Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Section 2. Clause (8) of the Limitation Act,
  • Limitation Act of 1859,
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Section 2. Clause (8) of the Limitation Act,
  • Limitation Act of 1859,
Smart Summary

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

In 1842 the Government of Madras, by exhibit Ex. A, placed the Rajah of Palghat in possession and management of the devaswom at issue, a grant relied upon by the plaintiff and not contested as to validity. The Palghat Raj is described as a Malabar Stanom with succession in the senior male member of a number of families. The grant (Ex. A) was made as part of a policy of divesting the East India Company of direct management of religious institutions and, in the court's view, intended to confer a hereditary trusteeship on the Rajah and his successors.

The Subordinate Judge held that the suit to recover possession of the Stanom properties was barred by limitation under Article 124 of the Limitation Act. On findings not seriously disputed, the defendants' family had been in possession since 1843 when the then Rajah purported to assign the devaswom to them under Ex. 1. The principal issue on appeal was whether the suit was barred by Article 124 (and related limitation provisions), and whether successive holders (Stanom-holders, trustees) are to be treated as deriving title from or through their predecessors for the purposes of the Limitation Act.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the suit to recover possession of the Stanom properties is barred by limitation under Article 124 of the Limitation Act.
  2. Whether successive Stanom-holders (trustees/shebaits/mahants) are to be regarded as deriving title "from or through" their predecessors within the meaning of Section 2 of the Limitation Act, so that adverse possession against predecessors starts limitation running against successors.

Arguments of the Parties

Arguments advanced by Mr. Ramachandra Aiyar (counsel appearing for the appellant/plaintiff as presented in the opinion)

  • Main contention: The previous holders of the Stanom were not persons "from or through whom the plaintiff derived this right to sue" within Section 2 of the Limitation Act; therefore adverse possession against predecessors should not be imputed to the present plaintiff.
  • Related submission: Each successive holder of a Stanom who brings a suit under Articles 124 or 144 can only be barred if there is possession adverse to himself personally; adverse possession against predecessors cannot be taken into account for limitation against the successor.
  • Alternative limitation point: The cause of action accrued to the plaintiff when he personally became Rajah; as the suit was within 12 years of his succession, his right was not barred (i.e., the accrual point is the moment of succession).
  • Argument on the character of Ex. A: The Government, it was contended, created a succession of life-estates by Ex. A (i.e., a new grant in the case of each succeeding Rajah), which would affect how limitation should run.

Respondents' Contentions (as presented in the opinion)

