Sir John Edge, C.J and Banerji, J.:— The plaintiff in the suit out of which this appeal has arisen obtained on the 24th of December 1881, [287] a simple decree for money against one Mahabir Prasad. During Mahabir Prasad's lifetime this present plaintiff obtained under that money-decree attachment of half of a garden then belonging to Mahabir Prasad. After the death of Mahabir Prasad, his widow, Makundi Bibi, was brought on the record as his representative, and subsequently she sold to Babu Madho Das, the defendant-appellant in this appeal, the half of the garden which was then still under attachment, and certain other property which was in her possession, as the widow of Mahabir Prasad. That took place in 1884. By the sale-deed under which this other property was sold, it was agreed that Rs. 50,000 of the purchase-money should be treated as paid “on account of the demand of the decrees” of Babu Madho Das, and that two lakhs of the purchase-money should remain on deposit with Babu Madho Das, to be applied in payment of certain debts, and that if any balance should be left after the payment of those debts, Babu Madho Das should pay that balance to Makundi Bibi. Ramji Patak, the plaintiff in the suit against Mahabir Prasad, proceeded to execute his money decree by sale of the half of the garden. Babu Madho Das filed an objection to that execution, claiming, not as the representative of Mahabir Prasad or of Makundi Bibi, but as purchaser in his own right of the half of the garden. That objection was allowed. In execution of his decree for money the present plaintiff brought to sale the balance remaining due to Makundi Bibi out of the two lakhs which were left in Babu Madho Das' bands to be applied in discharge of the debts mentioned in the sale-deed to which we have referred. At the sale the present plaintiff purchased that balance for Rs. 100. Madho Das denied that there was any balance remaining. Thereupon the plaintiff brought this suit against Madho Das to obtain a declaration of his right to bring the half of the garden to sale in execution of his money-decree, and he also claimed that Madho Das should be compelled to produce the account of the purchase-money, i.e, the Rs. 2,50,000, and that the balance should be ascertained and should be decreed to be payable to him. He estimated such balance at Rs. 500, but the frame of his relief shows that he not only asked for such Rs. 500, but for any amount which might be found in excess of that sum as the balance due. The [288] suit was brought in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Benares. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit. The plaintiff appealed to the District Judge, and the District Judge on appeal gave the plaintiff a decree declaring his right to bring the half of the garden to sale under his decree for money, and also decreed in favour of the plaintiff Rs. 7,082-11, as the balance payable by Madho Das of the Rs. 2,50,000 purchase-money. From that decree this appeal has been brought by Babu Madho Das.
It has been contended that the District Judge had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal presented to him, as the plaintiff had left it uncertain in his relief claimed what the actual amount claimed as the balance was, and further that the District Judge had no jurisdiction as a Court of appeal to give a decree in appeal in the plaintiff's favour for any sum exceeding Rs. 5,000. These contentions were based upon Chap. III of Act No. XII of 1887, which is the Chapter which prescribes the ordinary jurisdiction of Munsifs, Subordinate Judges and District Judges. Now it has been held by this Court in Mahabir Singh v. Behari Lal that “for the purpose of determining the proper Appellate Court in a civil suit, what is to be looked to is the value of the original suit, that is to say, ‘the amount or value of the subject-matter of the suit.’ Such ‘amount or value of the subject-matter of the suit’ must be taken to be the value assigned by the plaintiff in his plaint and not the value as found by the Court, unless it appear, that, either purposely or through, gross negligence, the true value of the suit has been altogether misrepresented in the plaint.” As a matter of fact in this case the value assigned by the plaintiff in his plaint was Rs. 1,500. That valuation made the suit one which was triable in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, and that valuation also made the appeal from the decree of the Subordinate Judge he to the Court of the District Judge. The law contemplates that, in many cases, it may be impossible for a plaintiff, at the inception of his suit to state correctly the value of the relief which he seeks, as, for example, in cases to which s. 11 of the Court-Fees Act, 1870 (Act No. VII of 1870) [289] applies. This was particularly a case in which, until all the evidence had been taken, it was impossible for the plaintiff to put anything more than a hypothetical value on the relief claimed qua the balance in the hands of Babu Madho Das. In our opinion it would be impossible to hold that the jurisdiction of an Appellate Court should depend upon the amount of the decree of the Appellate Court. Take for example, this case. The lower Appellate Court here being satisfied that the plaintiff under his second relief was entitled to a decree for over Rs. 7,000, gave him that decree. If the lower Appellate Court had not jurisdiction to give that decree, what would have been the result? According to the argument for the defendant-appellant the lower Appellate Court could have done nothing except return the memorandum of appeal for presentation in the High Court. It could not, according to that contention logically worked out, have given the plaintiff in his appeal a decree for any sum whatever, even a sum less than Rs. 5,000, as, if that contention was correct, its jurisdiction was determined by the finding that the plaintiff was entitled in appeal to a sum exceeding Rs. 5,000. If that contention were correct and the lower Appellate Court returned the memorandum of appeal and it was presented in this Court as a first appeal, it is conceivable that this Court might have come to the conclusion that the plaintiff was entitled, we shall say, to Rs. 2,000 only. Now, if the