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Case Number
Judges
  • Woodroffe
  • Mookerjee, JJ.
Acts
  • sections 198 and 199 of the Criminal Procedure Code
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
  • Woodroffe
  • Mookerjee, JJ.
Acts
  • sections 198 and 199 of the Criminal Procedure Code
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Smart Summary

Legal Opinion Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner complained to the Deputy Magistrate of Satkhira on 25 February that one Batu Dhali had married the petitioner’s son Hanif’s wife, Meherjan Bibi. It was alleged that Hanif was insane, that he had been married to Meherjan about ten years earlier, and that Meherjan’s father Nobai took her from the petitioner’s house in December and that a marriage ceremony between Meherjan and Batu had been subsequently performed. The Deputy Magistrate examined the complainant and issued a warrant against Batu and Meherjan for an offence punishable under section 494, Indian Penal Code. On 9 March, Batu appeared and was released on bail; Meherjan did not appear and a fresh warrant was issued on 20 March.

On 3 April Batu raised a preliminary objection that the complainant was not competent to institute proceedings as a “person aggrieved” within the meaning of section 198 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC). The Deputy Magistrate, relying on the decision in Queen-Empress v. Bai Ruhshmoni, sustained that objection and discharged Batu under section 209, CrPC, and recalled the warrant against Meherjan. The District Magistrate declined to interfere. The petitioner then obtained a Rule from this Court to challenge the Deputy Magistrate’s order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, for the purposes of section 198 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the complainant in this case (the father-in-law of the alleged bigamist’s wife, and head of the family whose son is a lunatic) is a "person aggrieved" competent to institute criminal proceedings under section 494, IPC.
  2. How the phrase "person aggrieved" in section 198 should be construed in light of section 199 and the legislative scheme distinguishing certain private offences.

Arguments of the Parties

Complainant / Petitioner

  • The petitioner alleged that his son Hanif was insane and that Meherjan Bibi had been living under his protection as his daughter-in-law.
  • He alleged that Meherjan was taken to her father's house in December and was subsequently married to Batu, amounting to an offence under section 494, IPC.
  • Implicit in the petitioner's position was that, given these facts and his role as head of the family and guardian of the lunatic son, he was a person "aggrieved" within the meaning of section 198, CrPC and thus competent to complain.

Accused / Respondent (as presented in the record)

  • Batu raised a preliminary objection under section 198, CrPC, contending that the complainant was not a person aggrieved and therefore not competent to institute the proceedings.
  • The Deputy Magistrate sustained this objection relying on the authority of Queen-Empress v. Bai Ruhshmoni and discharged Batu under section 209, CrPC, and recalled the warrant against Meherjan.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Queen-Empress v. Bai Ruhshmoni Held that a complainant, merely as the brother of a lunatic, could not prosecute the wife of the latter for bigamy (i.e., that the brother was not a "person aggrieved"). The Deputy Magistrate below relied on this decision to discharge the accused. The Court reviewed that case and held it did not lay down an inflexible rule excluding all brothers in every circumstance.
Chhotalal v. Nathabhai Articulated that the grievance must be a "legal grievance" — not merely fanciful or sentimental — and addressed who may be a person aggrieved; emphasised caution in allowing anyone to drag such private offences into court. The Court adopted Jenkins, C.J.'s formulation from this case as authoritative: a complainant must show a legal grievance. The Court relied on this principle in construing "aggrieved" under section 198.
Deputy Legal Remembrancer v. Sarna Kahmi Recognised that where the offence charged is bigamy on the part of the wife, the husband is a person aggrieved within the meaning of section 198, CrPC. Used as an example showing that the husband is undoubtedly a person aggrieved for bigamy; supported the proposition that more than one class of persons may be aggrieved depending on circumstances.
Emperor v. Alii Also held that when the offence charged is bigamy on the part of the wife, the husband is a person aggrieved under section 198. Reinforced the point that the husband is a classically aggrieved person in bigamy cases; the Court treated these decisions as consistent authority for that proposition.
Emperor v. Imtiazan Held that the brother of the man with whom the alleged bigamy was committed was not a person aggrieved within the meaning of section 198. The Court noted this decision as an instance where a non-husband relative was held not to be aggrieved, distinguishing it on its facts from the present case.
Thakur Das v. Adhar Chandra Held that where imputations were made against the character of a Hindu lady (a widow) residing in the house and under the charge of her brother, the brother was a person aggrieved within section 198 in a defamation case. The Court relied on this decision to support the proposition that a brother (or other relative) may be a person aggrieved depending on the circumstances and local conditions; it was used to justify permitting relatives to complain in appropriate situations.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by identifying that the central question is the construction of section 198, CrPC, which restricts cognizance of certain private-character offences (including bigamy under section 494, IPC) to complaints made by "some person aggrieved." It contrasted section 198 with section 199, observing that section 199 restricts complaints in relation to sections 497 and 498, IPC specifically to the husband (or person having care of the woman), whereas section 198 uses the broader term "person aggrieved" for listed offences including section 494. This difference in language informed the Court's interpretive approach.

