Somnath Iyer, J.:— This revision petition involves the interpretation of section 4(iv)A of the Mysore Court Fees Act, 1900.
The material facts are these: The respondent in this revision petition who was the plaintiff in the court of the Subordinate Judge, Mysore, sued for the cancellation of a deed of settlement executed by him and for partition and delivery of possession to him of his share in the properties described in the schedule to the plaint. He valued the relief for cancellation at Rs. 3,900 which was the value specified in the deed of settlement, of the properties covered by that document. Defendants 1 and 2 who are the petitioners in this revision petition and who are the sons of the plaintiff raised an objection that the relief for cancellation had not been property valued since the market value of the properties in respect of which the deed of settlement had been executed exceeded Rs. 12,000. They therefore contended that the suit was beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Subordinate Judge. This contention was accepted by the Subordinate Judge who directed the return of the plant to the plaintiff for presentation to the proper Court. But in the appeal preferred by the plaintiff to the District Judge that order made by the Subordinate Judge was set aside and the Subordinate Judge was directed to entertain the suit and dispose of it on its merits. The District Judge who made this order came to the conclusion that the suit had been properly valued by the plaintiff and that the court fee paid by him was sufficient.
In this revision petition, defendants 1 and 2 contend that the view taken by the District Judge that the value of the subject matter of the suit in so far as it related to the prayer for the cancellation of the settlement deed, was not the market value of the properties settled, but was only the value of those properties specified in the deed of settlement and that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to pay the Court Fee on the market value of these properties, is opposed to the plain language of section 4(iv)A of the Court Fees Act. It is the validity of this contention which has to be decided in this revision petition.
section 4(iv)A of the Court Fees Act on which the defendants rely reads:—
“In a suit for cancellation of a decree for money or other property having a money value, or other document securing money or other property having such value, according to the value of the subject matter of the suit, and such value shall be deemed to be—
the whole decree or other document is sought to be cancelled the amount or the value of the property for which the decree was passed or the other document executed.
If a part of the decree or other document is sought to be cancelled, such part of the amount or value of the property:”
It is clear from the provisions of this clause of section 4 of the Court fees Act that it prescribes the court fee payable in respect of two categories of suits. What it first does is to require the payment of court fee in a suit brought for the cancellation of a decree on the amount specified in the decree if the decree is for money, and on the value of the property for which the decree has been passed, if the decree sought to be cancelled is a decree for property. It next provides that if the suit is brought for the cancellation of a document, the court fee is payable on the value of the property to which the document relates. If the document is for the payment of money, court fee payable is on that amount Paragraphs 2 and 3 of this clause prescribe the court fee payable respectively in cases in which the entire decree or document is sought to be cancelled and in suits in which the cancellation sought is a part of the decree or a part of the document. Since the suit out of which this revision petition arises was not a suit brought for the cancellation of a decree but one brought for cancellation of a document, the question is whether the Court fee payable in that suit is on the value of property in respect of which the deed of settlement is executed, specified in the deed of settlement, or on the market value of that property.
Now it is clear from the second paragraph of section 4(iv)A that where a suit is brought for the cancellation of a document securing property, the Court fee payable is on the value of that property. That, that is the requirement of that clause is not seriously disputed by Mr. Gopivallabha Iyengar who however contends that value is not the market value of the property as assumed by the Subordinate Judge, but the value stated in the document.
Mr. Gopivallabha Iyengar attempted to support his contention on the basis of the words “such value shall be deemed to be” occurring towards the end of the first paragraph in section 4(iv)A. His contention was that those words made it clear that the value of the property on which court fee is payable is not the real or actual value of the property but some value other than the real value of the property which, in the cause before us, according to him, is the value stated in the document.
Now, one thing which is very clear from the paragraphs 1 and 2 of section 4(iv)A is that in a suit brought for the cancellation of a document executed for the purpose of securing property, the court fee payable is on the value of such property. Although those paragraphs do not refer in terms to the market value of the property, as some of the other parts of the Act do, I have no doubt in my mind that the word “value” occurring in those paragraphs has reference to no other value than the market value. The word “value” when it occurs in an enactment like the Court Fees Act, has to my mind, particularly known and definite meaning. That word has reference to the price which the property will fetch when exposed to the test of competition.
Mr. Gopivallabha Iyengar had to admit that the word “value” occurring in the first paragraph would have to be understood as the market value if paragraphs 2 and 3 did not exist in section 4(iv)A. If, therefore, the word “value” occurring in the first paragraph means market value, I see nothing in paragraphs 2 and 3 on which Mr. Gopivallabha Iyengar strongly relied which can persuade me to take the view that the word “value” occurring in the first paragraph which, as ordinarily understood, is the market value, should be understood differently.