  • Defendants' family have been in possession since about 1843, following an assignment under Ex. 1 to the defendants' ancestors, and have managed the devaswom continuously for decades (over 60 years as conceded).
  • Documents (Exs. 9, 10, 12, C, F and extracts from registers) show governmental practice and administrative recognition of the Rajahs (and subsequently the defendants' ancestors as managers) as the trustees/managers of the devaswom.
  • The defendants asserted title both by limitation (Article 124) and by prescription arising from long adverse possession and management.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gnanasambanda Pandara Sannadhi v. Velu Pandaram (Privy Council) Interpretation of Article 124: treating trustees/successive holders as persons through whom title is derived for limitation purposes. Relied upon by Wallis, C.J., and by other judges as authority that successive trustees form a continuing representation such that adverse possession against predecessors counts against successors.
Chiruvolu Punnamma v. Chiruvolu Perram Discusses treatment of succeeding trustees/mahants/Stanis as claiming through predecessors; reference by Subramania Aiyar, J. Cited as part of a strong current of authority in this Court supporting the view that successors claim through predecessors for limitation.
Sankaran v. Krishna Decision dealing with Stanis and limitation (treated as though Article 124 did not apply in that case). Noted as proceeding upon similar views concerning succession and limitation; cited among supporting authorities.
Pydigantam Jagannadha Row v. Rama Doss Patnaik Addresses limitation/prescription issues in analogous contexts (trustees/stanis). Listed with other cases as supporting the proposition that successors are affected by adverse possession against predecessors.
Ambalavana Pandarasannadhi Avergal v. Sree Minakshy Sundareswafa Devaswtanam Illustrative authority on trusteeship and limitation. Included among cases supporting the court's approach to succession and limitation.
Runchordas Vandravandas v. Parvatibai (Privy Council) Dictum that a reversioner suing after widow's death did not derive title from or through the widow; the extinguishment of the widow's right could not extinguish reversioner's right. Cited by appellant's counsel; the court confined this dictum strictly to widows/reversioner context and held it inapplicable to ordinary heirs or Stanom-holders.
Aumirtolall Bose v. Rajone Kant Mitter Prior authority treating next reversioner as claiming from or through a widow (prior to introduction of Article 141). Referred to in historical discussion of how reversioners were treated under earlier Limitation Acts.
Sambasiva v. Ragava Earlier case on reversioner claiming through widow. Referred to in the same historical context as Aumirtolall Bose.
Venkateswara Iyan v. Shekhari Varma Authority noting that the position of a Stani is analogous in some respects to that of a Hindu widow (life interest). Quoted to explain analogy but court emphasized limits of the analogy for limitation purposes.
Patinharkuru v. Raman Varma Case on rights of persons who might succeed to stanoms and accrual of cause of action. Distinguished by the court: it concerned a different question (right to the Stanom itself) and did not govern the present limitation issue.
Gulabdas Jugjivandas v. Collector of Surat; Marium Begum v. Mirza; Jotendromohun Tagore v. Ganendromohun Tagore Related authorities on succession and the creation of successive life-estates. Noted in discussing whether Government could create successive life-estates by grant; court found Ex. A did not evidence such intention.
Bajah Vurmah Valia v. Ravi Vermah Kunhi Kutty Principle that certain alienations are invalid (context of absolute alienation by grantee). Cited to note that Ex. 1's apparent conveyance of absolute right of management would be invalid as a permanent alienation.
Prosunno/Prosonna Kumari Debya v. Goiab Chand Baboo (Judicial Committee) Statement that judgments against a former shebait should be binding on succeeding shebaits as they form a continuing representation of the idol's property. Quoted by the court (p.256) to support that successive trustees form a continuing representation binding successors for limitation/debt purposes.
Nilmony Singh v. Jagabandhu Roy Observations (Banerjee and Gordon, JJ.) supporting the idea that succeeding managers do not get a fresh start for limitation; they form a continuing representation. Quoted approvingly as directly supporting the court's reasoning about the anomalous results that would follow if successors were not treated as deriving title through predecessors.
Veerabhadra Varaprasada Row v. Vellanki Venhatadri Authority laying down the same principle about succession and limitation. Listed among the cluster of cases that affirm limitation runs from adverse possession against predecessors.
Prosonna Kumar Mukherjee v. Srikant Rant; Radhabhai v. Anantrav Bhagvant Deshpande Cases relied on by appellant to show differing outcomes where property was resumed and re-granted. Distinguished by the court on their facts; the court explained why they do not undermine the present conclusion.
Gazzala Veerayya v. Gazzala Ganamma Authority followed in Patinharkuru v. Raman Varma regarding accrual of cause of action for potential successors. Mentioned in discussing Patinharkuru and why that decision dealt with a different issue from the present appeal.
Damodar Das v. Lakhan Das Decision that appears to reaffirm the Privy Council's view in Gnanasambanda Pandara Sannadhi. Referred to as supportive of the approach that successors are affected by limitation running from predecessors.
Bahadur Singh v. Mohar Singh Decision that one reversioner does not claim through another (cited by the court as not bearing on the present case). Distinguished: the court observed its principle about reversioners is inapplicable to Stanom succession where successor is the heir of the previous holder.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a two-part analysis: (1) the character and effect of the grant(s) under Ex. A (and related documents) and (2) the proper construction and application of the Limitation Act (in particular Article 124 and the definition of "plaintiff" in Section 2).

On the nature of the grant: the judges concluded Ex. A was intended to place management in the Rajah and his successors as a hereditary trusteeship (a "continuing representation" of the trust), not to create a succession of fresh, unrelated life-grants to each Rajah. Documentary evidence (Exs. 9, 10, 12, C, F and extracts from the Inam Register) and administrative practice of 1842–43 support that the Government intended to vest the right of management in the Rajah for the time being, and that successors were to be recognized as trustees/managers.

On the limitation question: Article 124 fixes a 12-year period from the date "when the defendant takes possession of the office adversely to the plaintiff." The appellant's argument was that a successor-plaintiff does not derive title from or through his predecessors and therefore adverse possession against predecessors cannot be imputed to him. The court rejected this: under Malabar customary law a Stanom passes by operation of law to a successor who occupies the same legal position as an heir succeeding on intestacy. For the purposes of Section 2 of the Limitation Act and Article 124 the definition of "plaintiff" is inclusive and is intended to cover predecessors-in-title; to hold otherwise would defeat the scheme of the Limitation Act.

