchased different units in a constructed building situated in Bilimora Nagarpalika know as Mazda Estate constructed by Mazda Estate and Finance Pvt. Ltd. (‘Mazda’ for short). The construction was completed in the year 1991 or 1992. The petitioners had booked their respective shops in the said building. Upon completion of the construction, the petitioners were put in possession of such shops in the year 1991-92. On 17/18 May 1995, all the petitioners executed separate sale deeds with Mazda for purchase of respective units.

    Mazda had defaulted in making payment of income tax dues to the extent of Rs. 19.88 lacs arising out of various assessment orders. The case of Mazda was therefore referred to TRO, Mumbai for recovery. Under the instruction of TRO, Mumbai, the property in question was attached on 22.5.95 Finally, TRO, Valsad by the impugned order dated 8 November 2005 declared that all the sales mentioned therein including those in favour of the present petitioners were void in terms of section 281 of the Act. In the said order, he recorded that several demand notices were issued to Mazda for different assessment years between 1989 and 1994. Such demand notices were served on the defaulter before the date of transfer of the properties. He, therefore, declared the transactions void.

    Under communication dated 20 December 1995, the petitioners raised objection to the said order dated 8.11.95 contending, inter alia, that such order was passed without any notice to them and in any case, TRO had no jurisdiction to declare any transaction as void under section 281 of the Act. There was no response to this communication by the respondents.

    Many years later, the petitioners once again wrote to the department on 21.10.03 and requested for withdrawal of the order under section 281 of the Act. Yet another letter was written for the same purpose on 18.12.2013 by the petitioners. Finally, the Tax Recovery Officer, Navsari wrote to the directors of Mazda on 3rd February 2004 indicating that the department would proceed with the auction sale of the properties under attachment to recover the dues of Mazda. Thereupon, the petitioners filed the present petition.

    Learned counsel Shri Bandish Soparkar for the petitioners submitted that in terms of section 281 of the Act, the TRO had no jurisdiction to declare the transaction as void. If at all, the department would have to file civil suit for such purpose which in the present case was not done. He further submitted that the petitioners had purchased the properties for adequate consideration without notice of the dues of the defaulter. The petitioners could never bring such facts to the notice of the TRO and avail of the proviso to section 281(1) of the Act since the petitioners were never heard before the impugned order was passed.

    In support of his contentions, he relied on the following decisions:

    (1) In the case of T.R.O v. Gangadhar Vishwanath Ranede, 234 ITR 189 (SC).

    (2) In the case of Ms. Ruchi Mehta v. UOI, 294 ITR 614 (Bom).

    On the other hand, learned counsel Shri Sudhir Mehta for the department opposed the petition. Relying on section 281 of the Act, he contended that the transactions in question were void. The defaulter was duly served with notices for recovery of the unpaid tax long before the properties were transferred. In support of his submissions, he relied on following decisions:

    (1) In the case of Abdul Jamil v. Secretary, Income-tax Department, (1998) 102 Taxman 332 (Madras).

    (2) In the case of Palani Gounder v. I.T Revenue Department, 229 Itr 59.

    Having thus heard the learned counsel for the parties and having perused the documents on record, it emerges that notices were issued to the defaulter during the years 1989 to 1994 for recovery of unpaid taxes. Such taxes were, however, not paid. In the meantime, the defaulter sold certain properties to various persons including the petitioners. Such sale deeds were executed on or around 17/18 May 1995. It was only thereafter that the department attached the property in question by issuing an order dated 22.5.95 On 8.11.95, the TRO, Valsad passed the impugned order declaring the sale transactions as void. This order was passed without any notice to the petitioners.

    Section 281 of the Act provides certain transfers to be void. Subsection (1) thereof, which is relevant for our purpose, reads as under:

    “281(1) Where, during the pendency of any proceeding under this Act or after the completion thereof, but before the service of notice under rule 2 of the Second Schedule, any assessee creates a charge on, or parts with the possession (by way of sale, mortgage, gift, exchange or any other mode of transfer whatsoever) of any of his assets in favour of any other person, such charge or transfer shall be void as against any claim in respect of nay tax or any other sum payable by the assessee as a result of the completion of the said proceeding or otherwise:

    Provided that such charge or transfer shall not be void if it is made-

    (i) for adequate consideration and without notice of the pendency of such proceeding or, as the case maybe, without notice of such tax or other sum payable by the assessee; or

    (ii) with the previous permission of the Assessing Officer.”