Paragraph 2 does no more than to merely provide that, if a document is sought to be cancelled in its entirely, the court fee is payable on the value of the whole of the property in respect of which the document is executed. Likewise paragraph 3 merely provides that where the cancellation sought is a partial cancellation, court fee is payable only on the value of the property in respect of which cancellation is sought. It is for that purpose that the words “value shall be deemed to be” are used by the Legislature in the first paragraph of the clause and not for the purpose of assigning to the word ‘value’ occurring in the first paragraph, a meaning different from that which has to be ordinarily given to it.
It is, no doubt true that the second paragraph of section 4(iv)A directs that the Court fee payable in a suit brought for the cancellation of a document is the court fee on the value of the property ‘for which’ the document was executed. Ordinarily the expression ‘for which’ occurring in that paragraph might have justified the interpretation that the amount on which the court fee has to be paid is the amount specified in the document. But, that, that would not be correct way of understanding those words occurring in paragraph 2 of that clause is clear from the fact that Section 4(iv)A does not provide merely for cancellation of a document executed for a specified consideration such as a sale deed, but also provides for the payment of court fee even in suits brought for cancellation of other documents such as a deed of settlement, a gift deed or a trust deed. In the latter category of cases it would not be appropriate to regard those documents as executed for a consideration or a specified amount and those cases would not be appropriate to regard those documents as executed for the document is executed.
The second paragraph which requires the payment of court fee on the value of the property ‘for which’ the document was executed, does not, when properly understood, direct the payment of such court fee on the value for which the document was executed, but on the value of the property for which it was executed. In other words, the words ‘for which’ occurring in that paragraph do not refer to the value but to the property to which the document relates. The words “for which” occurring in that paragraph, in my opinion, mean “for securing which”, so that what that paragraph directs is the payment of court fee on the value of the property for securing which the document is executed.
That, that is the correct interpretation is indicated by the word “securing” occurring in the first paragraph of the clause in the context of a document of which cancellation is sought.
It therefore follows that what is relevant for the purpose of section 4(iv)A is not the value of the property specified in the document but its real and actual value when the suit is brought. It is on that value that the court fee has to be paid if the suit is for the cancellation of a document recording a transaction involving such property.
Mr. Gopivallabha Iyengar strongly depended in support of his contention to the contrary on section 27 of the Stamp Act which requires a person presenting the document for registration to make a full disclosure of the particulars referred to in that section including, in cases where it is necessary to do so, a true statement of the value of the property to which the document relates. Mr. Iyengar further pointed out that the 56th article of Schedule I to the Stamp Act also makes it clear that the duty with which a settlement deed is chargeable has to be computed on the value of the property involved in the deed of settlement.
But these provisions in the Stamp Act far from supporting Mr. Iyengar's contention, to my mind, are destructive of the argument presented. If the expression ‘value’ occurring in the 56th article of Schedule I to the Stamp Act means the market value, as Mr. Iyengar had to admit, there is no reason why the word “value” occurring in section 4(iv)A of the Court Fees Act should be given a different meaning.
I am not also impressed by the argument that there is anything in section 27 of the Stamp Act which can assist the argument that the value of a property stated in a document before it is presented for registration has to be accepted as its real value when the question arises before a civil Court as to its value. There is also nothing in section 64 of the Stamp Act to which Mr. Iyengar next, referred which can support his argument to the contrary. Under the provisions of that section, a person making a misstatement in contravention of section 27 is liable to be proceeded against in respect of such misstatements. If a person who succeeds in getting an instrument registered by making a false statement of its value can be proceeded against in that way, it is not easy to understand why, if he brings a suit for the cancellation of that document and the defendant questions the correctness of the value stated in it, the Court should not have the power to make a similar investigation into the question whether the value stated in the instrument is or is not the correct value.
In the view that I take, it was necessary for the plaintiff in this case to pay Court fee on the market value of the property settled by the document the cancellation of which was sought by him. I should mention that the conclusion reached by me that the value of the property referred to in section 4(iv)A of the Mysore Court Fees Act, 1900 is its market value, receives support from the pronouncement of their Lordships of the High Court of Madras in Kolachala Kutumba Sastri v. Lakkaraju Bala Tripura Sundaramma(1) a full Bench decision of that Court, in which section 7(iv)A of the Madras Court Fees Act, the language of which is similar to that of Section 4(iv) A of the Mysore Court Fees Act, 1900, arose for interpretation. Their Lordships pointed out that in a suit for cancellation of a deed of conveyance and for possession of the property covered by the deed, the plaintiff should value his relief in accordance with the provisions of section 7(iv)(A) and not according to section 7(v) of (the Madras Court Fees Act, which corresponds respectively to Sections 4(iv)A and Section 4(v) of the Mysore Court Fees Act, 1900. Their Lordships further pointed out that, to give the wording of paragraph (iv-A) of section 7 of the Madras Court Fees Act, its plain meaning, the valuation must be the valuation based on the market value of the property at the date of the plaint. With this view I respectfully agree.
