George Vadakkel, J.:— In accordance with the principles governing recruitment of Block Development Officers (shortly B.D.Os) as laid down by the 1st respondent in consultation with the Kerala Public Service Commission as per Ext. R1 G.O dated 26.7.1962, petitioner was selected and appointed as B.D.O on 21-11-1964. Some B.D.Os including the petitioner were reverted to their parent de partments in April and July 1966 and January 1967, of these reverted a few filed O.P Nos. 1601 etc. of 1966. These petitions were dismissed by Mathew J. by a common judgment dated 23-6-1966. By Ext. P. 1 G.O dated 1-8-1967 all those who had joined the parent departments pursuant to revesion were ‘re-entertained’ and those who continued as B.D.Os On the strength of interim order passed in the writ petitions were allowed to continue as B.D.Os Petitioner is one of the those who were ‘re-entertained’. Ext. P2 dated 3-8-1967 is the posting order consequent upon Ext. P1 G.G About 7 years thereafter, on 3-4-1974 he was again reverted and this information was conveyed to the petitioner through Ext. P4 telex message. This reversion order is impugned by the petitioner as punitive in character.
2. The point for decision is whether petitioner's reversion is by way of punishment, or a termination simpliciter of his deputation on account of his unsatisfactory performance of his work in accordance with Ext. R1 principles as contended for an behalf of the respondents. Incidentally, the learned Government Pleader argued that as held by this Court in Abdu Salam v. State of Kerala (1) cancellation of deputation would at the most amount only to a breach of contractual term, and that therefore, the same is not amenable to writ jurisdiction. The question raised herein, viz. whether termination of deputation was penal in nature does not seem to have been raised therein, presumably because that question did not arise on the facts of that case. And in view of what this Court held in respect of reversion of B.D.Os earlier in the batch of case, O.P Nos. 1601 etc. of 1966, I do not think that the above contention merits any further examination. It was said in those cases:—
“As regards the first point, the question for consideration is whether these orders are passed by way of punishment. If they are simple and straightforward orders of discharge then no question of the applicability of Art. 311 arises. But if, on the other hand, they are orders dismissing the petitioners from the posts of Block Development Officers on the ground that they are unfit for the work, then there is a punitive element in the orders and the orders could not have been passed without giving them an opportunity for showing cause against the proposals to passed the orders.”
3. And again lower down in the judgment discussing the scope of Cl. 8 in Ext. R1 it was pointed out by the learned Judge:—
“I think, the clause only embodies the undoubted right of a master to terminate the services of a servant in the event his work proves to be unsatisfactory to the master. There is nothing penal about it. If services of the petitioners as Block Development Officers are terminated under it, it is a case of termination in prusuance to an express term of employment. No doubt, the circumstances of the termination may be such as to show that the termination was not in pursuance to the power conferred by the clause, but with an idea to punish. To such a case Art. 311 may be applicable.”
4. The decision of the Supreme Court in Debesh Chandra v. Union of India (2) also supports the view that the termination of a tenure post could amount to reduction in sank and could be penal in character so as to attract Article 311. The next question for consideration is whether the reversion of the petitioner was an accordance with Ext. R1 principles. The relevant principle is that contained in clause 8 which reads:—
“Persons selected for the post of Block Development Officers in prusuance of the principles and laid down above will be considered as on deputation to the Development Department for a period of five years, the Development Commissioner having the right to revert any of them to his parent Department if his work proves unsatisfactory, and to extend the period of deputation beyond five years in exceptional cases.”
5. In the earlier batch of cases accepting the sworn statements of Commissioner for Agricultural Production and Rural Development (formerly designated Development Commissioner) as also of the Asst. Secretary to government Agricultural and Rural Department, to the effect that the former having assessed about the work of the concerned B.D.Os On the basis of relevant materials and his own personal knowledge was satisfied that the work of the B.D.Os reverted was not satisfactory and that the reversion was on that account. Mathew J. held that the reversion was in terms of Clause 8. It was pointed out that ‘the Development Commissioner must make an honest appraisal of the work’ of the B.D.Os The Development Commissioner has not sworn an affidavit in this case, and the counter-affidavit sworn on behalf of the 1st respondent by a Section Officer of the Development (D) Department does not anywhere state that the Development Commissioner made any honest appraisal of the petitioner's work and that on such appraisal his work was found to be unsatisfactory. Under clause 8 relied on by the learned Government Pleader the Development Commissioner, no doubt, has the right to revert a B.D.O to his parent department, but only ‘if his work proves unsatisfactory’ which as earlier construed by this Court, means ‘that the Development Commissioner must make an honest appraisal of the petitioners' work, and come to a conclusion whether the work is satisfactory or not’. The impugned reversion is not established to be in accordance with Cl. 8 in Ext. R1.
