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Factual and Procedural Background

On the night of 24-9-1944 a party of dacoits armed with spears, swords and daggers raided the house of Mr. C.N. Joshi (P.W.2), retired Superintendent of the Deputy Commissioner's office, Nagpur. Property worth about Rs. 8,000 was removed after the householders, including Mr. Y.C. Joshi (P.W.1), were intimidated. A report (Ex. P-1) was made to the police almost immediately and, during investigation, numerous articles and cash were seized from the house of the appellant Narayan (son of Dinba) and from locations associated with other accused.

Several appellants were convicted at trial under various provisions of the Penal Code: Narayan (son of Dinba) was convicted and sentenced to 5 years rigorous imprisonment under Section 412; Gullarshah, Santosh and Narayan (son of Madhorao) were each sentenced to two concurrent terms of 7 years rigorous imprisonment; Mahgya to 5 years rigorous imprisonment under Section 412; Watu was convicted and sentenced under Section 412 but did not appeal; Govinda's previous appeal had been summarily dismissed and was therefore considered untenable and dismissed here.

The present opinion considers the appeals of the named appellants arising from that trial and addresses (inter alia) whether convictions under the more serious charge of receiving stolen property knowing it to be the proceeds of a dacoity (Section 412) were sustainable or should be reduced to the lesser offence of receiving stolen property generally (Section 411), and other individual factual and evidentiary questions relating to identification and recovered property.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether mere possession of property taken in a dacoity, without further evidence, suffices to convict an accused under Section 412 of the Penal Code (i.e., knowledge that the property was taken in the course of a dacoity), or whether such possession only warrants conviction under Section 411.
  2. Whether the conviction of particular appellants for dacoity (Sections 395 and 457) was justified on the prosecution's evidence, including eyewitness identifications and seized property linked to the accused.
  3. Whether statements/memoranda recorded from co-accused (and referred to in other accused's cases) are admissible and can be used against an accused (issues touching Section 30 of the Evidence Act and Section 27), and what evidentiary weight such statements should carry.
  4. Whether an acquittal of some persons charged with dacoity affects the validity of convictions for dacoity of other persons when the evidence shows that more than five persons were engaged in the offence.

Arguments of the Parties

Prosecution Case

  • Prosecution alleged a dacoity on 24-9-1944 resulting in removal of property worth about Rs. 8,000 from the Joshi household.
  • Numerous articles (A–F, H–Z, A-1, A-2, etc.) and cash (Rs. 187) were seized from Narayan (son of Dinba) and other accused; some ornaments were exhumed or produced from different rooms; other seized items linked other accused by recovery or by their statements.
  • Eyewitness identifications and statements led to the conviction of several accused for offences including dacoity (ss. 395) and receiving stolen property (ss. 411/412).

Defence(s) — Narayan (son of Dinba)

  • Narayan disclaimed all connection with the dacoity and the burying of certain ornaments.
  • He admitted that some of the property recovered at his house had been brought there by Govinda and Santosh and denied that he had produced any of the articles; he admitted that cash of Rs. 187 had been seized from him but claimed it partly belonged to him and partly to his mother-in-law (Mt. Gajra, D.W.4).
  • Mt. Gajra's evidence purported to place Santosh and Govinda bringing a bag into the house in Narayan's absence; her testimony about Narayan's absence conflicted with Narayan's own account of being ill at home.

Defence Evidence Generally (other supporting witnesses)

  • Witnesses who testified for the defence were often shown to be interested (tenants or persons to whom Narayan was financially connected), and their evidence was limited to statements that police went to the house and seized property or to character evidence.
  • Some accused made memoranda admitting possession or transfer of specific items (e.g., Narayan son of Madhorao's Ex. P-17; Mahgya's Ex. P-19), and those memoranda were used by the prosecution to trace recoveries.

