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  • Act VI (Bengal Council) of 1870,
  • sec. 26 of the Evidence Act,
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  • Act VI (Bengal Council) of 1870,
  • sec. 26 of the Evidence Act,
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The accused, Bepin Behary Dey, was tried before the Sessions Court of Birbhum on a charge of murder for causing the death of Suchand Kalu. Two Assessors opined that the charge was not established, but the Sessions Judge disagreed, convicted the accused under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to transportation for life. The accused appealed against that finding and sentence.

The prosecution's case, as set out in the opinion, is that the deceased (about 18 years old) had earlier offended the accused by splashing water on the accused's young wife; the accused purchased a bhojali (weapon) from a blacksmith, Batobi Karmokar, and on 14th April, while the deceased was writing in the accused's baitakhana, the accused suddenly attacked and fatally struck him. Relations of the deceased, searching for him, went to the accused's baitakhana where, after keys were procured and the door opened, the body was found. The accused was arrested by the village chowkidar (Grish Chowkidar) and reportedly confessed, saying he had killed to avenge the insult and that he had used an axe which he had thrown into a neighbour's house.

Police information was sent at about 1 a.m. of the 15th. Sub-Inspector Rash Mohun Dey inspected early on the 15th but reportedly found nothing of importance in an initial search and could not locate the alleged axe. Later the same day, another officer, Rassik Lal Das, took up the inquiry and found a bloody footprint matching the accused's foot, a blood-stained dhuti under a bedstead and a blood-stained bhojali in a basket of rejected cocoons. Multiple prosecution witnesses and the Civil Medical Officer (Dr. Fleming) gave evidence at the trial. There were no direct eyewitnesses to the attack.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the confession of the accused, made while in the custody of the village chowkidar, was inadmissible under section 26 of the Evidence Act because the chowkidar should be treated as a "police-officer" within the meaning of sections 25 and 26.
  2. Whether the evidence adduced for the prosecution (including circumstantial evidence and physical exhibits) was reliable and sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
  3. Subsidiary factual issue (addressed by Assessors): whether the place where the dead body was found (the accused's baitakhana) was a plausible scene of the murder or whether the murder must have been committed elsewhere. (The court notes this was not pressed before it.)

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The confession made by the accused while in the custody of the village chowkidar is inadmissible under section 26 of the Evidence Act because the chowkidar should be regarded as a police officer within the meaning of sections 25 and 26.
  • The totality of the evidence is unreliable and insufficient to support a finding of guilt — specific points raised include inconsistency about the weapon, the fact that the bloody footprint and other incriminating items were not found in the first police search, conflicting evidence as to ownership of the weapon, alleged enmity of some prosecution witnesses, and overall room for doubt even if the prosecution evidence were accepted.
  • Authorities cited in support of the first contention included Queen v. ??? Chunder Ghose and Queen-Empress v. Bhima.

Prosecution's Case (as summarized in the opinion)

  • The accused had motive (revenge for insult to his wife), purchased a weapon from Batobi Karmokar shortly before the incident, and attacked the deceased in the accused's baitakhana during the deceased's accustomed activity of writing papers for the accused.
  • After the body was discovered in the baitakhana with multiple wounds, the accused was arrested and confessed (although he initially named a different weapon and a different place where it was disposed).
  • Subsequent police search uncovered a bloody footprint matching the accused, a blood-stained dhuti identified as the accused's, and a blood-stained bhojali in a basket of rejected cocoons; the post-mortem evidence and a blood-stained piece of paper (bearing the deceased's handwriting) corroborated aspects of the confession and the circumstances of the killing.
  • Prosecution called multiple village residents, the blacksmith and his servants, the investigating police officers, and the Civil Medical Officer to establish the sequence of events, ownership of the weapon, and the medical circumstances of death.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Queen v. ??? Chunder Ghose Interpreting protections in sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act broadly; concerns about confessions to police officers. The court acknowledged the case and its salutary rule (that such sections should be construed widely) but distinguished it: that case concerned whether a Deputy Commissioner of Police was a "police-officer" within section 25; the present case concerns whether a village chowkidar is such an officer, and the court found it distinguishable.
Queen-Empress v. Bhima Application of sections 25 and 26 to determine whether certain functionaries (there, a police patel in Bombay) fall within "police-officer". The court treated this case as following the previous one (affirming that some local officers can be police-officers for these sections) but held it distinguishable from the present facts; it emphasized that the chowkidar is not a police-officer in the same sense.
Queen Empress v. Fatia Binappaji Used as supportive authority regarding the proper application of sections 25 and 26 in context. The court stated that its view — that a village chowkidar is not a police-officer within the meaning of sections 25 and 26 — was to some extent supported by this decision.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two main analytical stages corresponding to the appellant's contentions.

