1. This appeal arises out of a suit for foreclosure of a mortgage dated 7th July 1924 executed by the first five defendants and one Ayadat Ali Khan who is now dead. The first two defendants were major at the date of the mortgage and the remaining mortgagors were minors. They were represented in the transaction by their mother, the first defendant, Mt. Hasan Bi. The litigation was carried up to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner which upheld the mortgage, that is to say its execution, the passing of consideration and the absence of fraud, but held that the minor defendants were not bound as their mother had no power to alienate their shares. The case was therefore sent back to ascertain the extent of the minors' share in the mortgaged property. The appeal is thus confined to the house property claimed in paras. 1(g), 5 and 6 of the plaint.
2. The plaintiffs' case is that these houses belonged exclusively to the minors' mother Mt. Hasan Bi. The allegation is that these properties were transferred to her by her husband in lieu of dower by two deeds of which Exs. P-45 and D-47 dated 2nd October 1912 and 31st August 1920 are copies. The originals are with defendant 1 who did not produce them though noticed to do so, therefore the plaintiffs tendered secondary evidence in the shape of certified copies obtained from the Registration Department. These two deeds are attacked by the defendants (who are the respondents 3 to 5 here) as sham transaction (the word actually used is bogus) entered into with a view to deprive two of the transferor's sons of their inheritance. They urged that they were not meant to be acted on and were never given effect to. Dealing with this question first, the learn, ed Judge of the lower Court threw the burden of proof on the plaintiffs and held that they had not proved the execution of these documents and also that satisfactory secondary evidence of their contents had not been given. As regards consideration he held that the extent of the Mehr fixed had not been proved. We confess we are at a loss to under, stand how the contents of a document can be more satisfactorily established than by producing a certified copy. Even the defendants themselves have not questioned the accuracy of these copies or thrown any doubt upon them. If they had wanted to do so they could easily have produced the originals. In the circumstances we are surprised at the comment of the learned Judge about this matter. Turning to the question of execution, the defendants admit that they signed the deed. Defendants 3, 4 and 5, are the only ones interested in this question and the pleading on their behalf is as follows:
The recitals of the mortgage deed that their houses were assigned to Hasan Bi in lieu of her Mehr by registered deed of transfer dated 2nd October 1912 and 31st August 1920 are not true, That since before the year 1910 there was ill-feeling between Khan Bahadur Ali Raza Khan and his sons Walayat Ali Khan and Umardaraz Khan due to certain family affairs. Khan Bahadur All Raza Khan with a view to deprive these people from Inheritance of his property executed the above two bogus assigned deeds in favour of Mt. Hasan Bi which were never intended to be acted upon by anybody.
3. In our opinion this is an admission which throws the burden of proving the sham nature of the transaction upon the defendants who assert it. We are aware that there is authority to the contrary. In 20 NLR 7 AIR 1921 Nag 103 , 78 IC 104 , 20 NLR 7 for instance it was held that an admission by the defendant that a document bears his signature coupled with an assertion that it had been placed upon a blank piece of paper upon which the rest of the document was fraudulently scribed was not an admission of execution and so the burden of proof lies upon the plaintiff. One of us (Bose, J.) recently came to the opposite conclusion in Second Appeal No. 208-B of 1935. In view of this conflict of opinion we think it desirable to examine the question at length. We however take the liberty of freely reproducing the reasons and language of the unreported judgment. As an abstract proposition it is beyond doubt that the initial burden of proving execution when it is denied is upon the plaintiff. The real question we have to decide here is not that but whether this onus can be discharged by mere proof of Signature: not proof of execution as such but by bare proof of signature. With the utmost respect for the learned A.J.C who decided 20 NLR 7 AIR 1921 Nag 103 , 78 IC 104 , 20 NLR 7 we think it can.
4. Quite apart from all technical considerations what is the inference that an ordinarily careful person would draw from a letter or document which he knows or is assured bears a man's signature? Which is more in accordance with the ordinary Bourse of human affairs? What is the common course of business?—to sign a blank piece of paper and hand it over to strangers, or, as here, solemnly to execute deed with no intention of acting on them, or to affix one's signature to a document one has read and understood, or had explained, in token of execution with the full intention of giving effect to it? We think it would be a serious thing to hold that execution cannot be proved except by direct evidence. What is to happen when everybody who can speak about the matter is dead and the document is less than 30 years old? How often does any one but the executant see a cheque or a promissory note signed? What can a plaintiff do in such cases but adduce bare proof of signature, and yet according to the view in 20 NLR 7, AIR 1921 Nag 103 , 78 IC 104 , 20 NLR 7 which was a case of a promissory note, that would not be enough.
