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  • provisions of Section 15(1) of the Relief of Indebtedness Act,
  • Section 15(1) of the Relief of Indebtedness Act.
  • Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act
  • TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
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Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of Section 15(1) of the Relief of Indebtedness Act,
  • Section 15(1) of the Relief of Indebtedness Act.
  • Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act
  • TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal is from the judgment of Choudhuri, J. (with leave of the learned Single Judge) in Second Appeal No. 206 of 1947 decided on 30-1-1952. The present appellant was the plaintiff who sued to enforce a right of redemption in respect of a document dated 26-6-1940 (Exhibit D-1).

The two Courts below (trial and first appellate Court) had held that the document was a deed of mortgage and that the appellant was entitled to redeem. The learned Single Judge reversed those concurrent findings and held that the transaction was an absolute conveyance (sale) with merely an option of repurchase.

The plaintiff-appellant also contended in the lower Courts that the transaction was invalid under Section 15(1) of the Relief of Indebtedness Act because, on the date of the transfer, an application for conciliation of the plaintiff-mortgagor's debts was pending before the Debt Relief Court. The first appellate Court decided that point in the appellant's favour, but the learned Single Judge did not decide that point and omitted to deal with it in his judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the document dated 26-6-1940 (Exhibit D-1) was a mortgage (i.e., a mortgage by conditional sale entitling the plaintiff to redeem on payment of Rs. 1,300) or an absolute sale with a mere option of repurchase exercisable only in the strict terms of the deed.
  2. Whether the transaction was invalid under Section 15(1) of the Relief of Indebtedness Act because a petition for settlement of debts was pending before a Debt Relief Court on the date of transfer (this point had been decided in favour of the appellant by the first appellate Court but was omitted from the Single Judge's decision).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The transaction embodied in Exhibit D-1 was a mortgage (a mortgage by conditional sale) and the plaintiff is entitled to redeem by paying Rs. 1,300.
  • The absence of an express interest clause or rent does not preclude characterising the transaction as a mortgage, particularly where possession was delivered to the transferee and the document included a repurchase condition.
  • The transaction may also have been invalid under Section 15(1) of the Relief of Indebtedness Act because a conciliation application was pending before the Debt Relief Court on the date of transfer (first appellate Court had decided this point for the appellant).

