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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
  • Sankaran Nair
  • Spencer, JJ.
Acts
  • articles of the Limitation Act, 1871,
  • (2) Act 9 of 1871 was the Act
  • Limitation Act 1871
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
  • Sankaran Nair
  • Spencer, JJ.
Acts
  • articles of the Limitation Act, 1871,
  • (2) Act 9 of 1871 was the Act
  • Limitation Act 1871
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Sankaran Nair, J.; Spencer, J. concurring)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal from the decree of the Subordinate Judge of Mayavaram dismissing the plaintiff's suit for recovery of properties alleged to have belonged to his maternal grandfather, Gopala Row. The plaintiff's narrative (as set out in the plaint) is that Gopala Row and Srinivasa Row were undivided brothers; Srinivasa Row died leaving a widow, Kapila Bai; Gopala Row thereafter became solely entitled to the property, and on Gopala Row's death he left a widow, Kaveri Bai, and a daughter, Ammani Bai (who predeceased Kaveri Bai). The plaintiff claims title to properties described in Schedules A and B as left by Gopala Row, and to properties in Schedule C as purchased by Kaveri Bai. Some of the properties are now in possession of alienees. The Subordinate Judge held that the Schedule B properties never belonged to Gopala Row, and that the plaintiff's claims as to Schedules A and C were barred. The plaintiff appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff proved that the properties in Schedule B ever belonged to Gopala Row and thus whether the Subordinate Judge's finding that they did not should be reversed.
  2. Whether the plaintiff can successfully challenge the validity of the adoption of Raghunatha (also spelled Raghunatha/Raghunatha Row/Raghunatha Row) and thereby establish title to the Schedule C properties (issues raised include the validity of the adoption, prior adjudication/res judicata, and estoppel).
  3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the Schedule A properties, taking into account prior transactions (alienation to an alienee, Raghunatha's prior suit and receipt of Rs.5,000) and limitation considerations.
  4. Whether the plaintiff's claims are barred by limitation under the Limitation Acts in force at relevant times and by prior judicial determinations (res judicata/estoppel).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

  • The plaintiff claims the properties in Schedules A and B were left by Gopala Row at his death and that Schedule C properties were purchased by Gopala Row's widow, Kaveri Bai.
  • The plaintiff contends some alienations of the properties are not binding on him.
  • With respect to Schedule C, the plaintiff argues the adoption of Raghunatha Row by Kapila Bai is invalid because the relevant property had already vested in Gopala Row and thereafter in his widow, Kaveri Bai — reliance being placed on the decision in Adivi Suryaprakasa Row v. Nidamarty Gangaraju.
  • Regarding Schedule A, the plaintiff (through his pleader) contended before the appellate court that because the plaintiff keeps possession of a moiety of the Schedule C properties, it is not open to the plaintiff to deny the right of those who paid the money (in satisfaction of Raghunatha's claim) to uphold the alienation of Schedule A properties. The appellant's pleader also argued that the point about the source of the purchase-money for Schedule C had not been raised in the lower court.

Respondents' Arguments / Defendants' Position (as reflected in the opinion)