5. We are aware this view does not stand alone. An earlier ruling of the Nagpur Judicial Commissioner's Court in 9 NLR 8 (1913) 9 Nag LR 8 , 18 IC 853 at p. 9 is to the same effect:
The mere fact that a piece of paper purports to lave been bought in the plaintiff's name and to bear his signature is by itself no indication that he executed it.
6. This is also the view of the Rangoon High Court in 5 Rang 527. AIR 1927 Rang 319 , 105 IC 361 , 5 Rang 527 A number of rulings in various unauthorized reports are to the same effect. AIR 1931 Pat 219, AIR 1931 Pat 219 , 134 IC 635 , 12 PLT 233 20 ALJ 672 AIR 1922 All 401 , 68 IC 809 , 20 ALJ 672 and AIR 1933 Pat 129. AIR 1938 Pat 129 , 145 IC 690 , 14 PLT 727 With the utmost respect we cannot agree.
7. We have no quarrel with the general proposition that proof of signature is not necessarily proof of execution and that an admission that a document bears a man's signature is not necessarily an admission of execution. The circumstances of the case may negative such an inference. We folly realize that quite apart from fraud cases may arise in which a document is signed without any intention of present execution; for instance, a man might sign a fully drawn up contract and put it in his pocket without having any intention of executing it. He may have signed with the intention of delivering it at some later date if a certain event should happen and of tearing it up it should not. That of course would not amount to execution, not even to conditional execution. It would not create even a contingent interest in the subject-matter of the instrument. But surely if nothing else is known then the mere fact that a document is proved to bear a certain signature and that it comes from proper custody ought to be enough to raise an inference that it was signed with the intention of execution. Surely it is evidence by which execution can in conceivable circumstances be proved.
8. This seems to be the view of the learned author of Taylor's Evidence, Vol. 1, p. 142:
Courts are in general bound to presume prima facie in favour of the deeds which appear to have been duly executed.
9. In our opinion this inference arises in India directly from Section 114 of the Evidence Act Persons do not ordinarily sign documents without intending to execute them that is not the common course of human conduct, nor yet the common course of either public or private business. Consequently if any person wants to rely on an exceptional circumstance if he wants to show that in some particular instance the ordinary rule was abrogated surely he must prove it. See also Section 106 of the Evidence Act. If it is accepted that mere proof of signature constitutes prima facie evidence of execution, that it does furnish the necessary scintilla of evidence which would in a jury trial prevent the case from being withdrawn from the jury, then who would fail if nothing else is known beyond the one fact that a document bears a man's signature and Comes from proper custody? Surely the person who asserts that the usual course of business was not followed in that particular case. This is the view of the Allahabad High Court in 50 All 145. AIR 1928 All 16 , 106 IC 250 , 50 All 145 , 25 ALJ 833 Ashworth, J. quotes the following passage from Pipson on Evidence which we think lays down the right rule:
The burden of proof may be shifted not alone by rebuttable presumptions of law but by presumptions of fact of the stronger hind or indeed by any species of evidence sufficient to raise a prima facie case.
10. Even AIR 1931 Pat 219, AIR 1931 Pat 219 , 134 IC 635 , 12 PLT 233 which takes the opposite view, states that the fact that she defendant's thumb impression appears on a document is “a very strong piece of evidence in favour of the plaintiff.” If it is and if nothing more is known then why should it not be legally sufficient to discharge the initial onus? The learned A.J.C, who decided 20 NLR 7 AIR 1921 Nag 103 , 78 IC 104 , 20 NLR 7 also looks at the matter in another way. He says that an admission made by a defendant that a piece of paper bears his thumb impression when qualified by the statement that it had been affixed to a blank piece of paper must be used subject to the Qualification or not at all. Here again, with the utmost respect, we think the rule has been misunderstood. It was expounded by the Privy Council in 39 Bom 399 AIR 1915 PC 2 , 29 IC 223 , 12 IA 103 , 39 Bom 399 (PC) at p. 409 and all that their Lordships said was that:
An admission in a pleading cannot be dissected in the same way as a witness's testimony can. If it is made subject to a condition it must be either accepted subject to the condition or not accepted at all.
11. The claim in their Lordships' case was based on a promissory note. The defendants pleaded that by an oral agreement the parties had agreed that the defendants' liability should cease on a certain date. The plaintiff's case was that the liability was to cease only if full security for the loan were furnished by that date and as it had not been furnished the liability still remained. What then was the admission? Merely this that a collateral oral agreement had been entered into between the parties. There was no admission about the terms of the agreement, and as the question of liability turned on that point their Lordships naturally held that the plaintiff's admission that there had been an agreement about the cessation of liability could not be dissected to mean that it was unconditional and in accordance with the terms pleaded by the defendants.