Respondent's Arguments

  • The document is an absolute sale with a bare option of repurchase and must be construed strictly according to its terms; the appellant did not exercise any repurchase right as required by the deed.
  • Several surrounding circumstances indicate a sale rather than a mortgage: the document begins with an absolute sale, no mention of interest, no arrangement for rent, mutation in the transferee's name, an adequate price, and a fixed resale date (five years) rather than an open right of redemption.
  • The restrictive clause in the document (prohibiting sale, mortgage or alterations within five years) operates against the vendee (transferee), not the vendor, because possession and rights were transferred.
  • Reliance was placed upon the learned Single Judge's decision which treated the transaction as an absolute conveyance with an option of repurchase.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Chunchun Jha v. Ebadat Ali, AIR 1954 SC 345 Set out tests for distinguishing sale with an option of repurchase and mortgage; indicated presumption in favour of mortgage where sale and repurchase conditions are in one document (post-amendment to S.58(c)). Adopted as the leading authority guiding the approach: where repurchase condition is in same document, there is a presumption of mortgage unless rebutted; the Court applied those tests to Exhibit D-1.
Saheba Deochand v. Jagannath, AIR 1940 Nag 84 Held that when both sale and repurchase conditions are in one document, there is a prima facie presumption the document indicates a mortgage (Grille, J.'s view). Referred to as representing one strand of judicial opinion on the presumption issue; placed in context with later authority.
Welji v. Ganpat, SA No. 70 of 1945, D/- 30-6-1949 (Nag) Represents a contrary view (dissent) to the presumption that a single-document repurchase indicates a mortgage. Cited to illustrate the pre-existing conflict in the Court's approach before the Supreme Court decision; used to show that opinions diverged.
Bhaiyalal v. Kishorilal, AIR 1950 Nag 198 Rao, J.'s observations emphasizing onus probandi: burden lies on party who seeks to construe an ostensible sale as in fact a mortgage. Quoted for the articulation of the onus rule; Court discussed and reconciled this approach with later Supreme Court authority.
Bhagwan Sahai v. Bhagwan Din, 12 All 387 (PC) Authority approving observations of Lord Cranworth on construction of conveyances and repurchase clauses. Used in tracing the lineage of the rule that construction and commonsense dictate whether an instrument is a sale or mortgage.
Alderson v. White, (1858) 44 ER 924 Lord Cranworth's observation: an absolute conveyance prima facie remains so even if vendor reserves right to repurchase; the true question is fair construction of the instrument. Quoted at length and used as an instructive principle; the Court considered it alongside later statutory amendment and Supreme Court interpretation.
Shrinarayan v. Bhaskar, AIR 1954 Nag 193 Applied Lord Cranworth's approach; stated that where a repurchase condition and something more exist, document may be sale or mortgage and the onus is on party alleging mortgage. Referred to as part of local precedential treatment; examined to reconcile with the Supreme Court's decision.
Chatenay v. Brazlin Submarine Telegraph Co., (1891) 1 QB 79 Statement (Lindley L.J.) that the construction of words may be a question of fact; meaning of words sometimes falls within factual inquiry. Invoked to support the proposition that interpretation of words in a title deed can be a question of fact; used in discussing scope of interference on second appeal.
Sahebrao v. Jaiwant Rao, AIR 1933 PC 171 Privy Council rule that unless there is misconstruction, a mistaken inference from documents is an error of fact (not law). Cited to explain appellate interference limits: misconstruction of a document becomes a question of law open to second appeal; the Court considered this in evaluating the Single Judge's construction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Overview: The Court undertook a textual and contextual analysis of Exhibit D-1 in the light of statutory amendment to Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act and authoritative case law, particularly the Supreme Court decision in Chunchun Jha v. Ebadat Ali.

  1. Statutory backdrop: The Court noted the 1929 proviso to Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act (effective 1-4-1930) making it necessary that both the sale and the condition of repurchase be in the same document before the document can be construed as a mortgage by conditional sale. This statutory change affects the presumptions to be applied.

  2. Presumption established by recent authority: Relying on Chunchun Jha (AIR 1954 SC 345), the Court held that where the condition of repurchase is included in the same document as the sale, there is now a presumption in favour of construing the instrument as a mortgage. Accordingly, the burden falls on the party asserting that the document is an absolute sale with only an option of repurchase to rebut that presumption by pointing to express words or surrounding circumstances showing a sale was intended.

  3. Interpretation of the clave restrictive clause: The Court analyzed the specific clause in Exhibit D-1 (which imposed a five-year restriction: neither mortgage, sell nor effect changes). It considered competing constructions adopted below: first appellate Court read the restrictive clause as applying to the vendor; Single Judge read it as applying to the vendee. The Court reviewed grammatical and contextual indications and concluded the natural and grammatical meaning pointed to the clause operating against the vendor (i.e., the vendor was restrained).

  4. Ambiguity and surrounding circumstances: The Court found the document, read as a whole, to be ambiguous as to its tenor. Because the repurchase condition appears in the same document, the starting presumption favours mortgage. The Court then looked to surrounding circumstances (limited to facts existing at the time of the transaction) to see whether the presumption was successfully rebutted.

  5. Evaluation of respondent's surrounding-circumstances arguments: The respondent relied on absence of interest or rent, mutation in transferee's name, adequacy of price, fixed resale date, and restrictive conditions in the deed. The Court accepted the appellant's explanations for some features (e.g., possession delivered to transferee explains lack of a rent arrangement; a five-year period is long but does not preclude a mortgage where a presumption exists). The Court held that subsequent conduct (events after the transaction) was of limited weight and cannot displace the initial presumption.

