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  • provisions of s. 105 of the Indian Evidence Act
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  • provisions of s. 105 of the Indian Evidence Act
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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises from a complaint filed on October 31, 1956 by Dattatraya Dulaji Ghadigaonkar (the respondent) about the death of his younger brother Sitaram, who was shot and fatally wounded on the evening of June 3, 1956 during disturbances at a public meeting in Bombay (Chowpatty area). The respondent alleged that the appellant, Vadilal Panchai (also referred to as Vadilal Panchal/Wadilal Panchal in the record), fired a shot from a blue car that struck and killed Sitaram; a police surgeon's post-mortem concluded death resulted from the gunshot wound and noted charring indicating the shot was fired from close range.

A Coroner's Jury returned a verdict on October 16, 1956 that the shot was fired by the appellant and that the firing was "in exercise of the right of private defence and as such justified." The respondent made enquiries with the police earlier in July 1956 and, receiving no action, filed the formal complaint in October 1956.

The Presidency Magistrate referred the complaint for an inquiry under s. 202 CrPC to the Superintendent of Police, C.I.D. The police inquiry (report of November 15, 1956 and subsequent inquiry report of March 12, 1957) concluded that the appellant was justified in resorting to firearms in self-defence. On April 30, 1957 the Presidency Magistrate, after detailed consideration of witness statements and reports, concluded that the police finding and other materials established that the shot was fired in self-defence and dismissed the complaint under s. 203 CrPC.

The respondent appealed to the High Court, which set aside the Magistrate's order and directed issuance of process against the appellant, reasoning that the Magistrate could not treat a police report as sufficient to establish the exception of private defence given the mandatory provisions of s. 105 of the Indian Evidence Act. The appellant obtained special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against the High Court's order dated September 13, 1957.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, when a Magistrate directs an inquiry under s. 202 CrPC and receives an inquiry report supporting a plea of self-defence by the person complained against, the Magistrate may accept that plea on the materials before him and dismiss the complaint under s. 203 CrPC, or whether as a matter of law the Magistrate must in all such cases issue process and leave the defence to be established at trial.
  2. Whether the Magistrate, in reaching a decision under s. 203 CrPC, is precluded as a matter of law from accepting a defence based on an exception (such as private defence) on the basis of a police/inquiry report and recorded statements because of the requirements of s. 105 of the Indian Evidence Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as reflected in the record)

  • The appellant's case, as recorded, was that his car was surrounded by a large and violent crowd on Queen's Road, stones were pelted and attempts made to drag occupants out; the appellant fired his revolver in the exercise of his right of private defence to protect himself and other occupants, thereby clearing the way for the car to leave.
  • After the incident the appellant along with K.K. Shah went to Gamdevi Police Station and the appellant was medically treated; inquiry and police statements supported the plea of self-defence.

Respondent's (Complainant's) Case

  • The respondent alleged that Sitaram, while crossing Queen's Road with companions, heard shots and found a person injured; when they went to help, a further shot from a blue car struck Sitaram in the chest, causing fatal injury.
  • The respondent identified the appellant as the person who fired the fatal shot from the blue car.

Submissions Supporting the Magistrate (State of Bombay as recorded)

