Hegde, J.:— In this appeal, the true scope of Section 32 of the Mysore Tenancy Act, 1952 (Mysore Act No. XIII of 1952—which shall be hereinafter called ‘the Act’) comes up for consideration.
2. The appellant (plaintiff) sued for a declaration that he is the kadim tenant in the suit land and further prayed for a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with his possession. Both the plaintiff and the defendant claim to be the tenants in the suit property under the same landlord. Amongst other grounds, the defendant contended that the suit is not maintainable in a Civil Court in view of Section 46 of the Act. The trial Court rejected his contention and decreed the suit. But the appellate Court allowed the defendant's appeal holding that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to decide the question of tenancy that has arisen for consideration and directed the return of the plaint for presentation before proper authority. The correctness of this decision is assailed before us by the appellant.
3. Section 46 of the Act ousts the jurisdiction of Civil Courts to settle, decide or deal with any question which is, by or under the Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Amildar, etc. Hence the question is wether the rival claims about the same tenancy is a matter to be decided by the Amildar under Section 32 of the Act. The duties and functions of the Amildar are enumerated in section 32 of the Act. The relevant portion of sec. 32 is as follows:—
“For the purposes of this Act, the following shall be the duties and functions to be performed by the Amildar:—
(b) to decide whether a person is a tenant”
Section 32 starts by saying that:
“for the purposes of this Act, the following shall be the duties and functions to be performed by the Amildar.”
What is the meaning to be attached to the words “for the purposes of this Act?” According to Dictionary meaning ‘purpose’ means the idea or aim kept before the mind as the end of effort. In other words the end desired. What is the end desired by the Act? It is a well accepted canon of interpretation that ouster of Civil Court's jurisdiction will not be easily assumed and any provision of law providing for such ouster will be strictly construed. From a treading of Sections 32 and 46, it is clear that the Amildar is given exclusive jurisdiction to decide certain matters enumerated in Section 32 but his decision must be “for the purposes of the Act”. What are these ‘purposes’? To assist us in getting at these ‘purposes’ it is useful to examine the title of the Act; its preamble; the scheme of the Act and the relevant provisions.
4. The title of the Act says that it “is an Act to regulate the law relating to the tenancies of agricultural lands”. From this it is reasonable to assume that it is intended to regulate the relation between landlords and their tenants. But in the present suit the dispute is between two persons both of whom claim to be tenants under the same landlord. It is not a suit between the landlord and the tenant. Hence the title of the Act lends no support to the contentions advanced by the respondent.
5. We shall now proceed to the preamble of the Act. It says that:
“Whereas it is necessary to regulate the law which governs the relations of the landlords and tenants of agricultural lands and to regulate and impose restrictions on the” transfer of agricultural lands, dwelling houses, sites and lands, appurtenant thereto belonging to or occupied by agriculturists in the State of Mysore and to make provisions for certain other purposes hereinafter appearing.”
(underlining is ours.)
According to the preamble, the Act has three purposes, i.e, (i) to regulate the law which governs the relations of landlords and tenants of agricultural lands; (ii) to regulate and impose restrictions on the transfer of agricultural lands, etc., and (iii) to make provisions for certain other purposes appearing in the provisions contained in the Act. Surely the present dispute does not fall within the first two purposes mentioned above. Does it fall within the residuary purpose, “to make provisions for certain other purposes hereinafter appearing”? Are there any provisions in the Act providing for such purposes? It will be seen that the Act owes its inspiration to the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (which shall hereinafter be called ‘the Bombay Tenancy Act’) both as regards the substance and the language employed. The preamble of the Act is to some extent copied from the preamble of the Bombay Tenancy Act. The words “to make provision for certain purposes hereinafter appearing” appear to have been borrowed from the Bombay Tenancy Act. But for one reason or other they did not incorporate the corresponding provisions of the Bombay Tenancy Act, as will be seen later, in the body of the Act. Hence really speaking the preamble speaks of only two purposes: (1) to regulate the relations between landlords and tenants, and (2) to regulate the alienation of agricultural land.
