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  • sec. 14 of Act XX of 1863 (the Religious Endowments Act)
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  • sec. 14 of Act XX of 1863 (the Religious Endowments Act)
Smart Summary

Summary of Opinion — Woodroffe, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiffs are members of the Sitambari sect of the Jain community in Calcutta and claim an interest in the maintenance and worship at the Jain temple at No. 139, Cotton Street. They allege the temple was established by members of their sect and that the community alone has the power to appoint trustees. The Plaintiffs claim they were appointed by their community as trustees and authorised to take charge of the temple and its properties.

Defendants claim to be trustees by virtue of an alleged appointment made by the late trustee Hira Lall Johurry. Plaintiffs deny that Hira Lall Johurry validly appointed the Defendants and assert that if such an appointment was made it was beyond his authority. Plaintiffs allege they have demanded possession from the Defendants, who have refused.

The suit was instituted in three titles: (1) in the Plaintiffs' personal capacity as trustees; (2) by leave under section 30 of the Code on behalf of themselves and other members of the Sitambari Jain community; and (3) in their individual capacity as members of that community. The plaint seeks primary relief (declaration that Plaintiffs are trustees, possession, and ancillary relief) and alternative relief (appointment of new trustees, framing of a scheme for management, and ancillary relief) if the primary claim fails.

Procedurally, the Defendants applied for dismissal of the suit with costs on the ground that the suit falls within the terms of section 539 and was not maintainable because no prior consent of the Advocate-General had been obtained. Counsel for both sides agreed to treat the matter as if it had come for settlement of issues.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the present suit falls within the scope of section 539 of the Code (i.e., whether it is a suit of the character requiring the sanction/consent of the Advocate-General).
  2. If the suit does fall within section 539, whether that section is mandatory (prohibiting institution of such suits except as provided) or permissive/enabling (leaving pre-existing rights of suit unaffected).
  3. Whether the primary relief claimed by the Plaintiffs (their individual claim to be trustees and to obtain possession) is within the scope of section 539 or is an enforcement of personal/individual rights outside that section.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendants' Arguments

  • The case falls within the terms of section 539 and that section is mandatory; consequently, the present suit must have been instituted only in accordance with that section (i.e., with the Advocate-General's consent where required) and not otherwise.

