AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

These two appeals challenge a Single Bench judgment in C.O. No. 13788 of 1990 and C.O. No. 13796(W) of 1990. The Single Judge directed the Administrative Training Institute (ATI) authorities to regularise the service of respondent No. 5 (Sri Subhas Chandra Misra) in the post of Accountant and dismissed the appellant's application in F.M.A.T No. 3467 of 1992.

Facts (as presented in the opinion): Sri Misra had been working at the Orientation and Study Centre, Kalyani since 1964 and was promoted in 1967 to Cashier-cum-Store Keeper. Around 1979 he was brought to the ATI on deputation, and correspondence among ATI, Home (Personnel & Administrative Reform) Department, and the parent department sought his deputation and later contemplated absorption. Sri Misra joined ATI in July 1980 as Accountant and later officiated as Head Clerk with revised pay/orders in December 1981/January 1982.

The ATI repeatedly corresponded with the Home (P & AR) Department about permanent absorption, but recruitment rules for ATI were not finalised for many years. The parent department at times insisted on either the permanent absorption of Sri Misra by ATI or his repatriation to fill his original post. In June 1990, following directions from the Home (P & AR) Department, an order of reversion/repatriation was passed and Sri Misra was released to join his parent organisation; routine correspondence thereafter revealed disagreement between departments about whether he could be absorbed or rejoined his former post. Sri Misra approached the High Court by writ; the writ court directed payment of dues and allowed him to join the post previously held. The appellant (Mrinal Kanti Chatterjee), a confirmed U.D. Assistant who claimed promotion prospects were blocked by Sri Misra's retention at ATI, also filed a writ seeking appointment to Head Clerk and repatriation of Sri Misra (alternatively appointment as Accountant at higher scale from Aug 1980). The Single Judge allowed Sri Misra's writ and regularised his service; dismissed appellant's writ. These two appeals followed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a government servant on deputation (a deputationist) has a legal right to be permanently absorbed in the borrowing department.
  2. Whether the doctrine of promissory estoppel or legitimate expectation can prevent repatriation/allow permanent absorption of a deputationist where recruitment rules are not finalised.
  3. Whether the authorities were bound to afford the deputationist an opportunity of hearing before passing the repatriation/reversion order (application of principles of natural justice).
  4. Whether the retention/absorption of the deputationist adversely affects the promotional prospects and seniority of other employees (and what remedial approach is appropriate).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Mr. Bikash Ranjan Bhattacharyya for Mrinal Kanti Chatterjee)

  • The respondent No. 5 was only on deputation and therefore had no right to be absorbed permanently in the deputation post; the writ court committed illegality by directing absorption.
  • The appellant, being a confirmed U.D. Assistant, had his promotional prospects clogged by respondent No. 5's retention in ATI; he should be promoted to Head Clerk (or appointed as Accountant at a higher scale from Aug 1980 as alternate relief).
  • Even if the respondent was temporarily assigned duties, he cannot claim seniority over the appellant until final absorption; seniority counting and promotion decisions are within the borrowing authority's powers and must follow rules.

Respondent's / Writ-Petitioner's Contentions (Sri Subhas Chandra Misra)

  • He was brought to ATI with assurances that he would be absorbed permanently and given promotional opportunities; having served for many years in ATI in substantive duties (Accountant and officiating Head Clerk), he acquired a valuable right to continue.
  • The government and ATI had repeatedly corresponded about absorption and the parent department had suspended his lien; in equity and by reason of the State's conduct, he should not be repatriated abruptly.
  • He sought protection through writ proceedings when the repatriation/release was attempted and obtained interim relief from the writ court for salary and resumption.