The court relied on a line of authorities (including Privy Council and High Court decisions) that treated successive trustees/shebaits/stanis as a continuing representation of the trust or idol's property such that adverse possession or acts against predecessors will start limitation running against successors. The court distinguished authorities concerning reversioners and widows (e.g., Runchordas Vandravandas v. Parvatibai) as applying specifically to that context and not controlling for ordinary heirs or Stanom-holders.

Applying these principles to the facts — with the finding that the defendants' family had possessed and managed the devaswom since about 1843 and had been so recognized administratively — the court concluded limitation began to run when the defendants assumed management adversely to the previous Rajahs (who were trustees). Consequently, the plaintiff's suit was barred under Article 124. The court also held that, for the same reasons, the defendants acquired title by prescription to the office.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court dismissed the appeal and affirmed that the suit to recover possession of the Stanom properties is barred by limitation under Article 124 of the Limitation Act. The judgment of the Subordinate Judge was held to be correct. The opinion records that the suit is dismissed with costs (costs to respondent 1 mentioned; appellate disposition records appeal dismissed with costs).

Direct implications for the parties:

  • The plaintiff's claim for recovery of possession is time-barred under Article 124; the appeal is dismissed.
  • The defendants were found to have acquired a title to the office by prescription through long-term adverse possession and management (over 60 years as conceded in the record).
  • Costs were awarded against the appellant (the opinion records costs to respondent 1 and generally that the appeal is dismissed with costs).

Broader legal implications noted by the court (as expressed in the opinion):

  • The decision affirms the principle, supported by prior authorities, that successive trustees/shebaits/Stanom-holders constitute a continuing representation of the trust or office for limitation purposes; adverse possession against predecessors can start limitation running against successors.
  • The court confined dicta about reversioners and widows (where a reversioner may get a fresh starting point under later Limitation Act provisions) strictly to that context and held they do not generalize to ordinary heirs, Stanom-holders, or trustees who take by operation of law.

No new precedent was explicitly announced; the court applied and reconciled existing authorities to the facts and concluded the suit was barred by limitation and that defendants acquired title by prescription.

    Raja Of Palghat v. K.N.V.K. Raman Unni

    Wallis, C.J:— In 1842 the Government of Madras by Ex. A put the Rajah of Palghat in possession and management of the suit devaswom, which is stated to have belonged to two persons whose family had become extinct. This is the grant relied on by the plaintiff and its validity has not been called in question. The Palghat Raj is a Malabar Stanom, the succession to which is in the senior male member for the time being of a large number of families who are presumably descended from a common ancestress. The grant of this and the other devaswoms included in Ex.-A was made in pursuance of the policy adopted by the East India Company about this time of divesting itself of the direct management of religious institutions, and was intended, in but opinion, to confer the office of trustee of these various endowments on the Rajah and his successors in the Stanom as a hereditary office descendible in the samemanner as the Stanom. This is not now contested for the respondents, and the only question before us is, whether the suit to recover possession of the Stanom properties is barred by limitation under Article 124, Lim. Act, as held by the Subordinate Judge. After the very full arguments we have heard, I am of opinion that this is the article applicable and that the suit is barred under it, if it was not already barred under the Regulation and the previous Limitation Acts.