  • Counsel for the State supported the Magistrate's dismissal, pointing to material (including earlier versions of some witnesses and evidence of mob violence) inconsistent with the complainant's later account that Sitaram and companions were quietly crossing the road; evidence showed the car was surrounded and occupants threatened, supporting the appellant's plea of private defence and discrediting the complainant's eyewitnesses.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Emperor v. Dhondu Bapu Gujar Considered a case where a Magistrate dismissed a defamation complaint under s. 203 relying on an exception; the order of dismissal was held bad where evidence had not been taken. The Court noted this case does not lay down the absolute proposition that a Magistrate can never accept an exception on s. 202 materials; it was cited to show circumstances where dismissal without adequate inquiry was improper, but not to support an absolute rule forbidding acceptance of an exception at the s. 203 stage.
Emperor v. J.A. Finan Cited for the proposition that when a defendant pleads justification (ss. 76 & 79 IPC in that case) the Magistrate must investigate whether that plea is made out by legal evidence, especially where supporting documents were not produced. The opinion observed that this decision does not establish an absolute rule that a Magistrate may never accept a defence on inquiry materials; instead it shows the Magistrate must investigate when necessary and cannot accept an unsubstantiated claim without legal evidence.
Tulsidas Amanmal Karani v. S.F. Billimoria Addressed the question whether a member of the Bar had absolute privilege (contextually different from the self-defence issue). The Court stated this decision has little bearing on the issue in the present case and does not establish the absolute proposition relied on by the respondent.
Gulab Khan, through Karam Khan v. Gulam Muhammad Khan and Others (Lahore High Court) In a factually similar case the Lahore High Court endorsed a Magistrate's exercise of s. 202 powers where the Magistrate found the complainant's evidence wholly unworthy of credence and therefore took no further action. The Supreme Court cited this decision to show precedent for a Magistrate exercising s. 202 CrPC powers to ascertain whether there is sufficient foundation for issuing process and dismissing where the evidence in support of the complaint is not credible.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the statutory scheme of ss. 200, 202 and 203 CrPC and analysed their aims and interplay:

  • S. 200 prescribes the procedure when a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence on complaint (examination of complainant and witnesses, etc.).
  • S. 202 permits the Magistrate, for reasons to be recorded, to postpone issuing process and to inquire or direct an inquiry for the limited purpose of ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint — i.e., whether there is evidence supporting the complaint to justify issuing process. The inquiry's scope is not a trial on the merits.
  • S. 203 directs that after considering the statement on oath (if any) and the result of any investigation under s. 202, if in the Magistrate's judgment there is no sufficient ground for proceeding, he may dismiss the complaint, recording brief reasons.

From these provisions the Court concluded that the Magistrate's judgment under s. 203 must be based on the complainant's statements and witnesses and the result of the inquiry. The Court rejected the High Court's conclusion that, as a matter of law, a Magistrate may not accept a defence based on an exception (such as private defence) at the s. 203 stage merely because s. 105 Indian Evidence Act sets a burden of proof for exceptions.

The Court reasoned that nothing in ss. 202–203 precludes the Magistrate from applying his judicial mind to the materials before him and, where satisfactory and reliable materials (including inquiry reports and witness statements) support a plea of exception, from accepting that plea and dismissing the complaint. The Magistrate is not bound to accept the inquiring officer's conclusion, but may accept or reject the plea after judicial consideration of all materials. The Court emphasized that no universal rule can be laid down; whether a plea of exception falsifies the complainant's case depends on the facts of each case.

On the facts of this case the Court found that the learned Presidency Magistrate had fairly and impartially considered the materials (including police reports and witness statements), that there was material showing a riotous mob surrounding the car, and that witnesses for the complainant were found not to be credible. The Court agreed with the Magistrate's view that there was no sufficient ground for proceeding.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order dated September 13, 1957, and restored the Presidency Magistrate's order dated April 30, 1957 dismissing the complaint under s. 203 CrPC.

Implications

  • Direct effect on the parties: The dismissal of the complaint was restored, meaning there will be no process issued against the appellant on this complaint as a consequence of the Supreme Court's decision in this case.
  • Legal implication as articulated by the Court: A Magistrate exercising powers under ss. 200, 202 and 203 CrPC must apply his judicial mind to the materials before him and may, where satisfactory and reliable materials support a defence based on an exception (such as private defence), accept that defence at the pre-process stage and dismiss the complaint. There is no absolute rule that a Magistrate must always issue process whenever an exception is pleaded; factual sufficiency and credibility of materials govern the decision.

    Vadilal Panchal v. Dattatraya Dulaji Ghadigaonkar And Another.