6. If we examine the scheme of the Act it will be seen Chapter I deals with preliminaries including definitions; Chapter II is the most important Chapter; it sets out the provisions regarding tenancies? Chapter III deals with procedure and jurisdiction of the Amildar and appeals from his order; Chapter IV enumerates offences and penalties; Chapter V is a miscellaneous Chapter which provides for framing of rules, delegation of power, summary eviction in some cases, bar of jurisdiction of the Civil Courts, indemnity to persons in respect of anything which is done in good faith or intended to be done under the Act, etc. From the scheme of the Act it is seen that “the purposes of the Act” are grouped together in Chapter II whereas the other Chapters deal with incidental matters.
7. Let us now proceed to examine the provisions in Chapter II in order to find out what light they throw to ascertain the “purposes of the Act”. In this Chapter there are as many as 29 sections. Section 3 makes certain provisions of the Transfer of Property Act applicable to tenancies and leases falling under the Act; section 4 lays down who should be deemed to be tenants; sec. 5 provides that there should be no tenancy for a period of less than 5 years and the tenancies in force are extended for a period of five years from the date of the commencement of the Act; section 6 fixes the maximum rate rent payable by a tenant; section 7 provides for the fixation of rent subject to the maximum rate fixed under section 6; section 8 deals ‘with fixation of rent in kind; section 9 prohibits the landlord from demanding or obtaining service or labour from a tenant and provides for computation of the services agreed to; section 10 provides for the refund of rent recovered in contravention of the provisions of the Act and other penalties; section 11 abolishes all ceases such as mamool huk or tax and service; section 12 provides for enquiries as regards reasonable rent; section 13 authorises the Amildar to reduce the rent fixed under certain circumstances; section 14 provides for suspensions and remissions of rent on the happening of certain events; sections 15 and 16 deal with the termination of tenancies; section 17 lays down that where the period of tenancy of any tenant has expired and if such tenant has been allowed to hold over under sub-section (2) of section 15, the tenancy of such tenant shall be deemed to have been renewed for a further period of 5 years from the date of its expiry on the same terms and conditions as before; section 18 bars eviction from a dwelling house if the same had been built at the expense of the tenant prior to the commencement of the Act; section 19 provides that if a landlord intends to sell a building site as mentioned in section 18, the tenant should be given the option to purchase the said site at the value determined by the Amildar; sec. 20 deals with the eviction of the tenant from dwelling houses built after the commencement of the Act; section 21 provides for the payment of compensation in the event of eviction from the dwelling house; section 22 provides that if a landlord intends to sell any agricultural land leased to a tenant, such tenant should be given the first option of purchasing the land; section 23 deals with the tenancies leased by persons in Military service; sections 24 and 25 provide for relief against termination of tenancies in certain cases; section 26 lays down that in the absence of an express intimation rent paid shall be presumed to have been paid towards the current year's rent. It also provides for the issue of receipt for the rent paid; section 27 prohibits sub-division, sub-letting and assignment by the tenant; section 28(A) bars interference by landlords with the cultivation by tenants; section 29 lays down procedure for taking possession of the property under the Act, either by the tenant or by the landlord; section 80 provides for the recovery of rent by the landlord from the tenant; and section 31 lays down that the rights and privileges conferred on the tenants by any other law or usage or contract, grant, decree or order are kept intact. From the foregoing it is seen that provisions in sections 4 to 31 excepting section 28 govern the relations of the landlords and the tenants. Section 28 is as follows:—
“Save as expressly provided in this Act, any interest in the land held by a tenant, shall not be liable to be attached, seized or sold in execution of a decree or order of a Civil Court
No provision in the Act has been brought to our notice expressly providing for attachment, seizure or sale “of any interest in the land held by a tenant” in execution of a decree or order of a Civil Court. Even if Section 28 is not a barren provision the only “purposes” available from Chapter II are (i) to regulate the relations of the landlords and the tenants of agricultural lands and (ii) to regulate and impose restrictions on the transfer of agricultural lands, dwelling houses, etc. But in reality there appears to be only one purpose, that is to regulate the relations between the landlord and the tenant.
