1. This second appeal raises a question under Section 4 of the Partition Act. The action is one brought by the widow of one Chiman against the mortgagee auction, purchaser in a suit brought by the mortgagee against Chiman's undivided brother Hari, who after Chiman's death mortgaged a house to which admittedly Hari and Chiman were each entitled to a one-half share. This suit has for its purpose the obtaining of a declaration that the plaintiff is entitled to a one-half undivided share in the house. In the course of the pleadings the defendant applied under the Partition Act for partition and the application was granted, a commissioner was appointed and the matter went forward. Then, operating under the powers conferred by Section 4 of the Partition Act, the widow (the plaintiff in the suit), respondent to the application, sought the right to buy the share of the auction-purchaser and made the necessary application which was dismissed by the trial Court. On appeal that order was reversed, and from that reversing order this appeal is brought. The effect of the order is to give her the right to tender the price of the half that would go otherwise to the defendant and retain the whole house. From that order the money-lender, auction-purchaser, appeals and counsel on his behalf takes four points. Firstly it is said that the trial Court's order was not an appealable order. This point was taken in the lower appellate Court and if a good point, the lower appellate Court should have dismissed the appeal as not maintainable, and having failed so to do, it is said this Court should dismiss the appeal as not maintainable. The reason why it is said the appeal is not maintainable is that the order in question is not one to which O. 43 of the CPC, applies. The answer, I think, is to be found in Section 8 of the Partition Act, which says:
Any order for sale made by the Court under Ss. 2, 3 or 4 shall be deemed to be a decree within the meaning of Section 2 of the CPC.
2. The second point is that S. 4 only applies where the applicant is a member of the undivided family to which the dwelling house belonged and it is said that the plaintiff, the widow of one of the two brothers, is not such a member, and AIR 1928 Cal 5391 at p. 541 is relied upon because there, after observing that the section should be construed liberally and that the narrow meaning of “undivided Hindu joint family” should not be applied to the “undivided family” spoken of in this section, it is said:
It includes a group of persons related in blood, who live in one house under one head or management.
3. It is argued that, because there it is said that it includes such persons, it must be inferred that it does not include persons who do not fall within that description, that this lady is not related by blood to the brothers and that she did not live in one house under one head or management.
4. It seems to me however that it is beyond argument that a widow of a member of a Hindu joint family would be a member herself of the Hindu joint family in its strictest sense, a fortiori, a member of an “undivided family” within the meaning of Section 4 of the Partition Act, which is an expression that should be given a wider and not a narrower meaning than that given to the term “Hindu joint family”. As the Court observes in AIR 1928 Cal 539, above referred to:
The object of the section is to prevent a transferee of a member of a family who is an outsider from forcing his way into a dwelling house in which other members of his transferor's family have a right to live.
5. The next point raised is that this section should be strictly construed. I am not going to examine the consequences that would follow if the argument were accepted because I am of opinion that it is not maintainable, especially in view of the case cited by counsel, AIR 1928 Cal 539, in which the direct contrary was stated—and with respect I think correctly stated—that it should be liberally construed. Finally it is urged that the section only applies where the transferee sues for partition, and stress being laid on the word “sues” it is stated that the transferee did not sue but applied for partition in a suit brought not by the transferee but by the widow. Now, apart from the fact that 116 IC 1612 is against that contention, in my opinion, it can also be disposed of by considering what is meant by the word “sues.” “To sue” is a verb that is not restricted to bringing a suit. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, quoting the old case in 2 WMS Saund 94,3 says:
These words ‘to sue’ may be applied indifferently either to the demandant or plaintiff, or to the tenant or defendant, for the suit of one party or of the other must be followed. And the words ‘to sue’ not only signify ‘to prosecute’ but also ‘to defend’ or to do something which the law requires for the better prosecution or defence of the cause.
6. I think, bearing in mind the clear intention of the Act, where in the course of another suit the defendant applied to have a partition under the Partition Act, he is correctly regarded as having “sued” for partition within the meaning of S. 4. From this it follows that the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Pleader's fee, Rs. 20.
K.S/V.V
7. Appeal dismissed.