Plaintiffs' Arguments

  • The suit, or at least that portion of it seeking the primary relief (declaration that Plaintiffs are trustees and recovery of possession), does not fall within section 539.
  • If section 539 does apply to some suits, it is not mandatory but permissive/enabling. Pre-existing rights of suit survive: interested persons may jointly sue, or may sue by representative action under section 30 of the Code, or two or more persons may sue under section 539 with the Advocate-General's consent.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For (as stated in the opinion) Application by the Court (how the precedent was used or distinguished)
Tricum Dass Mulji v. Khimji Vullabh Dass Authority cited for view that section 539 is mandatory. Cited as part of cases supporting the mandatory view; the Court noted this line of authority but did not adopt it as controlling in the present case.
Lutifunnissa Bibi v. Nazirun Bibi Authority cited for view that section 539 is mandatory. Placed among decisions supporting mandatory character; the Court treated the authorities as conflicting and examined both lines of decisions.
Subbayya v. Krishna Cited in both contexts: as authority relevant to the scope of section 539 and to the idea that suits which existed prior to the section may still lie. Used to support the proposition that where an ordinary right of suit existed before the enactment it is not taken away by the procedural section; treated as part of the conflicting authorities and relied on for the permissive interpretation.
Sayad Hussain Mian v. Collector of Kaira Cited for view that section 539 is mandatory. Not applied to the present facts; included among authorities supporting the mandatory view which the Court considered but ultimately rejected.
Sajedur Raja v. Baidyanath Deb Cited for view that section 539 is mandatory. Cited as part of the mandatory line; the Court discussed it but preferred the view that section 539 does not oust pre-existing rights of suit.
Sathappayyar v. Periasami Authority supporting the view that section 539 is permissive/enabling and does not take away pre-existing rights. Relied on to support the position that founders or heirs retained rights of suit unaffected by the procedural provision.
Thackersey Dewraj v. Hurbhum Nursy Authority cited for permissive view of section 539. Placed among cases supporting the non-restrictive interpretation; used to show conflicting case law.
Sajedar Raja Chowdhury v. Gour Mohan Dass Baishnav Discussed in two contexts: (a) cited for the proposition that the section did not create a new and special jurisdiction in respect of removal of trustees; (b) noted for a decision allowing joinder of ejectment of an alienee to a suit for administration (which the present Court regarded as wrongly decided or distinguishable). The Court observed that some rulings from this line were distinguishable and explicitly considered whether its reasoning should be followed; it rejected the extension that would bring the present suit within the section for the Plaintiffs' primary relief.
Nellaiyappa Pillai v. Thangama Nachiyar Cited among authorities treating section 539 as permissive/enabling. Used to support the view that certain suits permitted before the section remain permissible.
Kalee Churn Giri v. Golabi Illustrated the historical doubtfulness of the extent of mofussil Courts' equitable jurisdiction (e.g., relief where no breach of trust alleged). Referred to in the historical overview of equitable jurisdiction limitations prior to the Code.
Ganapati v. Savithri Referenced regarding whether the Court could order a scheme to be framed. Noted as part of the survey of remedial possibilities that pre-existed or were clarified by the section.
Jawahra v. Akbar Hussain Authority that Lal worshippers may have suits to enforce purely personal and individual rights (e.g., free access for worship) which are not within section 539. Used to illustrate that suits enforcing individual worship rights are distinct from representative public-trust suits under section 539.
Anandrav v. Shankar Same context as Jawahra — suits enforcing personal individual rights are not within section 539. Referred to as part of cases distinguishing personal rights from representative public-trust suits.
Venkatachalapati v. Subbarayadu Same contextual use as above (personal rights distinct from section 539 suits). Referenced to support that certain personal claims fall outside the section.
Kalidas Jivram v. Gor Porjaram Cited among cases where Lal worshippers may sue to rectify maladministration, restrain breaches, etc. Used as part of the general catalogue of remedies available apart from section 539.
Vengamuttha v. Pandaveswara Similar citation: suits by worshippers to rectify maladministration may lie apart from section 539. Referred to in explaining the kinds of relief that were available independently of the section.
Subbarayadu v. Asanali Sheriff Same category: enforcement of trust remedies apart from section 539. Included in the survey of pre-existing remedies.
Rangasami v. Yaradappa Illustrated that outside Presidency Towns there was originally no public official who could take action, hence section 539 was enabling for such persons. Used to explain the enabling aspect of section 539 for public officers in mofussil areas.
Raghubardail v. Kesho Ramanuj Cited for the proposition that jurisdiction may now be exercised to give directions even where there may have been no breach of trust. Used to illustrate that section 539 clarifies or confers jurisdiction to give certain directions.
Kazi Hassain v. Sagun Balkrishna Authority for the proposition that suits against strangers (alienees or trespassers) are not within section 539. Relied upon to support the principle that the section is directed against trustees and not mere strangers/trespassers.
Lakshman Dass Parashram v. Ganpatrar Krishna Listed among cases showing that suits against alienees from the trustee are not within section 539. Used to illustrate limits of the section's scope (strangers excluded).
Sheoratan Kunwari v. Ram Pargash Cited multiple times: as supporting permissive view and as authority on suits by founders/heirs. Used both to show permissive interpretation and as an example of suits not affected by the section.
Husseni Begam v. The Collector of Moradabad Authority listing that suits against alienees are not within the section. Referred to in the Court's exposition of the section's limits.
Budh Sing Dudhuria v. Niradbaran Roy Cited for two points: (a) that joinder of ejectment of an alienee to a claim under the section may be misjoinder; (b) that the general clause of "further or other relief" must be read with preceding specific clauses. The Court agreed with this authority when rejecting the view that a claim simply to eject an alienee falls within section 539 and when construing the scope of the general relief clause.
Vishvanath Gobind Deshmane v. Rambhat Held that suits against trespassers/strangers are not within the section; cited in support of that rule. Used to emphasize that section 539 targets trustees (including de son tort trustees) rather than mere trespassers.
Augustine v. Medlycott Another authority cited for the principle that suits against trespassers are not within section 539. Referred to as part of the line of decisions delimiting the section's scope.
Strinivasa Ayyanger v. Strinivasa Swami Also cited to show that claims against trespassers are outside the section. Used in the Court's list of supporting authorities.
Shri Dhundiraj Ganesh Deb v. Ganesh Included among cases showing the section does not apply to mere trespassers. Referred to in summarising precedents on the point.
Muhammad Abdullah Khan v. Kallu Listed with other authorities that suits against strangers are not within the section. Used to support the distinction between trustees and strangers.
Jugal Kishore v. Lakshman Das Raghu Nath Dass Cited for the use of terms "trustee de son tort" and "constructive trustee" and their treatment in prior authorities. Referenced in the discussion distinguishing trustee de son tort from a constructive trust.
Lakshmandas Raghoonath Das v. Jugol Kishore Authority that when two or more persons sue with consent they sue to represent the public. Used to explain the representative character required for suits under section 539.
Vishvanath v. Rambhat Authority that suits to enforce a personal claim to be trustee are not within section 539. Applied directly to support the conclusion that the Plaintiffs' personal trusteeship claim falls outside the section.
Manijan Bibi v. Khadem Hossain Cited alongside Vishvanath for personal-claim exceptions to the section. Used to reinforce the course of authority excluding personal trusteeship claims from section 539.
Miya Valiullah v. Sayed Bava Authority that a claim to be co-trustee or to vindicate personal management rights is outside section 539. Relied on to show that litigation to enforce individual trusteeship rights is not the type of representative suit contemplated by section 539.
Navroji Manekji v. Dustur Kharsedji Example of a suit to vindicate management rights which is not within section 539. Used as a direct parallel to the present contest between claimants to trusteeship.
Gyana v. Kandasami Cited as authority that suits to ensure trusts are managed by those entitled are not within section 539. Referenced in support of the distinction between representative public suits and individual enforcement suits.
Neti Rama Jogiah v. Venkata Charulu Authority where section 539 applied because plaintiffs did not claim to be trustees but alleged a vacancy and sought appointment of new trustees. Distinguished by the Court as factually different; used to show why the present case is not within the section when Plaintiffs themselves claim trusteeship.
Jamaluddin v. Mujtaba Husain Cited for the proposition that the general clause of “further or other relief” must be read with preceding specific clauses. Used to reject the argument that a declaration that Plaintiffs are trustees falls within the catch-all relief clause of section 539.
Sheoratan Kunwari v. Ram Pargash (repeat) Appears again as authority supporting pre-existing rights unaffected by section 539. Reiterated in the discussion giving weight to permissive interpretation.
Nillaiyappa v. Thangama Cited for the proposition that a general manager (and by analogy certain other persons) may sue independently of the section. Used to support the conclusion that suits allowed prior to the Code remain permissible.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first framed the dispute: the Defendants' application to dismiss under section 539 for want of the Advocate-General's prior consent, and the Plaintiffs' contention that at least their primary relief is outside the section or that the section is permissive. The Court observed conflicting authorities on the mandatory vs permissive character of section 539.