6. Now it remains to be considered as to whether the reversion was punitive. ‘The onus to prove that such was the intention of the authority terminating the employment must lie upon the employee concerned.’ Union Territory of Tripura Agartala v. Gopal Chander Dutta Chaudhury (3). It is well nigh impossible in many cases to draw a line and say that a case falls within one or the other of the two groups of cases viz. cases where the impugned action is founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or any other disqualification and cases where the impugned action though motivated by all or any one of those factors is really founded on an assessment made ‘for the purpose of deciding whether the power under the contract or the relevant rule should be exercised’. But I think that once it is found that the impugned action is not based on an assessment made by the authority competent to assess the Governments Servants' work for the purpose of deciding whether in terms of the contract or under the relevant rule the action in question should be taken, that fact will go a long way to establish that it was taken by way of punishment.
7. In State of Bihar v. Gopi Kishore (4) it was said:—
“(6) It would thus appear that in the instant case, though the respondent was only a probationer, he was discharged from service really because the Government had, on enquiry, come to the conclusion, rightly or wrongly, that he was unsuitable for the post he held on probation. This was clearly by way of punishment and, therefore, he was entitled to the protection of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution. It was argued on behalf of the appellant that the respondent, being a mere probationer, could be discharged without any enquiry into his conduct being made and his discharge could not mean any punishment to him, because he had no right to a post. It is true that, if the Government came to the conclusion that the respondent was not a fit and proper person to hold a post in the public service of the State, it could discharge him without holding any enquiry into his alleged misconduct. If the government proceeded against hint in that direct way, without casting any aspersions on his honesty or competence his discharge would not, in law, have the effect of a removal from service by way of punishment and he would, therefore, have no grievance to ventilate in any court. Instead of taking that easy course, the Government chose the more difficult one of starting proceedings against him and of branding him as a dishonest and an incompetent officer. He had the right, in those circumstances, to insist upon the protection of Art. 311(2) of the Constitution. That protection not having been given to him, he had the right to seek his redress in court. It must, therefore, he held that the respondent had been wrongly deprived of the protection afforded by Art. 311(2) of the Constitution.”
8. And an Jagdish Mitter v. Union of India (5) the same court said:—
“This simple position is sometimes complicated by the fast that even while exercising its power to terminate the services of a temporary servant under the contract or the relevant rule, the authority may in fairness enquire whether the temporary servant should be continued in service on not. It is obvious that temporary servants or probationers are generally discharged, because they are not found to be competent or suitable for the post they hold. In other words, if a temporary servant or a probationer is found to be satisfactory in his work, efficient and otherwise eligible, it is unlikely that his services would be terminated, and so, before discharging a temporary servant, the authority may have to examine the question about the suitability of the said servant to be continued and acting bona fide in that behalf, the authority may also give a chance to the servant to explain, if any complaints are made against him, or his competence or suitability is disputed on some grounds arising from the discharge of his work; but such an enquiry would be held only for the purpose of deciding whether the temporary servant should be continued or not. There is no element of punitive proceedings in such an enquiry; the idea in holding such an enquiry is not to punish the temporary servant but just to decide whether he deserves to be continued in service or not. If an a result of such an enquiry, the authority comes to the conclusion that the temporary servant is not suitable to be continued it may pass a simple order off discharge by virtue of the powers conferred on it by the contract or the relevant rule; In such a case, it would not beopen to the temporary servant to invoke the protection of Art. 311 for the simple reason that the enquiry which ultimately led to his discharge was held only for the purpose of deciding whether the power under the contract or the relevant rule should be exercised and the temporary servant discharged.”
9. In State of Punjab v. Sukh Raj Bahadur (6), the Supreme Court enunciated 5 propositions as guide lines and they have been reiterated in the recent decision of that Court in R.S Sial v. State of U.P (7). They are:—
“(1) The services of a temporary servant or a probationer can be terminated under the rules of his employment and such termination without anything more would not attract the operation of Article 311 of the Constitution.
(2) The circumstances preceding or attendant on the order of termination of service have to be examined in each case, the motive behind it being immaterial.
(3) If the order visits the public servant with any evil consequences or casts an aspersion against his character or integrity, it must be considered to be one by way of punishment, no matter whether he was a mere probationer or a temporary servant.
(4) An order of termination of service in unexceptionable form preceded by an enquiry launched by the superior authorities only to ascertain whether the public servant should be retained in service, does not attract the operation of Article 311 of the Constitution.
(5) If there be a full-scale departmental enquiry envisaged by Art. 311 i.e, an Enquiry Officer is appointed, a charge sheets submitted, explanation called for and considered, any order of termination of service made thereafter will attract the operation of the said article.”