State / Departmental Position and Relevant Administrative Correspondence

  • The Home (P & AR) Department and Finance Department repeatedly indicated that finalisation of recruitment rules was a precondition to permanent absorption; they also expressed concern that indefinite deputation/absorption without rules would affect promotions of regular staff at ATI.
  • The Rural Development Department/parent department at times insisted that if ATI did not absorb Sri Misra, he should be repatriated so that his substantive post at the parent organisation could be filled.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ratilal B. Soni v. State of Gujarat, 1990 Supp SCC 243 : AIR 1990 SC 1132 Held that a deputationist has no right to be absorbed in the borrowing department irrespective of the length of deputation. The Court relied on this as the trite position but discussed recognised exceptions and emphasised limits of the rule in the present case.
B.C. Sinha (Bimal Chandra Sinha) v. Union of India, 92 CWN 852 Applied promissory estoppel where employer offered permanent absorption and employee relinquished right to return; subsequent retraction was held unfair. The trial judge relied on it for promissory estoppel; the Division Bench analysed its facts and distinguished it from the present case because there was no unequivocal promise here and the deputation rules applied.
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ashoke Deshmookh, (1988) 3 SCC 503 : AIR 1988 SC 1240 Rule 14 ('last come first go') does not apply to a deputationist moving between departments. Cited to demonstrate limits on applying typical seniority/reversion rules to deputationists.
K.H. Phadnis v. State of Maharashtra, (1971) 1 SCC 790 : AIR 1971 SC 998 Reversion from a temporary/higher paying post to substantive post does not necessarily carry stigma; reversion may be legitimate if not a punitive reduction. Used to show that reversion per se need not be punitive and must be examined on substance.
Dr. Shree Krishan v. Union of India, 1990 (5) SLR 251 Deputationist continues to hold lien on parent department and remains subject to parent authority until final absorption/delinking. Cited to support the proposition that deputationists remain employees of parent organisation unless formally absorbed.
Amrik Singh v. Union of India, 1986 (3) SLR 273 (CAT) A deputationist can be repatriated; there is no unilateral right to be absorbed at the end of deputation. Reinforced the principle that the borrowing authority is not obliged to absorb at the end of deputation.
Daulat Ram Sharma v. Union of India, 1990 (7) SLR (CAT) 303 Long service on deputation alone does not entitle one to absorption; absorption regulated by statutory rules. Cited to show mere lapse of time does not create a right to absorption.
Shri Inder Raj Kakar v. Delhi Transport Undertaking, 1972 SLR 39 An officer on deputation remains an employee of parent organisation and should be considered for promotion in parent organisation. Used to show continuity of lien and promotional consideration in parent cadre.
Harbhanjan Malian Assistant v. State of Punjab, 1986 (3) SLR 443 Where the Government order states lien can be revived, the employee should not have misapprehension about reversion and lien revival. Cited to illustrate administrative positions where lien revival was explicitly provided for.
Ram Prakash Makkar v. State of Haryana, 1993 (2) LLJ 1053 Construction of correspondence may show appointment was by deputation (not transfer), permitting reversion to parent department. Applied as authority that factual construction of appointment documents determines whether reversion is permissible.
Albert v. State of Kerala, 1994 (2) LLJ 445 Employee has no right to remain on deputation or to claim a right to continue on deputation. Reinforced the proposition that deputation confers no automatic right to continue.
Indrajit Prasad Vinit v. State of Bihar, 1994 (2) BLJ 151 : 1995 (1) PLJR 487 A deputationist does not have any legal right to continue on deputation. Cited as further support for the negative answer to the question of a right to absorption.
Union of India v. Godfrey Philips India Ltd., (1985) 4 SCC 369 : AIR 1986 SC 806 General principles concerning administrative actions (noted as being on a different footing). The Court observed these decisions stand on different footing and do not bear on the present facts.
Surya Narain Yadav v. Bihar State Electricity Board, (1985) 3 SCC 38 : AIR 1985 SC 941 General administrative law principles (distinguished by the Court). Noted as inapplicable to the facts before the Court.
Sone Vanaspati Ltd. v. State of Bihar & Ors., 1995 (1) PLJR 2 Referenced for principles on promissory estoppel/representations by public authorities. Used as part of analysis that promissory estoppel cannot be applied against statutory/regulatory constraints.
Amrit Banaspati Co. Ltd. v. State of Punjab, (1992) 2 SCC 411 Promise or agreement prohibited by statute or against public policy cannot be enforced. Cited to underline limitation that estoppel cannot override statutory prohibitions.
Madras City Wine Merchants' Association v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1994) 5 SCC 509 Elements of legitimate expectation: express promise or regular practice and reasonableness; subject to changes in policy/public interest. Cited to explain when legitimate expectation arises and its limits where rules/policy change.
Kamal Kanti Chatterjee v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Calcutta (FMAT No. 3064 of 1989) Observed that non-absorption may be unsustainable if irrational or wholly unreasonable even though deputationist has no legal right. Quoted and discussed; Court expressed respectful disagreement with aspects of its reasoning but acknowledged the point that non-absorption can be challenged if irrational.
Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651 Limits of judicial review of administrative action. Referred to when discussing the boundaries of judicial intervention in administrative decisions.
T. Shantharam v. State of Karnataka, (1995) 2 SCC 538 Although deputation may have been de hors rules, long satisfactory service can make repatriation unjust. Referred to as an instance where equity and long service influenced the court's view against repatriation.
Nilima Misra v. Dr. Harinder Kaur Paintal, (1990) 2 SCC 746 : AIR 1990 SC 1402 Case cited by trial judge for natural justice/entitlement to hearing (but held inapplicable by Division Bench). Distinguished by the Division Bench as not applicable where the action is governed by deputation rules and does not attract civil consequences or stigma.
Ramesh Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, (1978) 1 SCC 37 : AIR 1978 SC 327 Principle that a person is aggrieved only when denied a legal right by someone having a legal duty. Quoted to explain who is legally 'aggrieved' in service disputes.
Muni Subrat Jain v. State of Haryana, (1977) 1 SCC 486 : AIR 1977 SC 276 Earlier articulation supporting Ramesh Prasad Singh principles on legal rights and grievance. Quoted in support of who can claim to be aggrieved in the context of service rights.
Masood Aktar Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1990 (5) SLR 639 Authorities on counting seniority only from date of regularisation/appointment under the cadre rules. Cited to support the rule that seniority accrues from regular appointment, not ad hoc service.
Ashok Gulati v. B.S. Jain, 1986 Supp SCC 597 : AIR 1987 SC 424 Seniority / regularisation principles in service law. Used as authority that ad hoc appointments do not confer seniority as against regular appointments.
Keshab Chandra Joshi v. Union of India, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 272 : AIR 1991 SC 284 Senioriry and date of regularisation principles. Referred to when discussing counting seniority only after regularisation.
V. Sreenivasa Reddy v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh, JT 1994 (6) SC 461 : 1995 Supp (1) SCC 572 : AIR 1995 SC 586 Supreme Court authority that seniority/promotion follow rules and date of regular appointment. Applied to explain seniority accrual principles relevant to the parties.
Puranjit Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh, 1994 (69) FLR 1027 Seniority in parent department to be counted; deputation service does not transfer seniority to parent cadre. Cited to demonstrate that seniority accrual remains with parent organisation unless regularised.
Ex Capt. K. Balsubramaniam v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1991) 2 SCC 708 If orders are invalid, persons cannot claim rights based on those orders; therefore hearing may not be required before declaring nullity. Quoted to support that where an appointment is a nullity, the requirement of natural justice may not arise.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The decision contains opinions of Panigrahi, J. (leading) and Sinha, J. (concurring with separate reasons). The core analytical thrust is:

  1. The fundamental legal position, drawn from Ratilal B. Soni and other authorities, is that a deputationist does not have an inherent legal right to be absorbed into the borrowing department irrespective of the length of deputation. The Court re-states this rule as the starting point for analysis.
  2. The Single Judge had allowed the respondent's writ chiefly on equitable grounds—finding that the State and ATI had led the respondent to believe he would be absorbed and that lengthy inaction by the Government made repatriation unfair. The Single Judge applied promissory estoppel and concluded the respondent had acquired a valuable right.
  3. The Division Bench carefully examined whether the exceptions to the Soni principle apply. The trial judge had treated four exceptions as relevant: (a) promissory estoppel, (b) where repatriation amounts to reduction in rank, (c) where the order is arbitrary or discriminatory, and (d) where the order is passed without giving an opportunity of hearing. The Division Bench considered each:
    • Promissory estoppel: the court set out three pre-conditions for promissory estoppel (unequivocal promise, action taken in reliance, and alteration of position). It concluded that in this case, while ATI and others made representations and prolonged inaction occurred, there was no unequivocal promise independent of the statutory/deputation framework: the absorption was expressly made conditional upon finalisation of recruitment rules. The Court emphasised that estoppel cannot operate against statutory rules and that promises contrary to statutory provisions cannot be enforced.
    • Reduction in rank: the court found this exception inapplicable in the facts of this case (the trial judge also so found).
    • Arbitrariness / discrimination: the Division Bench noted that administrative action is justiciable where it is arbitrary, irrational or procedurally improper, but stressed the limits of judicial review and that mere inequity arising from delay does not automatically render administrative decisions illegal.
    • Opportunity of hearing / natural justice: the court held that principles of natural justice apply when administrative action has civil consequences or casts stigma; where the action is a lawful exercise of repatriation under deputation rules and does not entail civil consequences or stigma, the requirement of hearing is limited. The Division Bench observed that in the present facts it was difficult to uphold that the respondent had an entitlement to a hearing that would change the result.
  4. The Court also analysed the practical administrative mess caused by prolonged non-finalisation of recruitment rules and long deputation. Both Judges expressed sympathy for the plight of the respondent, noting in places that it was unfortunate the matter remained unattended for many years and that repatriation without an available commensurate post in the parent department would be harsh. However, sympathy did not supplant the legal rule forbidding a deputationist's automatic right to absorption.
  5. The Division Bench distinguished earlier decisions relied on by the Single Judge (for example, cases applying promissory estoppel) on factual grounds where there had been an unequivocal promise and the parent department had released the employee such that he ceased to be a deputationist. Here, by contrast, suspension of lien and conditional communications expressly tied absorption to the framing of recruitment rules.
  6. On seniority and promotions, the Court reiterated established authorities that seniority accrues from date of regularisation/absorption and not from ad hoc or deputation service; therefore inter-se seniority and promotions would have to be determined by the competent authority in accordance with applicable rules if and when absorption is ordered.
  7. The Court concluded that the Single Judge's reasoning contained infirmities in law and set aside the writ-court order. At the same time, both Judges urged the administrative authorities to consider the matter afresh promptly and lawfully, balancing statutory rules, equity and the effects on other employees.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The Division Bench set aside the Single Judge's order regularising the respondent No. 5 and allowed the appeals; accordingly both appeals succeed and the writ-court judgment and order are set aside. The parties were ordered to bear their own costs.

Implications (direct, as stated in the opinion)

  • The Single Judge's direction to regularise Sri Misra's service in ATI was set aside; the Division Bench held that a deputationist has no inherent legal right to permanent absorption.
  • The decision requires administrative authorities to consider the matter afresh in accordance with law: if absorption is contemplated, the borrowing authority must decide on absorption, seniority and inter-se ranking consistent with recruitment rules and statutes; conversely, repatriation should take account of lien and available posts at the parent department to avoid unfairness.
  • The Court emphasised that promissory estoppel cannot operate against statutory/regulatory requirements, and that natural justice requirements depend on whether the administrative action entails civil consequences or stigma; the Division Bench directed reconsideration by concerned authorities rather than affirming the Single Judge's equitable remedy.
  • No novel legal principle was announced that overrides established authority; the Court reinforced existing precedents on deputation, promissory estoppel limits, hearing rights and seniority principles and remitted practical decisions to administrative authorities to be taken lawfully and promptly.

Note: This summary is strictly confined to the statements and material contained in the provided opinion. Where the opinion did not provide additional detail on certain procedural steps or ancillary matters, that additional information has not been invented or inferred.

    Director Of Administrative Training Institute & Ors. v. Sri Subhas Chandra Misra & Anr.

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    Panigrahi, J.:— These two appeals are directed against the Judgment and order passed by a Single Bench of this Court in C.O No. 13788 of 1990 and C.O No. 13796(W) of 1990, whereby the learned Single Judge directed the authorities, i.e Administrative Training Institute, to regularise the services of the respondent No. 5 in the post of Accountant and dismissed the application of the appellant in F.M.A.T No. 3467 of 1992.