On the character of section 539, the Court concluded that the section is not mandatory in the sense of ousting pre-existing substantive rights of suit. Two principal reasons supported this conclusion as given by the Court:

  1. The Code is a statute of procedure, and procedural enactments presumptively do not extinguish substantive rights unless they expressly do so; section 539 contains no express provision taking away pre-existing rights of suit.
  2. Historical and judicial authorities show that certain rights (e.g., rights of a founder or his heirs to enforce trusts) existed and were respected independently of the Code; the section can be read as enabling additional parties (public officers, two persons with consent) to sue where previously they could not, rather than as cutting down prior rights.

The Court nevertheless observed it was unnecessary to rest the decision solely on whether the section is mandatory because the threshold question is whether the present suit is of the character contemplated by section 539. If it is not, the mandatory/enabling debate is moot.

The Court analysed the substantive nature of the suit against the prerequisites of section 539:

  • The section contemplates suits brought against trustees (express, constructive or trustees de son tort). The plaint must allege the defendant is a trustee; suits against strangers, alienees or mere trespassers are not within the section.
  • Although the Plaintiffs assert the Defendants are trespassers, the Court observed the Defendants here recognise the trust and are administering it under a claimed appointment; a person who assumes the administration of a trust without title can be a trustee de son tort and is liable as such.
  • Even if the defendant is a trustee in some sense, a further condition of section 539 is that the suit be representative — brought to enforce the public rights of those for whom the trust exists. If the suit seeks to vindicate a personal or individual right (for example, a private claim to be trustee or to exclusive management rights), it is not within the section.
  • The Court emphasised distinctions between (a) suits to enforce individual claims to trusteeship or management (treated as outside section 539) and (b) suits where plaintiffs do not themselves claim trusteeship and instead seek appointment of new trustees or directions for administration (which may fall within section 539 if the reliefs correspond to those enumerated in the section).
  • The Court considered whether there was any alleged breach of an express or constructive trust necessitating directions for administration. It found none relevant to the Plaintiffs' primary claim: the alleged appointment by the late trustee was only relevant as the Defendants' asserted title and did not constitute the cause of action in this particular suit, which is the Plaintiffs' assertion that the Defendants acting under that claim must yield to the Plaintiffs' own asserted title.
  • The Court distinguished the present case from decisions (e.g., Neti Rama Jogiah) where plaintiffs alleged a vacancy and sought appointment of new trustees — relief which plainly falls within section 539; by contrast, here Plaintiffs claim trusteeship themselves, and if they succeed no appointment or court scheme would be necessary.
  • With respect to the scope of the section's catch-all clause for "further or other relief," the Court interpreted that clause in light of the preceding specific clauses and authorities (notably Budh Singh Dudhuria and Jamaluddin) and held that a mere declaration of title (i.e., that Plaintiffs are trustees) does not fall within that general clause when read contextually.

On these bases the Court concluded that, insofar as the Plaintiffs sue in their individual capacity as trustees to enforce their personal claim to trusteeship and possession (prayers (b), (c) and ancillary prayers insofar as they are ancillary to those primary prayers), the suit is not within the scope of section 539 and therefore did not require the Advocate-General's leave for institution.