8. On an examination of the corresponding provisions of the Bombay Tenancy Act, it is seen that there are several provisions in that Act disclosing other purposes. To cite only a few, in that Act there are provisions for fixing a ceiling area; economic holdings; disposal of balance of lands after purchase by the tenants; management of estates held by the landholder; restrictions on transfers of agricultural lands; management of uncultivable lands; and acquisitions of estates and lands. Hence to find out the “purposes of the Act” it may not be safe to wholly rely on the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy Act and the decisions rendered thereon.
9. It is contended on behalf of the respondent that one of the “purposes of the Act” is to decide whether a person is a tenant or not. In other words the “purposes of Act” are those mentioned in Section 32. We do not think that this is a correct view. From the language employed in Section 32 it is clear that for finding out the “purposes of the Act” we must look to provisions other than Section 32. From the expression “for the purposes of this Act the following shall be the duties and functions to be performed by the Amildar” it is reasonable to assume that Sec. 32 does not create the “purposes of the Act”, but is intended to implement them. If the contention of the respondent is correct then Section 32 should have been worded “the following shall be the duties and functions to be performed by the Amildar.” There would not have been any reference to “the purposes of the Act”.
10. The Amildar is constituted as a special Tribunal to decide certain matters arising under the Act with a view to implement the provisions of the Act. He is not constituted as one more Court in the hierarchy of Courts, with exclusive jurisdiction to try all cases in which directly or incidentally disputes enumerated in Section 32 arise for determination whether the same have anything to do with the other provisions of the Act or not. If the argument advanced on behalf of the respondent is accepted as sound it may lead to an anomalous position. Take a case where A sues B for damages for theft of crops from his property. B puts forward the plea that no is a tenant in the land and his landlord is C. If the contention of the respondent is valid, the Civil Court which had jurisdiction to entertain the suit ceases to have jurisdiction the moment B pleads that he is a tenant in the land. He need not even plead that he is the tenant of the plaintiff. It is sufficient if he pleads that he is somebody's tenant. If this interpretation is accepted it is bound to throw open the flood-gates for speculative litigation. We find it difficult to believe that the Legislature could have intended such a situation to arise.
11. A careful analysis of Section 32 itself makes it clear that each of the disputes mentioned in clauses (a) to (1) has reference to one or other of the provisions in the Act. In fact clauses (c) to (j) mention the section of the Act to which they relate. Clause (a) clearly refers to Sec. 2(2); clause (b) to Sec. 4; clause (k) refers to Sections 18, 29, etc., clause (1) is very important to know the scope of the section. It speaks of the Amildar's duty to decide “such other matters as may be referred to him by or under this Act”. To find out these “matters” one has to look to Chapter II of the Act. From those provisions it will be seen that some “matters” are referred to him by the Act and some under the Act. Clause (1) is a residuary clause and hence it is not likely to refer to “matters” mentioned in clauses (a) to (k).
12. The Court below has relied on certain decisions rendered by the Bombay High Court in interpreting the Bombay Tenancy Act. In spite of a great deal of similarity between the two Acts there are important differences making it unsafe to unduly rely on the decisions given under the Bombay Tenancy Act. With all these differences there is no denying the fact that some of the Bombay decisions on which the respondent has relied land considerable support to his contentions. Hence we propose to examine them.
13. Before proceeding to examine these cases, it may be noticed that there are no provisions in the Mysore Act which lay down that a Civil Court is not entitled to try civil proceedings which involve the determination of any question falling within Sec. 32 of the Act, even though if those questions had arisen in proceedings under the Act they should have been settled, decided or dealt with by the Amildar. On the other hand Section 46 says that:
“No Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is, by or under the Act, required to be settled, decided, or dealt with by the Amildar”.
(underlining is ours)
Hence before we could conclude that a Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try any particular matter, we should first come to the conclusion that the matter in question is required to be decided or dealt with by the Amildar “by or under the Act”. Ordinarily the jurisdiction of the Civil Court depends upon the allegations made in the plaint and not upon the defences raised. In any case the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts cannot be ousted except on facts proved, except in so far as any special law has provided to the contrary. One other aspect may be disposed of before we proceed to examine the decided cases. Under Section 32(b) the Amildar is required to decide “whether a person is a tenant”. Some controversy has arisen as to whether he could also decide “whether a person is not a tenant”. If he has to decide “whether a person is a tenant”, it stands to reason that he must also have the power to decide that he is not a tenant, they being two facets of the same question.