1. Admissibility of the confession (sections 25 and 26, Evidence Act)

  • The court accepted the general protective principle reflected in earlier authorities (e.g., Queen v. ??? Chunder Ghose) that sections like 25 and 26 are to be construed broadly to protect accused persons.
  • However, it distinguished the present situation factually: the earlier cases turned on whether higher-ranking local functionaries (Deputy Commissioner of Police; a police patel) were "police-officers" within the meaning of the sections. The court asked whether a village chowkidar should be similarly regarded.
  • The court examined the nature and duties of a village chowkidar (citing Act VI (Bengal Council) of 1870 as defining his duties) and concluded that a chowkidar is not a police-officer either in a technical or in a popular sense: he lacks powers to hold police inquiries and is only authorized to arrest proclaimed offenders or persons found committing certain offences.
  • The court reasoned that the rationale for excluding confessions to police officers (the risk of threats, promises, or other improper influence by an officer with investigative powers and duties) does not apply to a chowkidar who lacks such powers and duties and thus is not likely to exert the same improper influence.
  • For these reasons, and with some support identified in Queen Empress v. Fatia Binappaji, the court rejected the appellant's contention that the confession was inadmissible under section 26.

2. Sufficiency and reliability of the evidence

  • The court noted the Assessors' opinion (that the room was not a likely place for a murder in broad daylight and the murder must have occurred elsewhere) had not been pressed and, in any event, was rendered implausible by the presence of blood marks all over the room indicating the killing occurred there.
  • The court examined the several attacks on the prosecution case: (a) the accused's confession allegedly contradicted by the facts as to the weapon, (b) the footprint and blood-stained items were not found in the first police search, (c) conflicting evidence on ownership of the weapon, (d) alleged enmity of some witnesses, and (e) asserted remaining doubt even if evidence believed.
  • On the weapon discrepancy in the confession, the court observed the accused may have deliberately misled others about the weapon when confessing (possibly from self-preservation), and that this inconsistency did not fatally impair the confession's value because other parts of the confession were corroborated.
  • The court found important corroboration of the confession: the accused stated he struck the deceased while the deceased was writing. This point was corroborated by (i) a blood-stained piece of paper proved to bear the deceased's handwriting and (ii) the Civil Surgeon (Dr. Fleming)'s medical opinion that certain wounds (Nos. 5 and 6) were mortal and "the man could not have received [them] while standing. He must have received them in a stooping posture," consistent with the deceased's posture while writing.
  • Concerning the absence of incriminating items in the first police search, the court accepted the explanation that the first Sub-Inspector (Rash Mohun Dey) was comparatively inexperienced and did not make a careful search; it saw no reason to suspect the veracity of witnesses who described the later comparison of the footprint and the subsequent discovery of the cloth and weapon.
  • Discrepancies in testimony from Batobi Karmokar, his servant and a relative were attributed plausibly to inaccuracy rather than deliberate falsehood; taking the evidence together, including a letter that Bani Chowkldar said the accused gave to be taken to Batobi, the court concluded ownership of the bhojali by the accused was sufficiently proved.
  • Alleged enmity among some witnesses was found not to be established to an extent that would make it likely they would falsely implicate the accused in a serious charge like murder.
  • Overall, the court found the circumstantial evidence excluded every reasonable hypothesis except the guilt of the accused, and the confession (properly considered and corroborated in key particulars) placed his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court affirmed the conviction and sentence and dismissed the appeal.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that Bepin Behary Dey's conviction for murder under section 302 IPC and the sentence of transportation for life were upheld.
  • The court rejected the proposition that a village chowkidar is to be treated as a "police-officer" within sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act for the purpose of excluding confessions; it applied statutory duties (Act VI (Bengal Council) of 1870) and policy reasoning about the scope of police powers to reach that conclusion.
  • The opinion does not state any broader rule of law declared as a new precedent beyond the application of existing authorities to the facts; it distinguished earlier cases and noted a supporting decision but primarily resolved the issues on the facts and existing legal principles as applied to a chowkidar's status and the sufficiency of corroborated circumstantial evidence.
Appeal dismissed.