    2. The respondent No. 5 was working in the Orientation and Study Centre, Kalyani since 1964. The centre was a Training Institute which was under the control of the then community Development Department of the Government of West Bengal. In 1967 he was promoted to the post of Cashier-cum-Store Keeper at the centre. The Administrative Training Institute was set up in or about 1978. The then Director of ATI wrote to the Principal, requesting him to allow the respondent No. 5 on deputation to the borrowing Institute on promotion. Accordingly, the Principal, Orientation and Study Centre agreed for sparing respondent No. 5 to the ATI and thus, forwarded his Bio-Data. On 19th January 1979, the then Director addressed a letter to the Secretary, Home (Personnel and Administrative Reform) (P & AR) Department, Government of West Bengal for creation of staff for the ATI. It was stated that the post of accountant in the said office had to be filled up without delay. It is indicated that the respondent No. 5 having possessed proficiency in accounts and long standing experience who would be very useful in organizing the Institute should be brought on deputation. The Secretary, on the other hand was requested to arrange for the release of respondent No. 5 by the CD Department. On 3rd February, 1976 the Deputy Secretary Home (P & AR) Department wrote to the Secretary Agricultural and CD Department stating that since, the post of accountant was created in the ATI which had to be filled-up immediately to enable smooth management of the office. The Secretary, Agricultural CD Department was requested to let Home (P & AR) Department know whether the respondent No. 5 could be immediately spared for appointment to the post of accountant in the ATI on a purely temporary basis. The Deputy Secretary, Department of Panchayat and Community Development in letter dated 3rd April, 1979 expressed that the Department had no objection to spare the services of Sri Misra for the said post. The Home (P & AR) Department wrote to the Director ATI on 7th May, 1979 relating to the appointment of respondent No. 5 in the post of Accountant; requesting him for issuance of the necessary order. It is indicated that the terms of deputation to be finalised after consulting with the Finance Department. From the subsequent correspondence with the Home (P & AR) Department it reveals that in future some problems might arise in case the respondent No. 5 was not absorbed in the borrowing Department as an Accountant. It was proposed that the promotion to the post of Accountant be given to the respondent No. 5. Accordingly, after consultation with the Director ATI it was decided to fill up the post of Accountant by SCM in the scale of pay of Rs. 330-10-400-15-550/- in terms of Home (P & AR.) Department's order No. 1690 P.A.R(Trag.)/3T-26/79 dated 19.9.1979 for a period of one year with effect from the date of his joining. Copies of the letter was also sent to the parent Department, Principal, Orientation and Study Centre with a request of his immediate relief. However, for some reason or other the respondent No. 5 could not be immediately released from his parent Department for taking up his post in ATI. Therefore, the Government in the Home (P & AR) Department took a decision to find out another suitable person for the post of Accountant in ATI in the scale of Rs. 450-675/-. The ATI requested the concerned Employment Exchanges for sponsoring suitable candidates for the post of Accountant. The names of 7 (seven) candidates were forwarded including the appellant who was then serving as Junior Accountant in the Comprehensive Area Development Corporation (CADC). From the interview conducted by the ATI it appears that none of the candidates was found to be suitable to the said post. In the meanwhile, the Administrative Officer, ATI visited the Orientation and Study Centre and discussed the relief of the respondent No. 5 to serve as Accountant in the Institute. The Principal of the Institute exnressed his desire to retain the respondent No. 5 in the borrowing Institute in constitution with the Secretary (Panchayat and Community Development). In the meantime, appellant applied in the scale of pay of Rs. 330-550/- to the ATI through proper channel. Nevertheless, none of the candidates who appeared before the interview in the ATI was found suitable for the post yet the appellant stood first in the said interview and implored for his absorption in the said post. Accordingly, the Administrative Officer ATI addressed a letter to the Comprehensive Area Development Corporation (CADC) for absorbing the appellant and if CADC had no objection for his appointment. On 18th July, 1980 the appellant was appointed as temporary U.D Assistant in the scale of pay of Rs. 330-550/-. On 2nd August, 1980 the appellant wrote to the Additional Director accepting the offer of U.D Assistant in ATI on the terms and conditions mentioned in the office order dated 18.7.1980 The respondent No. 5 was released from his parent Department on 3.7.80 and seems to have joined with ATI as Accountant on 4.7.80 On 29.12.1981 from the office order passed by the Director of ATI; it appears that the respondent No. 5 was employed not only as Accountant but had been allowed to officiate in the post of Head Clerk of ATI until further orders. On 20th January, 1982 the Director again issued an order allowing him to draw pay and allowance in the scale of pay of Rs. 425-1050/- with higher initial starting at Rs. 670/-. This order was to take effect from 30.12.81 A copy of the said order was sent to the Home (P & AR) Department and also to the Assistant Commissioner of Community Development Department under the caption “absorption of Sri Subhas Chandra Misra under Home (P & AR) Department at ATI, Salt Lake”. It was suggested in the said letter for his permanent absorption. The purpose and intent of the letter was to enable the parent Department to fill up that post which was lying vacant on account of release of Sri Misra for the last two years. The Home (P & AR) Department in their turn asked the Director ATI for his comments. On 17.2.83 Sri Misra expressed his willingness for his permanent absorption in the borrowing Institute. On ??? the Home (P & AR) Department wrote to the Director ATI in response to the later's proposal for Misra's permanent absorption in the post of Accountant stating that this would be considered only after finalisation of the Recruitment Rules of the Employees of ATI. In the meantime, the appellant was confirmed in the permanent post of U.D Assistant with effect from 2.8.1983 Such as an arrangement continued with Sri Misra being allowed to function as Accountant and officiating Head Clerk and the appellant working as U.D Assistant till 1985. On 10.5.85 the Deputy Secretary, Community Development Department wrote to the then Director, ATI, stating that Sri Misra was taken on deputation to ATI since 1.7.80 on stipulation that he would be permanently absorbed there. The parent Department however, made persistent request to the borrowing Institute that since the Administrative Training Centre had expanded considerably which becomes imperative on their part not to keep the post of Cashier-cum-Store Keeper lying vacant for indefinite period. Therefore, it is necessary either to release Sri Misra from ATI by 30.6.85 or absorb him permanently in the borrowing Institution. If no intimation would be received from the borrowing Institution it will be deemed that Sri Misra will be absorbed permanently and the parent Department will take steps to fill up the vacancy of Cashier at the O & S Centre, Kalyani. In response to the said letter Home (P & AR) Department wrote to the Director, ATI, stating that the question of permanent absorption of Sri Misra in ATI had to be yet finalised and the draft rules regulating, recruitment of the various posts in the ATI had already been sent. The Director, ATI was requested to expedite the matter. The Administrative Officer, ATI had, thus, replied to the CDD stating that the question of absorption of Sri Misra in ATI had been pending for the reason that the relevant recruitment rules was yet to be finalised.

