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  • Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, re-enacts section 539 of the Code of 1882
  • provisions of section 539 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1832
  • clause (a) of subjection (1) and sub-section (2).
  • provisions of section 539 of the old Code
  • SECTION 92 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • clauses (a) to (h) of sub-section (1),
  • section 92 of the Code of 1903
  • sub-section (1) and section 539
  • clause (1)(d) of section 92
  • 1908 of sub-section (2).
  • section 92(1)(d)
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
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Acts
  • Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, re-enacts section 539 of the Code of 1882
  • provisions of section 539 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1832
  • clause (a) of subjection (1) and sub-section (2).
  • provisions of section 539 of the old Code
  • SECTION 92 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • clauses (a) to (h) of sub-section (1),
  • section 92 of the Code of 1903
  • sub-section (1) and section 539
  • clause (1)(d) of section 92
  • 1908 of sub-section (2).
  • section 92(1)(d)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The reference before the Court arose from a suit brought by certain hereditary trustees against their hereditary co-trustees. Among the reliefs claimed was a decree directing the defendants to render accounts of profits of temple lands and topes in their possession and to pay over sums due for the use of the temple. The central procedural question referred to the Bench was whether a plaintiff, suing as a trustee, is precluded, in the absence of the sanction required by section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, from obtaining a decree for an account against co-trustees. The matter was considered by a Bench of several Judges (including Oldfield, Sir William Ayling, Kumaraswami Sastri, Ramesam and Odgers, JJ.), who delivered concurrent opinions and answered the reference.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a plaintiff suing as a trustee is precluded, in the absence of the sanction referred to in section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code, from obtaining a decree for an account against his co-trustees.
  2. Whether the scope of section 92 (which re-enacts section 539 of the earlier Code with modifications) is determined by the nature of the relief sought (e.g., an account falling under clause (1)(d)) regardless of whether the suit is between co-trustees, or whether the identity/character of the plaintiff (trustee versus public/beneficiary) matters for applicability.
  3. Whether the addition of subsection (2) to section 92 (in 1908) altered the law so as to require sanction for suits by trustees inter se, i.e., whether subsection (2) expanded the class of suits caught by the mandatory requirements to include trustee plaintiffs as well as representative suits by persons interested in the public trust.

Arguments of the Parties

First Defendant's Arguments

  • Contended that sanction under section 92 is essential for the suit because "account" is one of the reliefs specifically enumerated in section 92(1)(d). By reference to subsection (2), it was argued that any suit claiming such a relief must be instituted in conformity with subsection (1), i.e., with the sanction or joinder required thereunder.
  • Relied on literal reading of the statute and on authorities that, in their view, applied subsection (2) literally to bar such suits unless brought in the representative manner specified.

Plaintiff / Appellant's Arguments (as represented by Mr. Lakshmanna, vakil for appellant)

