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citation codes
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  • Procedure Code of Rules 4 and 6 of Order XVI of the Judicature Act,
  • Rule 1 of Order XVI of the English Judicature Act, S. 27, like Rule 2
  • Rule 2 of Order XVII, Rule b. of s. 44 and Rule 5
  • CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • S. 30 of the Code, and Rule 9
  • provisions of s. 44, Rule a.
  • Rule 1 of Order XVIIthe
  • Rule 4 of Order XVI
  • Rule 3 of Order XVI
  • Rules 17, 18, 11, 20,
  • Code and Rule 8
  • Rule 4 of Order
  • s. 47 and Rule
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  • Procedure Code of Rules 4 and 6 of Order XVI of the Judicature Act,
  • Rule 1 of Order XVI of the English Judicature Act, S. 27, like Rule 2
  • Rule 2 of Order XVII, Rule b. of s. 44 and Rule 5
  • CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • S. 30 of the Code, and Rule 9
  • provisions of s. 44, Rule a.
  • Rule 1 of Order XVIIthe
  • Rule 4 of Order XVI
  • Rule 3 of Order XVI
  • Rules 17, 18, 11, 20,
  • Code and Rule 8
  • Rule 4 of Order
  • s. 47 and Rule
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion addresses a reference concerning the validity of a plaint that was rejected by the Munsif on the ground that it disclosed several claims not against the same defendants jointly, but united several causes of action against several sets of defendants. The procedural issue centers on whether the plaint was properly rejected for multifariousness or misjoinder of parties and causes of action under the Civil Procedure Code.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaint was open to the objection of multifariousness, i.e., improper joinder of distinct and independent causes of action and defendants in one suit.
  2. Whether the joinder of defendants and causes of action in the plaint was permissible under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, specifically sections 26, 28, 31, 34, 44, and 45.
  3. The interpretation and distinction between the terms "cause of action" and "matter" as used in the Civil Procedure Code, and their impact on joinder rules.
  4. The scope and effect of the procedural provisions relating to joinder of parties and causes of action, including whether the plaint improperly united distinct causes of action against different defendants without sanction.

Arguments of the Parties

Majority Opinion

  • The plaint improperly united different causes of action against different defendants who were not jointly liable for all the causes of action.
  • The joinder of defendants was not permissible because the causes of action were distinct and separate, contrary to the permission under the Procedure Code.
  • The Munsif rightly exercised discretion under section 53 of the Code in rejecting the plaint.
  • The language of the Code and the omission of certain English Judicature Act rules indicate a narrower scope for joinder in India.

Mahmood, J.'s Dissenting Opinion

  • The term "multifariousness" includes misjoinder of defendants and causes of action, but the Code should be construed liberally, permitting procedures unless expressly prohibited.
  • The "matter" in section 28 is broader than "cause of action," allowing joinder of defendants if the subject-matter is the same.
  • The plaint disclosed one connected subject-matter: wrongful dispossession of land and related claims, thus joinder was proper.
  • The defendants' liabilities were connected and the suit was not multifarious as the claims arose from one connected story.
  • Section 45, which limits joinder of distinct causes of action, does not restrict section 28.
  • The procedure aims to prevent multiplicity of suits and allow complete relief in one proceeding.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Janokinatk Mookerjee v. Ramrunjun Chuckerbutty Similar points on joinder of parties and causes of action Supported Mahmood, J.'s dissenting view that joinder was permissible and suit was not multifarious
Story's Equity Pleading (s. 271, 271a) Definition and explanation of multifariousness and joinder of parties Used by Mahmood, J. to elucidate the nature of multifariousness and its application to the case
Salvidge v. Hyde, 5 Madd. 138 Principle that suit may include different persons with separate interests if connected to a single object Applied to show that different defendants with connected interests may be joined in one suit

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The majority examined the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code relating to joinder of parties and causes of action, comparing them with corresponding rules from the English Judicature Act. They noted that the Code permits joinder of plaintiffs only in respect of the same cause of action, and defendants only in respect of the same matter. The majority found that the plaint improperly united several distinct causes of action against different defendants who were not jointly liable, a procedure not sanctioned by the Code. They emphasized the absence of certain English procedural rules in the Code, indicating a narrower scope for joinder in India. Consequently, the rejection of the plaint for multifariousness was proper.