    3. The appellant feeling aggrieved by the retention of Sri Misra in the ATI as Accountant-cum-Head Clerk inasmuch as the appellant's promotional aspect is being clogged made a representation in 1986 claiming that he should be appointed in the post of Head Clerk with effect from 2.8.83 i.e the date on which the appellant had been confirmed as U.D Assistant. His subsequent reminders claiming the post of Head Clerk did not evoke the authority from their slumber.

    4. The respondent No. 5, Sri Misra applied to the Director, ATI on 25.8.88 for being permanently absorbed in the said establishment. On 8th July, 1988 the CDD wrote to the Principal, Orientation and Study Centre expressing that the Government had directed that the lien of Sri Misra on the post of Cashier-cum-Store Keeper should remain suspended in terms of sub-Rule (2) of Rule 20 of the West Bengal Service Rules, Part-I. A copy of the said letter was also sent to respondent No. 5. In response to the representation of Sri Misra for his permanent absorption it was indicated to him that since the matter has been pending for framing relevant recruitment Rules it could not be taken up. Due to this uncertainty, the post of Cashier-cum-Store Keeper in SIRD was filled up. In a letter dated 19.2.90, this fact was communicated to the Director, ATI by the Deputy Secretary, Rural Development Department. From the letter it throws light that there was no scope for reversion of Sri Misra to the post of Cashier-cum-Store Keeper in the SIRD. On the representation of the appellant dated 27.4.88 the Joint Secretary, Home (P.& AR) Department wrote to the Director of ATI on 11.6.90 to revert Sri Misra to his original post of Accountant as his appointment to the post of Head Clerk was in violation of the existing rules of the Government. Since Sri Misra has been, ratained in the ATI on deputation for a long period and his absorption cannot be finalised within short time without Rules being finalised he should be reverted back to this parent Department. It was further indicated that Sri Misra's absorption in the deputation post would adversely effect the promotional venue of other employees working in the establishment. Immediately following the said letter the Director. ATI passed an order of reversion of Sri Misra on 25th June, 1990 from the post of Accountant and released him with effect from 10th June, 1990 enabling him to join in SIRD (erstwhile of Orientation and Study Programme) on repatriation. On 29th June, 1990 the Special Secretary, Rural Development Department asked on the basis of a representation by the respondent No. 5 dated 27th June, 1990 to the Director, ATI that there was no scope to absorb Sri Misra, in his original post. It was further stated that in so far as the Rural Development Department is concerned there is no possibility for Misra to join, SIRD. It was accordingly, stated that no unilateral decision regarding the release of Sri Misra should be taken and that the matter had been already referred afresh to the Home (P & AR) Department and Finance Department for their opinion/information. It was requested that until some workable solution was evolved by the two Departments, Sri Misra should not be released as it might cause some avoidable hardship. From subsequent correspondence of respondent No. 5, it appears that he moved the Director, ATI and the Secretary Home (P & AR) Department for withdrawal of order dated 25.6.90 From the several correspondences a reasonable inference can be drawn that whole thing was in a mess and in labyrinth.

    5. It further appears that the appellant was asked to perform the work of the Head Clerk and Accountant as stop-gap arrangement till other permanent arrangement was made. For the purpose of discharging the duties as Head Clerk it was specifically stated that he would not be given any extra remuneration. Respondent No. 5 made over the charge on 30th June, 1990 and on 2nd July, 1990 submitted his joining, report to the Principal, SIRD. The Principal wrote a letter to the Deputy secretary, Rural Development Department on 5.7.90 stating that there was no scope for the respondent No. 5 to join in the office as no post was lying vacant there. Thus, the respondent was forced again to submit a representation to the Secretary, Home (P & AR) Department, P & AR Department requesting him to restore in the post of Head Clerk-cum-Accountant on the ATI and for cancellation of the orders dated 25.6.90 and 27.6.90 But the Director, ATI expressed his inability on account of the orders passed by the Home (P & AR) Department and accordingly the declined to accept his joining report. The appellant had to run from post to pillar and no response was received from any quarters, respondent No. 5 was, thus, obliged to approach this Court by way of filing a writ application for vindicating his remedy. The Writ Court passed an order on 10.9.90 directing the Government to pay respondent No. 5's salary which was due and to allow him to join in the post where he was previously working.

    6. The appellant Mrinal Kanti Chatterjee also filed a similar writ application under which he prayed for appointment to the post of Head Clerk in ATI and for repatriation of the respondent No. 5 to his parent Department in view of the Memo dated 11.6.90 The appellant, Mrinal Kanti Chatterjee, has alternatively prayed for appointment in the post of Accountant with the scale of pay of Rs. 450-675/- with effect from August 1980.

    7. Both the writ applications were heard together and the Learned Trial Court allowed the writ application filed by the respondent No. 5 and directed the State Government and the Director, ATI to regularise his service in the post of Accountant with effect from the date of suspension of his lien in the Orientation and Study Centre while she dismissed the writ application filed by the appellant Mrinal Kanti Chatterjee.

    8. The learned counsel, Mr. Bikash Ranjan Bhattacharyya, appearing for the appellant Mrinal Kanti Chatterjee has taken an inexorable plea that the order impugned in this appeal suffers from several vulnerability. It is contended that the respondent No. 5 being on deputation has no right to be absorbed against the deputation post and he should be reverted to his Department immediately. Thus, the learned writ Court committed palpable illegality directing the State Government for his absorption.