  • Submitted that the proper question in dealing with the scope of section 92 is the nature of the relief sought. If the relief falls within clauses (a)–(h) of subsection (1), then subsection (2) applies and the suit must be brought as provided in subsection (1).
  • Relied on precedents, notably Swaminatha Pillai v. Sundaresa Pillai, as supporting the contention that a trustee's suit for account in these circumstances falls within section 92.
  • Implicitly asserted that the protective/representative provisions of section 92 govern suits relating to public charitable trusts regardless of the plaintiff's identity, if the relief sought is one enumerated in subsection (1).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Swaminatha Pillai v. Sundaresa Piliai (also cited as Saminatha Pillai v. Sundaresa Pillai) Held that a suit by a trustee of a temple against the trustee of a kattalai (a subordinate trust) for an account fell within the provisions of section 92. The Court observed that this case was distinguishable because it concerned a general trustee suing a subordinate trustee where the former effectively represented the general trust (i.e., beneficiary-like interest). Sir William Ayling, who had been party to that decision, agreed it required narrower application and indicated willingness to reconsider its applicability if a similar case arose.
Subramania Pillai v. Krishnaswami Somayajiar (also referenced as Subrahmania Pillai v. Krishnaswami Somayajiar) Discussed in relation to whether suits by trustees fall under section 92 after the 1908 amendment; earlier decisions treated suits by trustees as caught by section 92. The Court noted that earlier benches had dealt with the proposition that every suit by a trustee was governed by section 92, but in this case the Court treated those decisions as not controlling where the suit is between co-trustees and where the plaintiffs are asserting personal trustee rights.
Nellaiyappa Pillai v. Thangama Nachiar Taken as authority to the contrary of the view that section 92 always applies to trustee suits. Oldfield, J. noted it was an authority the other way but that it did not bind the Bench of three in the Letters Patent Appeal. The Court considered its applicability but did not treat it as decisive here.
Vaikunta Pai v. Vittappa Shanbhaga / Vittappa Sharibhaga Relied on as a decision treating suits for account by a trustee as falling within section 92 (apparently on a bare reference to subsection (2)). The Court treated this authority as a decision resting on a bare reference to subsection (2) without detailed discussion of scope and therefore of limited assistance on the point now before it.
Mullangi Venkatasubbamma v. Mullangi Venkatarangam Chetty Applied a literal view of subsection (2) to hold suits claiming reliefs enumerated in subsection (1) must comply with section 92. The Court regarded this case as important but observed that the Judges did not consider fully the character of the plaintiffs as trustees distinct from beneficiaries; thus its application to trustee-versus-co-trustee suits is limited.
Tricunidass Mulji v. Khimji Vullabhdass / Tricumdas Mulji v. Khimji Vullabhdass Held sanction under section 539 (old Code) was essential for a suit between co-trustees for removal and for an account. The Court noted this decision laid no special stress on the plaintiff's trustee character and that it has not been consistently followed; it was treated as not decisive of the present question.
Subbayya v. Krishna Foundation case cited in the reasoning of later cases regarding application of the sanction requirement. The Court observed that in Subbayya v. Krishna the plaintiffs were trustees but did not rely on that character; the point was not treated as material in that decision.
Budree Das Mukim v. Chooni Lall Johurry (also Budree Das Makim) Woodroffe, J.'s elaborate judgment distinguished between representative suits (for the public) and suits by trustees to enforce their personal rights; held the representative procedure was not intended to bar trustee personal suits. The Court indicated it would respectfully follow Woodroffe, J.'s reasoning (subject to one point), treating that judgment as a complete and persuasive statement of the law on the issue; it relied on the distinction between public/representative suits and trustee personal suits.
Ayatunnessa Bibi v. Kulfu Kalifa and Muhammad Abdul Majid Khan v. Ahmad Said Khan Cases decided after the 1908 Code in which the distinction drawn by Woodroffe, J. was followed; suits by trustees were treated as not necessarily caught by section 92. The Court noted these cases supported the view that suits by trustees (as opposed to representative public suits) could lie without compliance with the sanction provisions of section 92.
Ulagappa Chetti v. Ramanath Chetti Held that section 92 governs suits for vindication of public rights in charitable trusts and does not apply to suits between hereditary trustees as to management rights. The Court (Wallis, C.J. and Oldfield, J. in that case) was cited and followed by several Judges in the present Bench as supportive of the view that trustee-versus-co-trustee suits for internal management (including accounts) are not within section 92.
Venku / Veniku Chettiar v. Doraisami Chettiar Held a suit by a trustee against a person alleged to have been dismissed for recovery of trust property and for an account was not governed by section 92. The Court recorded that Napier and Odgers, JJ., followed Ulagappa Chetti and Woodroffe, J.'s approach in holding s92 inapplicable to certain trustee suits; the present Bench adopted the same reasoning for co-trustee account suits.
Ali Hussain v. Mohamed Hussain Indicated a similar view to the line of authorities declining to apply section 92 to trustee personal suits. Noted by the Court as another authority consistent with the distinction between representative and trustee personal suits.
Venkatarangam Chetty v. Venkatasubbammah Raised the question whether section 92 applied to suits by reversioners (private parties) seeking removal of a trustee; Wallis, J. thought s92 did not apply while on appeal the decision was reversed by other Judges. The Court recited the conflict of authority in this Court and used the decision history to illustrate divergent views on whether suits asserting private rights in the trust are within s92.
Miya Vali Ulla v. Syed Bava Santi Miya Held a suit by a co-trustee for an account and recovery of his share did not fall within section 539. The Court cited this as a contrary authority to Tricumdas Mulji and as supportive of the view that co-trustee suits for account may lie outside the sanction provisions.
Nilkanth v. Ramkrishna Held that a suit for declaration that defendants were not properly appointed trustees and for an injunction did not fall under section 92; expressed doubt whether certain suits could be regarded as suits for removal governed by s92. The Court referenced this decision as expressing doubts about broad application of section 92 to trustee disputes and used it to support the narrower construction advocated by several Judges.
Singara Chariar v. Krishnasivami Iyengar Cited in context as a case distinguished from later decisions relying on the 1908 amendments. The Court recorded that some authorities distinguished Singara Chariar as having been decided prior to certain amendments and therefore not determinative of the amended law's scope.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis focused on statutory construction of section 92 (which re-enacts section 539 of the earlier Code with modifications) and on distinguishing suits that are genuinely representative of the public interest from suits brought by trustees to vindicate their personal management rights.

