Straight, J. and Tyrrell, J.:— We do not feel called upon in this case to interfere with the decision, of the Sessions Judge acquitting the two respondents, Gayadin and Binda. We are not prepared to say that, had it been our task to try them, as well as the persons who have been convicted, we might not have taken a view of their conduct similar to that expressed by our late colleague Mr. Justice Spankie in his judgment in the appeal of Madari and the others. But does not appear to us that this is quite the test to be applied in determining this appeal by Government from the acquittal of Gayadin and Binda. On the contrary, we think it would be an inaccurate and inappropriate one. The powers given to the Local Government by s. 272 of the Criminal Procedure Code are of an exceptional and Unusual character; and while we fully recognize the necessity for their existence in this con try, we are equally clear that they should be most sparingly enforced and in respect of pure precisions of facts only in these cases where, through the incompetence, stupidity, or perversity of a subordinate tribunal, such unreasonable or distorted conclusions have been drawn from the evidence as to produce a positive miscarriage of justice. It is not because a Judge or a Magistrate has taken a view of a case in which Government does not concede, and has acquitted accused persons that an appeal, from his decision must necessarily prevail, or that this Court should be called upon to disturb the ordinary course of justice, by putting in force the arbitrary powers conferred on it by s. 272. The doing so should be limited to those instances in which the lower Court has so obstinately blundered and gone wrong as to produce a result ??? at once to the administration of justice and the interests of the public. We cannot say in the present case that the Sessions Judge so ??? and foolishly erred in his conclusions as to the respondents Gayadin and Binda, that we feel ??? bound either to convict those two persons, or to order a new trial. He had the witnesses before him, and consequently the best opportunity of judging their truth and be appears to have conducted the inquiry with care and patience, and to have weighed and considered the facts, to the best of his ability. It may be, as we have already remarked that we might have arrived at a view other than that formed by him, but holding his decision to be an honest and not unreasonable one, of which the facts were susceptible, we unhesitatingly dismiss this appeal.
Appeal dismissed.