  6. Burden not discharged: After assessing the document and surrounding circumstances, the Court concluded the respondent had not discharged the burden of proving that the instrument was an absolute conveyance with only a bare option of repurchase. The presumption of mortgage therefore stood.

  7. Section 15(1) Relief of Indebtedness Act point: The Court observed that the first appellate Court had decided this point in the appellant's favour but the Single Judge had not addressed it. The panel considered remanding the question but ultimately did not reach a final decision on this statutory invalidity point because the Court resolved the appeal on the mortgage-versus-sale question. The Court therefore left the S.15(1) matter undecided in this judgment.

  8. Remedy and consequential orders: The Court allowed the appeal, reversed the decision of the learned Single Judge, restored the decision of the first appellate Court, and directed that a decree for redemption shall follow. Regarding costs, the Court declined to grant the appellant costs of the appeal: the appellant had changed his initial stance under Section 15 and his proof relating to providing money for payment was insufficient; counsel had also stated the second ground would not be pressed, which the Court treated as not pressed. Accordingly, the Court made no order as to costs.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: The Court held that the transaction embodied in Exhibit D-1 must be regarded as a mortgage (a mortgage by conditional sale) and that the suit for redemption was properly laid. The appeal was allowed, the decision of the learned Single Judge was reversed, and the decision of the first appellate Judge was restored. A decree for redemption was directed to follow.

Implications:

  • The immediate practical consequence is that the plaintiff (appellant) is entitled to redeem the property in accordance with the terms identified (payment of Rs. 1,300), and a decree for redemption was ordered.
  • The Court declined to express a final view on the separate contention under Section 15(1) of the Relief of Indebtedness Act and did not remit that question for further decision because resolution on the mortgage point made remittal unnecessary.
  • The Court made no order as to costs (the appellant was not awarded costs of this appeal). The second ground (Section 15(1) point) was treated as not pressed by the appellant's counsel and thus not adjudicated finally.
  • On the question whether this decision sets a new legal precedent, the opinion applies existing statutory rule (proviso to S.58(c)) and Supreme Court authority (Chunchun Jha). The Court did not purport to lay down a new legal rule beyond applying those authorities; hence the decision resolves the dispute between the parties without announcing a novel principle of law.

Disposition: Appeal allowed; learned Single Judge's decision reversed; decree for redemption to follow; no order as to costs.

    Mohammad Ibrahim Khan Ikramkhan v. Sugrabi Abdul Rashid And Others

    1. This appeal is against the judgment of Choudhuri, J., (with the leave of the learned Single Judge) in Second Appeal No. 206 of 1947 decided on 30-1-1952.

    2. The present appellant is the plaintiff who brought his suit to enforce a right of redemption in respect of what he said was a mortgage dated 26-6-1940 (Exhibit D-1). The two Courts below held that the document in question was a deed of mortgage and that the appellant was entitled to redeem the mortgage. The learned Single Judge reversed the concurrent decision of the two Courts below, holding that the transaction was an absolute conveyance of the property with merely an option of repurchase.

    3. It was also contended in the Courts below by the plaintiff-appellant that the transaction itself was invalid in view of the provisions of Section 15(1) of the Relief of Indebtedness Act, because on the date of the transfer an application for conciliation of the plaintiff-mortgagor's debts was pending before the Debt Relief Court.

    4. This point, which was decided in favour of the appellant by the learned Judge of the first appellate Court, appears to have been lost sight of by the learned Single Judge, and no decision on it has been rendered. At first, we were at pains to consider whether in view of this omission in the judgment under the appeal we should not send the case back on remand to the learned Single Judge for disposal on this point.

    5. We, however, went on to consider whether the conclusion that the transaction was a sale and not a mortgage was correct in the circumstances of the case. Having heard the entire case, we are of opinion that the appeal must succeed on that point.