Oldfield, J. — principal analytical points:

  • Identified the precise question as whether a trustee plaintiff is barred, without sanction under section 92, from obtaining an account decree against co-trustees; the Court excluded other reliefs or the framing of a scheme from that specific reference.
  • Accepted that a literal reading of subsection (2) might support first defendant's position (because subsection (1) lists an "account" and subsection (2) restricts suits claiming such reliefs), but rejected a purely literal approach because it ignores historical and purposive considerations.
  • Held that the 1908 addition (referred to in the opinion as the addition of sub-section (3) or of sub-section (2) — the text treats the 1908 amendment as clarifying previous law) was intended to make explicit the law stated in subsection (1) and the old section 539, not to deprive trustees of rights to sue co-trustees to discharge their own trust-related duties.
  • Examined authorities: some decisions applied subsection (2) literally, but many decisions (including Woodroffe, J.'s well-considered judgment in Budree Das Mukim) drew a distinction between representative suits (requiring sanction/representative procedure) and trustee personal suits. Oldfield concluded that the latter should not be subject to the safeguards intended for representative public suits.
  • Emphasised that a construction which avoids practical difficulties (for example, a trustee being unable to sue because the Advocate-General would not move or no suitable co-plaintiff with a wider interest could be joined) is preferable when it is consistent with statutory language and legislative policy.

Kumaraswami Sastri, J. — complementary analysis:

  • Stated that the key is whether the suit is for vindication of public rights in a charitable trust (representative) or whether it is a trustee suing to remedy infringement of his personal rights as trustee.
  • Explained the legislative history: section 92 re-enacted section 539 with modifications; subsection (2) was intended to resolve doubts about whether the old provision was mandatory, not to enlarge its scope to take away private rights of action by trustees.
  • Observed practical hardships that would result for hereditary trustees if the sanction requirement applied to internal trustee disputes (e.g., denial of practical remedy if Advocate-General refuses leave), and found the language of section 92 insufficiently clear to compel such consequences.
  • Adopted the distinction in Budree Das Mukim and followed decisions (Ulagappa Chetti, Venku Chettiar, Ayatunnessa Bibi, etc.) that supported limiting section 92 to representative suits brought for the public benefit.

Sir William Ayling, Kt., O.C.J. — concurrence with qualification:

  • Agreed with the negative answer proposed by Oldfield, J., but noted his prior participation in Swaminatha Pillai v. Sundaresa Pillai and acknowledged that that judgment had been worded in a way that suggested a broader application than intended.
  • Distinguished Swaminatha Pillai as involving a general trustee suing a subordinate trustee (where the former effectively represented the broader trust) and observed that he would be prepared to reconsider the applicability of section 92 in a similar future case.

Collective view and weight of authorities:

  • The Court treated Woodroffe, J.'s analysis in Budree Das Mukim as authoritative on the distinction between representative public suits and trustee personal suits and considered subsequent cases (some supporting the literal application of subsection (2), others following the distinction) in reaching its conclusion.
  • The Court preferred a construction that preserved trustees' private rights to sue co-trustees for accounts and other management remedies where the suit is essentially personal to the trustees and not to the public at large.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Bench answered the reference in the negative. In the language adopted by the Court: the plaintiff suing as a trustee is not precluded, in the absence of the sanction referred to in section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code, from obtaining a decree for an account against his co-trustees in this suit.