The Court expressly refrained from deciding the position as to the Plaintiffs' alternative or secondary relief (prayers (d), (f) and related ancillary relief) which would arise only if the Plaintiffs failed to make out their primary claim.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The application by the Defendants to have the suit dismissed under section 539 for want of the Advocate-General's consent is refused with costs (the Court refused the application to dismiss and awarded costs as of a hearing).

Implications (direct effects stated in the opinion)

  • The Plaintiffs may proceed, at least as regards their primary claim brought in their individual capacity as trustees (prayers (b), (c) and ancillary prayers insofar as ancillary to those primary claims), without having previously obtained the leave of the Advocate-General under section 539.
  • The Court did not decide the position in relation to the secondary or alternative relief (prayers (d), (f) and their ancillary relief) which would be implicated only if the Plaintiffs failed to establish their initial claim to be trustees; that question remains to be determined if and when it arises.
  • The opinion states and applies the legal propositions that: (a) section 539 is to be read as not abolishing pre-existing substantive rights of suit; (b) suits to enforce personal claims to be trustees are generally not within the section; and (c) suits under section 539 must be representative and for the protection of public rights under a public trust.

This summary is confined to the matters expressly discussed and decided in the provided opinion. Matters not decided in the opinion (including the disposition of the secondary relief claim if it arises) were left open by the Court.


Counsel and Attorneys (as recorded in the opinion): Mr. N. C. Bose (Attorney for the Plaintiffs); Messrs Orr, Dignam & Co. (Attorneys for the Defendants).

Opinion delivered by Woodroffe, J.

    Rai Budreedas Mukim Bahadur v. Chuni Lal Johurry

    Woodroffe, J.:— This is an application by the Defendants that the suit should be dismissed with costs on the ground that it is one within the terms of sec. 539 and is not maintainable, no consent of the Advocate-General to its institution having been previously obtained.

    The discussion of a preliminary objection as to the form of the application became unnecessary, as learned Counsel for both sides agreed to treat the matter as though it had come before me for settlement of issues.

    The claim is alleged to be demurrable. In the determination of an objection of this nature the facts must be taken and accepted as they appear in the plaint.

    As there stated, the Plaintiffs are members of the Sitambari sect of the Jain community at Calcutta who claim as such to be interested in the maintenance of the Jain temple situate at No. 139, Cotton Street, as also in the worship of the Thakurs there kept. The Plaintiffs say that the temple was established by the members of their sect and that the appointment of trustees of the temple rests with such members—that they have been in fact appointed as trustees by their community and authorised to take charge of the temple and its properties. They further say that the Defendants, who claim to be trustees by virtue of an alleged appointment made by the late trustee, Hira Lall Johurry, are not trustees but are trespassers. They deny in the first place that Hira Lall Johurry in fact appointed the Defendants to be trustees and they further charge that if lie did so it was without authority on his part, as the power of appointing trustees was vested in the community alone. They state that they have demanded possession of the Defendants who are now in charge under their claim to be trustees, but that the Defendants have refused it.

    Upon these facts, the Plaintiffs institute this suit in three titles. First, in their personal capacity as trustees of the temple. Secondly, they sue, with leave under sec. 30 of the Code, on behalf of themselves and other members of the Sitambari Jain community of Calcutta. Thirdly, they sue in their individual capacity as members of such community.

    Two sets of relief are claimed in the plaint. The first, which I may call, the primary relief and the second is alternative relief in the event of their failing to establish their claim to the first. They seek under the heading of primary relief that it may be declared that the Defendants are not trustees of the temple and its properties and that the Plaintiffs are such trustees (cl. b), that the Defendants may be ordered to make over possession of the temple and its properties to the Plaintiffs as such trustees (cl. c), and for further relief ancillary to that mentioned (cls. e, g, h and i).

    The Plaintiffs, however, go on to pray as an alternative case that, in the event of the Court being of opinion that their appointment as trustees is not valid, then that new trustees may be appointed and that the Defendants be directed to make over possession to such new trustees (cl. d), that, if necessary, a scheme may be framed for the management and conduct of the temple and properties (cl. f) and for further relief ancillary to that mentioned (cls. e, g, h and i).

    It is to be observed, that if the Plaintiffs succeed in establishing their case that they are trustees, then the alternative relief sought in cls. d and f of the prayer of the plaint become unnecessary; for if they be held to be trustees, there is no necessity for the appointment of new trustees nor for a scheme nor for the administration of the trusts which will then be in their hands as such trustees.

    The Defendants deny that the appointment of trustees rests, as alleged, with the community and assert that, according to the prevailing custom, the future trustee of the temple is appointed by the trustee for the time being before his death and that in accordance with such alleged custom they were in fact appointed by the admitted late trustee Hira Lall Johurry and are thus entitled to possession and management of the temple and its properties. In short, the contest on this point is as to which party is entitled to be trustee.