In contrast, Mahmood, J. reasoned that the term "matter" in section 28 is broader than "cause of action" and allows joinder of defendants where the subject-matter is the same, even if the claims arise from different wrongful acts by different defendants. He emphasized a liberal construction of procedural rules, allowing joinder to avoid multiplicity of suits and to afford complete relief. He analyzed the facts and found the plaint disclosed one connected subject-matter: wrongful dispossession of land and related claims for mesne profits. This connectedness justified joinder of all defendants. Mahmood, J. also distinguished section 45 as unrelated to limiting section 28. He concluded that the plaint was not multifarious and should not have been rejected.

Overall, the court’s analysis hinged on interpreting the scope of "cause of action" versus "matter," the statutory provisions permitting joinder, and the practical consequences of joinder on the trial process.

Holding and Implications

The majority held that the plaint was properly rejected by the Munsif on the ground that it improperly united different causes of action against different defendants, a procedure not sanctioned by the Civil Procedure Code.

The direct effect of this decision is that plaintiffs must not join distinct causes of action against different defendants in one suit without statutory sanction, thereby limiting joinder to cases where the causes of action and parties are properly connected under the Code. The opinion does not establish any new precedent beyond clarifying the scope of joinder under the Code and confirming the Munsif’s discretion in rejecting multifarious plaints. Mahmood, J.'s dissent highlights a contrasting liberal approach, but the majority view prevails.

    Narsingh Das v. Mangal Dubey

    Stuart, C.J and Straight, Brodhust, and Tyyrrell, JJ.:— Perhaps the most convenient mode in which to consider the matter will be to examine the provisions of the Procedure Code, firstly, us to parties to suits; and secondly, as to the frame of suits; and in doing so it will be instructive to see is what respects the rules of the English Judicature Act, from which they have been taken, are followed or departed from. With regard to the former, they are to be found in chapter III, and in substance are as follows:— By s. 26 it is enacted that “all persons may be joined as plaintiff's in whom the right to any relief claimed is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally or in the alternative, in respect of the same cause of action, and judgment may be given for such one or more of the plaintiffs as may be found entitled to relief, for such relief as he or they may be entitled to, without any amendment.” With the exception of the words “in respect of the same cause of action,” this section is identical with Rule 1 of Order XVI of the English Judicature Act, S. 27, like Rule 2 of the above Order, provides for the substitution or addition of plaintiffs. S. 28 declares that “all persons may be joined as defendants against whom the right to any relief is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally or in the alternative in respect of the matter, and judgment may be given against such one or more of the defendants as may be found to be liable, according to their respective liabilities, without any amendment.” These are ipsissima verba with Rule 3 of Order XVI save as to the interpolated words “in respect of the same matter.” S. 29, like Rule 5, provides for the joinder of all or any of the parties “liable on any one contract.” It may here be observed that Rule 4 of Order XVI, which states that “it shall not be necessary that every defendant to any action shall be interested as to all the relief thereby prayed for, or as to every cause of action included therein,” and Rule 5, “where the plaintiff is in doubt as to the person from whom he is entitled to redress.” as to the joinder of “two or more defendants to the intent that in such action the question as to which, if any, of the defendants is liable, and to what extent, may be determined as between all parties to the action,” have not been imported into the Procedure Code, and must be presumed to have been intentionally left out. S. 30 of the Code, and Rule 9 as to one party suing or defending on behalf of others in the same interest, are pretty much the same in language. S. 31 corresponds with the first paragraph of Rule 13, but it contains the additional and important provision that “nothing in this section shall be deemed to enable plaintiffs to joint in respect of distinct causes of action” S. 32, and the latter paragraph of Rules 13 and 14 and 15 are similar in terms, and deal with the question as to striking of or adding parties, the service of summonses, where defendants are added, and the consequent necessary amendment of plaint. S. 34 of the Code enacts that “all objections for want of parties, or for joinder of partief not interested, or for misjoinder of plaintiffs or defendants must he taken at thy earliest possible opportunity, and in all cases before the first hearing.” Rules 17, 18, 11, 20, and 21, which relate to cases where contribution or indemnity is claimed by a defendant over or against a person not a party to the suit, or where the Court or Judge thinks that a question in the action should he determined, not only as between the plaintiff and defendant, but between them and such other person, or any of them, and to the procedure to be followed therein, have not been contacted in the Code, probably because it was very rightly anticipated that they would be found too complicated and confusion for our subordinate judicial tribunals. Patting the matter shortly then upon the first point to be considered, namely, the joinder of parties, it would appear that any number of plaintiffs may join in respect of the same cause of action; that they may not join in respect of distinct causes of action; that any number of defendants may be joined, where the relief sought against them is “in respect of the same matter,” or of any one contract; that no suit shall fail for mere misjoinder; that except where plaintiffs have joined in respect of distinct causes of action, “the Court may in every suit deal with the matter in controversy as far as regards the right and interests of the parties actually before it.”