12. This is not the case here and as we view the matter was not the case in 20 NLR 7. AIR 1921 Nag 103 , 78 IC 104 , 20 NLR 7 In that case the plaintiff's statement when analyzed consisted of three separate assertions of fact: (1) that the thumb impression in question was the defendant's, (2) that it had been affixed to the document in question as opposed to the piece of paper on which it appeared, and (3) that it had been so affixed in token of execution. The defendant admitted the first of these three statements and denied the other two. As regards the first there was no qualification whatever. Of course this was not an admission of liability and not an admission of execution. It was merely admission of the one fact that the thumb impression on the paper was the defendant's. That being so, as we view the law the plaintiff was not called upon to prove that fact. But if that is accepted then according to our view an inference arises under the law about execution and not because of any admission made by the defendants an inference that the thumb impression had been affixed in token of execution. The plaintiff would succeed if nothing more is known not because the defendants had admitted execution but because the plaintiff has established a prima facie case.
13. So also in the present case. The fact that the documents in question bear the executant's signatures is unconditionally accepted. There is no qualification in the pleadings about that fact. That in out opinion is enough to discharge the initial onus which lay on the plaintiffs to prove execution and the burden then shfited to the defendants to prove the special circumstances which according to them rendered this execution nugatory. We cannot see how the plaintiff can be put in a worse position than he would have been if the defendant had denied both signature and execution. In such a case surely the moment the plaintiff proved the signature the burden would shift to the defendant to show that it did not import execution. If the defendant admits the signature and denies execution then all that happens is that the plaintiff is relieved of the necessity of proving the signature, but except for that he is in exactly the same position as he was before.
14. Turning next to the question of consideration, both Exs. P-45 and D-47 purport to have been executed for the satisfaction of a dower debt. On the face of the documents their considerations must be taken to have passed. The defendants who are now challenging these transactions claim through the executant who was their father. There can be no doubt that he had the right to convey and that the defendants had no interest in the properties at that date. That being so, the burden of proving that consideration did not pass when the recitals say that it did is on the defendants. They can be in no better position than the transferor through whom they claim. We are in respectful agreement with the decisions in 13 CPLR 1 (1900) 18 CPLR 1 and 13 CPLR 69 (1900) 13 CPLR 69 at p. 70 on this point. Therefore so far as the plaintiffs are concerned, they have established a prima facie case and for the moment need go no further. The burden is now on the defendants to show that the properties which on the face of the document purport to have been conveyed to their mother and which their father had an undoubted right to convey, in fact belong to them: see 4 Rang 518 AIR 1926 PC 77 , 96 IC 142 , 4 Rang 518 (PC) at p. 520 and 5 Rang 852 AIR 1927 PC 237 , 105 IC 788 , 5 Rang 852.
15. It is urged that their Lordships have laid down a different rule in AIR 1930 PC 255. AIR 1930 PC 255 , 128 IC 647 (PC) We do not think so. That was a case under O. 21, R. 63 of the CPC, and the usual rule was applied, namely that the burden of proof lies on the plaintiff who has lost in the objection proceedings. No objection proceedings intervened here and so we are not hampered by the special rule which applies there. AIR 1933 Nag 185 AIR 1933 Nag 185 , 143 IC 419 was also a case under O. 21, R. 63 and be need not be considered any further. Turning now to the defendants' evidence their case rests almost wholly on an entry in a diary of which Ex. 3 D-7 is a copy. The original has been filed a Ex. P. 17 in a suit between two of the sons of K.B Ali Raza Khan, who is the husband of the first and father of the remaining defendants. It par ports to have been made on 21st March 93 and states that the Khan Bahadur's second marriage was performed with the first defendant on a Mehr of Rs. 300. It is-argued that if this is true then it is impossible to accept the recitals in Exs. P-45 and D-47, one of which purports to have been in satisfaction of a Mehr debt of 1000 and the other of Rs. 400. We doubt if this would be enough. It is clear that the Khan Bahadur never at any time repudiated either transaction. It is equally clear that the first defendant upheld them in 1924 when the mortgage in suit was executed and that she still upholds them. She repudiated the mort gage on a number of grounds in her pleadings but not these documents. In her evidence as D.W 3 she not only claimed to be in possession of the two documents but also said that her husband had executed them in her favour. In the circumstances, we doubt if the mere fact that the consideration is wrongly stated in the two deeds, if fact it be, would be enough to invalidate them: see 27 All 271 (1905) 27 All 271 , 32 IA 113 , 3 Sar 772 , 8 OC 155 (PC) at p. 289. But we need not go so far as that we are not prepared be accept this statement in the diary at its face value though we agree that the handwriting of the late Khan Bahadur has been duly proved.
16. The result is that the appeal succeeds, our view being that the remaining defendants have no interest in the house property in appeal. Costs will be paid by the defendants 3, 4 and 5.
D.S/R.K
17. Appeal allowed.