If further party-specific legal arguments (beyond the factual defences and prosecution assertions above) were presented in the record, they are not detailed in the provided opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
A.I.R 1941 Pat. 2231 Held that possession of property taken in dacoity may support a presumption that the possessor knew the property to be stolen, but not that he knew or had reason to believe it was taken in a dacoity rather than in a theft or burglary; conviction under the more serious charge (S.412) requires evidence that the accused knew or had reason to believe the property was the proceeds of a dacoity or that the transferor belonged to a gang of dacoits. The court relied on this distinction to conclude that Narayan (son of Dinba) was not proven to have known the property to be the proceeds of a dacoity, and therefore his conviction under S.412 could not stand; it justified reducing the conviction to S.411.
A.I.R 1942 Pat. 439 Reiterated that mere possession of property removed by dacoits will not be sufficient to sustain a charge under S.412 unless it is proved the accused knew or had reason to believe the property was taken in a dacoity. The court cited this authority alongside A.I.R. 1941 Pat. 2231 to support its decision to set aside Narayan's S.412 conviction and substitute conviction under S.411.
A.I.R 1945 Bom. 2923 (Divatia, J.) Observed there is no general principle that a receiver of property taken in dacoity must always be guilty under S.412; in most cases of mere possession the presumption will be of the lesser offence under S.411. The court expressly aligned with this view when modifying Narayan's conviction from S.412 to S.411 and imposing a reduced sentence.
I.L.R (1937) Mad. 6954 (Full Bench) Held that statements in memoranda may be admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act and can be taken into consideration against another accused. The court noted this authority but observed that even if such memoranda were admissible, their evidentiary value could be low. It did not decide the admissibility question in detail for Gullarshah's case because the available identification evidence gave rise to doubt.
12 Cr. L.J. 1935 (Division Bench) Held that where evidence shows more than five persons concerned in an offence, conviction of a subset of those persons for dacoity is sustainable; acquittal of some persons charged does not negate the finding that more than five participated. The court cited this authority to reject the contention that convictions under S.395 were improper merely because fewer than five persons were convicted; it agreed that the evidence showed at least six persons were involved and that convictions for dacoity could stand.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by evaluating the factual evidence (seizures, identifications, memoranda and witness testimony) and applying established principles from prior authorities about the evidentiary significance of possession of property taken in a dacoity.

For Narayan (son of Dinba), the court found the trial Magistrate correctly rejected the defence evidence because: (a) property had been exhumed from different parts of his house; (b) he had signed three seizure memos stating that he had exhumed the property; (c) his mother-in-law's testimony conflicted with his own statements and was of limited probative value; and (d) some defence witnesses were interested (tenants, persons with financial ties). These facts justified rejecting the defence that he had no connection with the property.

However, on the crucial legal question whether possession established guilt under Section 412 (knowing the property to be the proceeds of a dacoity), the court applied the line of authorities (A.I.R. 1941 Pat. 2231; A.I.R. 1942 Pat. 439; A.I.R. 1945 Bom. 2923) holding that mere possession, without evidence that the possessor knew or had reason to believe the property was taken in a dacoity, does not support conviction under Section 412. The court therefore concluded that while the materials warranted conviction for receiving stolen property (S.411), they did not prove knowledge that the property was taken specifically in the commission of a dacoity; accordingly Narayan's conviction under S.412 was set aside and substituted by a conviction under S.411 with a commensurate sentence.

For Santosh, the court relied on eyewitness testimony of Mr. Y.C. Joshi and Mrs. Joshi placing him in the house on the night of the dacoity. Given that identification and the surrounding circumstances, the court concluded there was no reason to disturb his convictions under ss. 395 and 457 and found the concurrent sentences not excessive.

For Narayan (son of Madhorao), the court relied on identification by Mr. Y.C. Joshi and on the appellant's own memorandum (Ex. P-17) admitting receipt of a gold kada and leading police to Watu who produced the ornament (Ex. P-18). The ornament was identified by victims as their property. These facts supported maintaining his convictions and sentences.

For Mahgya, notwithstanding some confusion in the trial court's paragraph about the specific ornaments, the court accepted that he had admitted in Ex. P-19 that he had secured a gold item in the dacoity and placed it with Budha. Subsequent recoveries (via Budha's house and from Pandurang, to whom Mahgya had sold a gold challa on 28-9-1944) and evidence of Mahgya's involvement in having gold worked for Rajaram supported a finding that he knew the property to be the proceeds of the dacoity. His conviction under S.412 and sentence were therefore maintained.