The Court observed that "aggrieved" is not defined in the Code and adopted the guiding principle from Jenkins, C.J., in Chhotalal v. Nathabhai that the grievance must be a legal grievance — not merely fanciful or sentimental — and that no inflexible, all-purpose rule can be laid down; whether a complainant is "aggrieved" depends on the nature of the offence and the facts of the particular case.

The Court reviewed authorities: it acknowledged cases where the husband was held unquestionably to be a person aggrieved in bigamy cases, but rejected any rigid rule that only the husband could be aggrieved. It analysed Queen-Empress v. Bai Ruhshmoni and noted that the decision did not establish a universal rule precluding a brother (or other relative) from being aggrieved in all circumstances. The Court referred to Emperor v. Imtiazan, where a brother was held not to be aggrieved, as a fact-specific outcome not determinative of all similar situations. It also relied on Thakur Das v. Adhar Chandra to show that a brother can be a person aggrieved in appropriate circumstances (there, in a defamation matter involving a woman living under her brother’s charge).

The Court gave weight to legislative language: if the Legislature had intended that only the husband could complain about bigamy, it could have included section 494 in section 199, but it did not. Applying these principles to the facts, the Court observed that the complainant was the head of his family, that his son Hanif was a lunatic, that the daughter-in-law had been living under his protection, and that her alleged removal and subsequent marriage to Batu would affect the complainant’s reputation and status in society. On these facts the Court concluded that the complainant suffered a legal grievance within the meaning of section 198.

Accordingly, the Court held that the Deputy Magistrate erred in sustaining the preliminary objection and discharging Batu; the complainant was competent to institute the complaint and the proceedings should continue.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Rule was made absolute. The order of the Deputy Magistrate discharging the accused Batu Dhali under section 209, CrPC and recalling the warrant against Meherjan is set aside, and the Deputy Magistrate is directed to proceed with the case against these persons according to law.

Implications: The direct effect is that the criminal proceedings under section 494, IPC initiated by the petitioner are to be permitted to continue because, on the facts before the Court, the petitioner (the father-in-law and head of the family whose son is a lunatic) is a "person aggrieved" within the meaning of section 198, CrPC and thus competent to complain. The Court’s reasoning emphasises that the question of who is a person aggrieved under section 198 is fact-specific and requires a legal (not purely sentimental) grievance; the opinion does not purport to establish a rigid new rule excluding or including any particular class in all cases. No broader doctrine beyond the fact-specific holdings and interpretive guidance articulated was announced.

Judges represented in the opinion excerpt: Woodroffe, J.; Mookerjee, J. The Rule was ultimately made absolute.

Show full summary ...