    When this reference was under discussion before the Full Bench, great stress was laid by the pleader maintaining the validity of the plaint on the terms of s. 28 of the Code and the words “jointly, severally or in the alternative.” But, as was pointed out to him, this liability must be in respect of the “same matter.”—an expression it is difficult to interpret as meaning more than the same “cause of action.” Had Rule 4 of Order XVI declaring that every defendant need not be interested in all the relief prayed for, or as be every cause of action, been made part of s. 28, a more comprehensive effect might perhaps then have been given to the words “same matter.” It is, however, to be observed that, while by s. 26 all plaintiffs may join in respect of the same “cause of action.” in whom the right to any relief is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally or in the alternative, by s. 28 all defendants may be joined, against whom the right to any relief in respect of the same matter whether jointly, severally or in the alternative, is alleged to exist. Whether the use of the two expressions “cause of action” and “matter” was intended to convey and very important distinction or difference, is not particularly clear, though there is no doubt force in the argument that coming so near to one another in the Act, they can scarcely be construed as bearing, precisely the same meaning. This much upon the portion of the Code that deals with the joinder of parties, as to which it may be added that it must necessarily be read with and controlled by the subsequent provisions of chapter IV regulating a still more important subject, namely, the “frame of the suit.” Now, it is to be borne in mind, in considering the present reference, that, the real ground upon which the Munsif rejected the plaint was not for misjoinder of defendants, but because it disclosed several claims not against the same defendants jointly, or in other words, because it united several causes of action against several sets of defendants, and was therefore not within the permission of s. 45 of the Procedure Code, Let us again for a moment turn to the Rules under Order XVII of the English Judicature Act as to “joinder of causes of action,” and see how far they have been reproduced in chapter IV of the Procedure Code s. 44 provides that a plaintiff, with a suit for recovery of immoveable property, may join claims for mesne profits, or arrears of rent, or for damages for breach of any contract under which such property, or any part of it, has been held, or by a mortgagee to enforce any of his remedies under his mortgage, and this partly corresponds with Rule 2 of Order XVII, Rule b. of s. 44 and Rule 5 are pretty much a like. S. 45 says that, “subject to the rules contained in chapter 11 (as to jurisdiction) and in s. 44 (as to the claims that may be joined with a suit for recovery of immoveable property), the plaintiff may unite in the same suit several causes of action against the same defendant, or the same defendants; and any plaintiffs having canses of action in which they are jointly interested against the same defendant or defendant jointly may unite such causes of actton in the same suit. This, it will be remarked, is widely different from the much more general language of Rule 1 of Order XVII—“the plaintiff may unite in the same action and in the same statement of claim several causes of action,”—and of Rule 6—“claims by plaintiffs jointly may be joined with claims by them or any of them separately against the same defendant”—which latter provision is diametrically opposite to the probition of the Procedure Code,” that plaintiffs may not join in respect of different causes of action and the terms of the concluding paragraph of Rs. 45 and 46 of the Code and Rule 8 are about indentical, and the same remark applies to s. 47 and Rule 9. Putting it shortly, then, the provisions of chapter IV of the Code, excepting s. 43, which does not appear to have any relevancy to the point under discussion, seem to provide that any plaintiff or plaintiffs having several causes of action, in which they jointly interested, against one defendant or several defendants jointly may unite them in the same snit, but that unless such causes of action are of the kind mentioned in clauses a, b, or c, of s. 44, they may not be joined, without leave of the Court, with a suit for the recovery of immoveable property; that where a plaintiff or plaintiffs have united in the same suit reveral causes of action against a defendant or defendants jointly within the terms of s. 44 of the Procedure Code, the Court of its own motion, or on the application of the defendants, or upon agreement of the parties, may order separate trials, or confine the scope of the suit, or exclude causes of action, and direct amendment of the plaint, where, by the joinder of several causes of action, inconvenience and confusion are likely to be caused. If then, as has already been remarked, ss. 28 and 45 must be read together, the joint, several or alternative liability of defendants mentioned in s. 28, means a joint, several or