    S.K Das, J. This is an unfortunate case in which a complaint filed in the Court of the Presidency Magistrate, Bombay on October 31, 1956, by one Dattatraya Dulaji Ghadigaonkar, respondent herein, has to be finally disposed of in the year 1960 in circumstances which we shall state at once. On June 3, 1956, in the evening, a public meeting was held at a place called Chowpatty in Bombay which was to be addressed by the Prime Minister of India. The meeting was called in connexion with an agitation which was then going on for the reorganisation of the State of Bombay. There was considerable disturbance at the meeting as a result whereof it had to be dispersed, and large crowds of people began to wander about in various localities around Chowpatty including an area round Charni Road Station. The case of the complaining respondent was that at about 8 p.m his younger brother Sitaram was crossing Queen's Road near a building called Laud Mansion. At that time there was a large crowd on the road and members of that crowd were stopping vehicles passing by that road. One taxi cab which had come from the direction of the Opera House and was going towards Churchgate was already stopped. Sitaram was then accompanied by Sashikant Kamtekar and Nand Kumar Vagal. When these three had crossed the road, they heard the reports of revolver shots and on looking back they found that a person called Bhayya was injured by one of the shots and fell down on the footpath. Sitaram and his friends went to help Bhayya; at this stage, another shot was fired by one of the occupants of a blue car which was near the taxi cab referred to earlier. Sitaram was hit on his chest, and the bullet having entered the chest cavity injured the right ventricle of the heart. Sitaram was removed to the G.T Hospital but died before medical assistance could be given Dr. H.S Mehta, Police Surgeon who made a post-mortem examination of the dead body, opined that Sitaram died of shock and haemorrhage as a result of the gun shot wound he had received. The doctor further said that the charring round the wound indicated that the shot had been fired from a distance of 2 to 18 inches only.

    The case of the respondent was that Vadilal Panchai, appellant before us, fired the shot from the blue car. The occupants of the car were K.K Shah, advocate, his son Vinay, and one Ratilal Sanghvi on the back seat, and the appellant and chauffeur Mohiddin on the front seat. K.K Shah was mentioned in the complaint as one of the complainant's witnesses. He was examined and said that after the meeting was over, he and his companions were returning in his car to his house. Because of the trouble, the car travelled by a longer route and when it reached Queen's Road, there were large crowds on that road who were pelting stones shouting slogans and committing other acts of violence: a public bus was burnt, and a taxi cab which was proceeding ahead of K.K Shah's car was stopped. Some three or four hundred people surrounded his car, pelted stones and shouted “maro, maro”. Some of them attempted to drag out Ratilal Sanghvi who occupied a corner seat; some caught hold of the appellant by his neck and hair and wanted to drag him out of the car. The appellant then opened fire with his revolver. The rioters then held back, and the way was clear for the car to pass. The car then drove away and after some time K.K Shah and the appellant went to Gamdevi Police Station where the latter made a report of what had happened. The appellant was sent to Nair Hospital where he was medically treated and allowed to go.

    The Coroner of Bombay held an inquest into the death of Sitaram at which K.K Shah, Shashikant Kamtekar and several other witnesses were examined. The Coroner's Jury returned a verdict that Sitaram died of the gunshot wound caused by a bullet fired by the appellant “under such circumstances as would render the firing to be in exercise of the right of private defence and as such justified”. This verdict was returned on October 16, 1956. Sometime earlier, on July 3, 1956, to be precise, the complaining respondent had made an enquiry through his advocate from the Commissioner of Police, Bombay as to whether the appellant had been arrested: the reply received was that the enquiries made by the police did not reveal any offence having been committed by the appellant and the police proposed to take no action.

    On October 31, 1956, the respondent filed his complaint. The learned Presidency Magistrate to whom the complaint was made referred it to the Superintendent of Police, C.I.D, for enquiry and report. Presumably, he acted under s. 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On November 15, 1956, the Superintendent of Police submitted the report of his Inspector in which it was stated:

    “From the exhaustive enquiries made immediately after the incident it was disclosed that Shri Vadilal Panchal was justified in resorting to firearms in self-defence of himself and other occupants of the motor car.”

    On January 17, 1957, the learned Magistrate gave the respondent another opportunity to examine his witnesses before the enquiring officer, because by reason of a revision application made to the High Court earlier against the order referring the case to the police for enquiry, the respondent did not produce his witnesses before the enquiring officer. The enquiring officer then examined all the witnesses and submitted his report on March 12, 1957. This time also the enquiring officer said:

    “From their statements and other evidence on record, it is clear that Shri Wadilal Panchal opened fire in the exercise of his right of private defence, which verdict the learned Coroner's Jury also brought after a protracted hearing of the Inquest Proceedings. Copies of all statements recorded by me, are attached for reference.”

