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    Niaz-Ullah Khan v. Nazir Begam

    Sir John Edge, C.J:— The suit out of which this second appeal has amen was one brought against a lambardar for a share of profits in a mahal which accrued for the years 1293 and 1294 Fasli. The plaintiff claimed under an assignment executed in her favour on the 29th of July 1889 by one Basti Begam, whom the plaintiff alleged to have been the heir to one Moti Begam deceased. Moti Begam during her life-time was a co-sharer and was recorded as such for the shares in respect of which the profits claimed accrued. Moti Begam died after the profits for 1293 Fasli had accrued due and before the profits for 1294 Fasli had become due and divisible.

    The suit was resisted on two grounds, one, which went to the whole suit, was that one Khwajah Bakhsh and not Basti Begam was the heir of Moti Begam. The other ground was that as to the profits claimed in respect of 1293 Fasli, they were profits due from the lambardar to Moti Begam deceased, and no certificate, probate or letters of administration within the meaning of s. 4 of Act No. VII of 1889 had been produced, although this suit was commenced after the coming into force of that Act. We shall dispose of the last point first. Act No. VII of 1889 applying, not only at the time when the suit was commenced, but also at the times when the decree in the first Court and the decree in appeal were passed, s. 4 precluded any of the Courts from giving a decree in the plaintiff's [110] favour for the profits of 1293 Fasli, no matter what her title may have been. So far the appeal succeeds with proportionate costs.

    The other ground of defence raises a more difficult question. It has been found on the evidence in the lower appellate Court that Basti Begam and not Khwajah Bakhsh was the heir of Moti Begam. It is contended, however, that a decree in another suit in which the present defendant-appellant was the plaintiff and in which Basti Begam and Khwajah Bakhsh were defendants, amongst others, and in which it was decided that Khwajah Bakhsh and not Basti Begam was the heir of Moti Begam, renders s. 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable. The other suit: to which we refer was instituted on the 3rd of June 1887, and was in respect of a house claimed by the present defendant-appellant, the then plaintiff, he claiming his title by assignment from Khwajah Bakhsh as heir to Moti Begam. In that suit the first Court on the 18th of November 1887, dismissed the suit on the finding that Basti Begam and not Khwajah Bakhsh was the heir of Moti Begam. The case went up on appeal, and the first appellate Court on the 19th of May 1890, reversed the decree of the first Court, finding that Khwajah Bakhsh and not Basti Begam was the heir of Moti Begam. That decree was affirmed by this Court on appeal on the 22nd of November 1892.

    There are two points to be kept in mind in considering how far, if at all, the litigation in the former suit affects the rights of the parties in this one. One is that the plaintiff here claimed by an assignment from Basti Begam, dated the 29th of July 1889, i.e, an assignment executed subsequently to the commencement of the other suit and prior to the final decree in that suit. The second point is that the subject-matter of the present suit was not in any sense the subject-matter of the former suit. There is no doubt that if the subject-matter of this suit had been any part of the subject-matter of the former suit, the doctrine of lis pendens would apply; and there is equally no doubt that if the assignment to the plaintiff here, who was no party to the former suit, had been made [111] subsequently to the final decree in the former suit, the principle of estoppel would apply. There appears to be, so far as we are aware, no decision of the Courts in India bearing upon the precise point which we have got to, decide. A similar question arose in the Engligh Courts as far back as 1834, in the case of. Doc dem Foster v. The Earl of Derby(1). In that case it was contended on the authority of a passage in Comyns' Digest (Title Evidence A. 5), that a verdict in another suit against a party through whom one of the parties claimed was admissible in evidence, although such verdict was subsequent to the creation of title in the party against whom it was proposed to give it in evidence. The passage in Comyns' Digest relied upon was:—“A verdict in another action for the same cause shall be allowed in evidence between the same parties, so it shall be evidence where the verdict was for one under whom any of the first parties claim.” That passage is explained in the judgment of Mr. Justice Little date at p. 790 of the Report thus:—“But that must mean a claim acquired through such party subsequently to the verdict. If, as has been now argued, the rule could be extended to parties claiming other lands under the same title previously to the verdict, the effect of such verdict might be carried back for a hundred years. None of the cases support such a proposition.” That ruling is treated as correct at the present day by the learned editors of Smith's Leading Cases (7th edition. Vol. II, p. 846), and the same distinction is recognised in Bigelow on Estoppels (p. 98). There are sound reasons of common sense why persons in the position of the plaintiff here should not be estopped by a final decree deciding the title of the person through whom the plaintiff claims, but deciding it in a suit to which the plaintiff was not a party, and deciding it after the date of assignment to the plaintiff, and deciding it in a suit in which the subject-matter of the present suit was not involved. As the plaintiff here was not interested by assignment or otherwise in any portion of the subject-matter of the prior suit she could not have availed herself of the provisions of s. 372 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and have got herself made a party to the prior suit in order to defend her interests [112] which were not involved in that suit, but which she had subsequently to the commencement of that suit and before final decree in that suit acquired.

    We are therefore of opinion that the final decree in the other suit does not affect the position of the plaintiff here, and it having been found in this suit in the lower appellate Court on evidence as a fact that her assignor, Basti Begam, was the heir of Moti Begam, she is entitled to maintain the decree which she obtained in the Court below so far as the profits for the year 1294 Fasli are concerned. The appeal succeeds in respect of the claim for the profits of 1293 Fasli, and the plaintiff's suit to that extent will be dismissed with proportionate costs, and the decree obtained below by the plaintiff will consequently be reduced by Rs. 242-0-3. Otherwise the appeal is dismissed with proportionate costs, and the decree below in respect of the profits of the year 1294 Fasli is affirmed with proportionate costs.

    Aikman, J.:— I concur.

    Decree modified.

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    Niaz-Ullah Khan v. Nazir Begam
    (Dec 7, 1892)