    9. The learned counsel however, indicated that due to the retention of the respondent No. 5 the appellant who is a confirmed U.D.A, has been prevented from getting his next immediate promotional post and a clog on promotion is being created.

    10. Let us now advert to the several correspondences made between the Director, ATI and the other Departments of the Government while taking the service of the respondent No. 5 to the ATI. The then Director ATI requested the Principal, Orientation Study Centre, Kalyani, Nadia for sparing the services of Sri Misra. The Bio-Data of Sri Misra was forwarded to the ATI. The Government was pleased to create the post of Accountant in the Administrative Training institute in the scale of pay of Rs. 330-10-400-15-550/-. The Administrative Training Institute moved the Government as per Annexure ‘G’ to the writ petition filed by the respondent No. 5 for his permanent absorption in the post of Accountant on deputation on 14th May, 1979. The Government in the Home (P & AR) Department in their letter dated 15.9.79 wrote to the Director, ATI for creation of the post of Accountant in the scale of pay of Rs. 330-550/- but declined the time scale pay post of Rs. 450-675/-. Accordingly, the office order was passed by the appellant Director, ATI whereunder the respondent No. 5 was appointed in the post of ‘Accountant’ in the scale of pay of Rs. 330-10-400-15-550/-. After the said order was passed the respondent No. 5 writ petitioner was released from his parent Department, viz. the office of the Principal, Orientation Study Centre, Kalyani and submitted his joining report on 4th July, 1980. The ATI passed an office order on 29th December, 1981 asking the respondent No. 5 to officiate in the post of Head Clerk in addition to his current duties as an Accountant and from then on uninterruptedly he has been working in that capacity. After sometime, the Government was moved for permanent absorption of Sri Misra in the ATI. The parent Department asked about the opinion in the above context. The Deputy Secretary, Home (P & AR) Department in his letter dated 20th August, 1983 informed the Director that the proposal for absorption of Sri Misra will be finalised only after the recruitment Rules of the Employees are framed. Although more than a decade has passed no such Rules has been yet framed by the Government regulating the appointment and the services of the employees of the ATI. We are at a loss to understand how the Government slept over the matter for a decade without taking any steps for framing the Rules and allowed the servants working in the establishment leaving them in the lurch.

    11. The writ petitioner No. 5 raised several contentions before the Court below that he got a valuable right to continue in the office of the ATI. It is further contended that he was brought to the office of the assurance that he shall not only be absorbed in the office but also given the scope of promotion. After allowing him to serve in the office of ATI for a number of years, abruptly neither the ATI nor the Government have any right to repatriate him to his original post. The learned Single Judge has however on a careful consideration of the contentions raised by the parties held that, indubitably, it is true that a deputationist has no right to be absorbed in the borrowing Department as held by the Supreme Court in the case of (1) Ratilal B. Soni v. State of Gujrat, 1990 Supp SCC 243 : AIR 1990 SC 1132, but, since he was allowed to work for a number of years in the establishment of the ATI on the assurance that he will be absorbed permanently, latter on the Government has no right to back out from their commitment. In such situation the principle of promissory estoppel shall be applied.

    12. The learned Single Judge also found that before passing an order of Repatriation the writ petitioner at least should have been given a chance of hearing. Without following the above doctrine the order passed by the authority asking him to join in orientation Institute appears to be arbitrary, whimsical and violative of principles of natural justice.

    13. The learned Trial Court also held that even in the absence of recruitment Rules the Government's right to permanently absorb the deputationist is not in any manner fettered or restricted. The authority has untrammelled power to absorb the writ petitioner in the office of ATI.

    14. The facts of the case lie within narrow campus i.e whether a deputationist has any right to be absorbed on a deputation post and whether he could be given any higher post with higher pay of scale.

    15. The trite position has emerged from the decision reported in the case of Ratilal B. Soni v. State of Gujrat, 1990 Supp SCC 243 : AIR 1990 SC 1132 that a deputationist has no right to be absorbed in the borrowing Department whatever length of service he has put in that establishment. It is, doubtless true that the writ petitioner his times without number requested the authorities of the ATI for his permanent absorption and the authorities also made several correspondences for regularisation of his service. In this back ground, we fail to understand how and why the Government slept over the matters for such a long time without taking any decision either to repatriate the petitioner to the parent department or to finally absorb him in the office of the ATI. In the meanwhile, the parent department has already suspended the lien of the petitioner, in that case, if he would be sent back to the parent department the latter may not agree to absorb him. We do not know if any post commensurate with the experience status and position is available to the petitioner. Furthermore, the petitioner having been allowed to work in the office of the ATI has gained considerable experience. His service can be better utilised if he is allowed to work in that office.

    16. In the case of (2) B.C Sinha v. Union of India reported in 92 CWN at page 852 it has been held:—

    “Where the deputation period of the incumbent the Railways indicated that no extension possible thereafter, the company thereupon offered the incumbent permanent absorption on certain terms, the incumbent accepted the same and relinquished his right to go back to the parent department and both the incumbent and the company acted on the basis of such permanent absorption the sudden and subsequent shifting of stand by, the company to release the incumbent is unreasonable, unfair and is a conduct not in accordance with law.”

    17. In the Division Bench decision, it is held that “he has got to be accepted that while a deputationist may be called back without assigning any reason, yet once it appears that such recall or repatriation is on the ground of alleged fault or the right. The deputationist must be given all reasonable opportunities to meet the allegation as otherwise the order shall fail. Before passing an order of repatriation the lending authority should have been consulted. “Before repatriation a deputationist may not have a right of being heard inasmuch as the doctrine of natural justice cannot be invoked. All the same what is required is that the lending authorities should have been consulted that in case the petitioner is repatriated whether he could be suitable absorbed with the same status and service benefits whatever he is enjoying in the borrowing department.