Implications / Consequences:

  • Direct effect on the parties: A trustee-plaintiff in a suit between co-trustees (as in this case) may seek and obtain a decree for an account without first obtaining the sanction of the Advocate-General or complying with the joinder/representative provisions of section 92, provided the suit is essentially one by trustees to enforce their personal rights of management and not a representative suit for the public benefit.
  • Scope limitation emphasized: The Court confined its ruling to suits between co-trustees and repeatedly distinguished cases where a trustee sues in a capacity effectively representing the general trust or the public interest (those remain within the protective ambit of section 92 and its procedural safeguards).
  • No sweeping conclusion that section 92 is inapplicable to all suits claiming reliefs enumerated in subsection (1); rather, the Court clarified that section 92 regulates representative public suits and was not intended to take away private rights of action that trustees have against co-trustees.
  • Judicial reservation: Sir William Ayling noted that a prior decision (Swaminatha Pillai v. Sundaresa Pillai) had been worded broadly and indicated a willingness to re-open that question if a closely similar case arises, showing the Court's caution about broad, unqualified readings of earlier authorities.

Delivered collectively by the Bench: Oldfield, Sir William Ayling, Kumaraswami Sastri, Ramesam and Odgers, JJ., with the reference answered in the negative.

    Appanna Poricha v. Narasinga Poricha

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    Sir William Ayling, Kt., O.C.J:— I have had the advantage of perusing the judgment which my learned brother Oldfield is about to pronounce. I agree with the views expressed therein and with the negative answer proposed by him to be given to the question referred to us: and I should not feel called upon to add anything, but for the judgment in Swaminatha Pillai v. Sundaresa Piliai, to which I was a party, which has been relied on by the learned vakil for appellant as supporting this contention.

    The case is, of course, distinguishable from the one with which we are concerned. This is a case between co-trustees: that was a case in which a subordinate trustee was sued by a general trustee, who, as representing the general trust, was really a beneficiary under the subordinate trust, and was seeking, as such, to enforce fulfilment of the latter.

    It was from this point of view and in reference to a suit of that character that the last paragraph of the judgment in that case was written: but was so worded as to suggest a more general application than I think we had in our minds. The argument addressed to us (and rejected) was apparently that every suit by a trustee—no matter of what nature or against whom directed—was exempted from the provisions of section 92. This was also, I think, the proposition placed before the Bench in Subramania Pillai v. Krishnaswami Somayajiar and dealt with by Abdur Rahim, J., in the last paragraph of his judgment.

    The correctness of our decision on the facts of the case then before us is unnecessary to discuss. Nellaiyappa Pillai v. Thangama, Nachiar was an authority the other way: but one which did not bind us sitting as a Bench of three Judges in a Letters Patent Appeal. But I feel bound to say that on reconsideration and in the light of the argument now addressed to us, I do not think that the applicability of that judgment was affected by reason of the introduction of clause (2) of section 92. I agree with my brother Oldfield's view of the intention and effect of the inclusion of that clause: and I may go so far as to say that if a case similar to Swaminatha Pillai v. Sundaresa Pillai came before me again, I should like to hear the question of the applicability of section 92 re-argued, and should be prepared to reconsider my views.

    I would answer the question referred to us in the negative.

    Oldfield, J.:— The question for decision is in effect whether the plaintiff, suing as a trustee, is precluded in the absence of the sanction referred to in section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code from obtaining a decree for an account against his co-trustees, the defendants, in this suit. We, therefore, are not concerned with his right to the other reliefs he has asked for or in particular to the framing of a scheme.

    It is argued on behalf of first defendant that such a sanction is essential, because, an account being specified in section 92(1)(d) as one of the reliefs which can be claimed in a suit under the section, with reference to sub-section (2) no further reason need be required for holding that an account can be claimed only in a suit instituted in conformity with sub-section (1); and no doubt a literal reading of the reference in the former to “a suit claiming any of the reliefs” specified in the latter at first sight supports this conclusion. But neither it, nor the authorities relied on by first defendant, take account of the considerations which have been urged before us and which in my opinion must prevail: that the addition of sub-section (3) in 1908 was intended not to alter, but to make explicit the law as stated in sub-section (1) and section 539 of the previous Code: and that the law so stated did not affect the right of a trustee, as opposed to beneficiaries, to sue a co-trustee in discharge of his duty to his trust.

    The authorities can be dealt with shortly.