alternative liability in respect of one or several causes of action, which cause or causes of action are united in the same suit against the same defendants jointly; in other words, while the cause or causes of action must be joint as to all the defendants, the relief asked may be joint, several or in the alternative. Attention has been drawn to the omission from the Procedure Code of Rules 4 and 6 of Order XVI of the Judicature Act, as well as of their relations to contribution, indemnity, &c., 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21, and the inference, therefore, that it was not intended to introduce into this country the wide scope now afforded to snits in the English Courts, is irresistible, Indeed, it seems for better to leave the matter upon the simple footing that defendants may be joined, where there is or are common cause or causes of action, in which they are jointly interested, and that judgment may be given against them according to their several liabilities. It was suggested by Mr. Justices Mahmood at the hearing that there was one cause of action in the case to which this reference related, wherein all the defendants were concerned, namely, the keeping the plaintiff out of possession, and that the suit ought therefore to be regarded as covered by as. 44 and 28 of the Procedure Code. As an answer to this, it seems almost enough to say that such is not the contention of the plaintiff himself. On the contrary, as has already been stated, his plaint distinctly covers three different causes of action on three different dates. But more than this, it is immossihle to hold that there is any one cause of action for a suit for the recovery of immoveable property against all the defendants, two of whom are admittedly not in possession of the holding at all, and one of whom never has been at all involved in the act of trespass that is required to lay foundation for a suit to recover immoveable property, with which, under the terms of s. 44, claims for mesne profits may be joined. Nothing is to be found in ss. 28 or 44 that authorizes a suit by a plaintiff against A for dispossessing him or opposing his obtaining possession with distinct claims against B, C, D, and E, for damages, for separate years in respect of such primary wrongful act on the part of A. What s. 44 do as contemplate is a suit for the recovery of immoveable property from the trespasser or trespassers wrongfully in possession of it at the time of suit, and the joinder of a claim or of claims for mesne profits or arrears of rent against such trespasser or trespassers. The plaint now before us shows nothing of this kind; the causes of action alleged are separate; the defendants are arrayed in different sete; the reliefs sought are declared in respect of distinct matters. It therefore comes to this, that the plaintiff has united different cause of action in one suit against different defendants, who are not jointly liable in respect of each and all of such cases of action—a mode of procedure that the law does not sanction. It is impossible for us to hold that under these circumstances the Munsif improperly exercised the discretion given him by s. 53 of the Code in rejecting the plaint. Indeed, we would go further and say that he was right in doing so. It is no part of our duty to enter into a consideration of questions of policy, or as to what the Legislature contemplated or intended. We have before us the seemingly plain language of the Act, and it is as to this and not upon our own speculations as to what would be most convenient or conducive to limiting litigation that our opinion must be formed and expressed. At the same time, taking a claim like that disclosed in the present plaint, we cannot concede that it would have been either advantageous or desirable for the suit to proceed with all the seven defendants as parties to it. The plaintiff's true and primary remedy was against defendants 1, 2, and 3 who failed to give him possession under the sale-deed of the 12th November, 1877, and save through them he could not hope to attach any liability to the other defendants. They were obviously liable for any and all loss or damages sustained by the plaintiff during such time as he was kept out of possession. On the other hand, defendants 4 and 5, for example, must necessarily have been adverse, not only to the plaintiff, but to defendants 1, 2, and 3, and to one another, while they could have no possible community of interest with defendants 6 and 7. The trial of the suit under these circumstances would have been most confusing and embarrassing, as not only would there have been a contest going on between the plaintiff and all the defendants, but a conflict amongst the defendants inter se. As we have already stated we think that the Munsif rightly rejected the plaint, and this reference must be answered by our saying that we are of opinion that it was open to objection, not for misjoinder of defendant, but because different causes of action against different defendants separately were joined, and for suck procedure no sanction is to be found in the Procedure Code.

