JUDGMENT
1. This is defendant 1's appeal from the judgment and decree of the First Additional District Judge, Nagpur, in Civil Suit No. 9-A of 1941, decided on 30-9-1942.
2. The case in outline is as follows. One Ghanshyam died on 1-7-1935 survived by his widows by name Mt. Chandrabhaga and Mt. Laxmi, and mother Mt. Kasubai. On 26-7-1935, that is within a month of his death, Mt. Laxmi, alleged to be 20 years old, executed a deed styled as Farkatnama (a deed of relinquishment) on her own account and as guardian for Mt. Chandrabhaga who was described as a minor aged 15 years whereby she purported to relinquish the entire moveable and immovable property which devolved on her and her co-widow on the death of Ghanshyam. In the mutation proceedings initiated by Mt. Kasubai (Ghanshyam's mother) the execution of the Farakatnama was admitted by Mt. Laxmi, but contest was raised on behalf of Mt. Chandrabhaga. The proceedings ultimately terminated in an order passed by the Honourable the Financial Commissioner on 19-12-1941 whereby Mt. Chandrabhaga's name was ordered to be recorded as a proprietor of her husband's share in mouza Dadhera. Pending those proceedings Mt. Chandrabhaga on 5-9-1936 applied for permission to prosecute a suit in forma pauperis. That application was dismissed as it was found that she had been in possession of ornaments of a value which would enable her to pay court-fees. Consequently, Mt. Chandrabhaga, alleging that she was born on 13-9-1921 instituted the suit out of which this appeal arises, on 13-9-1941 on payment of full court-fees for a declaration that Farkatnama dated 26-7-1935 was void as against her on the ground that her co-widow Mt. Laxmi acting as her guardian bad no right to relinquish the widow's estate, that she was neither de jure nor de facto guardian, that she, having been born on 18-12-1919, was herself a minor at the date of the Farkatnama and a victim of fraud and undue influence exercised by her mother-in-law, Mt. Kasubai, and persons interested in her. On these premises the plaintiff claimed possession of the entire property as described in Schs. A, B and C attached to the plaint or in the alternative half share thereof with mesne profits as set out in sch. D. As Mt. Kasubai had sold on 26-5-1939 to Ramji Tukaram Kunbi two houses described in Sch. A and on 20-4-1938 to one Doma, since deceased, some malik mokbuza fields Nos. 41, 50 and 51 of Monza Agra, Tahsil Katol, Ramji and Doma's legal representatives Fakirya, Vithoba, Gangaram and Pundlik were impleaded in the suit as defendants.
3. Mt. Kasubai and her transferees contested the suit but Mt. Laxmi, who was impleaded as defendant 2, admitted the plaintiff's claim. Mt. Kasubai, in resisting the plaintiff's claim, denied that Mt. Laxmi was a minor when she executed the Farkatnama of 26-7-1935. She denied that Mt. Laxmi was born on 18-12-1919 and stated in general terms that she was born in the year 1915. She, however, conceded that a daughter named Gouri was born to Tukaram, Mt. Laxmi's father, on 18-12-1919, but averred that she died on 23-11-1920. She further denied that Mt. Chandrabhaga was born on 13-9-1921 but averred that she was born on 29-7-18. She admitted that a daughter had been born to Namdeo on 13-9-1921 and maintained that she was not Chandrabhaga but another girl by name Kawatuki. Mt. Kasubai repudiated the allegations of fraud and undue influence in regard to the execution of the Farkatnama by Mt. Laxmi.
4. The real nature of the defence of Mt. Kasubai can better be described in the words of her own written statement filed on 13-12-1941, viz.
“It was therefore thought prudent that the should continue as de facto manager, and de jure character was to be conferred on her by this document to free the girl—widows of Ghanshyam from temptation not to remarry and lead an unhealthy life. The plaintiff was minor and defendant 2 would have been the natural and de facto guardian of the estate, being the senior widow. The “Panchas” (to use the common language) assembled on the 13th day ceremony of the death of Ghansbyam, thus considered all the pros and cons and came to the conclusion that the title to the property should rest in defendant 1, for the proper management of the estate and its preservation and the plaintiff and Mt. Laxmi should be freed to remarry. Thus the Farkatnama is a bona fide surrender by the two widows and being a family arrangement is binding on all. The plaintiff and Mt. Laxmi were allowed to appropriate to themselves the ornaments worth about Rs. 5000 each.”