  • The Subordinate Judge found (and respondents relied upon) that the Schedule B properties never belonged to Gopala Row but were acquired by the ancestors of defendants 21 and 22 by purchase from Chenga Bai and Appaji Row, and that title documents recited partition among those relatives.
  • As to Schedule C, the position accepted by the Subordinate Judge (and defended on appeal) was that these properties had not belonged to Gopala Row at his death but were purchased by Raghunatha Row (an adopted son) and that questions as to the validity of that adoption had already been raised and decided in prior litigation (Original Suit No. 48 of 1893) which found the adoption to be valid in fact; estoppel and res judicata were pleaded/applied.
  • Regarding Schedule A, the respondents relied on the prior suit by Raghunatha (Original Suit No. 75 of 1866), the settlement of that suit for Rs.5,000, and the subsequent use of funds (in part) to acquire lands; the Subordinate Judge treated these matters together with limitation as operating against the plaintiff.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Adivi Suryaprakasa Row v. Nidamarty Gangaraju Cited by the plaintiff to support the proposition that the adoption by Kapila Bai is invalid because the property had vested in Gopala Row and thereafter in his widow, Kaveri Bai. The court noted the plaintiff's reliance on this decision but, for the purposes of argument, assumed the adoption invalid and proceeded to hold that the question was nevertheless res judicata and barred by prior proceedings and limitation; thus the Adivi decision did not lead to a successful challenge in this case.
Jagadamda (Jagadamba) Chowdhrani v. Dakhina Mohan Roy Chaudhri Held (by the Judicial Committee) that under the Limitation Act, 1871 a suit to recover immovable property involving the validity of an adoption must be filed within twelve years from the date of the adoption (or from death of adoptive father at plaintiff's option). The court applied this principle to hold that the limitation period relevant to challenges to adoption had run (period expired in 1867 for the adoption in this case) and that the plaintiff's right to challenge was barred.
Mohesh Narain Munshi v. Taruck Nath (Paruk Nath) Moitra Applied the Limitation Act, 1871 to the period during which limitation was running; cited as authority for the same 12-year limitation rule in suits involving adoption. Used (along with Jagadamba) to support the conclusion that a 12-year limitation applied and that the plaintiff's right to challenge the adoption was time-barred.
Ratnamasari v. Akilandammal Full Bench explanation of the Privy Council decisions on limitation and adoption — explaining the operation of limitation in suits involving adoption. The court relied on the Full Bench explanation in applying the limitation rule to the facts of this case and concluded the plaintiff's right to challenge the adoption was barred.
Srinath Gangapadhya v. Mahesh Chandra, Roy Noted in the opinion in relation to Act 14 of 1859 and the limitation periods then in force (six years for suits to declare an adoption invalid; twelve years under Clause 1, Section 1 for suits for recovery of immovable property involving validity of an adoption). Spencer, J. invoked the pre-1871 Act (Act 14 of 1859) and cited this authority to show that the limitation periods relevant to the 1855 adoption expired in 1867 under the then-applicable law.
Appasami Odayar v. Subramanaya Odayar Authority for the proposition that a right of suit, once barred under an earlier Act, could not be revived by later limitation Acts. Spencer, J. relied on this decision to support the conclusion that if the period of limitation expired in 1867, later Limitation Acts could not revive the plaintiff's right to sue.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeds in discrete stages corresponding to the three schedules of properties and the legal obstacles relied upon by the respondents:

