N.N Mithal, J.:— One of the defendants against whom an ex-parte decree had been passed by the Court below and whose application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC had been dismissed by the impugned order, has come up in appeal. The facts, in brief, in so far as they are relevant for the purposes of disposing of this appeal, may be set out below.
2. Suit No. 32 of 1981 was filed by the Respondent No. 1 against the appellant and proforma Respondents 2 to 5 and one Prabhat Sharma, all being heirs of Sri Bishambhar Manav, the erst-while tenant of the disputed property. The suit had been filed after serving necessary notice demanding arrears of rent and terminating the tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The suit was instituted before the District Judge as the valuation of the suit was above Rs. 5,000. The defendants filed their written statement except the appellant. The appellant was served through beat of drum and by affixation and this substituted service was deemed to be sufficient by the Court vide its order dated 19-1-1981. The suit was contested by the remaining defendants and ultimately it was decreed on 17-8-1982. A revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, was filed by the contesting defendants being Civil Revision No. 647 of 1982, but that too was dismissed on 8-12-1982. After the dismissal of the suit, when the execution was moved seeking delivery of possession, the appellant along with her brother Prabhat Sharma moved two applications before the Court below. The first application was under Order IX Rule 13 CPC read with Section 151 CPC which was registered as Miscellaneous Case No. 2 of 1983. The other objection was filed purporting to be one under Order XXXII Rule 5 read with Section 47 CPC. This was registered as Misc. Case No. 3 of 1983. The contents of both the objections were just the same and in both of them the appellant and her brother Prabhat Sharma were the objectors. Both these applications were, however, dismissed by an order dated 25-11-1987. The decision in Misc. Case No. 3 of 1983 because subject of Civil Revision No. 1004 of 1987 which was filed on behalf of both Prabhat Sharma and Mamta Sharma. The revision was heard and finally disposed of by Hon'ble V.K Mehrotra, J. on 4-2-1988 whereby the same was dismissed. (Prabhat Sharma v. Hari Shanker Srivastava) reported in 1988 (1) ARC 285. After the dismissal of the revision, the present FAFO has been filed on behalf of the appellant alone although initially in the memo both were mentioned as the appellants. It is also to be noted that although the name of Prabhat Sharma has been deleted from the array of the appellants, it has not been added in the array of respondents. Before this FAFO was admitted, counsel for the plaintiff-respondent put in appearance and with the consent of the parties, the appeal was taken up for admission as well as final disposal thereof. The parties were, therefore, permitted to file their counter and rejoinder affidavits. Subsequently, the parties have also filed supplementary counter affidavit and supplementary rejoinder affidavit.
3. Although several questions have been raised but a preliminary objection has been taken by the respondent regarding the maintainability of the appeal. It is submitted by Sri A.K Sand appearing for the Respondent No. 1 that the suit was tried by the Court below exercising the powers of a Judge Small Cause Courts and as such only a revision under Section 25 would lie and the appeal was not maintainable. He has also raised an objection that after the dismissal of Civil Revision No. 1004 of 1987, the present appeal is not maintainable inasmuch as on almost the same ground the Civil Revision had been filed and had been finally disposed of. It is lastly urged that the application under Order X Rule 13 CPC was not maintainable as the appellant had not complied with the requirement of Section 17 Provincial Small Cause Courts Act.
4. Since the matter can be disposed of on a preliminary ground, I do not wish to enter into other questions which were argued at length.
5. On the first question that the appeal does not lie, it may be mentioned here that a suit between lessor and lessee is now entertain able by the Court of Small Causes in this State after amendment brought in by U.P Act 37 of 1972. By a notification published in Uttar Pradesh Gazette Part I dated October 9, 1972, at page 5973, the State Government, in exercise of its powers under Sub-section (3) of Section 25 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Court Act, 1987, as amended by Uttar Pradesh Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972, delegated its powers to the High Court under the said Section. In pursuance of this delegation, the High Court by its Notification No. 526 dated 25-10-1972 conferred upon all the District Judges and Additional District Judges jurisdiction of a Judge of the Court of Small Causes under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, for the trial of all suits (irrespective of their value) of the nature referred to in the said Sub-section (2). Sub-section (2) referred to above was introduced by means of an amendment to Section 25 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887 and is as follows:—
“The State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, confer upon any District Judge or any Additional District Judge the Jurisdiction of a Judge of a Court of Small Causes under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, for the trial of all suite (irrespective of their value) by the lessor for the eviction of a lessee from a building after the determination of his lease or for the recovery from him of rent in respect of the period of occupation thereof during the continuance of the lease or of compensation for the use and occupation thereof after such determination of lease, and may withdraw any jurisdiction so conferred.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section the explanation ‘building’ has the same meaning as in Article 4 in the Second Schedule to the said Act.”