5. In the written statement she contended that Mt. Laxmi had the fullest advice from her relations; namely father, brother and others and that she had understood the effect of executing the Farkatnama. She also contended that the Farkatnama was valid as having been made in lieu of ornaments worth about Rs. 5000 which were given to each of the two widows. Mt. Kasubai's transferees sought to support their transfers on the ground of legal necessity and benefit and also on the ground that they were bona fide purchasers for value.
6. The lower Court on a careful examination of the evidence found that Mt. Laxmi had attained the age of 18 years although the exact date of her birth was obscure and that Mt. Chandrabhaga was born on 13-9-1921 as alleged by the plaintiff and not on 29-7-1918 as alleged by Mt. Kasubai. In view of the circumstances in which the Farkatnama came to be executed it held that Mt. Kasubai was not able to discharge the burden that lay on her of proving that Mt. Laxmi was acting as a free agent in executing the Farkatnama. It further held that the Farkatnama was void as against Mt. Chandrabhaga (the plaintiff) for the reason that Mt. Laxmi was incompetent to alienate her interest and consequently that she was entitled to the whole property. On the point of limitation it held that inasmuch as the document was found to be void ab initio the suit was governed neither by Article 44 nor by Article 91, Limitation Act. Mt. Kasubai was made liable to pay the value of the money-lending business comprising mortgages, bonds, promissory notes and some decrees as she was found to have recovered some of the debts and did not render account of the money-lending business as a whole.
7. Upon this appeal, a great deal of argument has been addressed on behalf of the appellant contesting every head of the judgment. But the central point in the case is a simple one, viz.: When husband's property devolves on two widows, one of whom is a minor, whether the major widow acting as a guardian for the minor widow can make a valid surrender of whole of widow's estate in favour of the next reversioner. While considering this question as a neat point of law we assume for the sake of argument that the recitals in the Farkatnama as to the ages of the two widows, that is Laxmi as 20 and Chandra, bhaga as 15, were true. The point so arising has a two fold aspect which requires examination: (1) Was Mt. Laxmi competent to act as a guardian for Mt. Chandrabhaga? and (2) Could Mt. Laxmi in that capacity validly surrender Mt. Chandrabhaga's share on the assumption that Chandrabhaga had a distinct and defined share which could be separately dealt with?
8. Guardians recognised by law are ordinarily of three binds: natural, testamentary or those appointed by Court. Mt. Laxmi was neither a testamentary guardian nor one appointed by any Court. Can it be said that she was a natural guardian? Under the Hindu law the guardianship of the minor vests in the sovereign as parens patriate. This duty is no doubt delegated to the child's relations, of whom the father and next to him the mother would be the natural guardian. Any other relative cannot be a natural guardian but must be one deriving his authority from the Court: see S. 231 p. 299, Mayne on Hindu Law and Usage, Ed. 10. This was pointed out by Sadasiva Ayyar, J. in 38 Mad. 11251 at p. 1126. The learned Judge on the authority of the previous decided cases held that under the Hindu law nobody else than the father and mother of a minor (with probable exceptions in favour of the elder brother and the direct male and female ancestors of the minor) is entitled as a matter of natural right to be and to act as guardian of a minor's person and properties, and that recourse must be had to the Court (representing the rights of the King which are paramount to even the rights of the parents) where there is no natural guardian alive. In that case paternal aunt was held not to be the natural guardian of a minor. The same view was taken in A.I.R 1931 Mad. 597.2
9. The learned counsel for the appellant contends that the true rule of Hindu law is that the guardianship belongs as of natural right to the nearest sapinda of the minor and that in the case of a widow, the relations of her deceased husband are entitled to be the guardian in preference to her paternal relations; and he relies on 16 Cal. 584.3 That proposition is not open to any dispute as it is supported by the original text of the Shastras. It may be pointed out that in the cited case 16 Cal. 584 the minor's mother-in-law was approved as the legal guardian of the minor although the certificate of administration which had been granted to her was recalled on account of her advanced age which made her unfit to manage the property. On this view Mt. Kasubai would be the de jure guardian and not Mt. Laxmi, her co-widow. The word “guardian” as defined in the Guardians and Wards Act means a person having the care of the person of a minor or of his property, or of both his person and property. Mt. Kasubai admitted in her pleadings that she had been managing the estate since 1926 when her father-in-law died up to the time when her son attained majority and that even at the time of the Farkatnama in 1935 she was the manager de facto. That means that both the widowed daughters-in-law are living under her care and protection. It could not therefore be said that Mt. Chandrabhaga was under the guardianship of Mt. Laxmi only because the latter happened to be major. The preference of the relations of the husband of a minor widow over her paternal relations does not confer the status of natural guardians on the husband's relations. The right of any of such persons to act as guardian depends not on their relationship through the husband but on his or her being appointed by the Court to act as guardian. In the absence of any natural guardian no one can be recognised as a legal guardian unless he or she is appointed by a Court. Mt. Laxmi could not therefore had any legal status as the guardian of her minor co-widow.