    2. According to the finding of the Subordinate Judge which has not seriously been disputed before us, the defendants' family have been in possession since 1843, when the then Rajah purported to assign the devaswom to them under Ex. 1. Article 124 fixes the period of limitation at 12 years from the date “when the defendant takes possession of the office adversely to the plaintiff,” and Mr. Ramachandra Aiyar's main argument was that the previous holders of the Stanom were not persons “from or through whom the plaintiff derived this right to sue”, and so do not come within the definition of plaintiff in Section 2 of the Lim. Act. According to him each successive holder of the Stanom who brings a suit falling under Article 124 or 144 can only be barred under these articles if there is possession adverse to himself for the requisite period, as possession adverse to his predecessors Cannot be taken into account not being possession adverse to the plaintiff within the meaning of the Act. I am wholly unable to accept this contention. A Stanom, according to the customary law of Malabar, is descendible from one Stanom-holder to another in a peculiar line of succession, and it appears to me each successive holder is in the same position as an ordinary heir succeeding on intestacy. In either case it is the law of the land and not any act of the previous; holder or owner that confers title on the successor. The fact that the law of the land confers limited powers of disposition in one case and unlimited powers in the other case make no difference. In both cases it seems to me that for the purposes of the definition of plaintiff in the Limitation Act, which is intended to include predecessors-in-title of whom the successor is the representative, the heir must be considered to derive his title from: and through the purchaser and the inter mediate holders or owners who have, taken by inheritance. It would defeat the whole soheme of the Limitation Act to hold that adverse possession against the predecessors of an owner taking by inheritance was of no avail against such owner unless it could be shown that the owner derived title from him otherwise than by inheritance, and I think, as I have already said, that the succession to mutts, Stanoms, etc., stands on the same footing. As regards cases of ordinary succession I am not aware that this has ever been questioned, but if authority be wanted, it is to be found in the decision of the Privy Council on this very Article 124 in Gnanasambanda Pandara Sannadhi v. Velu Pandaram(1). There is also a strong current of authority in this Court on the present question. Subramania Aiyar, J., in his reference to the Full Bench in Chiruvolu Punnamma v. Chiruvolu Perram(2) refers to the decisions in which succeeding trustees, mahants and Malabar Stanis have been treated as claiming through or under their predecessors and these decisions are approved in the opinion of the Full Bench at p. 409, subject, mo doubt, to the observation, which was unnecessary for the decision, that they did not in strictness so claim from or through the predecessors. Gnanasambanda Pandara Sannadhi v. Velu Pandaram, deals with the case of trustees. Sankaran v. Krishna(3) proceeds upon the same view in the case of Stanis as though Article 124 was not considered to apply — why, is not apparent — it was held that the suit might be governed by Article 144, which equally raises the present question: see also Pydigantam Jagannadha Row v. Rama Doss Patnaik(4), Ambalavana Pandarasannadhi Avergal v. Sree Minakshy Sundareswafa Devaswtanam(5) Mr. Ramachandra Aiyar relied on a dictum of the Privy Council in Runchordas Vandravandas v. Parvatibai(6) that the plaintiff who sued as next reversioner after the death of the widows of the last male owner did not derive his title from or through the widows and the extinguishment of their right could not extinguish his.

    3. In my opinion this means at most that under the existing and recent Limitation Acts which gave the reversioner a fresh starting point from the death of the widow under Article 141, a reversioner cannot be treated as claiming from or through the widow. Prior to the introduction of Article 141 the next reversioner was held to claim from orthrough the widow; Aumirtolall Bose v. Rajone Kant Mitter(7) and Sambasiva v. Ragava(8). However this may be, this dictum which was not in any way the ground of their Lordships' judgment, must, in my opinion, be strictly confined to the case of widows and is no authority for the position that other persons such as ordinary heirs, Stanom-holders, mahants on whom property devolves by operation of law do not derive their title to sue from or through their immediate predecessors within the meaning of Section 2 of the Lim. Act. In the event the suit is dismissed with costs of respondent 1.

    Seshagiri Aiyar, J.:— I agree. The short point for consideration is whether the plaintiff, the Rajah of Palghat, or the defendants' tarwad is entitled to the here ditary trusteeship of the plaint devaswom. Till 1843, the Government managed it under Regn. 7 of 1817. In that year, they transferred the management to the then Palghat Raja (vide Ex. A) presumably under S. 13 of the Regulation. The Subordinate Judge considers that the transfer was to the then Rajah as an individual, and that the succeeding Rajahs were not entitled to the management. He is clearly wrong in this view. Mr. Ananthakrishna Aiyar, the learned vakil for respondent 1, did not endeavor to support him on this point. The first Rajah executed Ex. 1, to the ancestors of the defendants. What is exactly conveyed has been the subject of controversy. Acting on Ex. 1, the defendant's ancestor asked the Collector of Malabar to recognize him as the uralan of the devaswom. The Collector refused to deal with him in that capacity: Ex. D. Then followed some correspondence with the Rajahs. Exs. 12, C and F show that the Collector treated the successors of the first Rajah as the proper trustees. Ex. F is an extract from the Inam Register showing that the then Rajah was the trustee. By Exs. 9 and 10, the 3rd Rajah constituted the defendants' ancestor the manager of the devaswom. This was in 1851. There is no evidence whether from the date of Ex. A, the defendants' ancestor had possession of the temple properties. The above documents make it abundantly clear that the Government transferred the right of management to the holder of the Rajas such. The practice followed in this case has been the recognized mode of dealing with devasthanams by the Government in the years 1842 and 1843. The cases of the Mahants of Tirupati and of the Jeers of the Ahobilum Mutt show that the Government, in divesting themselves of their responsibility, assigned their rights to pereons holding particular positions who were expected to transmit those rights to their successors-in-office.