    On April 30, 1957, the learned Presidency Magistrate considered the report of the enquiring officer in great detail with reference to the statements of all the witnesses and said:

    “The Police have recorded in detail the statements of all witnesses produced by the complainant as well as of all the occupants of the car. There is, therefore, material on record showing fully whether the circumstances existed making out the right of private defence available to the accused. The fact whether the case falls within one of exceptions or not can be established on the evidence of the witnesses produced by the prosecution itself though of course the burden of proof lies on the accused. From the statements, recorded by the Police in this case and from the surrounding circumstances of the case, I have come to the definite conclusion that the report of the police stating that the shot was fired by the accused in self-defence is true. As I have stated the statement of the police surgeon conclusively supports the conclusion. I have come to the conclusion that the statements of the four eye witnesses brought by the complainant are false. These eye witnesses are not credible witnesses. It will be harassment to the accused and waste of public time if any process is issued in this case.”

    Accordingly, he dismissed the complaint under s. 203, Criminal Procedure Code.

    Against this order of dismissal the respondent complainant moved the High Court. The High Court set aside the order of dismissal and directed the learned Presidency Magistrate to issue process against the appellant and deal with the case in accordance with law, on a ground which the High Court expressed in the following words:

    “Now, in the case before us, causing of the death of Sitaram being indisputable, if it was found as the petitioner alleges that it was the shot fired by the respondent that caused the death of Sitaram, the accused would have to establish the necessary ingredients of the right of private defence as laid down in s. 96 and onwards of the Penal Code. We do not find anything in any of the sections in Chapter XVI to show that such an exception can be held to be established from the mere report of the police. That, in our view, is contrary to the provisions of s. 105 of the Indian Evidence Act which are mandatory provisions. There is nothing in s. 202 or s. 203 of the Criminal Procedure Code which abrogates the rule as to the presumption laid down in s. 105 of the Evidence Act and the mode of proof of exception laid down in imperative language in that section.

    In these circumstances and for the reasons aforesaid, we find that this was not a case in which it was proper for the learned Magistrate to dismiss the complaint under s. 203, there being no evidence before the learned Magistrate as and by way of proof to establish the exception of the right of private defence pleaded by the respondent.”

    The appellant then moved this Court and obtained special leave to appeal from the order of the High Court dated September 13, 1957.

    The short question before us is was the High Court right in its view that when a Magistrate directs an enquiry under s. 202 Criminal Procedure Code for ascertaining the truth or falsehood of a complaint and receives a report from the enquiring officer supporting a plea of self-defence made by the person complained against, it is not open to him to hold that the plea is correct on the basis of the report and the statements of witnesses recorded by the enquiring officer? Must he, as a matter of law, issue process in such a case and leave the person complained against to establish his plea of self-defence at the trial? It may be pointed out here that the High Court itself recognised that it would not be correct to lay down a proposition in absolute terms that whenever a defence under any of the exceptions in the Indian Penal Code is pleaded by the person complained against, the Magistrate would not be justified in dismissing the complaint and must issue process. Said the High Court: “As we have already observed, if there is a complaint, which itself discloses a complete defence under any of the exceptions, it might be a case where a Magistrate would be justified in dismissing such a complaint finding that there was no sufficient ground to proceed with the case.”

    We are of the view that the High Court was in error in holding in this case that as a matter of law, it was not open to the learned Presidency Magistrate to come to the conclusion that on the materials before him no offence had been made out and there was no sufficient ground for proceeding further on the complaint.

    The relevant sections bearing on the question are ss. 200, 202 and 203.

    “S. 200. A Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on complaint shall at once examine the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, upon oath and the substance of the examination shall be reduced to writing and shall be signed by the complainant and the witnesses, and also by the Magistrate:

    Provided as follows: —

    (a) . . . . . . . ..

    (aa) . . . . . . . .

    (b) where the Magistrate is a Presidency Magistrate, such examination may be on oath or not as the Magistrate in each case thinks fit, and where the complaint is made in writing need not be reduced to writing, but the Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, before the matter of the complaint is brought before him, require it to be reduced to writing;

    (c) . . . . . . . . .