    Vaikunta Pai v. Vittappa Shanbhaga was decided on a mere reference to sub-section (2) without discussion of its scope. Swaminatha Pillai v. Sundaresa Pillai was a suit by a trustee and the Full Bench held, following the case next to be referred to, that the addition of sub-section (2) rendered the statement of the law in Nellaiyappa Pillai v. Thangama Nachiar incorrect. Whether or no that was right, is immaterial for the present purpose, because those decisions were not between co-trustees, but between the trustee of a principal institution and the trustee of its subsidiary trust and the former may have been regarded as suing on behalf of his institution and those interested in it. Subrahmania Pillai v. Krishnaswami Somayajiar and Mullangi Venkatasubbamma v. Mullangi Venkatarangam Chetty no doubt are based on the literal application of sub-section (2), for which first defendant contends. But, if the former can be regarded as really a suit against trustees for their removal (and I share the doubt expressed in Nilkanth v. Ramkrishna, whether it can be), there is nothing in it regarding the question now before us except a bare reference to the terr as of the section and no consideration of the character of the plaintiffs as trustees and not beneficiaries. Mullangi Venkatasubbamma v. Mullangi Venkatarangam Chetty is more important, because the judgment under appeal had negatived the necessity for a sanction on the ground now relied on by plaintiff. But one learned Judge said nothing on the point and the other, after referring to it, confined his attention, as defendants contend that we should do, to the bare description of the relief claimed and its identity with one of those come rated in sub-section (1), without considering whether the section as a whole applies only to suits by beneficiaries or also to those brought by trustees. It is true that after doing so he referred to the inconvenience involved in compliance with the provisions of section 92 by a trustee, justifying it as not insuperable and as entailed by the general policy of the Legislature. But the necessity for such compliance might, if the Advocate-General would not move on a trustee's relation or would not consent to his suing, preclude his doing so altogether, and it would involve in any case the anomaly of his joining as co-plaintiff some second person possessing a more general interest than his own. With all deference, a construction which avoids those difficulties is, if otherwise legitimate, to be preferred and the policy of the Legislature on the point is not clear enough to influence the decision in the direction proposed.

    Neither of the learned Judges in Mullangi Venkatasubbamma v. Mullangi Venkatarangam Chetty referred to the state of the law before 1908 or the extent to which it was then altered by the addition of sub-section (2). On the first point, first defendant relies on Tricunidass Mulji v. Khimji Vullabhdass, in which sanction under section 539 of the Code then in force was held essential for a suit between co-trustees. But the judgment lays no stress on the plaintiff's possession of that character; and the fact that it was founded on Subbayya v. Krishna, in which the plaintiffs were trustees, is not material, since in that case they did not rely on the fact or on any distinction between their rights and those of persons generally interested. That distinction was, however, relied on and considered in Budree Das Mukim v. Chooni Lall Johurry; and I would respectfully follow the elaborate judgment of Woodroffe, J., therein, as it is, except on one point, a complete statement of the law on the question before us. He held, no doubt, that section 539 was not mandatory; but that is now immaterial, as the enactment of sub-section (2) has made it clear that sub-section (1) is so within its scope. Dealing, however, with its scope, he also held on full consideration of all the authorities (and it has not been shown that any direct dissent from his conclusions has since been expressed), that the suit contemplated in it is representative, two persons being enabled by it to sue on behalf of the public and sanction being required as a precaution against wasteful litigation; he distinguished between the right of the public “to see that, their alleged appointees have the management of the trust” (that being the point before him) and that of the plaintiffs “considered not as members of the public, but as trustees suing to enforce their own personal rights of management,” and he made use of this distinction to hold that no question whether the section was mandatory really arose, because the suit before him, being by trustees, was not of the description referred to in it.