10. Nor was she a guardian de facto as admittedly the property was being managed not by her but by Mt. Kasubai. A person is a de facto guardian only when he is found to intermeddle with the estate of the minor for a reasonable length of time: see, 51 Bom. 10404; and 55 M.L.J 861.5 No one is a de facto guardian unless he looks after the property of the minor as well as takes care of the person of the minor. It must therefore be held that Mt. Laxmi was neither de jure nor de facto guardian of Mt. Chandrabhaga and any alienation, (assuming that the surrender under consideration is analogous to alienation), made by her would be void and of no effect even under the Hindu law. In A.I.R 1938 P.C 1816 a compromise made by a guardian, who was neither de jure nor de facto, was set aside as void against the minor, See also 22 N.L.R 57 and I.L.R (1944) Nag. 698.8
11. Granting for the nonce that Mt. Laxmi could under the Hindu law act as a guardian for Mt. Chandrabhaga, the vital question is whether she could exercise that right in the matter of surrender of the widow's estate to the next reversioner. Surrender does not stand on the same footing as alienation. In 19 Cal. 236,9 42 Mad. 52310 and 47 Cal. 466,11 their Lordships of the Privy Council have had occasions to con-aider the legal character of surrender by a Hindu widow in favour of the next reversioners. In 19 Cal. 236, it was described as a withdrawal of the widow's life estate, in 42 Mad. 523 as a voluntary act of the widow operating her own death and an effacement which, in other circumstances, is effected by actual death or by civil death which opened the estate of the deceased husband to his next heirs. In 47 Cal. 466 the surrender was described as a complete relinquishment by the widow of all her estate.
12. As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in 42 Mad. 523, surrender is not an alienation, but a self-effacement or civil death. To understand the significance of this, one has to go back to the original conception underlying the widow's act of surrender, as re-fleeted in certain tests of the Smrities. But for that purpose we need not go beyond certain decisions in the early period of the development of the doctrine in the Judicial Courts: In 1 Boulnois 120,12 [see the Indian Decisions (old series) 3 Supreme Court Bengal Reports] Jackson, J. pointed out that on the occasion of a widow becoming Byraghi the estate at once descends to the nearest heirs living at that time, and he referred to 2 Macnaghten's Hindu Law, 131, 233 and the case 12 S.D.A 595.13 The same idea occurs in 10 Cal. 110214 at p. 1108 where Garth, C.J observed as follows:
“What is usnally therefore called a ‘surrender’ of a Hindu widow's estate is more properly a relinquishment of it in favour of her husband's heirs. If she died a natural death, those heirs would succeed; or if she were to become a byragee, or otherwise die a civil death, the result would be the same and as I take it to be clear that when her husband died, she might, if she had so pleased, have disclaimed her estate.”
13. Thus the idea of surrender is based on the withdrawal from worldly affairs which brings on civil death and the self-effacement of the widow from amongst the heirs of her husband. That being the true nature of surrender, it appears to us impossible that a minor co-widow's self-effacement or civil death or voluntary relinquishment could be brought about by anyone by purporting to exercise the minor's will. That would be imposing self-effacement on the minor widow when she is incapable of exercising her own will. The surrender being an act of a purely personal nature, it is inconceivable how that act can be performed by any person other than the widow herself.
14. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that the surrender could well be considered a joint gift on the footing that the two widows constituted a coparcenary of which Mt. Laxmi was the manager. It is true, as pointed out in 11 M.I.A 48715 at pp. 515, 516, that the estate of two widows, who take their husband's property by inheritance is one estate and that they are in strictest sense coparceners. But that would not authorise one of the co-widows any more than a father or manager of any Hindu coparcenary to make a gift of the coparcenary property unless it be of a small part of the estate for religious purposes. The surrender treated as a gift cannot stand for a moment for the obvious reason that Mt. Laxmi could not acting as manager or a guardian, gift away her minor co-widow's share in the property; and if the surrender by Mt. Laxmi does not bind the minor widows then the surrender must fail, as it does not comprise the whole of the widow's estate.