For Gullarshah, the court noted that no property was recovered from him; his conviction rested on identification by Mrs. Joshi junior (about a month after the event) and references to him in memoranda by other accused. The court expressly declined to resolve the admissibility question of those memoranda under Section 30 of the Evidence Act (and relatedly Section 27) because it was unnecessary: even assuming admissibility (as held in the cited Full Bench), the court considered the evidentiary value of those statements to be low. Given the possibility of an honest identification error by Mrs. Joshi junior and the absence of any recovered property linking him to the offence, the court found a legitimate doubt and acquitted Gullarshah.

The court also addressed a contention that because five or more persons were not convicted for dacoity, none of the appellants should have been convicted under Section 395. Citing 12 Cr. L.J. 1935, the court accepted the principle that where evidence shows more than five persons involved, conviction of some of them is consistent with the requirement of a dacoity involving five or more persons; acquittal of some charged individuals does not negate the finding that more than five persons were engaged.

Holding and Implications

The court's final determinations and their direct effects on the parties are as follows:

  • Narayan (son of Dinba): Conviction under Section 412 set aside; convicted instead under Section 411, Penal Code, and sentenced to undergo 3 years rigorous imprisonment. Subject to that modification, his appeal is dismissed.
  • Santosh: Convictions under Sections 395 and 457 were maintained; concurrent sentences upheld; appeal dismissed.
  • Narayan (son of Madhorao): Convictions and sentences maintained based on identification and the memorandum Ex. P-17 and recoveries linked to those admissions.
  • Mahgya: Conviction under Section 412 and sentence maintained on the basis of admissions in Ex. P-19 and recoveries/sales traced to him; appeal dismissed.
  • Gullarshah: Conviction and sentence set aside and he was acquitted; he is to be set at liberty forthwith and, if on bail, his bail bonds are to be cancelled.
  • Govinda: His previous appeal had been summarily dismissed; that position was left intact and his appeal here was dismissed as untenable.
  • Watu: Was convicted and sentenced in the same trial under Section 412 but did not appeal; no change was effected here.

Implications: The court applied established case law to clarify the distinction between mere possession of stolen property (which may support a conviction under Section 411) and possession with knowledge that the property was taken in the course of a dacoity (required for Section 412). The decision resulted in one conviction being reduced (Narayan son of Dinba) and other convictions being upheld or overturned based on the particular factual matrix; the opinion does not purport to lay down a new general rule beyond applying prior authorities.

Order: The court's orders and modifications are summarized above. The opinion applies existing precedents to the facts before it and does not announce any novel legal principle outside those applications.

    Narayan Dinba Accused v. Emperor

    JUDGMENT

    1. The appellant Narayan, son of Dinba, was convicted and sentenced to undergo 5 years rigorous imprisonment under S. 412, Penal Code, by the S. 30-Magistrate, Nagpur. With his appeal will be considered the appeals filed by Gullarshah, Santosh and Narayan son of Madhorao, who were each sentenced in the same trial to undergo two concurrent terms, each of 7 years rigorous imprisonment, and that of Mahgya who was sentenced to undergo 5 years rigorous imprisonment in the same trial under S. 412, Penal Code. As Govinda's previous appeal has been summarily dismissed, his appeal now is untenable and it is dismissed. Watu who was convicted and sentenced in the same trial to undergo 5 years rigorous imprisonment under S. 412, Penal Code, has not appealed.