    4. Further, Ex. 1 leaves very little room for doubt that the right was intended to be vested in the Rajah for the time being. The Rajah was asked to “manage the affairs of the Devasthanams in the same way as he managed the affairs of his own temples.”

    5. This shows that the management was to be by the Rajah for the time being, I have no hesitation, therefore, in holding that Rs. A was a grant to the Rajahs of Palghat, and that the plaintiff is entitled to manage the affairs, if he has not lost the right by prescription or has not been barred by limitation.

    6. Mr. Ramchandra Aiyar, for the appellant, contended that the Government created a succession of life-estates by Ex. A. The learned vakil's argument is that the document was intended to operate as a fresh grant of trusteeship in the case of each succeeding Rajah. Gulabdas Jugjivandas v. Collector of Surat(9) and Marium Begvm v. Mirza(10) show that the creation of successive life-estates is within the competence of the Government although the Tagore (see Jotendromohun Tagore v. Ganendromohun Tagore)(11) case holds that private individuals should not create a line of succession unknown to the law applicable to them.

    7. But there is nothing in the language of Ex. A to warrant the construction, that a fresh grant in the case of each of the Rajhas was in the contemplation of the Government. It seems to me that the Government were content to leave the devolution of the right to be regulated in the same way as succession to the Raj or to the management of the family devaswoms was done. The claim of the defendants is based both on prescription and on limitation. The grant to their ancestor (Ex. 1) seems to convey the absolute right of management. Exs. 9 and 10 also are to the same effect. But it is clear that such an alienation is invalid. This is settled law. Vide Bajah Vurmah Valia v. Ravi Vermah Kunhi Kutty(12). It is conceded, however, that the defendants and their ancestors have been managing the devaswom for over 60 years.

    8. The main argument of Mr. Ramchandra Aiyar was that the cause of action accrued to the plaintiff when he became the Rajah and that as the suit was within 12 years of his succession, his right was not barred. On the question of prescription his answer was that adverse enjoyment against the previous Rajahs could only deprive them of their rights, but was ineffective to affect the rights of his client who claimed in his own right and not as heir to the late Rajah-A very learned argument was addressed to us on the legal position and rights of Malabar Stanis. It has been stated by the highest authority that their position is analogous to that of Hindu widows. Venkateswara Iyan v. Shekhari Varma(13). I took the same view in Patinharkuru v. Raman Varma(14). It does not follow from these decisions that the Stani is bound by the same limitations as a widow is. It is true that like the widow he holds his property for life; but beyond this the analogy does not go. There is no one who corresponds to the reversioner. The next in succession is his own heir. The fact that in Stanoms the strict rule of Marumakkathayam succession is not followed is no reason for saying that the successor is not the heir of the last stani. Most of the important Stanoms have secondary Stanoms. On the death of the first Stani the person at the head of the first Stanom succeeds.

    9. The important prerequisite in all these cases is that the first and the other Stanoms should all be held by the members of the same family. I do not think that this customary rule of succession offers any ground for the suggestion that each succeeding stani is not the heir of his predecessor-in-office. In the East Coast Mutts, the successor is nominated. In the case of the mahants priority of discipleship regulates the succession. It is not correct to argue that in observing these customary rules of devolution of right the successor does not become the heir of the previous holder of the office. The position of a stani approximates more to that of an owner of an impartible estate before the Act than to that of a widow.