    18. Mr. Bhattacharjee, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, Chatterjee, advanced an inexorable plea that the respondent No. 5 being appointed on a temporary or stop gap basis cannot claim seniority over the appellant. Although his lien in the parent Department remains temporarily suspended. The question of seniority will be only considered as and when the writ petitioner shall be absorbed finally. In case, an order is passed regarding his absorption, it has to be next determined from what date he shall gain seniority. Those are the things which clearly be within the powers of the borrowing authority. We do not express any final opinion as to whether from what date the respondent No. 5 can claim, his seniority to the appellant Chatterjee. The respondent No. 5 was brought on assurance that he might be permanently absorbed in the establishment of ATI and on such assurance he joined on 7.4.80 From then on he not only continued in the above establishment but also his been discharging the functions of the Head Clerk for nearly about a decade he has been temporarily functioning as such. From the angle of equity if the matter is considered we are of firm views that if they passed an order asking him to join in the parent department great amount of injustice will be done to him. In case the ATI, establishment feels that his continuance in their office may be detrimental against the interest of the other employees they may ask the parent department for creation of such post which will carry not only the same remuneration but also other service benefits the respondent No. 5 ought to have enjoyed had he continued in the establishment. In case the authorities of the ATI feel because of his past long experience of respondent No. 5, his continuance in the establishment is desirable then they pass an administrative order for his permanent absorption and if so from what date the respondent No. 5 will receive his seniority. In the case of B.C Sinha this Court has considered the rationale of Soni's case and it was decided that from an equitable consideration if the matter is viewed, the deputationist should have an opportunity of being heard but we have earlier explained that the deputationist has no right to claim principle of natural justice as thereby there was no breach of statutory obligation. All the same the authorities should sympathetically consider about the continuance of the respondent No. 5 in the post of Accountant.

    19. Mr. Bhattacharjee, the learned counsel for the appellant, has however, strongly urged that in case the services of the respondent No. 5 would be regularised by the appellant ATI, the promotional avenue of the appellant shall be closed for all time to come. It may even be a breeding ground for discontentment, lack of zeal to work and acrimony among the employees who expect promotion in their official hierarchy. To substantiate his submission he placed the notification issued by the Finance Department, Audit Branch dated 6th August, 1985. Admittedly no rules have yet been framed by the authorities regulating the service. The respondent No. 5 has been working as Head Clerk even without any interval in case the appellant ATI take a decision about permanent absorption of writ petitioner and regularise his service they may fix up the interse seniority and prepare a gradation list. After taking suitable decision regarding the filling of the post they may consider the persons found to be eligible to hold such post.

    20. In view of the above discussion we hold that there are several infirmities in the writ Court's decision and we are unable to agree with the same and, accordingly, it is set aside.

    21. In the result, both the appeal succeeds but in the circumstances the parties are to their costs.

    22. Sinha, J.: I agree with the operative portion of the judgment prepared by my learned Brother, Panigrahi, J., but I would like to record separate reasons therefor.

    23. The principal question which, inter alia, arises for consideration in these two appeals is as to whether a deputationist has a legal right to be absorbed.

    24. The answer to the aforementioned question must be rendered in negative.

    25. In Ratilal B. Soni v. State of Gujarat, reported in 1990 Supp SCC 243 : AIR 1990 SC 1132, the Supreme Court clearly held:—

    “The appellants being on deputation they could be reverted to their parent cadre at any time and they do not get any right to be absorbed on the deputation post”.

    26. In (3) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ashoke Deshmookh reported in (1988) 3 SCC 503 : AIR 1988 SC 1240, the apex court while considering Rule 14 of the M.P Civil Service (General Conditions of Service) (Rules) which provided for ‘last come first go’ does not apply to the deputationist from one department to another department.

    27. The Supreme Court noticed the decision of (4) K.H Phadnis v. State Of Maharashtra† . reported in (1971) 1 SCC 790 : AIR 1971 SC 998 and held:—

    “A person holding a temporary post may draw a salary higher than that of his substantive post and when he is reverted to his parent department the loss of salary cannot be said to have any penal consequence. Therefore, though the Government has right to revert a Government servant from the temporary post to a substantive post, the matter has to be viewed as one of the substance and all relevant factors are to be considered in ascertaining whether the order is a genuine one of ‘accident of service’ in which a person sent from the substantive post to a temporary post has to go back to the parent post without an aspersion against his character or integrity or whether the order amounts to a reduction in rank by way of punishment. Reversion by itself will not be a stigma. (Underlining is mine for emphasis)”

    28. However, in that case it was held that the order of repatriation was not passed by way of punishment and it casts stigma. The Supreme Court clearly held:—

    “The impugned order of repatriation passed in respect of the 1st respondent does not on the face of it show that there is any stigma attached to the 1st respondent by reason of the said order. We are clearly of the opinion that the allegations of bias and mala fides made against Smt. Nirmala Buch have remained unsubstantiated. The 1st respondent had no vested right to continue on deputation as Block Development Officer. On the material placed before us we do not find that order of repatriation is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution”.

    29. In (5) Dr. Shree Krishan v. Union of India, reported in 1990 (5) SLR 251, a division bench of Allahabad High Court while considering a question as to whether a Central Govt. employee deputed to a state service, would be amenable to the jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunal held that an employee on deputation continue to hold lien on his parent department and on his being sent to the local body, corporation or society; he continues to function under the rules of such local authority, corporation or society but always subject to authority of the parent department to call him back whenever it desires. This position would continue till a final absorption is made of such employee in the local body corporation or society and the parent body approves of such absorption and delinks his service from the parent department. (Underlining is mine for emphasis).