  1. Schedule B: The appellate court agreed with the Subordinate Judge that the plaintiff failed to prove that Schedule B properties ever belonged to Gopala Row or were inherited by Kaveri Bai. Documentary evidence (notably Ex. 17, a title-deed) recited that Chenga (Changa/Chenga) Bai obtained the property by partition, and Appaji Row was a co-heir; these recitals undermined the plaintiff's theory that Chenga Bai received the property for her maintenance by arrangement with Kaveri Bai. On that evidentiary basis the court confirmed the finding that Schedule B did not belong to the plaintiff's ancestor and dismissed the appeal as to those properties.
  2. Schedule C: The court accepted the Subordinate Judge's factual finding that the Schedule C properties did not belong to Gopala Row at his death but were purchased by Raghunatha (an adopted son) after his adoption by Kapila Bai. The plaintiff argued that the adoption was invalid and relied upon prior authority. The appellate court examined whether the plaintiff could now challenge that adoption:
    • The court recited the prior litigation (Original Suit No. 48 of 1893), in which Lakshmana Row (natural son of Raghunatha) litigated for recovery of the moiety and the Subordinate Judge in that earlier suit had found the adoption to be true in fact; the family had treated Raghunatha as an adopted son; he lost rights in his natural family and performed rites only for his adoptive parents; the judge further held that Kaveri Bai was estopped by her conduct from disputing the adoption.
    • The appellate court analyzed the estoppel point: it observed that estoppel was an additional ground in the earlier decision but that Kaveri Bai, as widow in possession of the estate, was competent to represent the estate in that litigation. She raised the contentions she deemed necessary and could have raised the contentions the plaintiff now raises; the judge's reasons for estoppel applied to the whole family. Consequently the court held the question was res judicata and that the plaintiff could not reopen it.
  3. Schedule A and limitation: The court reviewed the history of alienations: Kaveri Bai had alienated Schedule A lands to Subramanian Chetti in February 1855; Raghunatha litigated against that alienee in Original Suit No. 75 of 1866 and accepted Rs.5,000 in satisfaction in that suit, allowing dismissal. That money (in part) was used to purchase Schedule C lands in Raghunatha's name. The Subordinate Judge dismissed the plaintiff's claim to Schedule A. On appeal the court addressed limitation:
    • The court relied on Privy Council authority (Jagadamba Chowdhrrani and Mohesh Narain Munshi), as expounded by the Full Bench in Ratnamasari v. Akilandammal, for the principle that under the Limitation Act, 1871 a suit to recover immovable property involving the validity of an adoption must be brought within twelve years from the date of adoption (or from the death of the adoptive father at the option of the plaintiff).
    • Applying this to the facts (adoption in 1855), the relevant twelve-year period expired in 1867. The court noted that under the Act of 1871 the suit would have had to be brought before 1873, but because the adoption occurred earlier the court analyzed the earlier law (Act 14 of 1859) via Spencer, J., who observed that the 1859 Act allowed six years for suits to declare an adoption invalid and twelve years under Clause 1, Section 1 for suits for recovery of immovable property involving adoption; thus the period expired in 1867.
    • Given that the limitation period had run by 1867, the court concluded it was unnecessary to consider later Limitation Acts or hypothetical situations (such as if Raghunatha had not been adopted). The court also relied on authority indicating that a right of suit once barred could not be revived by later Acts.
    • On these bases the court held the plaintiff's claims (including those to Schedule A and Schedule C, to the extent founded on challenging the adoption) were barred by limitation and/or by prior adjudication/estoppel.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The appeal is DISMISSED (with costs).

Implications and immediate consequences:

  • The appellate court confirmed the Subordinate Judge's dismissal of the plaintiff's suit: the plaintiff failed to establish title to the Schedule B properties and his claims to the Schedule A and Schedule C properties are barred (by prior adjudication/res judicata, estoppel and/or limitation) as analyzed in the opinion.
  • Specifically, the court upheld the Subordinate Judge's factual findings as to ownership and derivation of title in Schedule B and accepted the earlier judicial determination and the limitation analysis that barred the plaintiff's claims to Schedules A and C.
  • The appeal was dismissed with costs; the opinion applies and relies upon existing authority governing limitation periods and the effect of prior adjudication and estoppel in disputes involving adoption and succession. The court did not purport to lay down a new legal principle beyond the application of those authorities to the facts before it.

Final court notation in the opinion: "Appeal dismissed." (Sankaran Nair, J.; Spencer, J. concurring on the result and reasoning as set out.)

Show full summary ...

    E.N. Venkoba Row v. Thunia Nataraja Chettiar

    Sankaran Nair, J.:— This is an appeal from the decree of the Subordinate Judge of Mayavaram, dismissing the plaintiff's suit for the recovery of the properties which belonged to his maternal grandfather, one Gopala Row. Plaintiff's case is that Gopala Row and Srinivasa Row were two undivided brothers; that Srininasa Row having died leaving behind him a widow named Kapila Bai, Gopala Row became solely entitled to the property and he (Gopala Rao) died leaving his widow Kaveri Bai and a daughter Ammani Bai; that Ammani Bai predeceased her mother and that Kaveri Bai died in 1896. The plaintiff claims to be entitled to the properties left by Gopala Row. He says the properties in Schs. A and B attached to the plaint were left by Gopala Row at his death. The properties in Sch. C are said to have been purchased by his widow, Kaveri Bai. Some of the properties are now in the possession of certain alienees and the plaintiff says that these alienation are not binding on him. The Subordinate Judge held that the properties in Sch. B. never belonged to Gopala Row, and as to the properties in Schs. A and C the plaintiff's claim is barred. The plaintiff appeals.