14. Our attention has been invited by the appellant to an unreported Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in Sidraya Bhujanga Gunare v. Rachappa Bhujanga Gujare(1), wherein a Bench of the Bombay High Court consisting of Shah and Gokhale JJ. held:
“As the jurisdiction conferred upon the Tenancy Court is in derogation of the jurisdiction conferred upon the Civil Court, the provision of sections 70 and 85 (of the Bombay Tenancy Act) must be strictly construed. By Sec. 70 one of the duties imposed on the Mamlatdar is to decide whether a person is a tenant or protected tenant. That in our opinion contemplates a decision by the Mamlatdar of a dispute between two persons who claimed to be the owners of certain tenancy rights.”
15. Sadasivayya, J. has held in Sayyad Fakir Wd. Sayyad Karim Haliyal Kazi v. Gabriel Santolin Gonsalvis(2) that:
“A suit in the Civil Court by a person claiming to be the protected tenant of the suit land for a permanent injunction against the landlord is maintainable and is not barred by sections 29 and 85 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act.”
It is true that he has also observed that the question relating to the disputed tenancy of the plaintiff has to be referred to the tenancy Court. This point does not appear to have been debated before him. It was taken as an accepted proposition. In the case of Gowdara Puttappa v. Gowdara Ramappa, Somnath Iyer, J. held that under Sections 32 and 46 of the Mysore Tenancy Act, the Civil Court is not prohibited from issuing a temporary injunction under Order 39 rules 1 and 2 C.P.C in a suit where the plaintiff sued for a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with his possession of certain agricultural land. Here again, everyone concerned appears to have proceeded on the footing that “there can be no doubt that the moment the defendants pleaded that they were the tenants of the properties in suit, the issue as to whether they were such tenants could only be tried and decided by the Amildar as provided by Section 32 of the Tenancy Act.” One aspect of the question under examination had come up for consideration in the case of Bhimappa Venkappa Kerisa v. Basalingavva. In that case the plaintiff had sued for possession of the suit property on the ground that the defendant was a trespasser. The defendant pleaded that he was in possession of the suit property as a tenant of some third party and the plaintiff was not the owner of that property. In that case the trial Court decided to try as a preliminary issue the question as to who was the real owner of the suit property and then send the case to the Mamlatdar under Section 32 of the Bombay Tenancy Act. It was contended in that case that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try that issue. That contention was negatived by one of us. It was observed therein:
“Sri Bhatta the learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that the order under revision was passed without jurisdiction. According to him, once his client, pleads that he is a tenanti then the Civil Court is deprived of its jurisdiction to determine any of the issues till the Mamlatdar has given a decision under Sec. 70 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act. The jurisdiction of the Mumlatdar is a statutory jurisdiction. It is confined to Rangaiah matters included in Sec. 70 aforesaid. According to Sri Bhatta, his client's case falls within the ambit of Sec. 70(b) or at any rate, under Sec. 70(c). Sec. 70(b) reads as follows:
‘To decide whether a person is a tenant or a protected tenant or a permanent tenant’….
Reading section 70 as a whole, there could be no doubt that section 70(c) is only a residuary clause which must be read ejusdem generis to matters referred to in the other Sub-sections. It cannot be interpreted as to mean that any and every matter can be referred to the Mamlatdar. I am unable to place such a broad construction on this clause. Hence the only question that I have to consider is whether the present case comes within the scope of Sec. 70(b). I am unable to read the Sub-section as one authorising the Mamlatdar to decide as to who is the true owner as between the plaintiff and the third party put forward by the defendant. That question must be decided by the Civil Court.”