    The question is next whether this authority has been deprived of effect by the enactment in 1908 of sub-section (2). The contrary has been held in the two suits by trustees against trespassers claiming the trusteeship, Ayatunnessa Bibi v. Kulfu Kalifa and Muhammad Abdul Majid Khan v. Ahmad Said Khan, the distinction drawn by Woodroffe, J., being expressly relied on in the latter. It was also approved lately in this Court, the parties all being trustees, by Wallis, C.J, and myself in Ulagappa Chetti v. Ramanath Chetti, that decision having been followed by Napier and Odgers, JJ., in Venku Chettiar v. Doraisami Chettiar; and a similar view would appear to have been taken, although without specific reference to Budree Das Mukim v. Chooni Lall Johurry, in Ali Hussain v. Mohamed Hussain. And these authorities moreover commend themselves, when regard is had as the ordinary rules of construction require, to the amended provision as a whole and the effect of the amendment. The argument of first defendant involves that the intention in enacting sub-section (2) was to make clear, not only the mandatory character of section 539, but also, what (so far as we have been shown) had not been the subject of any marked conflict of decisions, the class of suits to which that section applied and, contrary to the ordinary interpretation of the expression “persons interested” and the clearly representative character of the procedure, to bring under it trustees as well as beneficiaries. This cannot be accepted. If the intention had been thus to abrogate the distinction between suits by these two classes, it is not to be supposed that it would have been effected by mere implication without the adoption of different wording in sub-section (1) and clearer wording of the new sub-section (2). The reference to reliefs in the latter cannot without undue violence be read as to reliefs in all suits relating to public trusts, by whomsoever instituted, and whether they are or are not suits of the kind dealt with in the main provision, sub-section (1), “suits by persons interested” and of similar nature to the others, provided for under the same heading in section 91. It may be that, as observed by Wallis, C.J, and myself in the unreported case above referred to and by the Bombay High Court in Nilkanth v. Ramkrishna, the reliefs claimed by a trustee will in some instances be indistinguishable from those which can be claimed on behalf of the public. But it does not follow that the legislature intended, what is not distinctly expressed, that they should be claimed only subject to safeguards for the representative and responsible character of the proceedings, which would not be appropriate or necessary when a trustee is the plaintiff.

    For the foregoing reasons I would answer the question referred in the negative.

    Kumaraswami Sastri, J.:— I am of opinion that the question referred to us should be answered in the negative. The suit is by certain hereditary trustees against their hereditary co-trustees claiming various reliefs. The relief which is relevant to the question to be decided is the prayer that a decree be passed directing the defendants “to render account of the profits of the temple lands and topes in their possession and to make over the amounts due from them for the use of the temple.”

    Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, re-enacts section 539 of the Code of 1882 with certain modifications, the most important of which is sub-section (2) which declares that

    “Save as provided by the Religious Endowments Act, 1863, no suit claiming any of the reliefs specified in sub-section (1) shall be instituted in respect of any such trust as is therein referred to except in conformity with the provisions of that sub-section.”.

    The main contention of Mr. Lakshmanna is that in dealing with the scope of section 92 the question is, not who are the plaintiffs or what is the relation between the plaintiffs and the defendants inter se but what is the nature of the relief sought, and that, if the suit relates to a public charitable trust and the reliefs or any of them fall within the class enumerated in clauses (a) to (h) of sub-section (1), no suit can be brought, except by the Advocate-General or by two or more persons with his consent, even though the dispute be between the co-trustees inter se and relate to matters of internal management and control. I am unable to agree with this contention. The history of the legislation on this subject, and the evils which the legislature wanted to remedy, show that section 92 was only intended to govern suits by the public or by the Advocate-General for the vindication of the rights of the public in charitable trusts. I agree with the view taken by Woodroffe, J., in Budree Das Mukim v. Chooni Lall Johurry, that section 539 only governs representative suits brought for the benefit of the public to enforce a public right in respect of an express or constructive trust and does not apply to suits brought by persons to remedy a particular infringement of their own individual right. The object of clause (2) was to set at rest the conflict of decisions as to whether the provisions of section 539 of the old Code were mandatory or merely permissive and enabling, and to this extent the decision of Woodroffe, J., is affected by the enactment of section 92. I do not think it was intended to enlarge the scope of the section by taking away private rights of action. In Ayatunnessa Bibi v. Kulfu Khalifa and Muhammad Abdul Majid Khan v. Ahmad Said Khan, which were decided after the passing of the Code of 1908, the view of Woodroffe, J., was followed with approval. When a trustee has against his co-trustees rights which are personal, and quite distinct from the rights of the general public to require that public charities are properly performed, it is difficult to see why the sanction of the Advocate-General, or the joinder of another person who has no interest in the quarrel between the trustees, should be necessary. In the case of hereditary trustees, there is the additional consideration that the refusal of the Advocate-General to give leave, or of a stranger to join in the suit, would mean the practical denial of his hereditary rights as against his co-trustees. If the language of section 92 were plain and clearly involved such consequences, Courts would have no option but to apply the section, but I am of opinion that there is nothing in section 92 which compels us to adopt a construction leading to such results. I think two conditions have to be satisfied. The suit should be one for the vindication of the rights of the general public in the charitable trust, and the relief should be all or any of the reliefs enumerated in clauses (a) to (h) of sub-section (1).