    They then take the objection on which this application is founded.

    On behalf of the Defendants, it has been argued that the case comes within the terms of sec. 539 and that section is mandatory: that in other words the present suit being of the character mentioned in this section must be brought in accordance with its provisions and not otherwise.

    For the Plaintiffs it has been contended that: this suit and in any event that portion of it which seeks the primary relief, to which I have referred, does not come within this section; that if it does, the section is not mandatory but enabling and permissive—in other words, that apart from any individual right, of suit it is open to all interested to jointly sue, or to one or more persons to institute a representative suit under sec. 30 of the Code, or to two or more persons to sue under sec. 539 with the consent of the Advocate-General.

    The case law upon which this, as upon several matters dealt with by this section, is conflicting.

    It has been held, on the one hand, that this section is mandatory [see Tricum Dass Mulji v. Khimji Vullabh Dass(1), Lutifunnissa Bibi v. Nazirun Bibi(2) and see Subbayya v. Krishna(3), Sayad Hussain Mian v. Collector of Kaira(4) and see Sajedur Raja v. Baidyanath Deb(5)].

    On the other hand, it has been held that the section does not take away pre-existing rights or remedies and that like sec. 14 of Act XX of 1863 (the Religious Endowments Act) it is merely permissive and enabling [see Sathappayyar v. Periasami(6), Thackersey Dewraj v. Hurbhum Nursy(7), Subbayya v. Krishna, and see Sajedar Raja Chowdhury v. Gour Mohan Dass Baishnav(8) and Nellaiyappa Pillai v. Thangama Nachiyar(9)].

    In the latter view, the first thing to be ascertained is whether the suit comes within the scope of the section. If it does not, then no question as to its mandatory character arises. If, however, a suit is one upon a cause of action and for relief mentioned in the section, then it is to be determined whether that particular suit would have lain prior to the enactment of the section. If it would have so lain it will lie now. That is a question of substantive law and if that law affirms the right of suit the latter may be instituted in the ordinary jurisdiction and as so instituted will be governed by the ordinary procedure. If it would not have lain, then it is obvious that the suit must be instituted according to the provisions of this section—that is, with sanction and in the High Court or District Court or not at all.

    In my opinion the section is not mandatory as contended for on behalf of the Defendants.

    It has been pointed out that this section did not, in respect of the removal of trustees, create a new and special jurisdiction, [Sajedar Raja v. Gour Mohan]. The equitable jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over charities and of the High Court, its successor, was complete and no amendment of the law was required. Though the mofussil Courts in their character as Courts of Equity gave relief in matters of public trust, the extent and nature of their jurisdiction was in some respects doubtful, as for instance whether relief could be given where no breach of trust was alleged, [see Kalee Churn Giri…Plaintiff; v. Golabi…Defendant.(10)], whether a Plaintiff might seek the appointment of new managers when there was merely a case of vacancy. [Subbayya v. Krishna], whether the Court could order a scheme to be framed [ib.: though — see Ganapati v. Savithri(11)]. Other relief, however, which it has been held comes within this section might always have been obtained. So, numerous cases establish the right of a founder of an endowment or his heirs to enforce the due performance and rectify abuses of the trust, to remove the old and appoint a new trustee, to sue to set aside alienations by the trustee, and to recover trust property for the trust.

    Similarly it has been held, though there is some conflict on the point, that Lal worshippers may [apart from suits, which are not within the section, to enforce some purely personal and individual right such as that of free access for worship: Jawahra v. Akbar Hussain(12), Anandrav v. Shankar(13), Venkatachalapati v. Subbarayadu(14), Kalidas Jivram v. Gor Porjaram(15), Vengamuttha v. Pandaveswara(16), Subbarayadu v. Asanali Sheriff(17)] sue to rectify maladministration of the trust, restraining a breach of trust, restoring possession to the trust, seeking an account and removing old and appointing new trustees. The cases on this point will be found collected in Mr. Iyer's useful work on Hindu Endowments to which I have been referred (see p. cclxviii, et seq.). So much for the nature of the relief which might have been given independent of this section.

    Then as regards parties in the Presidency Towns, it was always competent to the Advocate-General to initiate proceedings in matters of public trust. If, further, all persons interested joined, they were always competent to maintain a suit for the removal of a trustee, [Sajedar Raja v. Gour Mohan].

    Then has this section done away with or affected rights of suit which existed prior to and independently of it? I think not. If an individual could have sued before, he can, in my opinion, do so now. If all persons interested join, or a representative suit is brought under sec. 30, the jurisdiction of the ordinary Courts, in cases where it existed before still continues, [Subbayya v. Krishna].