    2. The prosecution case was briefly stated as follows: On the night of 24-9-1944 dacoits carrying Spears, swords and daggers raided the house of Mr. C.N Joshi (P.W 2), retired Superintendent of the Deputy Commissioner's office, Nagpur, and removed from it property worth about Rs. 8000 after the inmates including Mr. Y.C Joshi (P.W 1), pleader, the son of Mr. C.N Joshi, had been intimidated. The report, Ex. P-1, was made to the police almost immediately after the occurrence and in the subsequent investigation articles A-F, H-Z, A-1 and A-2, A-3, A-5, article J, articles A-6, A-11, articles I, K, nosering gold thread and cash amounting to Rs. 187 were seized from the appellant Narayan, son of Dinba. Of these articles, this appellant exhumed from a room in his house articles A-F, U-X, Z, A-1, and A-2, the gold ornaments articles J, A-3 and A-4, which were buried in another room were also produced by him and articles A-6, A-10, I and K were found on a wall in the upper storey of his house where there was also a bag in which article A, the rod of a nose-ring, was discovered. Narayan, son of Dinba, disclaimed all connection with the dacoity and the burying of certain ornaments, but admitted that the property recovered at his house had been brought there by Govinda and Santosh. He denied that he had produced any of the articles; and while admitting that cash amounting to Rs. 187 had been seized from him, he claimed that it belonged partly to him and partly to his mother-in-law Mt. Gajra (D.W 4). The latter in examination averred that on 1-10-1944, the day before the seizures, Santosh and Govinda had brought a bag containing something in the absence of her son-in-law who when apprised of it next morning by her paid no attention to what she said to him. Strangely enough, she made no enquiries concerning its contents and her testimony regarding his absence from the house when the property arrived divaricated from his statement to the effect that he was at that time ill in houso. It was, however, clear from her that Santosh and Govinda were this appellant's friends.

    3. Tukaram (D.W 6) and Sakharam (D.W 7) merely stated that when the police went to this Narayan's house and asked him where the property was, he said that it was in his house and they then seized it. The evidence was, however, interested by reason of the fact that they are his tenants. Miankhan (D.W 8), who deposed to the arrival of Santosh and Govinda svith two bags in Narayan's absence, was not, he declared, aware of the contents and he too was interested in Narayan who used to lend him money. Atmaram (D.W 9) was similarly interested in him and his testimony was merely regarding character.

    4. The defence evidence was, therefore, rightly rejected and I agree with the learned trial Magistrate that Narayan, son of Dinba, must have known that the property was stolen for the obvious reason that if it had not been he would not have buried it in different parts of his house. He is a literate man and had, moreover, signed 3 seizure memos stating that he had exhumed the property. It was also significant that in the course of the cross-examination of the investigating officer concerned, he was not questioned concerning the digging. The property had in all likelihood been given to him by his friends Santosh and Govinda but the material on record while warranting his conviction under S. 411 does not warrant it under S. 412, Penal Code. In other words, it cannot be held that he dishonestly received property which he knew to have been stolen in the commission of a dacoity.

    5. In A.I.R 1941 Pat. 2231 a Division Bench was of the view that when a person is found in possession of property taken in dacoity and is unable to give any reasonable explanation for its being with him, it may be presumed that he knew the property to have been stolen, but not that he knew or had reason to believe that it was the proceeds of a dacoity rather than of a burglary or a theft. In order to justify his conviction on the more serious charge, there must be evidence, circumstantial or oral, to show that he knew or had reason to believe that a dacoity had been committed and the property had been taken in it or that the person from whom he obtained it belonged to a gang of dacoits and the property was stolen property. It was also held in A.I.R 1942 Pat. 439,2 that mere possession of property taken away by dacoits at the time of commission of dacoity will not be sufficient to bring home the charge under S. 412, Penal Code, and it must be proved that the accused had knowledge or had reason to believe that the possession of the property was transferred by the commission of dacoity.

    6. Similarly, in A.I.R 1945 Bom. 2923 Divatia, J. made the following observations:

    “No general principle can be laid down that if the offence was dacoity, the receiver of the property taken in dacoity must always be guilty under S. 412, Penal Code. For these reasons I am unable to hold, as the learned Judge below has done, that in a case of dacoity the presumption would always be that the receiver of property taken in dacoity is guilty under S. 412. In most cases of mere possession of such property, the presumption would be of the lower offence under S. 411.”

    7. Being in respectful agreement with these decisions, I set aside the conviction and sentence of Narayan, son of Dinba, under S. 412 and convict him under S. 411, Penal Code, under which he is sentenced to undergo 3 years rigorous imprisonment. Subject to this modification his appeal is dismissed.

    8. There can be no question of the jail appellant Santosh's guilt under ss. 395 and 457, Penal Code. Both Mr. Y.C and Mrs. Joshi testified to his presence and activities, in the house on the relevant night. His convictions are, therefore, maintained and regard being had to all the circumstances, the concurrent sentences awarded cannot be said to be excessive. His appeal is accordingly dismissed.