defendant's contention were correct, in that event what could this Court do except again return the memorandum of appeal to be presented in the Court having jurisdiction, i.e, that of the District Judge? That is an illustration which we think goes to show that it is the plaintiff's valuation in his plaint which controls the jurisdiction, not only of the first Court, but of the Appellate Court, and not the amount which may be found and decreed by the first Court or by the Appellate Court. There are other considerations which lead us to the same conclusion. Take, for instance, a suit for pre-emption. The plaintiff brings his suit, for example, in the Court of a Munsif claiming pre-emption at a price of Rs. 700, honestly believing that was the sale-price and honestly, so far as he was concerned, alleging that the price in the sale-deed of Rs. 1,500 was false and fictitious. Now it appears to [290] us that in that suit the Munsif would have jurisdiction to decree pre-emption at a price of Rs. 1,500, if he found that the price alleged in the sale-deed was the true price, and that his jurisdiction to make a decree would not be ousted by that finding. If it were not so, see what the result might be. The Munsif would return the plaint to be presented in the Court of the Subordinate Judge. The Subordinate Judge taking a different view of the evidence might come to the conclusion that Rs. 1,500, the price alleged in the sale-deed, was a fraudulent and fictitious price, and that the true price was that alleged by the plaintiff, viz., Rs. 700. If the argument of the defendant in this case is correct, the Subordinate Judge in such a case would have to return the plaint to the plaintiff, so that he might comply with s. 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure by presenting his plaint again in the Court of lowest jurisdiction, namely, in the Court of the Munsif who had held previously that he had no jurisdiction. There are many other examples which might be given to show that convenience would require that the jurisdiction to hear a suit and make a decree, or to hear an appeal and make a decree in appeal, must be determined by the value assigned in the plaint, otherwise there would be no certainty as to the Court in which a suit should be brought, or as to the Court in which an appeal should be brought. It is to be observed that there is nothing in Chapter III of Act No. XII of 1887, which says that a Munsif shall not make a decree for more than Rs. 1,000 in a suit in his Court, or that a District Judge in an appeal from a Subordinate Judge shall not make a decree for more than Rs. 5,000. If other examples were necessary, we might refer to what might happen in a suit on a mortgage. Chapter III of Act No. XII of 1887 specifies the Court in which an original suit or an appeal shall be brought, but it does not limit the jurisdiction of any such Court as to the decree which it may make in a suit otherwise within its jurisdiction. We hold that the Court of the District Judge had jurisdiction to hear the appeal and to make the decree which the District Judge made in this case.
The next question to which we shall refer, is the contention on behalf of the defendant that s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure [291] bars this suit so far as the claim in respect of the half of the garden is concerned. That contention depends on whether Babu Madho Das was the representative within the meaning of s. 244 of the Code of Civil Procedure, of a party to the decree for money which this plaintiff had obtained against Mahabir Prasad. A legal representative he certainly was not. It has been held, and we think rightly, by the High Court at Calcutta and the High Court at Bombay and by this Court that where the decree in execution is a decree for sale of hypothecated property a purchaser who had purchased under a private sale from the judgment-debtor the property, or part of it, so decreed to be sold was a representative within the meaning of s. 244, and there was good reason for so holding, because the suit and the decree were based on the mortgage or hypothecation-bond. The proceeding was really one in rem qua the property, and the person claiming title to the property affected by those proceedings would be a representative within the meaning of s. 244. In a suit for sale under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. (Act No. IV of 1882) such a purchaser, if his purchase was made before the institution of the suit, and if the plaintiff in the suit had notice of the purchaser's interest, would, by reason of s. 85 of that Act, be a necessary party to the suit. If the purchase was made after the suit was instituted it was made pendente lite. In either case, if for no other reason, convenience suggests that such purchaser should be treated as a representative of the defendant-mortgagor from whom he purchased the whole or part of the property, the sale of which was sought by the plaintiff in the suit. The same principle would, we consider, apply if the purchase was made before suit, and the plaintiff had before suit no notice of the purchaser's interest. In this case, however, the decree against Mahabir Prasad was not a decree based upon any document hypothecating any property; it was not a decree for sale; it was a simple money-decree, and the only connection between that decree and the defendant here is that the plaintiff sought in execution of that money-decree to bring to sale property purchased by the defendant here from the legal representative of the judgment-debtor. In our opinion, it would be stretching s. 244 too far to hold that section [292] included in an application for execution of a simple money-decree a person who had purchased from the judgment-debtor property against which the decree was sought to be executed, but which was not affected by the decree itself and would not be affected until an order for attachment or an order for sale in execution of the decree was made. We therefore hold that the objection of Babu Madho Das to the attachment of the half-garden was one which came under s. 278 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and, that objection having been allowed, s. 283 of the Code applied and this suit was the plaintiff's sole remedy.