    That this is so must, apart from judicial precedent, appear from a consideration of the two following circumstances: Firstly, the Code is one of procedure. Presumably therefore it does not take away or affect existing substantive rights unless it says so. Secondly, the section does not say so. To support the contrary contention, it would have to be read as if the words “but no other person or persons” were inserted between the words “Advocate General” and “may institute.” That is, that no person but the Advocate-General or a public officer or two persons with their consent can sue in the case of an alleged breach of trust or where directions for administration are neces sary for the relief mentioned in the section.

    Nextly, there is authority the other way. It has thus been held that the right of a founder or his hairs to sue is not affected by this section, [Sathappayyar v. Periasami, Sheoratan Kunwari v. Ram Pargash(18)], and that a general manager is entitled to sue independently of it, the Court observing that it did not think that such a right was intended to be affected by this section, for, if it were, the rights which existed prior to it would be seriously restricted and it was difficult to believe that the Code intended to restrict special rights of the character in question, [Nillaiyappa v. Thangama]. In my opinion, on the same principles, such suits as were permitted to worshippers before the enactment of this section are not restricted by it. Of course, in all such cases the question would have to be determined whether there was a right of suit existing prior to the Code of 1877. If there was none, the question under discussion does not arise.

    I think, the argument addressed to me by learned Counsel for the Plaintiffs is sound, namely, that the section is not restrictive but cumulative in its effect. Its action is shortly this. As regards parties it confers a right on certain persons who had none before, namely, the Collector or other public officer such as the Legal Remembrancer in Allahabad Outside the Presidency Towns there was originally no public official who could in all such cases take action, [Rangasami v. Yaradappa(19)]. It is therefore entirely enabling as regards such persons. As regards the general public interested, it is enabling in this sense that two persons may now sue where it would have been necessary before that all should sue or that some should obtain leave to sue on behalf of the rest. To this special privilege it annexps a condition to prevent wasteful suits in that it requires that sanction should be obtained. Then as regards relief, it either confers or makes clear the jurisdiction of mofussil Courts to grant certain relief. Thus jurisdiction may now be exercised whenever the direction of the Court is necessary, not withstanding that there may have been no breach of trust, [Raghubardail v. Kesho Ramanuj(20)]. Appointment of trustees may be made in cases of mere vacancy and a scheme may be framed.

    It is not however, necessary to dispose of this case on this ground, for no question of the mandatory character of the section arises unless the suit is of the character mentioned in it.

    It is of course admitted that the trust is a public one. But the section further assumes that the suit is a representative one brought for the benefit of the public and to enforce its rights upon a cause of action alleging a breach of trust or necessity for directions for administration against a trustee and for the particular relief mentioned.

    It has been contended that the section does not apply as the Defendant is a mere trespasser and not a trustee.

    The opening words of the section imply the existence of a trustee who is alleged to have been guilty of the breach of trust referred to, [Subbayya v. Krishna].

    The plaint must allege that the Defendant is a trustee and if that is denied by him it must be established on the evidence.

    It is on this principle, viz., that the suit contemplated by the section is directed against trustees, that it has been held that as against strangers it does not apply, [Kazi Hassain v. Sagun Balkrishna(21)]. Such, as alienees from the trustee, [Lakshman Dass Parashram v. Ganpatrar Krishna(22), Sheoratan Kunwari v. Ram Pargash, Husseni Begam v. The Collector of Moradabad(23), Kazi Hassain v. Sagun Bal Krishna, Budh Sing Dudhuria v. Niradbaran Roy(24)], or trespassers [Vishvanath Gobind Deshmane v. Rambhat(25), Augustine v. Medlycott(26), Strinivasa Ayyanger v. Strinivasa Swami(27), Shri Dhundiraj Ganesh Deb v. Ganesh(28), Muhammad Abdullah Khan v. Kallu(29)].

    It has doubtless been held in one case that where there is a claim for administration of trust, which falls within the section, a claim to eject an alienee may be joined with it [Sajedar Raja Chowdhury v. Gour Mohan Das Baishnav]. But the latter claim does not in my opinion come within the scope of the section and is open to the charge of misjoinder, and the decision has been dissented from in a later case, [Budh Singh Dudhuria v. Niradbaran Roy], with which I agree.

    There is no doubt but that claims by trustees against persons who are strangers to the trust and who set up a title hostile thereto, such as alienees and mere trespassers holding adversely thereto, are not within the section.