15. It is contended that in so far as the co-widows had a right to partition their share. Mt. Laxmi's share at least must be deemed to have been gifted to Mt. Kasubai on the footing that there was a notional partition. Strong reliance is placed on 33 ALL. 443.16 This case on careful examination would be found to repel the appellant's contention. In theory it would be a perfectly sound proposition to say that Hindu widows are entitled to obtain a partition of separate portions of their property. That proposition is supported by 11 M.I.A 487, A.I.R 1928 P.C 251,17 10 N.L.R 5118 and A.I.R 1926 Mad. 6.19 But there is a difficulty in the application of that principle for the obvious reason that there could not be a valid agreement for partition between the two co-widows as one of them was a minor. No doubt in 30 Cal. 73820 at p. 752, their Lordships of the Privy Council envisaged the possibility of a valid partition during the minority of one or more of the coparceners but it appears to be impossible when the coparcenary consists of only two persons one of whom is a minor. The adult coparcener who desires partition in his own interest would be wholly incompetent to act as a guardian for the minor to promote the agreement for partition in his own interest. The decision in 33 ALL. 443, was in reality based on the hypothesis of a valid partition between the two co-widows. In that case both the widows, who were major, had made separate gifts: one of them of her share in the property and the other of the entire property. The dons of a half share sued for a declaration of their right and prayed for partition. That prayer was granted by the High Court subject to the condition that the partition would not affect the right of the surviving widow after the death of her co-widows. The decision proceeded on the well established principle, see, I.L.R (1938) Nag. 1,21 & 22 that a transferee of an undivided share of a coparcener gets the equitable right to ask for a partition of the joint property. In the present case the major co-widows never intended to make a gift, even of her own half share, and the transaction, as already shown above, was of a nature wholly distinct from an alienation, voluntary or for consideration. Laxmi purported to surrender the whole of the widow's estate and there is no trace of any intent to make a gift of her half share in the surrender deed. Granting for the nonce that this deed is susceptible of that interpretation, how can there be a gift of an undivided interest in a coparcenary? It may be conceded that in Bombay, Madras and the Central Provinces a coparcener may sell, mortgage or otherwise alienate for value (vide, 16 N.L.R 13123 and cases referred to therein), but not by way of gift. According to the Mitakshara law as applied in all the Provinces, no coparcener can dispose his undivided interest in the coparcenary property by gift, see, 7 Mad. 357,24 9 Mad. 273,25 11 Mad. 246,26 27 Mad. 162,27 19 Bom. 80328 and 2 N.L.R 5229 at p. 53. The same principle must a fortiori apply to co-widows jointy holding widows estate. No question of limitation with reference to Article 44, Limitation Act, can arise in the present case as Mt. Laxmi was neither a de jure nor a de facto guardian: see, 38 Mad. 1125, 58 Mad. 15530 & 31 and A.I.R 1931 Mad. 592.32 The surrender as has been shown above was void ab initio. The suit was governed by the 12 years' rule of limitation as one for ejectment of a trespasser.
16. Both parties have attacked the findings of the lower Court as to the age of the two cowidows. The question of their ages becomes immaterial on the view we have taken of the nature of the transaction. We however put on the record that we accept the lower Court's findings. As we heard nothing more substantial than what had been already presented in the lower Court and considered by it, we think it unnecessary to say anything beyond expressing our agreement with the lower Court's estimate of the evidence and the course of reasoning.
17. Nor need we go into the question of undue influence and fraud Suffice it to say that the circumstances in which the deed came to be executed by Mt. Laxmi who had just come of age, her position in relation to her mother-in-law, defendant 1, who obtained the benefit, laid a heavy onus on the plaintiff to dislodge the presumption arising against her and that she totally failed to discharge it.
18. The point raised about omission to amend the plaint in view of the remarriage of Mt. Laxmi in 1942 automatically drops out of consideration. Now we may turn to the question as to the money-lending business the aggregate value whereof was awarded as follows:
Translation
Value.
Mortgages
Rs. 8202-6-0
Simple money bonds
Rs. 2328-12-9
Promissory notes
Rs. 320-0-0
Decree in civil Suit
No. 189 of 1934
Rs. 1078-10-6
Rs. 11,938-7-3.