10. In the view that I have taken earlier in this judgment that the impugned reversion was not in accordance with clause 8 of Ext. R1 in that it is not established that the Development Commissioner honestly appraised the petitioner's work as required by clause 8 in Ext. R1 and assessed his suitability to continue as B.D.O Propositions Nos. 1 and 4 are not attracted to the case on hand; obviously proposition No. 5 also would not apply. But I think taking into consideration the circumstances of the case but not the motive for the action, the instant case would fall within the ambit of the 3rd proposition mentioned above and that therefore the impugned reversion was by way of punishment.
11. The reason for the action is, as disclosed in the counter-affidavit;
“There were local complaints about the work in this block and instances where the Officer misused his powers and acted irregularly were cited. The Block Development Officers have to maintain very close contact with the public. The post requires persons of broad outlook and service mindedness. Government felt, that continuance of such an officer would bring down the name of the Development Department in the eyes of the public and so in the Interests of service and the department, Government considered that he should be revetted back to his parent department.”
(underlining by me).
12. Once the application of clause 8 in Ext. R1 is ruled out and the reversion is admittedly on the gound of local complaints about the misuse of powers and irregular actions, which according to the respondent ‘would bring down the name of the Development Department in the eyes of the public.’ I have no hesitation to hold that the same was by way of punishment. It should also be noticed that from 1964 onwards with a short break the petitioner was working as B.D.O Once before he was reverted and re-entertained along with many other B.D.Os Now he is picked out and chosen, and is reverted not on an honest appraisal of his work by the authority competent to do so but on the basis of local complaints which as indicated in the counter-affidavit were treated or accepted as true without any enquiry, or at least any enquiry with notice to the petitioner. The impugned order is not before me. Ext. P4 massage on the face of it is harmless. The decision of the Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. S.B Mishra (8), is authority for the rule that though an order which is innocuous on its face and does not contain any imputation of misconduct can be considered as a piece of evidence for finding whether it was made by way of punishment or administrative routine, still the same is not conclusive of its nature and that it could very well be a cloak or camouflage for an order founded in misconduct for which reason courts are got debarred from looking at all the attendant circumstances to discover whether the order had been made by way of punishment or not. In Madan Mohan v. State of Bihar (9), the Supreme Court said:—
“It seems to us that on the facts of this case, the order dated January 15, 1972 violates Article 311(2) of the constitution. The petitioner had first been holding a temporary post and then a permanent post for nearly 17 years. The Chief Minister's statement in the Assembly that his services were not satisfactory and the Government was considering serving show-cause notice and the fact that his service were terminated without any enquiry being held would inevitably lead the public to believe that his services had been terminated on account of inefficiency or misconduct. This did cast a stigma on his Character.”
13. In State of U.P v. Sughar Singh (10), that Court again pointed out as follows:—
“Since we are concerned in this case with a case of reversion, we propose to confine our attention to the different circumstances in which an order of reversion may be made. An order of reversion is in its immediate, effect bound always to be a reduction inrank. Even a reversion from a higher but temporary or officiating rank to a lower substantive rank is in a sence a reduction. But such orders of reversion are not always reduction in rank within the meaning of Article 311. If the officer is promoted substantively to a higher post a rank, he gets a right to that particular post or rank and if he is afterwards reverted to the lower port or rank which he held before, it is a “reduction in rank”. In the technical sense in which the expression is used in Article 311. The real test in all such cases is to ascertain if the officer concerned has a right to the post from which he is reverted. If he has a right to the post then a reversion is a punishment and cannot be ordered except in compliance with the provisions of Art. 311. If on the other hand, the officer concerned has no right to the post, he can be reverted without attracting the provisions of Article 311. But even in this case, he cannot be reverted in a manner which will show conclusively that the intention was to punish him. The order itself may expressly state that the officer concerned is being reverted by way of punishment. In fact the order may in various other ways cast a stimga on the officer concerned. In all such eases, the order is to be taken as a punishment. Some times again, the order of reversion may bring upon the officer certain penal consequences like forfeiture of pay and allowances or loss of seniority in the subordinate rank or the stoppage or postponement of future chances of promotions in such cases also the government servant must be regarded as having been punished and his reversion to the substantive rank must be treated as a reduction in rank. In such a case article 311 will be attracted.”
14. The above decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner supports the view that I have taken above that the impugned reversion is by way of punishment. The decisions in Union Territory of Tripura Agartala v. Gopal Chander Dutta Chaudhary, (Supra) and in State of Nagaland v. G. Vasantha (11) relied on by the learned Government Pleader do not in any way advance his case. In the former case it was found that the Government servant on whom lay the onus of proof to establish that the termination was penal in character failed to discharge that onus, in the latter case, that on the facts of the case the termination did not attract Article 311.
15. The result of the above discussion is this O.P has to be allowed. I do so. In the circumstances of the case the parties will suffer their costs.
16. Petition allowed.