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    Girdhar Parashram Kirad v. Firm Motilal Champalal

    1. This appeal raises a number of points of law all of which could have been avoided by the joinder of the proper parties. This joinder was refused by the plaintiffs' pleader after the difficulties had been disclosed. On 17th April 1935 the pleader for the plaintiffs refused to make Gulabchand and Dhanraj parties. Now the question is: Are they necessary parties? The suit is a mortgage suit. The plaintiffs obtained, through a third party assignee, the mortgagee's rights by purchase. That purchase, however, was in conjunction with two other persons Premraj and Dhanraj. Premraj died and his estate went to Dhanraj and Gulabchand. Dhanraj and Gulabchand purported to transfer or (as it is put in argument) relinquish their rights in favour of plaintiffs for the sum of Rs. 75. That transaction was oral. The Court has held that it was a valid transfer under the provisions of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, on the ground that there was delivery of possession, that the consideration was under Rs. 100, that the mortgage debt is immovable property and therefore it can be sold, if of the value of under Rs. 100, by delivery. On appeal it is pointed out that S. 54 is concerned with two kinds of sales (1) where a registered instrument is required (2) where the transfer can be either by registered instrument or by delivery of posses, sion. What is meant by delivery is stated:

    Delivery of tangible immovable property takes place when the seller places the buyer, or such person as he directs, in possession of the property.

    2. What was transferred here were mortgagees' rights. Doubtless those rights are rights in immovable property: 29 CAL 1,1 AIR 1933 LAH 210,2 52 ALL 232,3 46 ALL 917.4 But they are not in our opinion rights of which possession can be taken.

    3. There is a wide difference between a transfer made by a mortgagor and a transfer made by a mortgagee: 50 ALL 986,5 60 CAL 87.6 What the mortgagor has is the land which is immovable ‘tangible property and property of which possession can be delivered. What a mortgagee has depends to some extent on the kind of mortgage but is broadly stated in Section 58 of the Transfer of Property Act; “A mortgage is the transfer of an interest in specific immovable property.” That interest, in our opinion, (at any rate in mortgages which do not involve the immediate transfer of either legal title or possession) is an intangible right in immovable property and cannot be transferred prima facie without a written instrument.

    4. But it is said that this is not a case of transfer but of relinquishment. One starts with the mortgagees composed of the mortgagee-plaintiffs and Dhanraj and Gulabchand. Regard them as partners, or regard them as co-tenants. On either view this, it is said, is a case of relinquishment. Therefore, the rules relating to relinquishment say, by a Hindu widow, apply. There is no transfer of title but merely an obliteration of rights. Consequently the document (there is a receipt) effecting this obliteration does not require registration. Alternatively the obliteration can be orally effected. This question was considered by one of us in AIR 1936 NAG 186.7 It was pointed out there that we start with this fundamental principle, namely that once a title or an estate has vested in a person he cannot rid himself of it except by death or by one of the modes of transfer recognized by law. Discussing the position of the heir-at-law in England it was said:

    If it had been a statement of the English law as it obtains today, it would, perhaps, be unassailable, but that is because the Land Transfer Act of 1897 has grafted a statutory exception on to the general law, and now vests an intestate's property in his personal representative, that is to say, his administrator and not in his heir-at-law: 14 Halsbury's Laws of England, page 160 (Edn. 2). Thus the heir having no vested interest in the property is free to disclaim the inheritance. But no such disclaimer can be made once the property has vested, for his rights are then different, and the interest once vested is vested irrevocably: (1802) 6 RR 5638 at pp. 566 and 567. The crux of the matter lies there. The test is the vesting of the estate. It is undoubted that in every other case a man is not bound to take what he does not want, and whether he be given property by a will or a gift or a conveyance, his assent, whether express or implied, is essential to vest the estate in him. Consequently he is free to disclaim it, if he so desires. But the heir-at-law is in a different position. He is the only person in whom the law of England, before the Land Transfer Act of 1897 vested property against his will whether he would or not. No disclaimer that he might make would have any effect, though, of course, he might as soon as he pleased, dispose of the property by an ordinary conveyance: Williams on Real Property, Edn. 24, p. 119, 40 Cal 7219 at p. 750 and 38 Mad 47410 at p. 478. The reason is obvious. An estate whether an inheritance or not, cannot remain in abeyance without statutory or other sanction. The seisin to it must reside in somebody during every moment of time and this is the Hindu no less than the English law. Mayne states in his Hindu Law, Edn. 9, page 725, para. 499. The right of succession under Hindu law is a right which vests immediately on the death of the owner of the property. It cannot in any circumstances remain in abeyance.

