AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts

    Ranbir Singh (Decree-Holder) v. Drigpal And Others (Judgment-Debtors).

    [24] Burkitt, J.:— In this case it appears that the decree-holder, appellant, obtained a decree in the Court of final appeal in February 1887. That decree directed the sale of property in default of payment of certain money due on a hypothecation-bond. One or more attempts were made by the appellant to execute the decree before he made the present application for an order absolute for sale under s. 89 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Court of first instance gave him the order absolute he asked for. On appeal, however, the learned Subordinate Judge, reversing the order of the Court below, rejected the application. He held that an application under s. 89 is one to which the provisions of art. 178 of sch. ii of the Limitation Act apply, and that the application must be made within three years from the date when the right to apply accrued. The Court then proceeded to hold that the decree-holder's right to apply for an order under s. 89 of the Transfer of Property Act accrued within three years from the expiry of the six months' grace granted under s. 88 of that Act. Consequently, as this application for such an order was not made till December, 1890, and as the six months' grace expired some time in August, 1887, the Subordinate Judge held that the application was time-barred. The decree-holder appeals.

    In my opinion this view of the law of limitation which the Subordinate Judge has adopted is incorrect. The Subordinate Judge, referring to a former application for execution made by the decree-holder, quite correctly held that it was an application such as is contemplated by s. 235 of the Code of Civil Procedure and within the purview of art. 179 of sch. ii, of the Limitation Act. He then went on to say that the present application, i.e, the application for an order under s. 89 of the Transfer of Property Act was not an application like the preceding one, and was therefore unquestionably governed by art. 178 of sch. ii of the Limitation Act. In this matter the Subordinate Judge is mistaken. The Limitation Act undoubtedly makes provision as to the limitation applicable to all suits and appeals. As to applications, however, the purview of the Act is by the preamble restricted to ‘certain applications’ and therefore it evidently does not apply to all applications of all [25] kinds. It has been held in several cases, and the rule is now generally accepted that art. 178 applies only to applications “ejusdem generis” with the other applications mentioned in sch. ii, that is to say, to applications such as can be made under the Code of Civil Procedure. It was so held by the Chief Justice of Bombay and Mr. Justice Melvill in the case of Bai Manekbai wife of Rastamji Beramji v. Manekji Kavasji. That case has been frequently followed in other High Courts. Applying, then, the rule laid down in that case to the present appeal, it is clear that the order of the Subordinate Judge is wrong, for the application made to the Munsif was not one which under any circumstances could be presented under the Code of Civil Procedure. It is an application which could be made and granted only by virtue of the provisions of s. 89 of the Transfer of Property Act.

    Therefore, as this application is not one which could be made under the Code of Civil Procedure, I hold that art. 178 sch. ii of the Limitation Act, does not apply to it. The Limitation Act was enacted some years before the passing of the Transfer of Property Act, and I cannot find, nor has my attention been called to, any rule of Limitation aliunde which could be applied to an application under s. 89 of the latter Act. I am accordingly obliged to hold that there is no limitation rule under which the application made by the appellant in March, 1890, can be considered to fall and that it was not time-barred when made.

    I must therefore set aside the order of the Subordinate Judge rejecting the application as barred by art. 178, and, allowing this appeal, I dismiss the respondent's appeal to the lower appellate Court and I restore the order of the Court of first instance with costs against the judgment-debtor, respondent, in all the three Courts. I remand the record for the purpose of further execution.

    Appeal decreed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Ranbir Singh (Decree-Holder) v. Drigpal And Others (Judgment-Debtors).
    (Jul 28, 1893)