    Queen-Empress v. Bepin Behari Dey Accused.

    The Judgment of the Court was as follows:—

    The accused Bepin Behary Dey was tried before the Sessions Court of Birbhum on a charge of murder, for causing the death of one Suchand Kalu. The Assessors were both of opinion that the charge was not established against the accused; but the learned Sessions Judge, disagreeing with them, has found the accused guilty of the offenoe with which he was chaffed, and has sentenced him under sec. 302 of the Indian Penal Code to transportation for life.

    Against that finding and sentence the accused has preferred the present appeal.

    The case for the prosecution is shortly this:—The deceased, Suohand Kalu, a youth of about 18 years of age, who was a fellow-villager of the accused, and who used frequently to go to his house to play chess, or to do his writing work, had, a few days before the occurrence, given offence to the accused by splashing water on the person of his wife, a girl of the age of 13 or 14 years, when she was bathing in a tank the accused had since been watching for an opportunity to take his revenge. He purchased a weapon, namely, a bhojali, from a blacksmith, named Batobi Karmokar, and, on the 14th April last, while the deceased was writing some papers for him in his baitakhana, as he was accustomed to do, the accused suddenly attacked him and gave him several severe blows with the bhojali, which caused his death Immediately. Pulin Behari Mundle and other relations of Suohand, not seeing him return home, felt anxious as time advanced. They came to the accused who was the collecting punchctit of the village, and requested him to write for them an itla or notice to be sent to the thana to the effect that Suchand was missing.

    The accused made various pretexts that he could not open his baitakhana to get pen, ink and piper, as the key of the door padlock could not be found, aid offered to go to Pulin's house to write the notice there. Eventually, Pulin and his companions insisting that the notice should be written in the baitakhana of the accused, a key was brought, and though it did not fit the padlock ezaotly, the padlock opened upon being moved, the door was then opened, and the body of Suchand was found with several wounds on it. The accused was then charged by the people assembled there with having murdered Suchand. He was arrested by Grish Chowkidar and he confessed his crime, adding that he had committed the murder to avenge the insult offered to his wife, but said he had killed Suchand with an axe which he had thrown into the house of a neighbour called Babaji Information was sent to the police on the night of the 14th or, more correctly, at about one o'clock of the morning of the 15th. The Sub-Inspector, Rash Mohun Dey, arrived at the spot early in the morning of the 15th, found the dead body in the baitakhana of the accused, made some search' in the baitakhana, but discovered nothing of importance, and then made an unsuccessful search for the axe mentioned by the accused. At about noon of the same day another police-officer, Easslk Lal Das, arrived at the spot and took up the Inquiry, and, on making a further search in the baitakhana, found a bloody foot print, which, on comparison, tallied with a foot of the accused, and he found a blood-stained dhuti underneath a thaktaposh or bedstead, and a blood-stained bhojali in a basket of rejected cocoons.