6. Thus, in the light of the above provisions, all the District Judges and Additional District Judges in the State have been conferred with the powers of Judge Small Cause Courts under the Act of 1887 and such Courts have jurisdiction to decide suits between lessor and lessee for eviction etc. It is not disputed that the dispute in the present suit also related to one between lessor and lessee after the termination of the lease and, as such it was a suit which was cognizible by the Court of Small Causes. It is also undisputed that the suit was filed before the District Judge, Allahabad from where it was transferred to the IV Additional District Judge for trial. There is nothing to indicate that during the trial the procedure which is required for deciding small cause suit had been followed or not. Even in the final judgment it is not indicated that the Court had decided the suit while exercising the powers of a Judge Small Cause Courts. On this basis the learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that the suit had been tried on the regular side and as such the appeal was maintainable. In my opinion, this alone is not sufficient to determine whether the suit was a suit of a small cause nature or it was a regular suit. Merely because the Court does not mention that it was deciding a particular suit as a Court of Small Causes can not determine the nature of the suit if inherently the suit was of small cause nature. It is the substance of the suit which is material. In Bisheshwar Prasad Gautam v. Dr. R.K Agarwal, AIR 1977 Alld. 103, it was held that where a suit for ejectment and recovery of arrears of rent was brought as an ordinary suit, although under Section 9 of the U.P Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972, the suit ought to have been transferred and tried on small cause side, it continue to refrain its nature namely, small causes. Almost similar situation arose before this Court in Trilok Singh v. Smt. Jamuna Devi, AIR 1978 Alld. 129, where a learned Single Judge of this Court, after taking notice of all the relevant provisions and the amendments made in U.P came to the conclusion that the pecuniary limit of Rs. 500 laid down by the proviso added to Section 15(3) of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act by U.P Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972 does not apply to the jurisdiction of District Judges and Additional District Judges to try suite by lessor for the eviction of the lessee from a building after determination of his lease or for recovery from him rent etc. Where they have been conferred such jurisdiction in terms of Section 25(2) of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act. In view of the above, it is quite obvious that it is not the procedure which has been adopted by the Court while disposing of the suit will determine the nature of the suit but it is the nature of jurisdiction exercised by the Court and the allegations made in the plaint which will determine the true nature of the suit.
7. In the present case, even if the Court had not mentioned that it was deciding the suit as a Judge of Small Causes Court, yet the very nature of the suit and the allegations made in the plaint clearly go to show that it was a suit of a Small Cause Court nature and the Court, thus, had the necessary jurisdiction to try the said suit and, therefore, it must be deemed to have been decided as a suit of small cause nature.
8. After reaching the above conclusion the question arises as to whether the above application under Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C was maintainable. It may be recalled that Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Court Act lays down the procedure and reads as under:
“17. Application of the Code of Civil Procedure—(1) The procedure prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 shall save in so far as is otherwise provided by that Code or by this Act, be the procedure followed in a Court of Small Causes in all suite cognizable by it, and in all proceedings arising out of such suits: Provided that as applicant for an order to set aside a decree passed ex-parte or for a review of judgment shall, at the time of presenting his application either deposit in the Court the amount due from him under the decree or in pursuance of judgment, or give such security for the performance, of the decree or compliance with the Judgment as the Court may, on a previous application made by him in this behalf, have directed.
9. Therefore, the ordinary procedure for making application under Order IX, Rule 13 C.P.C stands slightly modified in its application in case of an ex-parte decree passed by Court of Small Causes. An application under Order IX, Rule 13 C.P.C in such cases cannot be moved unless the amount decreed is deposited at the time of presenting the application. Admittedly, in the present case, this condition has not been complied with and, therefore, the application was liable to be dismissed only on this ground.
10. The appellant has also contended that the Trial Court has not given a clear finding as to whether the notice of the suit had in fact been served on the appellant. As mentioned earlier, service on the appellant was affected by beat of drum and by affixation. In the application, only this much has been stated that no service of the suit was ever affected on the applicant. For the same reason it was asserted that the proceedings against the appellant were a nullity and without jurisdiction because there was no service on her and she became aware of the existence of the decree only on 18-1-1983. The application was moved on 2-2-1983. In the application it was no where indicated that no affixation had been made and that no beat of drum had taken place. When the Court had specifically mentioned in its order dated 19-9-1981 that service on the appellant be deemed to be sufficient on account of beat of drum and affixation, it was the duty of the appellant to have set out in the application that there had been no beating of the drum at the time when it is alleged to have been done or there was no affixation of notice and such other facts on the basis of which she could not have been served. In the absence of any such material, it would be difficult for the plaintiff-respondent to lead any evidence to prove service. The Court below has, therefore, rightly mentioned that in view of the order passed by the Court on 19-9-1981, it must be deemed that service on her was sufficient in the absence of any specific ground why the service could not be deemed to be sufficient.
11. Several other points were also urged, but in my opinion they are not relevant at all because neither the application under Order IX Rule 13 C.P.C was maintainable nor the appeal is maintainable. In the result, the appeal fails and accordingly dismissed with costs.
12. Appeal dismissed.