    10. There can be no question that the Article of limitation applicable to the suit is 124. It was contended by Mr. Ramachandra Aiyar that even if the Article applied the suit was not barred by limitation. His argument was that the office could not be said to have been taken adversely to the plaintiff until the plaintiff succeeded to the Raj. There is great force in this contention. The effect to be given to it depends upon the meaning to be attached to the word “plaintiff” in Article 124. The definition in Section 2. Clause (8) of the Limitation Act, is not exhaustive. The use of the word “includes” shows that. Apart from this reservation, I am unable to hold that the present plaintiff did not derive his title from his predecessors. The holders of the Palghat Raj may be aptly described in respect of the devaswoms as forming a chain of trustees. That is the only locus standi they have to claim to manage the trust. In that view it is clear that the plaintiff and his predecessors continuously represented the trust. This was enunciated by the Judicial Committee in Prosunno Kumari Debya v. Goiab Chand Baboo(15). At p. 256, it was stated:

    “It appears to be right and reasonable that judgments obtained against a former shebait in respect of debts so incurred should be binding upon succeeding shebaits who, in fact, form a continuing representation of the idol's property.”

    11. In Gnanasambanda Pandra Sannadhi v. Velu Pandram, the Privy Council did not accept the thory that each trustee became entitled to the management performam doni. Reviewing all the previous decisions, Banerjee and Gordon, JJ., say in Nilmony Singh v. Jagabandhu Roy(16):

    “But that does not show that each succeeding manager gets a fresh stari as far as the question of limitation is concerned upon the ground of his not deriving title from any previous manager. The succeeding shebaits, as was observed in the case just referred to, formed a continuing representation of the idol's property. If we were to hold otherwise it would lead to a most anomalous result for then it would follow that although after any alienation of the idol's property ten successive shebaits may not take any steps to recover the idol's property, the eleventh shebait, it may be after a hundered years or more, would still be in time to institute a suit for recovery of possession. Such a result the legislature could not have contemplated.”

    12. These observations are exactly in point. Veerabhadra Varaprasada Row v. Vellanki Venhatadri(17), Sankaran v. Krishna, Peydigantam Jagandha Row v. Rama Doss Patnaik and Chiruvolu Punamma v. Chiruvolu Perrazu lay down the same principle. As against this chain of authorities, the learned vakil relied upon some decisions of the Judicial Committee and on Prosonna Kumar Mukherjee v. Srikant Rant(18) and on Patinharkuru v. Raman Varma. The decision in Bahadur Singh v. Mohar Singh(19), that one reversioner does not claim through another, has no bearing on the present case. Until the widow dies, it cannot be predicted of any one of them that he would be the heir. Consequently, they may not be said to claim title through each other. Moreover, the position of a Stani is not analogous to that of a reversioner. Nor does Runchordas Vandravendas v. Parvatibai help the appellant. It was held in that case that a reversioner does not derive title through the widow in possession. The position of successive trustees is not the same as that of a widow and a reversioner. In Prosonna Kumar Mukherjee v. Srikant Rant the properties in the possession of the previous ghatwal were apparently resumed and re-granted to the new ghatwal see, however, Radhabhai v. Anantrav Bhagvant Deshpande(20). Consequently, there can be no question of claiming through or from the previous owner. Patinharkuru v. Raman Varma to which I was a party related to a different state of affairs altogether. That was a case in which the right to the Stanom itself was in dispute and not to any property or office which appertained to the Stanom, It was argued in that case that a person who might at some future time succeed to one of the stanoms should have sued for a declaration that a person in one of the higher stanoms was a trespasser. I held that such a suit was not obligatory on the plaintiff, as he may never live to succeed to the Stanom and that his cause of action arose only when succession opened to him. I followed Gazzala Veerayya v. Gazzala Ganamma(21) and other cases. It is open to argument whether those decisions are any longer law, having regard to the character which the Judicial Committee are now clothing a reversioner with. However that may be, my judgment in Patinharkuru v. Raman Varma, related to a different question and involved very different consideration from what we are now dealing with. On the other hand, the decision in Damodar Das v. Lakhan Das(22) seems to re-affirm the view taken by the Judicial Committee in Gnanasambanda Pandara Sannadhi v. Velu Pandaram.

    13. I am, therefore, of opinion that limitation commenced to run against the plaintiff when the management was assumed by the defendants as against the previous Rajahs who were trustees of the devaswom and that consequently the suit is barred by limitation. For the same reason, I think the defendants acquired a title by presoription to the office. In the view I have taken, it is not necessary to consider the question raised by Mr. Ananthakrishna Iyer that the right to sue, having been barred under the Limitation Act of 1859, was not revived by the Act of 1871 or 1877. The decision of the Subordinate Judge is right and this appeal must be dismissed with costs.

    S.N/R.K

    14. Appeal dismissed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Raja Of Palghat v. K.N.V.K. Raman Unni
    (Feb 2, 1917)