    It follows there can be no disclaimer or relinquishment either generally or in favour of a particular person, unless it is specifically permitted by some special provision of law. In every other case a title once vested can be divested only by a recognized conveyance, or one of the other means allowed by law. It cannot pass by admission or relinquishment or disclaimer when the law requires a deed: 33 Cal 96711 at p. 983.

    5. There are two apparent exceptions. One is the case of a joint Hindu family. But that is not really an exception to the general rule because as was explained in the earlier decision, the distinction between a disclaimer of this kind by a member of a joint Hindu family where the seisin of the entire estate resides in each member and one where the seisin resides in the person disclaiming alone, is obvious. When a joint tenant relinquishes his right, there is no transfer or conveyance; only a blotting out of his interest and an enlargement of the inchoate rights of the others to a share on partition. But when a man is seised of the whole fee himself, the title which resides in him has to pass on to another, and that can only be done by one of the recognized modes of conveyance, when no questions of adverse possession or estoppel or part performance arise. This distinction was recognized in 14 NLR 5612 at page 59 where Drake-Brockman, J.C, in dissenting from 11 Mad 40613 observed: ‘I venture to doubt whether the Smritis treated renouncement as equivalent to an alienation.’ 16 All 36914 at page 370 and 25 Mad 14915 at p. 156 make the same observation. Golapchandra Sarkar Sastri also says in his Hindu law, Edn. 7th, p. 530: ‘Renunciation does not operate as alienation but as extinction of the co-parcener's interest, according to the true intent of the Smritis. If it were alienation, it would be gift; but it has been held that a member of a joint family cannot make a gift of his undivided share.’ This is so even in Madras and Bombay ‘where the strict antialienation doctrine of the Mitakshara has been departed from in favour of purchasers for value: 27 Mad 16216 at p. 166 and 19 Bom 803.17 It is further evident from the fact that the interests of the sons who are then in being are not affected in such cases: 33 Bom 26718 at pp. 270 and 271. I respectfully agree.

    6. The other exception is that of a limited female owner relinquishing under the Hindu law. But that stands on a special footing and the position is accepted at this date only on the ground of stare decisis and for no other reason. This was also explained in the ruling referred to.

    The right of a Hindu widow to surrender her life estate and accelerate the succession has long been recognized. But although founded on the Smritis, their Lordships of the Privy Council have twice observed that it has been settled ‘by long practice and confirmed by decision’: 42 Mad 52319 at page 532 and 47 Cal 46620 at p. 483. But even so whether the act is in reality a conveyance or not was for some time in doubt. The learned Judges in 43 Mad 85521 at page 858, seem to have placed it on that footing, though they observe that there can be no surrender without the consent of the next reversioner. Beaman J., disagreed with this in 39 Bom 8722 at p. 100, on the ground that an acceleration is not an alienation at all, but a mere renunciation, the obliterating of a bar in which the life estate is withdrawn in its entirety, and that after that it is not the tenant of the life-estate, but the law which does the rest. On the other hand, their Lordships of the Privy Council called it a ‘conveyance’ in 19 Cal 23623 at p. 241 and used that term again in 42 Mad 523 at p. 533 although at p. 532 they described the act as ‘the effacement of the widow—an effacement which in other circumstances is effected by actual death or by civil death—which opens the estate of the deceased husband to his next heirs at that date.’