    There is a conflict of authority in this Court as regards the point now under reference. In Venkatarangam Chetty v. Venkatasubbammah, the question arose whether section 92, Civil Procedure Code, applied to a suit by reversioners who sued for a declaration that the widow had forfeited her right to the office of trustee to a charitable endowment by reason of her having alienated the office, for possession of the trust properties and, if necessary, for removal of the widow from the office of trustee. Wallis, J., was of opinion that section 92 had no application to such a suit. After referring to that section, he observed:

    “Even so the scope of the section is to protect the rights of the public, and it is not aimed at the infringement of individual rights, and should not, if possible, be no construed as to deprive individuals whose rights have been infringed of their remedy. In Woodroffe and Ameer Ali's edition of the Code, page 350 (First Edition), the learned authors discuss the question and appear to be of opinion that such a case does not come within it and that if a general administration of the trust, which has included the removal of the trustee, is necessary to provide an efficient remedy for the infringement of the individual right in question, such general administration may be granted without regard to the provisions of the section.”

    On Appeal, Abdur Rahim, Offg. C.J, and Seshagiri Ayyar, J., reversed the decision [Mullangi Venkatasubbamma v. Mullangi Venkatarangam Chetty]. Abdur Rahim, Offg. C.J, in dealing with the contention, that the suit was mainly one for the assertion of a private right and therefore did not fall under section 92, was of opinion that.

    “once there has been a breach of trust the right of the public to see that the trust is properly administered arises and that the policy of the legislature, as it is to be gathered from the wording of section 92 is that in such a case the suit has to be instituted under certain conditions.”

    The hardship to the reversioners was, in the opinion of the learned Judge, not sufficient to outweigh the fact that in the opinion of the legislature suits instituted in respect of breaches of trust should be only in conformity with the requirements of section 92. Seshagiri Attar, J., was of opinion that when a suit embraces any of the reliefs specified in clause (1) the effect of clause (2) was to bar any suit not brought in accordance with the section. In Sulramania Pillai v. Krishnaswami Somayajiar, it was held by Abdur Rahim and Spencer, JJ., that suits by trustees for a declaration that the appointment of a co-trustee by the Devasthanam Committee was invalid fell within the scope of section 92. Abdur Rahim, J., was of opinion that the suit was in effect one in which the direction of the Court was necessary for the administration of a public trust within the meaning of the section and fell within clause (h), as it was “a relief cognate to removing a trustee.” Spencer, J., held that the suit was one to remove a trustee duly appointed by a body who were competent to make the appointment, and distinguished Singara Chariar v. Krishnasivami Iyengar, and the other cases cited, as having been decided prior to the addition of clause (a) of subjection (1) and sub-section (2). In Vaikunta Pai v. Vittappa Sharibhaga, Sadasiva Attar and Napier, JJ., on a bare reference to the provisions of section 92 were of opinion that a suit for an account by a trustee against his co-trustees fell within the scope of section 92 and could only be brought in conformity with clause (1). A contrary view was taken by Wallis, C.J, and Oldfield, J., in Ulagappa Chetti v. Ramanath Chetty, where hereditary trustees sued their co-trustees to recover immoveable properties and the sums that on taking an account may be due by defendants. Wallis, C.J, observed:

    “the question is not altogether free from difficulty but 1 think the connect principle is that this section 92 governs suits for the vindication of the rights of the public in public charitable trusts and has no application to suits for the vindication of the rights of management by hereditary trustees or to disputes between such trustees inter be as to their turns of management.”

    In Veniku Chettiar v. Doraisami Chettiar Napier and Odgers, JJ., held that a suit by a trustee against a person whom he alleges to have been dismissed for recovery of trust property and for an account was not governed by section 92. The learned Judges followed Ulagappa Chetti v. Ramanath Chetty, above referred to, on the view of Woodroffe, J., in Budree Das Mukim v. Chooni Lall Johurry.