    It has been argued therefore on behalf of the Plaintiffs that the Defendants, who the Plaintiffs deny to be trustees, but are now occupying that position, are trespassers and that therefore and on that ground this section does not apply. But it is to be noted that the Defendants do not claim adversely to, but in fact recognise, the trust under which the Plaintiffs themselves claim. In fact the only dispute is as to who is the trustee of that trust. The Defendants are now occupying that position and carrying out the trust, though the Plaintiffs allege (and it may prove to be the fact) they are doing so wrongly and without title. But a person who recognises the trust and has assumed, though it may be without authority, the right to administer and in fact administers the trust by virtue of his alleged title as trustee, stands on a different footing from that of a mere trespasser. A trustee may be such de jure or de facto. A person who without title chooses to take upon himself the character of a trustee becomes a trustee de son tort. He is liable to account for what he has done and received while so acting and cannot be heard to say for his own benefit that he had no right to act as trustee (see Godefroi on Trusts, second edition, p. 30).

    Though a trustee de son tort and a constructive trustee have been used as synonymous terms, [Jugal Kishore v. Lakshman Das Raghu Nath Dass(30)], both in the case cited and in the argument addressed to me, the two are not, in my opinion, the same thing. There cannot be both an express and a constructive trust in respect of the same subject-matter. There may be, as here, an express trust admitted by both the Plaintiff's and the Defendants. Both may, as here, claim to be trustees, though one only under the circumstances can in fact have title. If in fact the Defendant be found to have no title, then he is a trustee de son tort of the express trust.

    A constructive trust, to which this section also applies, is one arising not by act of the parties but by operation of law, where a trustee gains some personal advantage by availing himself, and through the medium of his situation as a trustee (see Lewin on Trusts, 11th Edn., 196). It is imposed on such a person to prevent him from holding for his own benefit an advantage gained by reason of the fiduciary relation subsisting between him and others and for whose benefit only it is his duty to act. [See Godefroi, p, 93]. So, if a lease were the subject-matter of a public trust, a constructive trust would arise if a trustee renewed the lease in his own name. He would, in such a case, be deemed to be a trustee for those interested in the original term, and this would be equally so if the trustee was a trustee as of right or a trustee de son tort and were there a breach of such constructive trust, as by making away with the renewed lease, or by not applying its profits for the purposes of the trust, there would be such a breach of trust as is referred to in the section. A suit would therefore under this section lie against a trustee of an express or constructive trust and whether such a trustee were so de jure or de son tort.

    It does not, however, follow that because the Defendant is a trustee that a suit brought against him is necessarily within the section. Its other conditions have to be fulfilled.

    It is necessary therefore to see whether though the suit is brought in respect of a public trust and against a person who according to the case of the Plaintiffs appears to be a trustee de son tort, it is in other respects within the scope of the section.

    It is only necessary at present to consider the suit as one brought by the Plaintiffs on their alleged title as trustees.

    The suit contemplated by the section is one of a representative character.

    It is obvious that the Advocate-General, Collector or other public officer can and do sue only as representing the public and if instead of these public officers two or more persons having an interest in the trust sue with their consent, they so sue under a warrant to represent the public as the objects of the trusts. [See Lakshmandas Raghoonath Das v. Jugol Kishore(31)].

    It follows from this that when a person or persons sue not to establish the general rights of the public of which they are a member or members, but to remedy a particular infringement of their own individual right the suit is not within or need not be brought under the section.

    Instances of the enforcement of personal individual rights (other than suits to enforce a personal right of access for purposes of worship to which I have referred) will be found in those cases which hold that where the suit is brought to enforce the personal claim of the Plaintiff to be a trustee [Vishvanath v. Rambhat, Manijan Bibi v. Khadem Hossain(32)] or to be a co-trustee. [Miya Valiullah v. Sayed Bava(33)] or to vinidcate the right of management in the case of obstruction offered to one vested with and actually exercising the right of management at the date of suit [Navroji Manekji v. Dustur Kharsedji(34)] or to enforce a right to see that certain trusts are managed by persons entitled to manage them [Gyana v. Kandasami(35)] are not within the section.

    The parties in such suits, as here, sue to enforce their personal rights as regards the trusteeship. Here there is a contest between two sets of persons as to who are the lawful trustees, both claiming to be such, and the decisions cited which hold that such cases are not within the section are directly in point.

    In my opinion the present suit, so far as it is brought by the Plaintiffs in their individual capacity as trustees to enforce their individual claim to be such trustees of the temple in suit, is not within the scope of the section.

    The public may be interested in seeing that their alleged appointees have the administration of this trust, but this right of the public and of the Plaintiffs qua members of that public is not the same as the right of the Plaintiffs considered not as members of the public but as trustees suing to enforce their own personal right of management.

    Secondly, there is no alleged breach of any express or constructive trust and no directions are necessary for the administration of the trust.

    It has been said that there was a breach of trust on the part of the last admitted trustee, Hira Lall Johurry, in making the alleged appointment of the Defendants. The factum of that appointment is denied but, apart from this, it is quite clear that is not any portion of the cause of action in this suit. It might have been a cause of action in a suit brought against Hira Lall Johurry, but, so far as the present suit is concerned, the fact of the appointment has no relevancy beyond this, that it is the title under which the Defendants claim to hold. The actual cause of action in respect of which this suit is brought is the assertion of the Defendants acting under that claim of title to be trustees of this endowment and their refusal to give possession to the Plaintiffs who claim to be the trustees appointed by the community to which they belong.