    6. The document with which we are concerned in this case is Exhibit D-1. It incorporates ostensibly — as such documents ordinarily do — an absolute conveyance of the property and says further that possession of the property was delivered on the same day. It, however, makes a provision which is the subject-matter of dispute here. It is better to quote an extract embodying that condition:

    “If I pay the sum of Rs. 1,300/- on dated the 26th June 1945 you shall have to take the same and return the house and within five years (I) will neither mortgage the aforesaid house nor will I sell the same, and I will also not effect any changes in the building.”

    7. There can be no doubt that there is here a right of repurchase at the expiry of five years. This condition and the subsequent sentence are differently interpreted by the contestants in this case. It is the claim of the plaintiff that the transaction was one of mortgage and that he is entitled to redemption on payment of Rs. 1,300/-. The contention on the other side is that the transaction was an absolute sale with an option of repurchase which had to be exercised strictly in terms of the provisions of the deed, and that inasmuch as it has been held that the appellant did not exercise his right in the manner so laid down he is not entitled to claim the benefit of that condition.

    8. The law on the subject of interpretation of documents which by their ambiguous words are capable of being construed either as sale coupled with an option of repurchase or mortgage by conditional sale, is a difficult one. Earlier under the Transfer of Property Act, there, was no compulsion that a mortgage by conditional sale should be incorporated in one document.

    9. In the year 1929, the legislature enacted a proviso to Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act by which before a document can be construed as a mortgage by conditional sale both the conditions of repurchase as well as the sale must be found in one document. The law was not made applicable from the day it was enacted, but a period of six months was allowed to pass and it was brought into effect from 1-4-1930.

    10. This was probably done because it was thought necessary that persons accustomed to the taking, of two separate documents should have notice of the disability which the law was about to create. As a result of this proviso, it is now necessary to incorporate the condition of repurchase in the same document if the transaction is to be interpreted as a mortgage at all. To that extent the matter is quite simple.

    11. Difficulty arises, however, when though the condition is mentioned in the document it is callable of being construed as a sale with an option of repurchase or as a mortgage, though ostensibly a sale. Such transactions give difficulty.

    12. It is not necessary to refer to the authorities which are legion on the subject. We have before us the pronouncement of the Supreme Court reported in — ‘Chunchun Jha v. Ebadat Ali’, AIR 1954 SC 345 (A). In that case their Lordships, though they observed that each case should be decided on its own facts — as it necessarily must — have stated certain tests which are useful.

    13. We shall hereafter refer in detail to what their Lordships have observed, but before we do so, we consider it proper to set out the law as understood in this Court prior to the decision.

    14. There was a conflict in this Court as to whether there was any presumption arising from, the fact that a condition of repurchase was incorporated in document by which an interest by way of sale was transferred. Grille, J. (as he then was) held in — ‘Saheba Deochand v. Jagannath’, AIR 1940 Nag 84 (B), that with the two conditions of sale and repurchase in the same document, there was a presumption that a document ‘prima facie’ betokened a mortgage, unless the person claiming to have it construed as a sale could establish that an absolute sale was meant.

    15. This view of Grille, J. was dissented from by, J. Sen, J. in — ‘Welji v. Ganpat’, SA No. 70 of 1945, D/- 30-6-1949 (Nag) (C), and in several other castes, to which reference has been made by Rao, J. in — ‘Bhaiyalal v. Kishorilal’, AIR 1950 Nag 198 (D). Rao, J. also dissented from the view taken by Grille, J., relying mainly on the observations of Lord Cranworth cited with approval by Sir Barnes Peacock in — ‘Bhagwan Sahai v. Bhagwan Din’, 12 All 387 (PC) (E). Lord Cranworth observed in — ‘Alderson v. White’, (1858) 44 ER 924 at p. 928 (F), as follows:

    “The rule of law on this subject is one dictated by commonsense, that ‘prima facie’ an absolute conveyance, containing nothing to show that the relation of debtor and creditor is to exist between the parties, does not cease to be an absolute conveyance and become a mortgage merely because the vendor stipulates that he shall have a right to repurchase………. In every such case the question is, what, upon a fair construction, is the meaning of the instrument?”