    Daem Sardar v. Batu Dhali

    Woodroffe, J.:— The facts of this case are stated in the judgment of my learned brother and I need not repeat them. I think it is sufficient to say that it must be determined in each case according to its own circum stances whether the complainant can be said to be in a legal sense a person ‘aggrieved’ within the meaning of sec. 198 of the Criminal Procedure Code. I agree also with my learned brother in holding that the complain ant in this case was competent to institute and carry on the proceedings and that the Rule should be made absolute in the terms mentioned in his judgment.

    Mookerjee, J.:— This is a Rule calling upon the Magistrate of the District of Khulna to show cause why the order of the Deputy Magistrate of Satkhira discharging the accused under sec. 209 of the Criminal Procedure Code, should not be set aside. It appears that on the 25th February last, the petitioner complained to the Deputy Magistrate that one Batu Dhali had married the wife of the petitioner's Son Hanif who was insane; it was alleged that Hanif had been married to Meherjan Bibi about ten years ago, that her father Nobai took her away from the petitioner's house in December last, and that since then the ceremony of marriage has been performed between Meherjan and Batu. The Magistrate examined the complainant and directed the issue of warrant against Batu and Meherjan for having committed an offence punishable under sec. 494, Indian Penal Code. On the 9th March, Batu entered appearance and was released on bail. As Meherjan, however, did not appear, a fresh warrant was issued on the 20th for her arrest. On the 3rd April, Batu took a preliminary objection that the complainant was not competent under sec. 198 of the Criminal Procedure Code to institute criminal proceedings as a person aggrieved by the alleged offen;ce within the meaning of that section. The Magistrate gave effect to this objection upon the authority of the case of Queen-Empress v. Bai Ruhshmoni (1) and discharged the accused Batu Dhali under sec. 209, Criminal Procedure Code. He further directed the recall of the warrant against Meherjan who up to that time had not entered appearance. The petitioner next moved, the District Magistrate who agreed with the view taken by the Deputy Magistrate and declined to interfere. The complainant thereupon moved this Court and obtained the present Rule.

    2. The decision of the question raised before us turns upon the construction of sec. 198 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which provides that no Court shall take cognizance of an offence falling under Chap. XIX or Chap. XXI of the Indian Penal Code, or under sees. 493 to 496 (both inclusive,) of the same Code, except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by such offence. Chap. XIX of the Code treats of the criminal breach of contracts of service, Chap. XXI deals with defamation, and sees. 493-496 deal with offences relating to marriage, excepting adultery and enticing away a married woman, which are covered by sees. 497 and 498, to which sec. 199 of the Criminal Procedure. Code is made applicable. Sec. 199, Criminal Procedure Code, lays, down that no Court shall take cognizance of an offence under, sec. 497 or 498 of the Indian Penal Code, except upon a complaint made by the husband of the woman, or, in his absence, by some person who had care of such woman on his behalf at the time when such offence was committed.