    Strong reliance was placed by the appellant's vakil on Saminatha Pillai v. Sundaresa Pillai, where it was held that a suit by a trustee of a temple against the trustee of a kattalai, established in connexion with the temple, for an account was held to fall within the provisions of section 92. In that case certain properties were left to the defendant under his father's will upon trust, to apply the income for the neivethiam in the temple of which the plaintiff was the trustee. Wallis, C.J, observed that

    “where there are several trustees of different properties vested in them respectively, for the performance of various services in the temple, I do not think the main or general trustee has any right to sue otherwise than under section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code for the failure of one of the trustees to perform his trust. If he had such a separate cause of action, I should not be disposed to construe section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code as taking it away from him but I am not satisfied that he has any such right of action under the general law.”

    Krishnan, J., Was of opinion that the suit as framed did not fall within section 92. Owing to this difference of opinion the case came on before a Bench of three Judges of which I was a member; I took the view that there was no contract between the plaintiff and defendant. The statement of the law by the Chief Justice as to independent trusts with different trustees, though for the benefit of the same beneficiary, was in my opinion correct, and the only question was whether the suit was governed by section 92. This case is therefore clearly distinguishable from the present one which is one between co-trustees. Reliance was placed by the appellant's vakil on the decision of Parson, J., in Tricumdas Mulji v. Khimji Vullabhdass, where the learned Judge was of opinion that the provisions of section 539 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1832 were mandatory and that a suit by two trustees against two other trustees for their removal and for an account was governed by the section, the claim for an account falling within the words “decree granting such further or other relief as the nature of the case may require.” This case, so far as I am aware, has not been followed and a contrary view was taken in Miya Vali Ulla v. Syed Bava Santi Miya, where Farran, C.J, and Hosking, J., held that a suit by a co-trustee for an account and recovery of his share did not fall within section 539, as the plaintiff's complaint merely was “that he claiming to be a co-trustee, has been excluded from a share in the management and in the profits of such, management.” In Nilkanth v. Ramkrishna, it was held that a suit for a declaration that the defendants were not properly appointed trustees of a temple and for an injunction did not fall under section 92, Civil Procedure Code. The learned Judges dissented from Subramania Pillai v. Krishnaswami Somayajiar. Macleod, C.J, observed:

    I do not think that merely because the suit concerns the question of the validity of the appointment of defendants 1 to 4 as trustees of the temple, and because it might on that account be considered that the suit is somewhat akin to suits which came within the provisions of section 92, that, therefore, we are to hold that the suit in the language of English lawyers is a suit that comes within the equity of the Statute.”

    Co-trustees are co-owners of trust properties and are in law entitled to be in joint possession of all trust properties whether it be in the form of immoveables, moveables, or cash. It would ordinarily render a trustee personally liable if he allowed the cash or moveables to be in the exclusive possession and management of a co-trustee and there was misappropriation. He is in law entitled to be in joint possession of the funds, even when the other trustee is carrying out the trust properly. Where moneys are in a co-trustee's hands an account would be necessary to ascertain his liability and the claim would, in a sense, be a suit for an account of trust moneys. I find it difficult to see why if a suit by a trustee against his co-trustees or strangers for joint or exclusive possession of immoveable or moveable properties does not require sanction of the Advocate-General or the joinder of another person, the mere fact that money is claimed, to ascertain which an account will have to be taken, should fall under section 92. I think the words, “directing accounts and inquiries” in clause (1)(d) of section 92 should be confined to suits by the Advocate-General, or by two or more persons with his consent, against all the trustees for an account of their management, and not one or more trustees against the others, as each trustee has a right to call upon the other to account to him for trust funds he has received, even though the other trustee commits no breach of trust.

    I am of opinion that the decision of Woodroffe, J., in Budree Das Makim v. Chooni Lall Johurry, though under the old Code of Civil Procedure of 1882, is equally applicable to suits under section 92 of the Code of 1903 and that the addition of clause (2) has not the effect of taking away the private right of suit which trustees may have against each other or strangers. I would follow the view taken, by Wallis, J., in Venkatarangam Chetty v. Venkatasubbammah and by the Chief Justice and Oldfield, J., in Ulayappa Chetti v. Ramanath Chetiy.

    Ramesam, J.:— I agree.

    Odgers, J.:— I agree that we should answer the reference in the negative.

    M.H.H

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