    To prove this case at the trial before the Sessions Court, there were examined for the prosecution, Pulin Behari Mundie, the brother of the deceased, Ram Chand Mundle, Rash Beharl Mundle and Pertap Chunder Mundle, his fellow-villagers and relations, Saroda Prosad Sirkar, the gomastha of the village, Grlsh Chowkldar, the chowkldar of the village) and Nobin Sheik, Shadananda Shaw and Dinu Das, residents of the village Khodepur, to the finding of the dead body of Suohand in the baitakkhana of the accused to his confession and to different stages of the search by the police, and three of whom, namely, Pulin, Ram Chand and Rash Beharl Mundle, speak also to the conduct of the accused before the discovery of the dead body of Suchand. In evading their request to open his baitakhana. There have also been examined Batobi Karmokar, his servant Easturi Karmokar, and his relative Ram Dhari Mlstree, the first two deposing to their having sold the bhojali to the accused a few days before the day' of occurrence, and the third to the fact of his having made that weapon and having left it with Batobi Karmokar for sale. Then there have been examined Chandi Dhopa, the washerman of the accused, who deposes to the blood stained dhuti being the property of the accused, Beni Chowkldar, who corroborates the witness Batobi Karmokar, and Chunder Das Bairagl, who was examined to disprove a suggestion made on behalf of the accused, that the deceased might have been murdered by a man named Pertap Poddar, and who says that Pertap Poddar had left the village some days before the day of occurrence. There is also the evidence of the investigating police-officers, Rash Mohan Dey and Rassik Lal Das. Lastly, there is the evidence of Dr. Fleming, the Civil Medical Officer, who held the post-mortem ??? in this case, and who corroborates the other evidence as to the circumstances under which the murder was committed.

    Thus, though there are no eye-witnesses to the occurrence, if the evidence, of which a brief returné is given above, is admissible and reliable, a clear case is made out against the accused.

    The learned vakil for the Appellant contends, first, that a part of this evidence, namely, that relating to the confession of the accused, is inadmissible under sec. 26 of the Evidence Act, the confession having been made by the accused whilst he was in the custody of the village chonkidar, and secondly, that the evidence is unreliable and ??? to establish the guilt of the accused.

    In support of the firs contention the cases of Queen v. ??? Chunder Ghose and Queen-Empress v. Bhima are relied upon.

    Without departing in the slightest degree from the salutary rule enunciated by Garth, C.J, in Quetn v. ??? Chunder Ghose that it is “better in construing a section such as the 25th, which was intended as a wholesome protection to the accused to construe it in its widest and most popular signification;” we must say that case and the case Queen-Empress v. Bhima , which follows it, are clearly distinguishable from the present, and that this case came neither within the letter nor within the spirit of secs. 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act in the first-mentioned case the question was whether the Daputy Commissioner of Police in Calcutta was a police-officer within the meaning of sec. 25, and in the second case the question was whether a police patel in Bombay came within that section; and the question in each case was answered in the affirmative. The question before us is whether a village chowkidar is a police officer Within the meaning of secs. 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act. Now, a village chowkidar is not a police-officer in any Sense, technical or popular. His duties, as defined in Act VI (Bengal Council) of 1870, are not the same as those of an ordinary police-officer. He has do power to hold any police inquiry. The only power of arrest he has in common with a police-officer is that of, arresting a proclaimed offender, or a person found actually committing certain descriptions of offences. The reason why the law in secs. 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act jealously excludes a confession made to a police officer, and a confession made by an accused whilst in the custody of a police-officer unless it be made in the Immediate presence of a Magistrate, is that there is room for apprehension that a police-officer who is armed With large powers over accused persons may unwillingly excite terror in their minds and extort ??? and Involuntary confessions and his duty to investigate criminal cases and to detect offenders and bring them to justice may make him feel tempted fo obtain confessions from accused persons by threat, or promise, or other improper influence; but the reason for the rule can have no application to a chowkidar who is vested with no such power, on whom no such duty of detecting and bringing to justice an offender is imposed, and who is not therefore likely to exercise any such infiuence or to be under any similar temptation. The view we take is to some extent supported by the case of Queen Empress v. Fatia Binappaji (3). The first contention of the learned vakil for the Appellant must therefore fail.