That case proceeded on the footing that the cases reported in Trimbak Sopana Girme v. Gang a ram Mhatarba Yadav and in Dhondi Tukaram v. Dadoo Piraj had laid down the law correctly. No arguments had been advanced in that case about the correctness of those decisions. Hence while the decisions of this High Court have consistently held that Civil Courts have jurisdiction to entertain suits not directly falling under Section 32 of the Act and Section 70 of the Bombay Tenancy Act, no occasion appears to have arisen in this Court to consider the scope of these sections.
16. The first case relied on by the respondent is the case of Trimbak Sopana Girme…(Original Defendant), v. Gangaram Mhatarba Yadav…(Original Plaintiff), Opponent*. That was a decision given by Chagla C.J In that case the plaintiff brought a suit against the defendant in the Civil Court for possession; his contention was that the defendant contended that he was a protected tenant; the question for consideration was whether the issue relating to the tenancy should be referred to the Mamlatdar under Section 70(b) of the Bombay Tenancy Act. His Lordship came to the conclusion that it should be so referred. In that decision his Lordship nowhere considered the import of the words “for the purposes of this Act” as found in Section 70 of the Bombay Tenancy Act. The decision was mainly based on considerations of convenience. His Lordship proceeded on the footing that under Sec. 70(b) one of the duties and functions of the Mamlatdar is to decide whether a person is a tenant or protected tenant. But no notice was taken of the fact that this duty of the Mamlatdar arises only if some “purpose of the Act” comes into play. The learned Judge was of the opinion that if the landlord is allowed to go to a Civil Court and sue the defendant on the ground that he is a trespasser even when the defendant contends that he is a tenant on the land really no occasion would ever arise for the Mamlatdar to decide the issue as to whether a person is a tenant or a protected tenant; if a person could, only go to the Mamlatdar in those cases where he admitted that the defendant was his tenant or a protected tenant, then the issue as to whether the person is a tenant or protected tenant would not arise; such an issue can only arise when there is a dispute as to the status of the particular person, and it is only when an allegation is made that the person is not a tenant or a protected tenant that the Mamlatdar would be called upon to try such an issue; it is clear that the question whether a person is a tenant or a protected tenant is not a jurisdictional fact as far as the Mamlatdar is concerned, but is a fact in issue. But these reasonings guess the point that the Mamlatdar will get jurisdiction only when some proceedings are instituted before him to carry out the “purposes of the Act”. The plaintiff who has come to the Court with the allegation that the defendant is a trespasser will have to establish that fact. If he does not do so, his suit will fail. In such a dispute the Mamlatdar does not come into the picture. The Mamlatdar himself has jurisdiction to try the question as to whether a person is a tenant or not only if that point arises in some proceedings contemplated in the Bombay Tenancy Act.
17. The next circumstance that has impressed the learned Judge can be best brought out by quoting a passage from his judgment.
“There is another very serious difficulty which would arise if Mr. Tarkunde's views were to be accepted. Assuming that the Civil Court was to hold that the defendant was a protected tenant, Mr. Tarkunde concedes that, under those circumstances, the Civil Court would have no jurisdiction to pass a decree in favour of the plaintiff or to deal further with the suit and the matter will have to go to the Mamlatdar. Suppose in the proceeding taken before the Mamlatdar by the landlord the Mamlatdar came to the conclusion that the defendant was not a protected tenant, we would then have one decision by the Civil Court and a contrary decision on the same point by the Revenue Court and the question would arise which view was to prevail. It is in order to avoid such a conflict that the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act has ousted the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to determine the issue as to whether the defendant is a protected tenant or not.”
We do not think that this is a proper approach to the case. The question for the decision of the Civil Court is whether the defendant is a trespasser. If it holds that he is a trespasser, then the necessary result follows. On the contrary if it is unable to hold that he is a trespasser, the suit will fail. There is no occasion for the Civil Court to pronounce whether he is a tenant or not excepting perhaps incidentally in considering the question of trespass. It must be remembered that the Civil Court has a wide jurisdiction under Section 9 C.P.C to decide all issues arising before it either directly or incidentally whereas the Legislature has confined the jurisdiction of the Mamlatdar to decide disputes mentioned in Section 32 and that only when they relate to “the purposes of this Act.”