The last point to which we shall refer, although it was the first argued in the appeal, was that there could be in law no attachment of the balance of Rs. 2,50,000 remaining unappropriated in the hands of Babu Madho Dis. It was contended that in law you cannot attach as a debt money which may be due unless the amount has been ascertained. The first case which was relied on in support of that contention was Syud Tuffuzzool Hossein Khan v. Raghoonith Pershad. It appears to us that the case which their Lordships of the Privy Council were dealing with, bore no resemblance to that here, and that so far as their Lordships' judgment could be applicable in a case like this, it would support the contention of Mr. Jogindro Nath Chaudhri, who appears here for the plaintiff-respondent, that the balance in question was attachable. In that case what was attempted to be attached was the possible debt which might be awarded by arbitrators to be a debt. That the debtor, whose debt was sought to be attached had, prior to the agreement to refer to arbitration, property which was capable of attachment was beside the point, because by the agreement of reference the rights of the parties to that agreement were made to depend, not on the facts as they existed at the date of the agreement of reference, but on such award as the arbitrators should make. We need only quote one passage from the judgment of their Lordships of the Privy Council: “In the present case the attachment, as it has been observed, is not of the antecedent share in the undivided assets. It is of a claim under a future award, as to which it is wholly uncertain, until the award [293] be made to what the debtor will be entitled. The uncertainty at the time of the attachment and sale was not limited to a mere question of quantum, it was wholly uncertain, as Sir George Couper has correctly explained in his judgment, in what the arbitration might terminate.” We were also pressed with the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Bebee Tokai Sharob v. Davod Mullick Fnreedoon Beglar. As to Chat case we need only say that there the claimant established adverse title, and that further the Privy Council held that an uncertain right in unascertained property was not the subject of attachment. In the case of Abbott v. Abbott and Crump what was sought to be attached was the assets of a judgment-debtor as yet unascertained in partnership business which were in the hands of a receiver, the decree-holder being one of partners. Until the dissolution of the partnership and the ascertainment of the share in the assets of the partners such share could not be treated as a debt attachable in execution of a decree. The decision of Sir, J. Stuart, V.C in Hill v. Boyle does not apply to a case like this, even assuming it to be a correct exposition of the law, as to which matter we express no opinion. There can, in our opinion, be no doubt that money or a balance in the hands of an agent, which he has received from, or holds for, his principal to be applied to certain purposes can be recovered from that agent as money had and received to the use of the principal, if the agent fails to apply it, or if, the agent having applied part of it, a balance remains in the hands of the agent; and the fact that when the principal brings his suit to recover such balance he may, until the agent's accounts are produced, be unable to specify the particular amount of the balance remaining in his agent's hands and due to him does not prevent such balance being a debt due to the principal. Such balance is a sum of money which the agent is bound on principles of justice and equity to pay over on demand to his principal, although there may have been no actual but only an implied agreement to re-pay such balance. Such a balance was always assignable in equity and passed to the assignee in equity a good title [294] to sue, and was so assignable as a debt. We are not referring to a case in which the agent loses the money pending the agency, so that it was never held by him to any use other than that of the agency, nor are we referring to a case in which an agent having received money from his principal to pay to a third party had, before the agent had notice that his authority to pay had been revoked, given notice to the third party that he held the money for him. As this case is not one of such cases, we need express no opinion as to what would be the rights of the principal or of the agent in such cases.
It was contended on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant that those cases in which it has been held that equity will not enforce the assignment of a mere naked right to litigate applied in this case. It appears to us that those cases have absolutely no application to the case of a debt in the hands of a vendee or an agent sought to be attached by a creditor of the person to whose order and for whose benefit the money is held. What was attached here was, in our opinion, a debt; although the amount of the debt was unascertained, it was capable of being ascertained, and as such debt it was attachable under s. 266 of the Code of Civil Procedure; it was not a mere right to sue for damages which would have been excluded from attachment by the proviso to that section. We are consequently of opinion that the balance which was found to have been in the hands of Babu Madho Das was legally attachable, was legally sold in execution of the decree for money and vested in the auction-purchaser, although that auction-purchaser happened to be the decree-holder.
There was one other question which was raised as to the construction of the sale-deed from Makundi Bibi to Babu Madho Das. It was contended that the Rs. 50,000 were to be treated as applied in satisfaction of the decrees held by Babu Madho Das in his own name. The sale-deed was incorrectly translated in the paper book here, but even on that incorrect translation, which we have given, the clause relating to Rs. 50,000 is capable of applying to decrees obtained by Babu Madho Das ism farzi, and that is the view of the Court below. We dismiss this appeal with costs.
Appeal dismissed.