    We have now to consider the second contention urged for the Appellant, namely, that the evidence is unreliable and insufficient.

    The ground upon Which the Assessors base their opinion in favour of the accused namely, that his house in which the dead body of Suohand was found, was not a place in which a murder was likely to be committed in broad day-light, and that the murder must have been committed somewhere else was not pressed before us; and, indeed, it could not, on the face of the evidence, have been pressed with any degree of plausibility, seeing that there were, as has been amply proved, marks of blood all over the room, clearly indicating that the murder must have been committed in that room and nowhere else.

    The ground upon which the case for the prosecution has been attacked on the evidence are, that the confession of the accused, as deposed to by the witnesses, is not borne out by the facts proved, but is, on the contrary, contradicted as regards the weapon; that the bloody footprint and the blood-??? cloth and weapon were not discovered on he first search by the police that the evidence of to the ownership of the weapon is conflicting and unsatisfactory that some of the witnesses who give evidence against the accused bear enmity towards him: and that the evidence, even if believed to be true, leaves room for doubt) as to the guilt of the accused.

    These arguments, no doubt, are entitled to consideration; but after having given our best attention to the case, the conclusion we arrive at is that the evidence adduced for the prosecution is true, and that it leaves no room for reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.

    As to the confession of the accused, no doubt, it is not borne out by the evidence so far as the weapon with which the murder was committed is concerned. It may well be, as the learned Sessions Judge in his careful and well-considered judgment has pointed out, that the accused whilst making the confession might have felt impelled by the instinct of self-preservation not to point out the weapon with which the crime was committed, but to put people on a wrong track. But be that as may, we are of opinion that the confession is corroborated in one important point by unimpeachable evidence. The accused in his confession said that he struck the deceased whilst he was writing; and this is borne out not only by the blood-stained piece of paper produced before the Court and proved to bear the handwriting of the deceased, but also by the evidence of the Civil Surgeon, who says, “wounds Nos. 5 and 6” (which according to him were mortal wounds) “the man could not have received while standing. He must have received them in a stooping posture.”

    As to the foot-print and the bloodstained doth and weapon not being discovered until after the arrival of the second police officer, Russik Lal Das, we do not think that circumstance can creat any suspicion. The Sub-Inspector who made the search in the first instance was a comparatively in-experienced officer, and he did not make any careful search, and we do not see any reason to suspect the veracity of the witnesses who depose to the comparison of the foot print and the finding of the blood stained cloth and weapon in the baitakhana of the accused.

    There are, no doubt some discrepancies in the deposition of ??? Karmokar, his servant Kaaturi Karmokar, and his relative Rimdhari Mistree; but they may, to some extent, be due to inaccuracy of statement on the part of the witnesses rather than to deliberate falsehood. Taking the evidence on this point as a whole, and along with the letter which the witness Bani Chowkldar says was given to him by the accused to be taken to Batobi, we think that the ownership of the bhojdi by the accused is sufficiently made out.

    As for the argument that some of the witnesses for the prosecution have given false evidence against the accused out of enmity, we must say that it is untenable. In the first ??? very little of direct enmity with the accused is made out; and, in the second place, the ill-feeling, such as might exist between the accused and one or two of the witnesses, is not shown to be so bitter as to make it likely that the witnesses would seek to implicate the accused falsely in a serious charge like that of murder.

    Touching the last argument of the learned vakil for the. Appellant, it is enough to say that nob only is the circumstantial evidence adduced against the accused such as excludes every reasonable hypothesis except that of the guilt of the accused, but his own confession places his guilt beyond any reasonable doubt.

    Upon a careful consideration of the evidence, therefore, we must affirm the conviction and sentence and dismiss the appeal.

    Appeal dismissed.

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    Queen-Empress v. Bepin Behari Dey Accused.
    (Nov 17, 1897)