18. The next case that was brought to our notice is the case of Dhondi Tukaram v. Dadoo Piraj. This case originally came up before Shah, J. He was of the opinion that:
“By section 70 of the Act (Bombay Tenancy Act) the Mamlatdar is authorised to decide the question whether a person is a tenant or a protected tenant, provided it is a decision to be given for the purposes of the Act. If in proceedings under sub-section (2) of Section 29 a contention is sought to be raised that the relation of landlord and tenant does or does not subsist between the parties, it would be for the Mamlatdar to decide the question whether a person alleged or claiming to be a tenant or a protected tenant is or is not such a tenant. Sec. 70 of the Act does not, however, profess to confer exclusive jurisdiction upon the Mamlatdar to decide questions set out in Cls. (a) to (o) of that section, whatever the nature of the proceedings; it merely imposes duties and sets out the functions of the Mamlatdar to be performed for the purposes of the Act. It would, therefore, appear that if in a matter filed in a Civil Court a question did arise which if it had arisen in proceedings instituted under the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, it would be the duty and the function of the Mamlatdar to decide, the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to decide or deal with that question cannot be regarded as barred. There does not appear any provision in the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 which lays down that a Civil Court is not entitled to try a civil proceeding which involves the determination of any question falling within section 70 Cls. (a) to (o), which if it had arisen in a proceeding under the Act would have been settled, decided or dealt with by the Mamlatdar.”
But in view of the decision of the learned Chief Justice in Trimbak Sopana v. Gangaram Mliatarba, the learned Judge referred this case to a Division Bench.
19. The reference in question came up before a Division Bench consisting of Gajendragadkar, J. (as he then was) and Vyas, J. The Judgment of the Bench was delivered by Gajendragadkar, J. His Lordship did not agree with Shah, J.'s interpretation of the words “for the purposes of this Act” as found in Sec. 70 of the Bombay Tenancy Act. According to him:
“The purpose of the Act in the context is deciding the claim of the parties as to possession of an agricultural land. Whenever any such dispute arises between the parties, the object of the party seeking relief is to take possession of the agricultural land; and that undoubtedly is one of the purposes of the Tenancy Act. Indeed s. 29 makes it clear that possession of the agricultural land can be awarded only in execution of an order passed by the Mamlatdar and not otherwise. Therefore, in our opinion, even if a plea is raised by a defendant in a suit like the present that he is a tenant or a protected tenant, that plea is ultimately referable to the provisions of the Tenancy Act and the purposes of raising the plea is to claim the protection of the Act. If that be so, the decision of this plea must be held to be for the purposes of this Act.”
This case has been followed by the Bombay High Court in its later decisions. With great respect to the learned Judges, we think that there is no justification to think that all claims for possession of agricultural land come within “the purposes of the Act.” Section 29 of the Bombay Tenancy Act has a limited purpose and does not embrace all suits for possession of agricultural lands.
20. Under Section 29 of the Bombay Tenancy Act:
“A tenant who is entitled to possession of any land or dwelling house under any of the provisions of that Act may apply in writing for such possession to the Mamlatdar.”
(underlining is ours)
Again under sub-section (2) of the same section:
“No landlord shall obtain possession of any land or dwelling house held by a tenant except under an order of the Mamlatdar.”
(underlining is ours)
From this it is seen that before that section, can operate there must be an application either by the landlord against his tenant or by the tenant against his landlord or by a person who claims to be tenant or landlord of the opposite party.
21. Allied to the question that we have been dealing with, another interesting question has some times arisen for consideration, i.e, can an Amildar under the Act or the Mamlatdar under the Bombay Tenancy Act entertain an application for a declaration that the opposite party is either a tenant or a protected tenant or a trespasser, and could he also give an injunction restraining the opposite party from interfering with his rights? In other words even when there is no proceeding under the Act before the Amildar, could he entertain an application for declaration or injunction? Earlier we have referred to the decisions of this Court which have held that the Amildar has no jurisdiction to issue an injunction.