    Mahmood, J.:— As the judgment of the majority of my honorable colleagues has fully set forth the allegations on which the plaintiff's claim is based, I shall confine my observations to the exposition of the reasons which have unfortunately prevented me from concurring in the view of the law taken in that judgment. The question raised by this reference may be briefly stated to be whether the plaint, which we are called upon to consider, was open to the objection of “multifariousness.” Although the term is not recognized by the Civil Procedure Code, I use it advisedly, as it is comprehensive enough to include the misjoinder of defendants as well as the misjoinder of causes of action—the only points to be considered in answering this reference.

    “By multifariousness in a bill is meant the improperly joining in one bill distinct and independent matter, and thereby confounding them,—as, for example, the uniting in one bill of several matters perfectly distinct and unconnected, against one defendant, or the demand of several matters of a distinct and independent nature against several defendants in the same bill.” (Story's Eq. Pl. s. 271).

    The consideration of the questions involved in this reference virtually amounts to a matter of construing some of the sections of the Civil Procedure Code. I may therefore at the outset state that, according to my view of the rules of construction applicable to statutes like the Civil Procedure Code, the Courts are not to act upon the principle that every procedure is to be taken as prohibited unless it is expressly provided for by the Code, but on the converse principle that every procedure is to be understood as permissible till it is shown to be prohibited by the law. As a matter of general principle, prohibitions cannot be presumed; and in the present case, therefore, it rests upon the defendants to show that the suit in the form in which it has been brought is prohibited by the rules of procedure applicable to the Courts of Justice in India. It is clear that in the determination of this question, cl. (f) of s. 53, under which the plaint was rejected by the Munsif, affords no help, because the misjoinder of parties or the misjoinder of causes of action contemplated by that clause obviously depends upon the provisions to be found in chapters III and IV of the Civil Procedure Code. Some difficulty in this case was felt in the course, of the argument, owing to the circumstance that the expression “cause of action” has always unfortunately had a signification which cannot be called precise or definite. The expression is sometimes taken to mean the title together with the injury; in other words, all the circumstances which a plaintiff is required to allege in order to show a right to sue for relief. Sometimes it is used as indicating merely the injury or the wrongful act of the defendant which is the cause of the plaintiff's coming into Court, it was in view of this circumstance, which has been the source of some uncertainty, not only, in questions of misjoider, but also in those of res judicata and jurisdiction, that at the hearing of this case I made the occasional remark to which my honorable colleagues have referred in their judgment. For if the expression “cause of action” is to be taken in its most cost comprehensive sense, the title upon which the plaintiff relies in the suit being one and the same, and his claim amounting only to a vindication of the rights to which he is entitled by virtue of that title, the circumstance that the injuries or wrongful acts complained of by him are alleged to have been committed by more than one person, and at more than one time, would not multiply the whole cause of action not only some of the circumstances which form the component perts of the cause of action in a suit of this nature. So far as the wording of the plaintiffs concerned, the Hindustani expression “bina-i-mukhasamat” used therein means “the foundation (or origin) of the dispute.” The expression is far too indefinite to bind the plaintiff to the coptention that there were distinct causes of action in the sense in which that phrase is to be understood as a term of law. It seems unnecessary for the purposes of this, reference to arrive at an absolutely precise and inflexibla definition of the term “cause of action” as used in the Civil Procedure Code. I have no doubt that