    3. It is obvious, therefore, that sections 198 and 199 of the Criminal Procedure Code impose a restriction upon the institution of Criminal proceedings in the case of certain specified offences which may be regarded as offences of a private character. As pointed out by Jenkins, C.J in Chhotalal v. Nathabhai (2) it would be eminently undesirable that any one should have it in his power to drag into a Court of justice offences of this sort, and that this was the possible mischief against which it was sought to guard by the provisions of secs. 198 and 199, Criminal Procedure Code. But although these two sections are founded on the same policy, there is an obvious distinction between the phraseology of the two. For, whereas sec. 199, allows a complaint of an offence under sees. 497 and 498 to be preferred only by the husband of the woman, or, in his absence, by some person who had care of her on his behalf, section 198 allows a complaint of an offence specified therein, and therefore of an offence under sec. 494 to be preferred by any person aggrieved thereby. Now, the term “aggrieved” is nowhere defined in the Code, nor is there any indication of the kind of grievance which may qualify a man to complain. But I agree with Jenkins, C.J in his view as expressed in the case of Chhotalal v. Nathc-bhai () that “any fanciful or sentimental grievance would not suffice: it must be such a grievance as the law can appreciate; it must be what has been termed a legal grievance; and not a stat pro ratione voluntas reason.” It is obviously impossible to lay down any inflexible rule for determining in every case whether the complainant is a person aggrieved by the offence alleged; the answer to the question must depend upon the nature of the offence and upon the special circumstances of each case. Thus it has been held, and in my opinion correctly, that when the offence charged is bigamy on the part of the wife, the husband is undoubtedly a person aggrieved within the meaning of sec. 198, Criminal Procedure Code: see the Deputy Legal Remembrancer v. Sarna Kahmi (3), and Emperor v. Alii (4). These cases, however, do not lay down that when the offence charged is bigamy, none but the husband can be the aggrieved person. A case on the other side of the line is that of Emperor v. Imtiazan (5) in which it was held that the brother of the man with whom the alleged bigamy was committed was not a person aggrieved within the meaning of the section, and upon the facts stated, in the report, it is not easy to see how any other view could have been possibly taken-The case of Queen Empress v. Bai Rukshnioni (6) upon which reliance was placed in the Court below and in which the learned Judges held that a complainant, merely as the brother of a lunatic, could not prosecute the wife of the latter for bigamy, does not lay down any hard and fast rule of law. It appears from the report that on behalf on the accused, the broad contention was advanced that in cases of bigamy, the only person that can be said to be aggrieved is either the husband or the wire: this, however, was apparently not accepted by the Court, and the learned Judges laid down in somewhat guarded terms that the complainant merely as the brother of the lunatic was not a person aggrieved within the meaning of sec. 198. If, however, the learned Judges intended to rule that under no circumstances can a brother be an aggrieved person within the meaning of sec. 198, I am unable to assent to such view of the law, which is contrary to the principles laid down by the Full Bench in the case of Chhotalal v. Nathabhai () and is directly opposed to the decision of this Court in the case of Thalcur Das v. Adhar Chandra (). I am not prepared to dissent from the view of the law taken in this latter case in which it was held that where imputations were made against the character of a Hindu lady, a widow, who was residing in the house and under the charge of her brother, having regard to the circumstances and conditions under which people live in this part of India, the brother was a person aggrieved within the meaning of sec. 198, Criminal Procedure Code, and it was competent to a Court to take cognizance of the offence of defamation upon his complaint. I may point out, however, that the learned Judges assumed that it has been held by a majority of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Chhotalal v. Nathabhai (), that only a husband can lay a charge of defamation when a wife is defamed. An examination of the judgment of the Full Bench will show that the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court did not lay down any such proposition. They held merely that in such a case, the husband is a person aggrieved; and the principles which they adopt, are perfectly consistent with the view taken by this Court in the case of Thakur Das v. Adhar Chandra (). I am further fortified in the view I take, by the difference in the language of secs. 198 and 199 to which I have already referred; if the Legislature had intended that the husband alone of the woman who was guilty of bigamy should be competent to institute a complaint, sec. 494, Indian Penal Code might easily have been included in sec. 199, instead of in sec. 198 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In the case before me, the complainant is apparently the head of his family, his son is a lunatic, and his daughter-in-law had been living under his protection; his allegation is that she was taken away to the house of her father and subsequently married to the accused. There can be no doubt that the offence, if true, seriously affects, to use the language of Jenkins, C.J in Chhotalal v. Nathabhai (), his reputation and status in society. I must hold, accordingly, that the father-in-law, in the circumstances of this case, was a person aggrieved within the meaning of sec. 198, Criminal Procedure Code and, was competent to institute the complaint; the case appears to me to be both within the letter and the spirit of the rule.

    4. The order of the Deputy Magistrate discharging the accused Batu Dhali under sec. 209 of the Criminal Procedure Code and recalling the warrant against the accused Meherjan is set aside and he is directed to proceed with the case against these persons according to law. The Rule is made absolute.

    5. Rule made absolute.

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    Comments

    Daem Sardar v. Batu Dhali
    (Sep 26, 1905)