22. In the case of Mela Kabhai v. Motibhai Kahandas Patel, Chainani, J. (as he was then) and Tarkunde, J. held that under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, the Mamlatdar is competent to entertain and decide an application for a declaration that a person is or is not a tenant. If this is the correct view of the law, it means that one of the purposes of the Mamlatdar is to decide the question whether a person is a tenant or not, irrespective of the fact whether it arises in a proceeding under the Bombay Tenancy Act or not. In arriving at this conclusion their Lordships placed considerable reliance on the fact that under Section 74(1)(a) of the Bombay Tenancy Act, any order passed under Sec. 4 of that Act is appealable. Sec. 4 by itself does not provide for any decision. But Sec. 74 speaks of an appeal against the order passed under Sec. 4. From this their Lordships concluded that the Legislature had intended to confer powers on the Mamlatdar, to decide the question of tenancy irrespective of the fact whether there is any application before him under any other provision of the Act or not. They also relied on an earlier decision of the same High Court in Dhondi Tukaram v. Dadoo Piraji, which held that whenever a person raises a plea that he was a tenant, his object is to claim the protection of the Tenancy Act and that the investigation of such a plea is covered by the expression “for the purposes of this Act” occurring in Sec. 70 of that Act. It is unnecessary for us to consider in this case the scope of Sec. 4 read with Sec. 74 of the Bombay Tenancy Act as there are no provisions similar to Sec. 74 of the Bombay Tenancy Act in the Act. This very question appears to have come up again before a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Special Civil Application No. 2339/1958, Special G.A No. 2639/58 and S.G.A No. 2342/58. The Full Bench consisted of Chainani C.J, Mudholkar and Patel JJ. It may be remembered that Chainani, J. (as he was then) was a party to the decision in Mela Kabhai v. Motibhai Kahandas Patel. The question that was referred to the Full Bench is:
“Whether under the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy Agricultural 1959 Lands Act, 1948, the Mamlatdar can entertain and decide an application filed by a landlord for a declaration that his opponent who claims to be his Mudugere tenant, is not a tenant under the said Act.”
In that case their Lordships considered the import of the words “for the purposes of this Act” as found in Sec. 70 of the Bombay Tenancy Act. They were of the opinion that the words “for the purposes of this Act” should be given a wide meaning. They observed that:
“The words ‘for the purposes of this Act in our opinion, mean for the purpose of deciding any question relating to a matter which is regulated or governed by the provisions of this Act.”
The words “for the purposes of this Act,” appear to us to be plain. There is no reason, much less justification to depart from its normal and natural meaning.
23. In the case of Sudhir Kumar Bhattacharjee v. Bibhuti Bhusan Majumdar, his Lordship Mookerjee, J. had to consider a somewhat similar provision under the Bengal Thika Tenancy Act. His observations as summarised in the Head Note of the case are of assistance. He said:
“In all proceedings under special Acts, the Special Tribunal has jurisdiction to decide questions which are necessary for the purpose of giving or refusing relief under the particular statute. The Thika Tenancy Controller has the power and authority under the law to order eviction of Thika tenants. For that purpose, it may be necessary for him to consider defences or objections, founded on a certain claim of status, or pleas of absence of relationship of landlord and tenant or denial of the landlord's title to the property. He is entitled to consider those questions so far as they are necessary for the performance of his duties under the statute which include passing of orders for ejectment.
In our opinion this appears to be the correct approach.
24. After giving our utmost consideration to the contentions that were canvassed before us, we have come to the conclusion that the jurisdiction of the Amildar is limited to cases that arise by or under the Act and the decisions that he is required to give under Section 32 should be “for the purposes of the Act.” The instant case does not arise under any of the provisions of the Act and the Civil Court, has therefore, jurisdiction to decide any of the points in dispute including the question of tenancy.
25. In the result, we set aside the order of the first appellate Court and direct the Court to hear the appeal in other respects. The points of law that have been urged before us are not free from difficulty. They have given rise to sharp conflict of judicial opinion. Hence we think it appropriate to direct the parties to bear their own costs in this Court.
Nittoor Skeenivasa Rau, J.:— I agree.
sections 29 and 85 of the Bombay Tenancy