    Nor, so far as the suit is brought on the title of the Plaintifis as trustees, is the direction of the Court necessary for the administration of the trust. No question of such a kind arises unless and until the Plaintiffs fail to make out their claim to be trustees. If they succeed they will administer the trust themselves.

    This circumstance distinguishes the present case from the decision cited by learned Counsel for the Defendants in which it was held that parties who do not themselves claim to be trustees but who allege that a trusteeship is vacant, may sue under this section persons wrongfully claiming to be or acting as trustees for an order appointing new trustees [Neti Rama Jogiah v. Venkata Charulu(36)]. The section was held to apply in that case as it was one where in the opinion of the Court the direction of that Court was deemed necessary and the relief sought was that mentioned in the section, viz., the appointment of new trustees.

    That case is entirely distinguishable from the present one. The Plaintiffs, in the case cited, did not themselves claim to be trustees. They further alleged that the Defendant was not a trustee. The case therefore which was made was that the trusteeship was vacant and if the Plaintiffs in that case succeeded in establishing the point taken by them, it necessarily followed that new trustees would have to be appointed and the trust would have to be administered. In the present case, however, the Plaintiffs claim to be trustees and if they succeed in establishing that claim, there is no necessity for administration by way of any of the reliefs which are mentioned in this section.

    It has been argued that the case is one in which the “direction of the Court is necessary for the administration” of the trust in that a question as to who is entitled to represent a trust comes within those words. I do not think this is so. The directions, which are referred to in this section, are such as are necessary for the carrying out of the trust and as are given to a trustee, either the existing trustee where there is one or the new trustee where one is to be appointed. The nature of the reliefs expressly mentioned shews what is meant by the words “deemed necessary for administration of any such trust.”

    Lastly, although some or even all the other elements stated in the section are found to exist, the suit will not be within it unless the relief sought therein is that which is expressly or impliedly mentioned in the section. So although suits have been otherwise within the section, the Madras High Court, though not the other High Courts, have held that a claim for removal of a trustee is not within the purview of the section.

    It has, however, been contended that the relief sought by way of declaration that the Plaintiffs are trustees comes within cl. (e) or within the words “such further or other relief as the nature of the case may require.”

    The contention as to cl. (e) is in my opinion unsustainable. The general clause dealing with “further or other relief” as has been already held, [Budh Singh Dudhuria v. Niradbaran Roy], ought to be read with the five preceding specific clauses and the nature of the reliefs which may be properly granted under it, is of the same character as the reliefs which may be granted under the preceding clauses. The five specific clauses are not merely illustrative but furnish an indication of the nature of the relief which may be granted in a suit under this section. [Budh Singh Dudhuria v. Niradbaran Roy].

    This clause must be read with what has preceded as referring to the further relief to which the party may be entitled, which arises out of the existence of the trust in respect of which the suit has been brought. [Jamaluddin v. Mujtaba Husain(37)].

    I hold that the relief mentioned does not come within this clause.

    The suit, as I have already stated, is brought under three separate titles (1) to enforce the individual rights of the Plaintiffs as trustees, (2) to assert the rights of the class of public to which they belong, and (3) to enforce their individual rights as members of the public. The relief sought, as regards the first title, is that mentioned in prayers (b), (c), and the ancillary prayers (e), (g) and (i). This is the primary relief which is sought. If the Plaintiffs succeed in establishing their claim to this relief, no administration is necessary. Then the Plaintiffs say that if they should fail to establish their title as trustees they are, both as representing their class and themselves as members of that class, entitled to certain other reliefs, viz., that mentioned in prayers (d), (f) and the ancillary reliefs (e), (g) and (i).

    These sets of titles and claims for relief must be distinguished. As regards the Plaintiffs' claim as trustees and the relief sought in respect of such claim, cls. (b), (c) and (e), (g) and (i) [so far as these three latter prayers are ancillary to the prayers in cls. (b) and (c)] I am of opinion that the leave of the Advocate-General was not necessary for the institution of the suit—even assuming, which I hold not to be the case, that the section is mandatory.

    I hold nothing as to the position of the suit, should the Plaintiffs fail to establish their alleged rights as trustees and claim a decree for the secondary relief sought.

    That is a matter which must be determined if and when it arises.

    The application, however, which asks that the suit should be now dismissed, is refused with costs as of a hearing.

    Mr. N.C Bose, Attorney for the Plaintiffs.

    Messrs Orr, Dignam & Co., Attorneys for the Defendants.

    Application dismissed with costs.
    A.N.C

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    Rai Budreedas Mukim Bahadur v. Chuni Lal Johurry
    (Feb 8, 1906)