Before concluding, it would be necessary to refer to a Full Bench decision of the former High Court of Mysore in Re: Bale Chikka Yadoora Setty(2) to which a reference was made during the course of the argument. That decision in my opinion, does not lay down a rule different from that enunciated by their Lordships of the High Court of Madras in the Full Bench decision to which I have already referred. The only question which was decided by their Lordships of the former High Court of Mysore was, whether in a suit brought for the cancellation of a document and for possession or other relief consequential on the cancellation, it was necessary for the plaintiff to pay court fee not only on the relief of cancellation but also on the ancillary relief which flowed inevitably from the cancellation, and their Lordships came to the conclusion that it was not necessary for him to do so. The question as to whether in a suit for cancellation of a document, the court fee payable by the plaintiff is the court fee on the value of the property stated in the document sought to be cancelled or on its market value did not arise for consideration and was not decided.
In the view that I take, this revision petition must succeed. It is accordingly allowed. The order of the appellate Court is set aside and that of the Court of first instance is restored.
In my opinion there should be no order as to costs.
Sadasivayya, J.
Section 4(iv)(A) of the, Mysore Court Fees Aqt, 1900 runs as follows:—
“In a suit for cancellation of a decree for money or other property having a money value, or other document securing money or other property having such value, according to the value of the subject—matter of the suit, and such value shall be deemed to be—
if the whole decree or other document is sought to be cancelled, the amount or the value of the property for which the decree was passed or the other document executed,
if a part of the decree or other document is sought to be cancelled, such part of the amount or value of the property;”
For the purposes of the present case, we are not concerned with the last para of Section 4iv(A). The short point for decision before us is as to whether the expression “value of the property” in the second para above referred to, should be understood as the market value of the property or as to whether it should be understood as the value of the property as mentioned in the document the cancellation of which has been sought for in the suit. It is no doubt true that in the Full Bench decision of the former High Court of Mysore reported in 5 Mysore Law Journal page 293 Bale Chicka Yadoora Setty v. Sri Chicka Veeradesikendraswami Galu) there is an observation which, to some extent, lends support to the contention that Court fee should be computed ad valorem on the amount for which the document has been executed. The following sentence appears in the said judgment, towards the end of the judgment:
“Our answer therefore to the reference is that the latter part of the decision in Bangara Setti v. Bhagyalakshamma is not correct, and that in cases of the nature of the two before us the primary relief and the one on which court fee should be alone computed is the cancellation of the document and under Section 4, Clause IVA the fee will be computed ad valorem on the amount for which the document has been executed.”
The underlined portion in the above sentence in that judgment does give the impression that the fee should be computed ad valorem on the amount for which the document has been executed. But, as pointed out in the judgment of my learned brother, the question as to whether Court fee had to be computed on the market value of the property or whether it had to be computed on the value specified in the document, was not specifically for decision before the learned Judge in that Full Bench case. As indicated in the order of reference, at Page 296, the question which gave occasion for that reference was whether court fee had to be paid both for cancellation of the deed of gift and also for possession. It was only in the course of answering the questions referred for decision, that the Full Bench observed that the court fee had to be computed on the amount for which the document was executed. Under these circumstances, I agree with my learned brother that the said Full Bench decision cannot be understood as deciding that court fee had to be paid in cases like this, on the amount specified in the document. In the course of his arguments, Sri Gopivallabha Iyengar also brought to our notice the fact that in Section 4iv(B), it is specifically stated that where the subject-matter is a house or garden, court fee has to be paid on the ‘market value’ of the house or garden. His contention is that when, in the second para of Section 4iv(A) the expression “market value” has not been used, the words “value of the property” need not necessarily be understood to be the market value of the property. But, as against this argument, the fact remains that in the second para of Section 4iv(A), it has not been expressly stated that court fee should be paid on the value specified in the document, the cancellation of which is sought. In this connection, it may be noticed that in Section 4 x, it is expressly stated that court fee should be paid: in suits for specific performance of a contract of sale, according to the amount of the consideration and that in suits for specific performance of a contract of mortgage, according to the amount agreed to be secured. If the intention was that court fee had to be computed on the amount specified in the document (the cancellation of which is sought), then, it would not be unreasonable to presume that the Legislature would have clearly stated so. In these circumstances, I agree with the view that the expression “Value of the property” in the second para of section 4iv(A), must be understood as the market value of that property. Therefore, court fee should be computed on the market value of such property.