the term “matter,” as used in s. 28, is not to be taken as a convertible term with the expression “cause of action.” The phraseology employed in s. 26, when compared with the wording of s. 28, shows that the word “matter” is used in the Code in a more comprehensive sense than the phrase “cause of action,” and this conclusion receives support, not only from the circumstance that the two expressions used in contiguous section (26, 27, and 28) of the same chapter, evidently in different senses, but also from the fact that the last part of s. 31, which prohibits plaintiffs joing in respect of distinct causes of action, is meant to be a limitation or restriction of the latitude allowed by chapter III as to the joinder of parties in respect of the same matter. Courts of Justice in India necessarily exercise the combined jurisdiction both of Courts of Equity and of Law, and the Civil Procedure Code, recognizing this circumstance has provided both the methods of limiting the scope of suits, viz., the method which prevailed in the Courts of Chancery, and that which was followed by the Courts of Common Law before the introduction of the recent improvements of the law in England. The former of these methods proceeds upon a system of limitation regulated by consideration of the subject-matter of the suit; the latter system upon consideration of the parties to the suit. Chapter III of the Civil Procedure Code soems to proceed upon the former of these methods, that is, it assumes the existence of an ascertained subject-matter in dispute, and from that point of view lays down rules as to the persons who may be made parties to the suit. Chapter IV proceeding upon the latter method, assumes the existence of ascertained parties and deals with the subject-matters of the suit. The two methods as they have been adopted in the Code do not clash with each other.

    Where there is identity of the subject-matter of the suit the rules which would govern the case are to be found in chapter III, where there is identity of parties, the scope of the action is to be limited by the rules provided in chapter IV. The two chapters regard the action from two different points of view, and the rules contained in the one cannot be regarded as proviso to the rules contained in the other. When a dispute arises and its subject-matter is ascertained, the question which has to be considered is, against whom is the relief to be enforced? The answer to the question is to be found in s. 28, which provides that “all persons may be joined as defendants against whom the right to any relief is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally or in the alternative, in respect of the same matter; and judgment may be given against such one or more of the defendants as may be found to be liable, according to their respective liabilities, without any amendment.” If the conditions of this section are satisfied that is, the matter in dispute is the same, the course of procedure should be to do complete justice between the parties with respect to that matter, and it is of no consequence whether the case presents a more complicated aspect than an ordinary action at law used to do in England. I have already said that I understand the expression “matter,” as used in s. 28, to have a more comprehensive meaning than the term “cause of action,” and it seems to me that so long as the matter in dispute is identical, the plaintiff is entitled to bring before the Court all persons whose presence is necessary to afford him full relief in respect of that matter. S. 45 does not appear to me to be applicable to cases in which the subject-matter of the suit is the same, and in which the scope of the suit is to be regarded from that point of view. That section relates to cases in which the causes of action are entirely distinct, that is, all the circumstances which constitute the right to sue as composing one cause of action are distinct from, and therefore independent of, the constituent parts of the other cause of action. For example, cases of two or more independent bonds of which the plaintiffs are joint obligees, would fall under the purview of s. 45, the identity of parties, coupled with the joint nature of the right and of the obligation, being sufficient to allow the joinder in one suit of causes of action which would otherwise have been subject-matters of distinct suits.