19. The plaintiff, in her plaint, claimed possession of valuable securities consisting of mortgage deeds, bonds, and promissory notes besides a decree. The mortgage deeds are described in Sch. A, and bonds, promissory notes and decree are set out in sch. B, appended to the plaint. The defendant, Mt. Kasubai, in her written statement did not dispute the existence of the various valuable securities but pleaded: “As regards secured and unsecured debts, some of them have been realised and adjusted privately. Some have Been conciliated through the Conciliation Board.” Beyond this bald and elusive statement she kept reticent. In the witness-box, Mt. Kasubai (1. D.W 14) could not explain why she did not take steps to recover the secured and unsecured debts. Although she admitted that the repayments had been noted in the diaries she did not produce them as she thought it unnecessary to do so. She was particularly asked about some of the debts but she gave evasive and unsatisfactory answers. It was her duty to have filed a complete and clear statement as to the outstandings in the money-lending business and the recoveries made by her but she failed to do so. She should have in any case placed the instruments of obligation in the custody of the Court but that also she failed to do. Very early in the case, the plaintiff asked for the appointment of a receiver to take charge of the whole estate and administer it and she objected to it. The lower Court, as an alternative to the appointment of a receiver, called on her to furnish security to the extent of Rs. 10,000. By persisting in her possession of the estate, Mt. Kasubai took upon herself the entire liability to account for the recoveries made by her.
20. It is urged on behalf of the defendant-respondent that it was the plaintiff's duty to have instituted suits to recover the debts or at any rate to have asked for the relief of rendition of accounts. The plaintiff could not possibly file suits against the debtors as she was resisted even in the mutation proceedings which terminated by the Financial Commissioner's order on 19-12-1941 and it was impossible for her to do so after the lower Court passed the order refusing to appoint a receiver on 12-3-1942. So long as the plaintiff's right itself was under litigation, she could not manifestly maintain any suit and the most reasonable and lawful course for her was to have a receiver appointed. That was all that she could do under the circumstances. It was incumbent on the defendant who was in possession of the instruments of obligation to take necessary legal steps—the more so because she successfully resisted the appointment of a receiver. It was at all events imperative on her to place all the documents in the custody of the Court. The attitude she took in the case cannot be characterised otherwise than as perverse. She handed over management of the estate to her son-in-law, Govinda. The manner in which the estate was managed can well be judged from the fact that a village share came to be sold for non-payment of arrears of land revenue. She sold away two houses and some fields without even the semblance of any necessity. In these circumstances, it would not be wrong for the Court to make her liable up to the full face value of the debts as has been done by the Court below, on the analogy of a claim for recovery of moveable property as contemplated in O. 21, R. 10 of the CPC. As the possession of these documents by Mt. Laxmi was wrongful and she admittedly recovered some amounts due on them, she was clearly guilty of wrongful conversion. It was her duty to prove that her act did not cause loss to the plaintiff, not the plaintiff's duty to show that it did. To such a case as this the rule, omnia presumuntur contra spoliatarem, must apply and it must be dealt with on the principle enunciated in (1722) 1 Strang 505.33 See Smith's Leading Cases, 13 Ed. vol. 1, p. 393 under which a person who having converted property refuses to produce it so that its exact value may be known is liable for the greatest value that such an article could have. This principle has been applied in various similar cases: see, (1919) 1 K.B 44334 at p. 458; (1921) 2 K.B 23735 and 1932 A.C 452.36
21. Lastly there survives the point raised for the first time in appeal that in the decree some provision must be made for Mt. Kasubai's residence and maintenance. Reliance is placed on 7 Bom. 22537 and 19 N.L.R 6938 at p. 71. That is a matter which depends on the discretion of the Court to be exercised on principle of justice and equity. In the present case it is strenuously contended by the plaintiff that inasmuch as Mt. Kasubai appropriated the profits, concealed some property in the name of her son-in-law and abused her fiduciary position vis-a-vis her minor daughter-in-law as she was, the discretionary power should not be exercised particularly because any enquiry that may be ordered by this Court may be used for hampering the execution of the decree obtained by the plaintiff. Even though all these contentions may be well-founded, they would not destroy Mt. Kasubai's right of maintenance, but it appears that in the present case the conduct of Mt. Kasubai does not justify any leniency towards her. In 7 Bom. 225 there was a bona fide dispute between the adoptive mother and the adopted son. In 19 N.L.R 69, the plaintiff, who was allowed this concession, lost his claim because he was congenitally blind. The considerations which induced the Courts in those cases are not present in this case. We, therefore, do not feel pressed in this case to accede to the appellant's belated prayer. The result is that the appeal stands dismissed with costs.
22. Appeal dismissed.