    9. The convictions and sentences of Narayan, son of Madhorao, must also be maintained. Mr. Y.C Joshi had identified him as among those present in his house on the night in question. Additionally, this appellant had made the statement contained in the memorandum Ex. P-17 in the course of which he declared that he had received a gold kada after the dacoity and had kept it with Watu (P.W 12). In pursuance of that statement, he took Ramlalsingh (P.W 5), Sub-Inspector, to Watu's house, where Watu on this appellant's demand produced the gold kada, Article A-15 which was duly seized under memo. Ex. P-18. Watu's wife, it is relevant to add, is Narayan's sister and he had given the gold kada to her for temporary safe-keeping. That ornament was identified by Mrs. Joshi, senior, and her daughter-in-law as their property. The convictions and sentences of this appellant are, therefore, also maintained.

    10. This brings me to the case of the appellant Mahgya. There was some confusion in para. 24 of the trial Court's judgment concerning the ornaments with which he was concerned, but it was on the whole clearly established that he had received one or more of those taken from the Joshi household. In Ex. P-19, memorandum recorded by Ramlalsingh, Sab-Inspector, he admitted that he had secured a gold yer in the dacoity and placed it with Budha. In furtherance of that statement he took the Sub-Inspector to Budha's house where Budha's wife, Mt. Tani (P.W 11) produced several ornaments which, she averred, had been given to her by Mahagya's wife Laxmi for temporary custody. Further, the gold challa Article A-26 was recovered from Pandurang (P.W 14) to whom it had been sold by Mahagya on 28-9-1944, i.e, 4 days after the dacoity. Then there was the evidence of Rajaram (P.W 17), to the effect that Mahagya and Budha had given him gold for the preparation of ornaments in Chipali, his village in Umrer tahsil. In view of all of these circumstances and the contents of the memorandum, Ex. P-19, his conviction under S. 412, Penal Code, was in order and it is maintained. The sentence which cannot be regarded as harsh is also maintained and his appeal is dismissed.

    11. There remains the case of the appellant Gullarshah. Strangely enough, he was convicted under ss. 395 and 457, Penal Code, although the learned Magistrate on similar material acquitted the accused Gangadhar. No property was recovered from him but Mrs. Joshi junior, identified him as having been present when the dacoity took place and Narayan, son of Madhorao, and the accused Manohar both mentioned in their respective memoranda, Exs. P-17 and 23, that he was present on that occasion. (The Magistrate's statement that Mahagya had mentioned him in the memorandum, Ex. P-19 was incorrect.)

    12. The questions whether the statements on this point in the memoranda are admissible and, if yes, whether they can be taken into consideration against Gullarshah under Section 30 of the Evidence Act, do not now call for consideration. Even if, as was held by a Full Bench) in I.L.R (1937) Mad. 6954 the whole of such statements is admissible under S. 27 and can be taken into consideration against another accused, its evidentiary value is very low. Here the substantive evidence merely consisted of Mrs. Joshi junior's identification of Gullarshah, but that identification took place about a month after the occurrence and she may well have made a bona fide mistake. No property was, as shown, recovered from him and the learned Magistrate also considered that her identification of Vithal, another accused in the case, might have been mistaken. Altogether, there is a legitimate doubt concerning Gullarshah's complicity and giving him the benefit of such doubt I set aside his conviction and sentence and acquit him. He shall be set at liberty forthwith. If on bail, his bail bonds shall be cancelled. The contention that as five or more persons were not convicted for dacoity there should not have been a conviction of any of the appellants under S. 395, Penal Code, does not possess force. The evidence showed that there were at least 6 persons involved and in 12 Cr. L.J 1935 a Division Bench held as follows:

    “Where eight persons were each of them separately charged with dacoity, but the jury acquitted four of them but found the other four guilty, the evidence before them being that there were more than five persons concerned in the offence, even if the four who were acquitted were not there, it was held that the charge as against each of dacoity was sufficient notice to each of the accused that they were charged with four or more others and the conviction by the jury of dacoity would import a finding that there were four or more others engaged with each dacoit. The mere fact that the evidence was not sufficient to convict four of the accused actually charged would not in any way affect the question of the number of persons engaged.”

    13. In that view I respectfully concur.

    14. Order accordingly.

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    Narayan Dinba Accused v. Emperor
    (Jan 21, 1946)