    16. This observation was applied by one of us (Hidayatullah, C.J) and Sinha, C.J (as he then was) in — ‘Shrinarayan v. Bhaskar’, AIR 1954 Nag 193 (G). The rule was stated by the Divisional Bench in the following words:

    “When there is such a condition and something more, the question falls for consideration whether the transaction should be treated as a sale coupled with a condition of repurchase, or as a mortgage by conditional sale. There is no presumption attaching to such a document but the anus is on the party alleging that an ostensible sale is in fact a mortgage. The ‘onus probandi’ was described by Rao, J. in Bhaiyalal v. Kishorilal (D) in the following words:

    “But it stands to reason that the onus must lie upon the person who wants to construe a document contrary to its tenor to establish the circumstances which go to prove that the sale evidenced by the document is only ostensible and not real. We cannot be oblivious of the fact that it is open to parties to enter into a transaction of sale with a covenant for reconveyance.”

    17. In laying down this law both Rao, J. and the earlier Division Bench seem to have been pressed by the observations of Lord Cranworth we have already quoted. Those observations have also received the approval of the Supreme Court in AIR 1954 SC 345 at p. 347 (A). It would appear that though the term of repurchase may be incorporated in the same document it may sometimes be so worded as to create two agreements independent of each other.

    18. That is the difference between a sale coupled with an option of repurchase and a transaction which indicates that the relation of debtor and creditor still subsists. The addition of the proviso to S. 58(c), it has been laid down, leads to a presumption in favour of a mortgage.

    19. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court interpreted the law with advertence to the observations of Lord Cranworth, but have observed that since the amendment of the law, at any rate, there should be a presumption that persons who record their dealing not in two separate documents but in one intend a mortgage rather than a sale and that unless that presumption is put out of the way by a person claiming that the transaction is an absolute sale, it must be regarded as a mortgage. This observation of their Lordships is to be found in paragraphs 8, 14 and 15 of their judgment referred to above.

    20. It would appear from this that the approach to the problem has to be restated. Whereas under the law as understood before, a document, though ostensibly a sale with a bare condition merely for repurchase, could be interpreted as incorporating two independent conditions creating an absolute conveyance and an option of repurchase, placing the burden upon the one who sought to interpret it against the clear tenor of the document as a mortgage, that approach is not now permissible.

    21. The inclusion of the condition of repurchase in the same document must now be taken as a token of mortgage in the first instance, and it must be left to one who contends that the conveyance was absolute with only an option of repurchase to establish it by express words to be found in the document and, in case of ambiguity, by reference to the surrounding circumstances. The need for interpretation would really arise if there be ambiguity.

    22. Beyond this, there does not appear to be anything different—and we say it with the utmost respect—in the statement of the law by their Lordships. We have studied their Lordships' decision, with care and feel that the law enunciated by the Privy Council and by this Court in other respects has not been altered. In all such cases the rule is that one should be guided in the first instance by the document itself. If the document is clear, there is no need for any further enquiry.

    23. If ambiguous, it can be interpreted either as a mortgage or as a sale, with a presumption in favour of a mortgage. For this purpose, of course, as their Lordships have indicated, to take the document out of the category of mortgages some express words excluding the mortgage have to be shown, or some surrounding circumstances have to be proved which go to show that the transaction was not to operate as a mortgage but as a sale with a mere option of repurchase.

    24. Bearing in mind the tests laid down by their Lordships, we must examine this document to determine whether the transaction can be regarded as a sale or as a mortgage.

    25. We begin by noticing the fact that the condition of repurchase is incorporated in the same document. We must, therefore, following the dictum of their Lordships, hold that there is a presumption that a mortgage was intended and that the burden of proving it to be otherwise is upon, the party claiming it to be an absolute conveyance with a bare right of repurchase.