    2. We have no hesitation in holding that it has not been proved that the properties in Sch. B ever belonged to Gopala Row or that they were inherited by Kaveri Bai. The properties are now in the possession of defendants 21 and 22., Their ancestors Srinivasa Row and Rama Row, acquired these properties by purchase from Changa Bai and Appaji Row. In one of their title-deeds, Ex. 17, it is recited that Chenga Bai got the property by partition. That must have: been a partition between her husband and his brothers. Appaji Row is one of those brothers. These recitals show that the plaintiff's case that Chenga Bai must have got the property for her maintenance by an arrangement with Kaveri Bai is not true. We accordingly confirm the Subordinate Judge's finding and dismiss the appeal so far as the properties in Soh. B are concerned. We will next consider whether the plaintiff has proved his title to the property in Sch. C. These properties did not belong to Gopala Row at the time of his death. The Subordinate Judge finds, and we see no reason not to accept that finding, that they were purchased by Baghunatha Row who was adopted by Kapila Bai after Srinivasa Bow's death mainly out of the ancestral funds in his hands. The plaintiff's case is that the adoption of Baghunatha Row by Kapila Bai is invalid because the property had already vested in Gopala Row and after him in his widow Kaveri Bai, and that Kapila Bai, the widow of Srinivasa Row, was therefore not entitled to make any adoption to her husband, Srinivasa Row, according to the decision in Adivi Suryaprakasa Row v. Nidamarty Gangaraju(1). Assuming that the adoption of Raghunatha Row is invalid in law, the Subordinate Judge holds that question is now res judicata and it is not open to the plaintiff to deny the validity of that adoption. The facts on which that plea has to be decided are briefly these: In 1876 Raghunatha Row entered into an arrangement with Kaveri Bai by which he reserved a moiety, that is, the lands in Sch. C for himself and he gave the other moiety of the lands to Kaveri Bai. After his death his natural son, Lakshmana Row, brought Original Suit No. 48 of 1893 for the recovery of the moiety, that is the lands in Sch. C which Raghunatha Row had reserved for himself and which he had entrusted to Kaveri Bai. In that case the question was raised whether Raghunatha Row's adoption is true fond whether it is invalid. It was found by the. Subordinate Judge that the adoption was true in fact; that all the relations including Kaveri Bai treated him all along as a validly adopted son of Srinivasa Row and Kapila Bai; that Raghunatha Row had lost all his rights in his natural family; that he took no share in his natural father's property: and that when his natural father and mother died he took no part in the funeral ceremonies, but performed the sradhas only of his adoptive father and that on his own death the members of his natural family did not perform his funeral ceremonies. He held that the grounds alleged for setting aside the adoption were not good in law and upheld the adoption. He further held that Kaveri Bai appeared to be also estopped by her conduct from questioning the validity of such adoption. He accordingly directed the defendants including Kaveri Bai, to surrender possession of the properties to Lakshmana Row. The question is whether the plaintiff is barred by these proceedings from claim in the Sch. C properties. It is contended that there is no bar, because Kaveri Bai was held estopped on account of her conduct from disputing the validity of the adoption, and therefore it cannot be said that she represented the estate of Gopala Row, that is to say, the reversioner who might become entitled to the property. It will be observed from the above extract that the estoppel was only an additional ground for the Judge's decision. That she as the widow in possession of the estate, was competent to represent it there is no doubt. If she had precluded precluded raising the contentions which are now put forward on behalf of the plaintiff, then it might be that the plaintiff's claim would not be barred. But she raised all the contentions which she thought necessary to put forward, and it was open to her to have raised the questions which are now put forward by the plaintiff in order to impeach the Validity of the adoption. It is also to be observed that the reasons given for the estoppel were reasons applicable not only to Kaveri Bai, but also to all the members of the family who treated Raghunatha Row as a member of their family.