    But such a rule has no reference to a suit such as is contemplated by s. 28, which essentially relates to cases in which the subject-matter is one and the same. I am unable, to regard s. 45 as a restrictive proviso to s. 28, for the effect of such a view would be to nullify an important part the latter section. The very essence of the provisions of s. 45 is that there should be joint rights in the plaintiffs and joint liability of the defendants, whilst s. 28 distinctly contemplates the granting of relief against the defendants not only jointly and in the alternative, but also severally; and I cannot conceive how this can be done in a case in which the liability of the defendants is joint, as required by s. 45. There seems no more reason for holding that s. 45 limits the operation of s. 28, than there is for the view that the latter extends the scope of the former. I am therefore of opinion that s. 28 lays down a rule which is distinct from and independent of the rule laid down in s. 45.

    The question then is—Does the plaint in the present suit disclose one and the same subject-matter? The whole case, as stated in the plaint, comes to this—A, as the owner of the land, is entitled to its possession produce. B, C, and D wrongfully keep him out of possession, and during the continuance of such trespass treat E as their tenant, who, as such, opposes the plaintiff's possession; they then oust E, and sell the produce of the land to F, and let the land for cultivation to G and H, who as the tenants of the trespassers, are still in possession. Now throughout these allegations the trespass by the first three defendants B, C, and D, is an essential part of the complaint against the others. The case against any of the other defendants would necessarily be incomplete unless the wrongful act of B, C, and D, is also made subject of complaint. The whole suit forms one connected story, the wrongful acts alleged against E, F, G, and H, are essentially connected with and subsidiary to the trespass by B, C, and D, and they have all participated in the wrongful invasion of the plaintiff's proprietary right. The plaintiff A claims the relief which that proprietary right entitles him to viz., the possession of the land, and the value of the produce as mesne profits. That claims of this nature can be joined in one suit is clear from the provisions of s. 44, Rule a. It is true that only five out of the seven defendants are said to be in possession of the land, and that in claiming mesne profits the plaintiff has specified the various amounts which he claims from the other defendants along with the first three defendants; but each of those amounts is claimed also from the first three defendants, and if each of those amounts formed the subject of a separate suit, the first three defendants would, according to the plaintiff's case, be necessary parties to each suit. The specification can only enable the Court, in deciding a suit of this kind to give judgment against the defendants “according to their respective liabilities,” within the meaning of s. 28. The plaintiff values the mesne profits of the land at Rs. 91-4 per annum, and as the suit includes mesne profits for three years, the specification is intended to show that the mesne profits of each year are claimed from the principal trespassers jointly with those who participated with them in misappropriating the produce of that year.