    S. 202 (1). Any Magistrate, on receipt of a complaint of an offence which he is authorised to take cognizance, or which has been transferred to him under s. 192, may if he thinks fit, for reasons to be recorded in writing, postpone the issue of process for compelling the attendance of the person complained against, and either inquire into the case himself or, if he is a Magistrate other than a Magistrate of the third class, direct an inquiry or investigation to be made by any Magistrate subordinate to him, or by a police-officer, or by such other person as he thinks fit, for the purpose of ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint:

    Provided that . . . . . . (it is unnecessary to read the proviso).

    (2) If any inquiry or investigation under this section is made by a person not being a Magistrate or a police officer, such person shall exercise all the powers conferred by this Code on an officer in charge of a police station, except that he shall not have power to arrest without warrant.

    (2A) Any Magistrate inquiring into a case under this section may, if he thinks fit, take evidence of witnesses on oath.

    (3) This section applies also to the police in the towns of Calcutta and Bombay.

    S. 203. The Magistrate before whom a complaint is made or to whom it has been transferred, may dismiss the complaint, if, after considering the statement on oath (if any) of the complainant and the witnesses and the result of the investigation or inquiry (if any) under s. 202, there is in his judgment no sufficient ground for proceeding. In such case he shall briefly record his reasons for so doing.”

    The general scheme of the aforesaid sections is quite clear. S. 200 says inter alia what a Magistrate taking cognisance of an offence on complaint shall do on receipt of such a complaint. S. 202 says that the Magistrate may, if he thinks fit for reasons to be recorded in writing, postpone the issue of process for compelling the attendance of the person complained against and direct an inquiry for the purpose of ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint; in other words, the scope of an inquiry under the section is limited to finding out the truth or falsehood of the complaint in order to determine the question of the issue of process. The inquiry is for the purpose of ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the complaint; that is, for ascertaining whether there is evidence in support of the complaint so as to justify the issue of process and commencement of proceedings against the person concerned. The section does not say that a regular trial for adjudging the guilt or otherwise of the person complained against should take place at that stage; for the person complained against can be legally called upon to answer the accusation made against him only when a process has issued and he is put on trial. S. 203, be it noted, consists of two parts: the first part indicates what are the materials which the Magistrate must consider, and the second part says that if after considering those materials there is in his judgment no sufficient ground for proceeding, he may dismiss the complaint. S. 204 says that if in the opinion of the Magistrate there is sufficient ground for proceeding, he shall take steps for the issue of necessary process.

    Now, in the case before us it is not contended that the learned Presidency Magistrate failed to consider the materials which he had to consider, before passing his order under s. 203 Criminal Procedure Code. As a matter of fact the learned Magistrate fully, fairly and impartially considered these materials. What is contended on behalf of the respondent-complainant is that as a matter of law it was not open to the learned Magistrate to accept the plea of right of self-defence at a stage when all that he had to determine was whether a process should issue or not against the appellant. We are unable to accept this contention as correct. It is manifestly clear from the provisions of s. 203 that the judgment which the Magistrate has to form must be based on the statements of the complainant and his witnesses and the result of the investigation or inquiry. The section itself makes that clear, and it is not necessary to refer to authorities in support thereof. But the judgment which the Magistrate has to form is whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. This does not mean that the Magistrate is bound to accept the result of the inquiry or investigation or that he must accept any plea that is set up on behalf of the person complained against. The Magistrate must apply his judicial mind to the materials on which he has to form his judgment. In arriving at his judgment he is not fettered in any way except by judicial considerations; he is not bound to accept what the inquiring officer says, nor is he precluded from accepting a plea based on an exception, provided always there are satisfactory and reliable materials on which he can base his judgment as to whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding on the complaint or not. If the Magistrate has not misdirected himself as to the scope of an enquiry under s. 202 and has applied his mind judicially to the materials before him, we think that it would be erroneous in law to hold that a plea based on an exception can never be accepted by him in arriving at his judgment. What bearing such a plea has on the case of the complainant and his witnesses, to what extent they are falsified by the evidence of other witnesses — all these are questions which must be answered with reference to the facts of each case. No universal rule can be laid in respect of such questions.