    Sub-section (1) of section 281 thus provides that where during the pendency of any proceedings under the Act, or after the completion thereof, but before the service of notice under rule 2 of the second schedule, any assessee creates a charge on, or parts with the possession by way of sale, mortgage, gift, exchange or any other mode of transfer any assets in favour of any other person, such charge or transfer shall be void as against any claim in respect of any tax or any other sum payable by the assessee as a result of completion of the said proceedings or otherwise.

    Proviso to sub-section (1), however, provides that such charge or transfer shall not be void if made for adequate consideration and without notice of pendency of such proceedings or without notice of such tax or other sum payable by the assessee or with the permission of the Assessing Officer.

    It can thus be seen that even if the transactions creating a charge or parting of possession has been entered into by the assessee during the pendency of any proceedings under the Act or after completion thereof, the eventuality of such charge or transfer being declared void can be avoided provided one of the two conditions contained in the proviso is satisfied. Under such circumstances, the transferee can demonstrate that the transaction had taken place with the previous permission of the Assessing Officer or that the same was entered into for adequate consideration and without notice of pendency of such proceedings or without notice of such tax or other sum payable by the assessee.

    This element of the transaction being with adequate consideration and without notice would equally apply to the assessee as well as the transferee. In a given case, it may even be open for the assessee to establish that the transaction was for adequate consideration without notice. In a given case, even if the assesee had notice of the pendency or the outstanding tax or sum payable, the transferee can still take shelter of the transactions having been entered into by him for adequate consideration and without notice. It is, therefore, that the courts have read into this provision the requirement of hearing the transferee also. Quite apart from this, as would be clear from the discussion hereinafer, courts have taken a view that sub-section (1) of section 281 of the Act only provides for the eventuality of the transaction hit by the said provisions as being void. It does not create any machinery for the Revenue authorities to entertain dispute and declare the transaction to be void for which purpose, only a civil suit would lie.

    In the case of Gangadhar Vishwanath Ranade v. T.R.O177 ITR 176, a Division of the Bombay High Court held that under section 281 of the Act, the TRO has no power to declare a transfer as void. This decision of the Bombay High Court was carried in appeal before the Supreme Court. The Apex Court in TRO v. Gangadhar Vishwanath Ranade (supra) confirmed the view of the Bombay High Court and held and observed as under:

    “In the light of this discussion about the provisions of Order XXI, Rules 58 to 63, if we examine Rule 11(4) of the Second Schedule to the Income-tax Act, it is clear that the Tax Recovery Officer is required to examine whether the possession of the third party is of a claimant in his own right or in trust for the assessee or on account of the assessee. If he comes to a conclusion that the transferee is in possession in his or her own right, he will have to raise the attachment. If the Department desires to have the transaction of transfer declared void under Section 281, the Department being in the position of a creditor, will have to file a suit for a declaration that the transaction of transfer is void under Section 281 of the Income-tax Act”

    Later on, once again, the issue came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Ms. Ruchi Mehta (supra). The Bombay High Court followed the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of TRA v. Gangadhar Vishwanath Ranade (supra) and held that the action of the TRO in declaring the transfer of property to be void was without jurisdiction. The Court also held that the impugned order attaches civil consequences. The authority therefore before passing such order ought to have given an opportunity to the petitioners of being heard. This was not done. This was an additional ground on which the order was struck down.

    In the case of Sancheti Leasing Company Ltd v. Income Tax Officer, (2000) 158 CTR (Mad) 190, learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court following the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Gangadhar Vishwanath Ranade (supra) held that ITO had no jurisdiction to declare the transaction of sale to the petitioners as void.

    The decisions cited by the counsel for the Revenue arose in different factual background. In the case of Abdul Jamil (supra), the issue arose out of civil proceedings in which the Court found that the vendor had sold the property to the first plaintiff after the issuance of certificate under the Act for recovery of the tax arrears from him. The Court therefore, held that the transaction was hit by the provisions of section 281 as well as rule 16(1) of the Rules.

    The case of Palani Gounder (supra), also arose in different factual background. It was a case in which the plaintiff had filed suit for declaration that their purchase of the suit property was for a valid consideration and it was a duly registered sale deed and was therefore not void. The Income Tax Officer had proposed to proceed under section 281 of the Act. The civil court in the suit filed by the plaintiffs found that the transaction was in breach of section 281 of the Act and therefore refused to grant the prayer. It was under such circumstances that the appeal was heard by the learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court and dismissed the same.

    The issue is squarely covered by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Gangadhar Vishwanath Ranade. We have, therefore, no hesitation in striking down the order dated 8 November 1995 qua the present petitioners. Rule is made absolute accordingly.

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    Karsanbhai Gandabhai Patel Shop No. 7 & 3 Petitioner(S) v. Tax Recovery Officer (S)
    (Feb 12, 2014)