    But this circumstance, according to my conception of the meaning of s. 28, does not multiply the matter in respect of which the relief is sought, nor does it render the suit multifarious. “The objection (of multifariousness) must be confined to cases where the case of each particular defendant is entirely distinct and separate in its subject-matter from that of the other defendants; for the case against one defendant may be so entire as to be incapable of being prosecuted in several suits, and yet some other defendant may be a necessary party to some portion only of the case stated. In the latter case, the objection of multifariousness could not be allowed to prevail. So it is not indispensable that all the parties should have an interest in all the matter contained in the suit; it will be sufficient if each party has an interest in some matters in the suit, and they are connected with the others.” (Story's Eq. Pl s. 271a.) To use the language of Vice-Chancellor Leacl; “in order to determine whether a suit is multifarious or, in other words, contains distinct matters, the inquiry is not whether each defendant is connected with every branch of the cause, but whether the plaintiff's bill seeks relief in respect of matters which are in their nature separate and distinct. If the object of the suit be single,—but it happens that different persons have separate interests in distinct questions which arise out of that single object,—it necessarily follows that such different persons must be brought before the Court, in order that the suit may conclude the whole subject,”—(Salvidge v. Hyde, 5 Madd, 138). On the interpretation of the various sections of the Civil Procedure Code, I cannot hold that the rule to be adopted by the Courts of Justice in India upon the particular point under consideration, was intended by the Legislature to be narrower than the rule which prevailed in the Courts of Equity in England. S. 26 of the Code distinctly limits the joimler of plaintiffs to suit “in respect of the same couse of action,” and the last part of s. 31 emphasizes the limitation thus imposed. But the whole of chapter III is entirely devoid of any such limitation in regard to the joinder of defendants. On the other hand, s. 28, which gives the widest scope to the joinder of defendants “in respect of the same matter” receives emphasis from the provisions of s. 42, which lays down that “every suit shall, as far as practicable, be so framed as to afford ground for a final decision upon the subjects in dispute, and so to prevent further litigation concerning them.”

    Now this last provision of the law is imperative, and unless something to the contrary is shown in the Code as amounting to a prohibition, it must, according to my view, be taken that the present suit in the form in which it has been brought was entertain-able. Reference was made on behalf of the defence to the provisions of s. 45, but I cannot understand that section, as I have already explained, to be a restrictive proviso to s. 28.

    Even upon the hypothesis of the defence it cannot be denied that it was necessary for the plaintiff to implead defendants Nos. 6 and 7 along with the first three defendants, for they are all in possession and obstructing the plaintiff from entering upon his own property. It is true that defendant No. 4 is no longer in possession, and that the only wrongful act attributed to defendant No. 5 is the purchase of the produce of the land from the first three defendants, the principal trespassers. But the plaintiff's case against them is an off shoot of the case against the first three defendants, the wrongful acts attributed to defendants Nos. 4 and 5 are essentially subsidiary to and connected with the trespass charged against the first three defendants. It may be that defendants Nos. 4 and 5 can substantiate pleas which, as a matter of substantive law, or, on the merits, would absolve them from liability. But this circumstance has no effect upon the question now under consideration; which is purely a matter of adjective law or procedure. I do not anticipate that any inconvenience can a rue in the trial of a suit such as the present. So far as the allegations in the plaint are concerned, all the defendants are interested in denying the plaintiff's title to the hind; they are all interested in showing that during the period in respect of which mesne profits are claimed the first three defendants had the right to let the land and to deal with the produce thereof.

    This would he the subject of the first issue, and the minor questions connected with the mesne profits cannot form the subject of more than three issues, similar to each other, each issue relating to each of the three years (in respect of which mesne profits are claimed), in order to ascertain the respective liabilities of the various defendants. The inference from the contrary opinion would be that the plaintiff is placed under the necessity of bringing at least three separate suits in respect of the mesne profits for each separate year. But an essential part of the plaintiff's claim is, that the first three defendants are liable for the mesne profits of each year along with such other defendant or defendants as participated in the produce of that year. Therefore, to each of the contemplated separate suits the first three defendants must be necessary parties, and plaintiff's title must come into question in every one of the three contemplated suits, and his right to take the produce be subject of adjudication. The policy of the law is to prevent the unnecessary multiplicity of suits. On the other hand, the provisions of ss. 31 and 34, as well as the latter part of s. 45, together with s. 46, seem to indicate that the Legislature intended to remove from the Civil Procedure of India technicalities which formerly defeated suits under a system of procedure not adapted to the method of pleading prevalent in this country. The view of the law taken by me in this reference appears to me to be fortified by the opinion expressed by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Janokinatk Mookerjee v. Ramrunjun Chuckerbutty (1),—a case in which the points for determination were similar to those which have arisen is the present case.

    My answer to this reference must, therefore, be in the negative.

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    Narsingh Das v. Mangal Dubey
    (Aug 26, 1882)