    3. It is next contended that the plaintiff is in any event entitled to the properties in Soh. A. These properties were in the possession of Kaveri Bai. She alienated them to one Subramanian Chetti in February 1855. Raghunatha Row, the adopted son, brought a suit, Original Suit No. 75 of 1866; for the recovery of property from the alienee. He received Rs. 5,000 in satisfaction of his claim and allowed the suit to be dismissed. It is partly with the money so reoeived and partly with other money which belonged to the estate that Raghunatha Row, according to the Subordinate Judge purchased the properties in Sch. O. It is contended before us that as the plaintiff keeps possession of a moiety of the properties in Sch. C., it is not open to him to deny the right of those who paid that money to uphold the alienation of the properties in Sch. A. In answer it is contended by the appellant's pleader that this point was not raised in the lower Court and though Sch. C property is now found to have been purchased in Raghunatha Row's name there was no issue raised on the question as to the source of the purchase-money. This, no doubt, is so. I accordingly proceed to consider the ground on which the Subordinate Judge dismissed the plaintiff's claim.

    4. It has been decided by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Jagadamda Chowdhrani v. Dakhina Mohan Roy Chaudhri(2) and in Mohesh Narain Munshi v. Taruck Nath Moitra(3), as explained by the Full Bench of this Court in Ratnamasari v. Akilandammal(4), that under the Limitation Act 1871 it was imperative that a suit for recovery of immovable property which involved the displaying of an adoption should be filed within twelve years from the date of adoption, or, at the option of the plaintiff, from the death of the adoptive father. In this case that period expired in 1867 and according to the Act of 1871 the suit should have been filed before 1873. The right of the widow or the plaintiff's mother, Ammani Bai, to set aside the adoption therefore became barred in 1873 and taking into consideration the facts found, that Raghunatha Row was treated as a member of the family by all the members thereof, it seems to be clear that after 1873 it was not open to the widow or reversioner or any other member interested to dispute the validity of the adoption.

    5. It is unnecessary in this view to consider what the result would be if the case was governed by the Limitation Act, 1877 or if Raghunatha Row had not in fact, been adopted. For the plaintiff to suceed it is necessary for him to displace Raghunatha Row's adoption and the ruling of the Privy Council as explained by the Full Bunch in Ratnamasari v. Akilandammal is therefore applicable. I am therefore of opinion that the plaintiff's claim to this property also is barred by limitation.

    6. The appeal is dismissed with costs.

    Spencer, J.:— On the question of limitation in respect of Sch. A properties, while agreeing that plaintiff's claim is time barred I think that it is unnecessary to consider this case in the light of the articles of the Limitation Act, 1871, seeing that the right of the plaintiff in this suit and his predecessors-in-title had been already extinguished before that Act came into force in 1873.

    7. Of the two Privy Council decisions referred to by the Subordinate Judge in support of his finding on issue 15, Jagadamba Chowdhirani v. Dakhina Mohun Roy Choudhri and Mohesh Narain Munshi v. Paruk Nath Moitra, in Jagadamba's case (2) Act 9 of 1871 was the Act to be considered, because as stated at p. 317 that was the Limitation Act in force in 1873 and 1874 when the suits concerned in that case were commenced, and in the latter it was observed at p. 195 that the Limitation Act, 1871 applied to the time when the period of limitation was running.

    8. Here the period of 12 years from the date of adoption which was in 1855, expired in 1867.

    9. The Act in force in 1867 was Act 14 of 1859 which allowed six years from the date of adoption for suits to declare an adoption invalid and 12 years under Cl. 1, S. 1 from the date of adoption in suits for the recovery of immovable property which involved the validity of an adoption: vide Ratnamasari v. Akilandammal and Srinath Gangapadhya v. Mahesh Chandra, Roy(5).

    10. If in 1867 the period of limitation expired, it becomes unnecessary to consider the effect of the later Acts for limitation of suits, as the right of suit could not be revived by them: vide Appasami Odayar v. Subramanaya Odayar(6). On all other points and on the general result of this appeal, I agree with my learned brother.

    S.N/R.K

    11. Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    E.N. Venkoba Row v. Thunia Nataraja Chettiar
    (Oct 20, 1914)