    The distinction is of importance, for a conveyance requires a registered document when the property involved is over Rs. 100 in value, whereas an ‘effacement’ not amounting to a conveyance can be effected orally. Sir Lawrence Jenkins C.J also refers to this in the Full Bench ruling in 40 Cal 721 at p. 750, and Mookerjee J., at p. 780. The latter points out that the right is not grounded on any logical principle but on long usage confirmed by judicial precedent which has confused two distinct ideas. He points out that surrenders have been upheld not only when the widow relinquishes without consideration, but also when she sells the estate to the next reversioner for cash and thus converts it into money ‘which may be shuffled out of sight as land can never be’, a transaction which by no stretch of language can be deemed a relinquishment of her interest in the estate. Some of the precedents quoted by Mookerji J., at pp. 778 and 779 uphold an alienation to a stranger of the entire estate with the consent of the next reversioner, on the ground that it can be ‘deemed to operate precisely in the same manner as two conveyances, one by the widow to the reversioner and the other by the reversioner to the transferee’, the question, being one of form rather than of substance. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee, when dealing with this in 42 Mad 523 p. 533, observe that, ‘the surrender once exercised in favour of the nearest reversioner or reversioners the estate became his or theirs, and it was an obvious extension of the doctrine to hold that, inasmuch as he or they were in title to convey to a third party it came to the same thing if the conveyance was made by the widow with his or their consent.’

    It is obvious this cannot be done without a conveyance, for however much the widow may be affected neither civil death nor natural death can vest the estate in any but the immediate reversioner, and his title cannot be passed on by mere assent. A conveyance at some stage would clearly be necessary. However these doubts have now been set at rest by the decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in 47 Cal 466 at p. 483 where their Lordships observe: ‘This voluntary self effacement is sometimes referred to as a surrender, sometimes as relinquishment or abandonment of her rights; and it may be effected by any process having that effect.’

    But they also observe that the question is not free from difficulty, and as X have already pointed out, it is not founded on any logical principle. The limited estate of a female owner under Hindu law is a peculiar one, and I do not think that considerations which prevail there, and which are now applied simply because of long usage, should be extended beyond it.

    7. But none of these rules would apply to tenants-in-common where there is no unity of title. If the titles are distinct as they are when persons hold as tenants-in-common, then we are left with the fundamental position that title cannot be handed on to another except in one of the ways expressly permitted by law. That there is no unity of title when there is a tenancy-in-common is clear from Williams on Real Property, Edn. 24, p. 295. Is the omission of these defendants fatal? As was pointed out in 1 PAT LJ 46824 a mortgage is indivisible and if all the parties entitled to a share in the money due on the mortgage are not upon the record the suit must be dismissed in its entirety: see also ILR (1938) NAG 37025 at p. 375 and 60 CAL 777.26

    8. A nice point in some cases arises as to whether O. 1, R. 9, is subservient to O. 34, R. 1. In the above case 1 PAT LJ 468 it was held that it was. Here the point does not arise because even though it be held that the Court has power to join (see, 52 ALL 13427 and 60 CAL 87,) a view to which we incline, a Court cannot join a party when the litigant in whose interest the joinder is to be made refuses to have the necessary parties joined, as here. Before us the respondents offered to join but we consider this comes too late. The point of non-joinder was properly taken in the pleadings. The danger was pointed out, and the pleader refused to join these people. If the proper parties have not been joined the plaintiffs cannot succeed to the extent of their share or at all. This being so the suit fails against the appellant for non-joinder and the further question of limitation does not arise. It follows that the appeal succeeds with costs here and below.

    D.S/R.K

    9. Appeal allowed.

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    Girdhar Parashram Kirad v. Firm Motilal Champalal
    (Sep 26, 1939)