    26. To discharge this burden the respondent (no. 1) in this case relies primarily upon the decision of the learned Single Judge, which he states is correct in all the circumstances, and also upon the express provision of the condition about non-transferability, etc., of the property in dispute. The second argument, of course, refers to the second sentence in the extract from the deed quoted by us above.

    27. In addition, the learned counsel for respondent no. 1 relies upon a variety of circumstances, which he says betoken that this was an absolute conveyance of the property with a bare right of repurchase at the end of five years.

    28. His contention is that the document begins with an absolute sale in his favour. That, of course, every document which has to be construed under Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act, ordinarily does. He further contends that there is no mention of interest, no arrangement for rent which was high, that there was mutation of the property in the name of the transferee, that the price was adequate, that resale was claimable only on a fixed date and not either before or after, and that there is nothing to show that the relation of debtor and creditor existed. On the other hand, he says that there were restrictive conditions in favour of the vendor and on the vendee.

    29. We shall deal with these contentions, but we must first begin with the interpretation of the restrictive condition about which the two Courts below have differed. The first appellate Court decided that the second sentence in the extract, which we have quoted, referred to the vendor and he was restrained from selling, mortgaging or adding and altering the structure of the house.

    30. This, the learned Judge of the first appellate Court deduced from the use of the word ‘karege’, which in his opinion showed that the statement was made by the vendor an his own behalf. The learned Single Judge, on the other hand felt that the restrictive condition could operate not against the vendor but against the vendee, inasmuch as the vendor had transferred possession and all rights in the property and in law could neither sell it nor mortgage it nor alter the structure by additions and alterations.

    31. The construction of a document and the meaning of words is a question sometimes of law and sometimes of fact. A decision as to the meaning words is undoubtedly a question of fact, as has been laid down by Lindley L.J in — ‘Chatenay v. Brazlin Submarine Telegraph Co.’ (1891) 1 QB 79 at p. 85 (H), noted by Sarkar in his Law of Evidence, 9th edition, page 737. On the other hand, their Lordships of the Privy Council have laid down in — ‘Sahebrao v. Jaiwant Rao’, AIR 1933 PC 171 at p. 175 (I), that unless there has been misconstruction a mistaken inference from documents is an error, not of law but of fact.

    32. We are concerned here with a title deed, because the title of the parties depends upon Exhibit D-1 and the construction to be placed upon it. If there is any misconstruction then the matter would be one of law and open to interference in second appeal, and we do not think that the learned Single Judge was beyond his jurisdiction when he attempted to intepret the document in his own way

    33. That argument put aside, we are however of opinion—and we say it with the utmost respect — that the learned Single Judge in interpreting, the document and its words was more impressed by attendant circumstances than by the words employed. One cannot say what was the reason for incorporating such a condition in the document. It may be that the vendee might have felt that with this option of repurchase existing, the vendor might attempt to do certain things to the property. Alternatively, it is capable of being considered that the parties thinking that this was a mortgage might have felt the need of restricting the vendor from dealing with the property in future, at any rate during the period of five years.

    34. We are, therefore, unable to find out the intention behind the incorporation of this clause. But we can interpret the document to see to whom the words in their grammatical and natural meaning apply.

    35. Now, the words of the second sentence in our quotation ran apply either to the vendor or to the vendee or to both of them taken together. There is no question that they do not apply to the vendee. The manner of its writing and the context clearly show that the vendee was not intended but the vendor by the restrictive clause. Whether or not the vendee also was contemplated is the next question which we have to decide.

    36. We have read the document carefully several times, and we are of opinion that the vendee was not contemplated. To hold otherwise would do violence to the scheme of the document as a whole and the manner in which this clause occurs after the clause for reconveyance on repayment of Rs. 1,300.

