Stuart, C.J, Straigh, J., Oldfield, J. and Tyrrell, J.:— We have very fully and carefully considered all the authorities and arguments laid before us at the bearing of this reference, but in framing our answer and having regard to clearness and brevity we have not thought it necessary to incumber our reply by referring to the various cases quoted seriatim and it length.
The question of the right to maintenance of a Hindu widow was discussed by the Full Bench of this Court in the cases of Ganga Bai v. Sita Ram (1) and Lalti Kuar v. Ganga Bishan (2), and so far determined that it was held that there is a legal obligation on the part of those who succeed by inheritance to the joint ancestral property to maintain the widow of the deceased co-parceners, and obligation which could be enforced against those who had succeeded to the estate, and which did not rest on the mere ground of relationship to the widow's husband. Those decisions however went no further and did not touch the question raised by this reference, whether maintenance is a charge on the property which will attach to it in the hands of a bonâ fide purchaser for value without notice.
The Hindu Law is extremely obscure on the nature of the widow's right to maintenance. But little is to be found in the Mitakshara beyond the passages which treat in general terms of the duty of supporting dependent relatives, and the right to maintenance of persons who are excluded from inheritance, who together with their wives are entitled to be supported by reason of such exclusion.
The Smriti Chandrika and Viramitrodaya are somewhat more explicit. They declare the widow's right to be supported by those heirs who succeed to the estate, whose duty in that respect is declared dependent on their taking the property, and the latter recognizes the widow's right to insist on provision being made for her support by allotting her a share of the estate (Smriti Chandrika, ch. IX, s. ii, v. 14; ch. IX, s. i, v. 34; Viramitrodaya, ch. III, pt. i, s. 13).
These and similar texts have reference only to the widow's right as against the heir who succeeds to the joint family estate by inheritance, and they do not seem to be intended to limit the full right of ownership in the land of the heir so as to give a real right of property in it to the widow, prior to allotment to her of a share. Indeed, too much stress should not be put on any of the texts which speak of the wife's ownership in her husband's property (Viramitrodaya, ch. III, pt. i, s. 13). The author of Viramitrodaya does not apparently consider there is any real ownership on her part; he says; “Her right is only fictional but not a real one: the wife's right to the husband's property, which to all appearance seems to be the same (as the husband's right) like a mixture of milk and water, is suitable to the performance of acts which are to be jointly performed, but is not mutual like that of the brothers; hence it is that there may be separation of brothers, but not of the husband and wife; on this reason is founded the text, namely,—“Partition cannot take place between the husband and wife; therefore it cannot but be admitted that on the extinction of the husband's right the extinction of the wife's right is necessary.”
Strange has treated of maintenance as one of the charges on inheritance, but scarcely in the sense of a charge attaching to the land into whosesoever hands it passes, since he places in the same category other claims which admittedly are not charges on the land in that sense.
It has been held that a purchaser of an undivided share of joint family property has a right to have the share partitioned, and takes subject to the right of the widows who at partition can claim a share. This right of Some widows to a share on partition is expressly given by law and stands on a different footing, and it would not be safe to infer from this that maintenance generally is of the nature of a charge on the property.
The later decisions of the Court have recognized that, until fixed and charged by decree of Court or contract on particular property, maintenance is not a charge on the estate, to be enforced against a bonâ fide purchaser without notice.—Lakshman Ramchandra v. Sarasvatibai , Lakshman Ramchandra Joshi v. Satyabhamabai , Adhiranee Narain Coomary v. Shona Malee Pat Mahadai (3), Juggernath Sawunt v. Maharanee Odhiranee Narain Koomaree (4), Srimati Bhabagati Dasi v. Kanailal Mitter (5). And this appears to us to be the correct view of the law. The right to maintenance is of an indefinite character: the heir who succeeds to the estate may be said to take it with a trust for the widow's support, which will give her a right against him to have the allowance ascertained and fixed and made chargeable on particular property, but till this has been done a charge cannot be said to exist in the sense of a title issuing out of the land itself, and binding every person who comes into the estate, and a bonâ fide purchaser for value without notice of the claim will therefore be protected.
The principle of protecting a bonâ fide purchaser without notice cannot be objected to as being something peculiar to English Law, as it rests on grounds of public convenience which are of universal application, and has been recognized by this Court.—See Heera Lall v. Kousillah and Goolabee v. Ramtahal Rai .
It may be added that, when the maintenance has been expressly charged on the purchased property, it will be liable, although it be shown that there is property in the hands of the heirs sufficient to meet the claim, but the property will not be liable if the transfer was made to satisfy a claim for which the ancestral property is liable by Hindu Law, and which under that law takes precedence of that of maintenance.