    In support of its view the High Court has relied on some of its earlier decisions: Emperor v. Dhondu Bapu Gujar(1), Emperor v. J.A Finan(2) and Tulsidas Amanmal Karani… v. S.F Billimoria…Opponent.(3). We do not think that any of the aforesaid decisions lays down any such proposition in absolute terms as is contended for on behalf of the respondent. In Emperor v. Dhondu Bapu Gajar (supra) a complaint charging defamation was dismissed by the Magistrate under S. 203 without taking any evidence, on the ground that the accused was protected by S. 499, exception 8. It was held that the order of dismissal was bad. Patkar, J. significantly observed:

    “If the Magistrate in this case had taken evidence on behalf of the prosecution and on behalf of the accused, and passed a proper order for discharge, the order of the District Magistrate ordering a further enquiry without giving reasons might have stood on a different footing. We do not think that, under the circumstances of this case, there are adequate grounds for interfering with the order of the District Magistrate.”

    In Emperor v. J.A Finan (supra) the accused did not dispute the correctness of the statements made by the complainant, but in justification pleaded the order pissed by his superior officer and claimed protection under ss. 76 and 79 of the Indian Penal Code. It is worthy of note that the order of the superior officer was not produced, but that officer very improperly wrote a letter to the magistrate saying that he had given such an order. In these circumstances, the same learned Judge who decided the earlier case observed:

    “It was, therefore, incumbent on the Magistrate to investigate the complaint and to find out whether the allegation of the accused that he was protected by ss. 76 and 79 of the Indian Penal Code was made out by legal evidence before him.”

    The facts in Tulsidas Amanmal Karani… v. S.F Billimoria…Opponent. (supra) were different, and the question there considered was whether a member of the Bar in India had absolute privilege. That decision has very little bearing on the question now before us.

    Our attention has also been drawn to a decision of the Lahore High Court where the facts were somewhat similar: Gulab Khan, deceased through Karam Khan v. Gulam Muhammad Khan and Others(4). In that case also the person complained against took the plea of self-defence, which was accepted. In the High Court an objection was taken to the procedure adopted and it was argued that the order of discharge should be set aside. In dealing with that argument Broadway, J. said:

    “Now a Magistrate is empowered to hold an enquiry into a complaint of an offence in order to ascertain whether there is sufficient foundation for it to issue process against the person or persons complained against. In the present case the Magistrate clearly acted in the exercise of these powers under s. 202, Criminal Procedure Code. He allowed the complainant to produce such evidence in support of his complaint as he wished to produce, and after a consideration of that evidence came to the conclusion that that evidence was so wholly worthy of credence as to warrant his taking no further action in the matter.”

    Therefore, none of the aforesaid decisions lay down as an absolute proposition that a plea of self-defence can in no event be considered by the Magistrate in dealing with a complaint under the provisions of ss. 200, 202 and 203, Criminal Procedure Code.

    On the facts, there is very little to be said. Learned Counsel for the State of Bombay supported the order of the learned Magistrate and pointed out that even on the narrow view taken by the High Court, a view to which he did not, however, subscribe, the learned Magistrate rightly held that there was no sufficient ground for proceeding; because the earlier version of some of the witnesses for the complainant itself showed that there was a riotous mob on the road which attacked cars, burnt a public bus, pelted stones etc. which was quite inconsistent with their later version that Sitaram and his companions were quietly crossing the road and a shot was fired from a passing or moving car. There was overwhelming material to show that K.K Shah's car was surrounded by the mob and some of the rioters tried to drag out and attack the appellant. K.K Shah was one of the witnesses mentioned by the complainant and so also two of the Inspectors of Police. Their evidence clearly supported the plea of the appellant and in any case, showed that the witnesses examined on behalf of the respondent were totally unworthy of credence as to the circumstances in which the shots were fired. We cannot therefore say that the learned Magistrate was wrong in his judgment that there was no sufficient ground for proceeding further on the complaint.

    We accordingly hold that the High Court set aside the order of the learned Magistrate on an erroneous view of the scope of S. 203, Criminal Procedure Code. We allow the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court dated September 13, 1957, and restore that of the learned Presidency Magistrate dated April 30, 1957.

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    Comments

    Vadilal Panchal v. Dattatraya Dulaji Ghadigaonkar And Another.
    (May 6, 1960)