    37. Once it is held that the restrictive covenant bound the vendor, we have here evidence to show that both the parties understood that the vendor, in spite of the ostensible nature of the document, enjoyed some measure of proprietorship over the property and that it was necessary to limit that proprietorship by imposing upon him a restriction as to transfers and alterations.

    38. This analysis of the clause is necessary because, in our opinion, the document read as a whole creates an ambiguity as to its tenor. If the matter had been clear, there would be no need to expound this clause; but in view of the ambiguity which evidently exists we have to look to the surrounding circumstances to determine the true nature of the document and the meaning of the words in relation to existing facts.

    39. The argument of the learned counsel for respondent No. 1 that there was no arrangement for rent or interest is easily met by the appellant by saying that inasmuch as the property was to be placed in possession of the so-called vendee there was no need for an agreement about interest on the amount advanced and for rent. The transaction was, it is suggested, a mortgage with possession redeemable at the end of five years.

    40. That explains possession as well. The question of the period fixed (5 years) must be answered in favour of the appellant, being a long period. The fixing of a day for redemption has nothing to do with the character of the document if there is already a presumption that it is a mortgage. There is nothing to show that it could not be redeemed after five years.

    41. It is clear that the presumption which attached to this document that it was a mortgage was not successfully repelled by adduction of evidence. We are not concerned with the surrounding circumstances deduced from subsequent events-When surrounding circumstances are examined to see how the words of the document are to be interpreted in relation to facts existing at that time.

    42. Subsequent conduct of parties though relevant, may be actuated by different motives and may have little bearing upon what happened at the time the transaction was actually entered into. That conduct may not only be in furtherance of what actually happened but also may be designed to create new circumstances to give a different air to what had previously transpired.

    43. All that has been shown is that the plaintiff wanted to repurchase the property. That is not conclusive, because if the transaction was a mortgage, the right to redeem cannot be denied. This subsequent conduct does not displace the initial presumption. In our opinion, therefore, regard being had to the pronouncement of the highest Court in the country, this document must be regarded as one of mortgage, of which redemption can rightfully be claimed. The relation of debtor and creditor must be held to have continued with a right of redemption.

    44. As we have already said, there is yet another point in the case, namely, the application of Section 15(1) of the Relief of Indebtedness Act. That section occurs in a portion of the Act which is headed ‘Invalidity of transfer made by debtors in certain circumstances’. It is contended that there is a difference in the phraseology of sub-s. (1) and sub-s. (2). Whereas sub-s. (2) mentioned the word ‘void’, the first sub-section used the words ‘No transfer shall be valid’.

    45. There is no real difference between the two. The transaction entered into by a person whose petition for the settlement of debts was pending before a Debt Relief Court is to be regarded as invalid, that is to say, of no effect in the eye of the law. If the transaction was invalid then no consequence would flow, and the plaintiff would be entitled to claim back the property.

    46. On this part of the case, as we have already said, we do not wish to express any final opinion, because if the other point had not prevailed we would have been disposed to sending the case back to the learned Single Judge for decision of this question. It is not now necessary to do so in view of our decision on the first part of the case.

    47. Thus, we are of opinion that the transaction amounted to a mortgage and that the suit for redemption was properly laid. The decision of the learned Single Judge — with all due respect to him — reversing that of the first appellate Court is not therefore correct. We accordingly allow the appeal, reverse the decision of the learned Single Judge, and restore that of the first appellate Judge. A decree for redemption shall follow.

    48. We are passing a decree for redemption in spite of the fact that in our opinion the transaction may probably be regarded as invalid, because the learned counsel for the appellant stated that should we agree with his contentions on the question of the redemption he would not press the second ground. We accordingly treat the second ground as not pressed. In view of the fact that the appellant changed his initial stand under S. 15 and because his case about providing the money for payment was not proved, we feel that he should not be allowed his costs of the appeal here. We accordingly make no order about costs.

    49. Appeal allowed.

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    Mohammad Ibrahim Khan Ikramkhan v. Sugrabi Abdul Rashid And Others
    (Mar 8, 1955)