    30. In (6) Amrik Singh… v. Union Of India & Anr.…, reported in 1986 (3) SLR 273 a bench of Central Administrative Tribunal held that a person on deputation can only be repatriated to his parent department. It was further held that the petitioner has no unilateral right to be absorbed in the Corporation and the Corporation is not obliged by the terms of the deputation, approved by the Appointments Committee, to necessarily absorb him at the end of two years. (Underlining is mine for emphasis).

    31. In (7) Daulat Ram Sharma v. Union of India, reported in 1990 (7) SLR (CAT) 303 it was held:—

    “The plea of the petitioner that he had been serving in the SSB for a period of more than 19 years, it would be unfair and unjust to repatriate him to parent department, he is used to the work he has been handling for about two decades and shall be a stronger to the new work which he would be required to do in the event of his repatriation and therefore, he should be absorbed in the SSB, has scarcely nothing to commend itself. This is so for the reason that the question of absorption in the SSB is regulated in accordance with the statutory rules viz., 1996 Rules. In view thereof, mere lapse or passage of time would not entitle one to be absorbed”.

    32. In (8) Shri Inder Raj Kakar v. Delhi Transport Undertaking, reported in 1972 SLR 39, it has been held that the officer on deputation remains employee of parent organisation till his lien is terminated and thus deputationist should be considered for promotion in his parent organisation.

    33. In (9) Harbhanjan Malian Assistant v. State of Punjab, reported in 1986 (3) SLR 443, a learned Single Judge of Punjab and Haryana High Court observed:—

    “The Government vide its order, the relevant part of which has already been quoted above, has clearly stated that the petitioner can be reverted to his parent department ‘where his lien may still be in tact, or it can be revived’. In view of this specific order, the petitioner, to my mind, need not have any misapprehension”.

    34. The learned Judge in that case directed that the petitioner be treated to be as an employee of the department from the date he was reverted to the said office and given all that is due to him treating him to be continuing therein.

    35. There lies a distinction between an appointment by transfer and deputation. In a case where an appointment is made by a transfer, the appointee gets right over the post whereas in case of deputation he derives no such right. This aspect of the matter has been considered by the Supreme Court in (1992) 4 SCC 725 : AIR 1993 SC 1974. The Supreme Court posed the question as to whether the appellant was appointed by transfer or on deputation. Upon reading the entire order as a whole the Supreme Court held that the appellant was appointed by transfer and thus the question of his repatriation to his parent department does not arise.

    36. In (10) Ram Prakash Makkar v. State of Haryana reported in 1993 (2) LLJ 1053, a division bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court on construction of the correspondences of the concerned departments held that the appointee was merely deputed to serve in the Directorate and that he can be reverted back to his parent department as and when his services were not required. The division bench also observed that the post in which the appellant was appointed as well as the department itself in which he was appointed was temporary and therefore the question of his substantive appointment to the post of Assistant or Personal Assistant cannot arise.

    37. The said decision has been referred to in (11) Albert v. State Of Kerala, reported in 1994 (2) LLJ 445, wherein it has held that the employee has no right to be deputed or to continue on deputation.

    38. In (12) Indrajit Prasad Vinit v. State of Bihar, reported in 1994 (2) BLJ 151 : 1995 (1) PLJR 487, a division bench of the Patna High Court (of which I was a member) held that a deputationist does not have any legal right to continue.

    39. The learned Trial Judge while following Soni's case (supra) held that there are four exceptions to the law laid down therein, namely:—

    1. Where the doctrine of promissory estoppel is applicable,

    2. Where it amounts to reduction in rank,

    3. Where the order is arbitrary or discriminatory,

    4. Where the order has been passed without giving opportunity of right to be heard.

    40. The learned Judge held that exception 2 aforementioned has no application in the instant case.

    41. So far as the question of promissory estoppel is concerned, the learned trial Judge relied upon a decision of U.C Banerjee, J. in Bimal Chandra Sinha v. Union of India reported in 92 CWN 852.

    42. The said decision is not applicable to the fact of the instant case. In that case the petitioner had been an employee of the railways and was deputed to the services of Burn Standard Company Ltd. Upon expiry of the deputation period the railways indicated that no extension was possible thereafter, whereupon the company offered the incumbent permanent absorption on certain terms which was accepted by him, and in that situation the learned Judge held that the subsequent shifting of stand by the company to release the incumbent was unreasonable, unfair and its conduct was not in accordance with law. The learned Judge applied the principles of promissory estoppel in the said fact situation. If an employee is released by his parent department and absorbed by the department where he had been sent on deputation, he becomes an employee of the concerned department and in such a situation he does not remain a deputationist at all.

    43. The learned Judge analysed the situation by posing a question whether he could himself go back to the railways to which the answer of the railways was rendered in negative.

    44. The decisions of the Supreme Court in (13) Union of India v. Godfrey Philips India Ltd. reported in (1985) 4 SCC 369 : AIR 1986 SC 806 and (14) Surya Narain Yadav v. Bihar State Electricity Board, reported in (1985) 3 SCC 38 : AIR 1985 SC 941 stand absolutely on different footing and have no bearing to the fact of the present case.

    45. The service conditions of the employees are governed by the Rules framed either under a statute or under the rules framed under proviso appended to Act 309 of the Constitution of India.

    46. In this case also the respondent Shri Mishra evidently was sent on deputation in terms of provisions of the West-Bengal Service Rules. In such a situation, the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot possibly be made to apply as it is well known that there cannot be any estoppel against the statute. For attracting the principles of promissory estoppel the following three pre-conditions must be fulfilled:—

    1. Unequivocal promise by a public authority.

    2. An act or omission resulting from the representation, whether actual or by conduct by the person to whom the representation is made.

    3. Alteration of his position by the promisee pursuant to such promise.

    47. Reference in this connection may be made to (15) Sone Vanaspati Ltd.… v. The State Of Bihar & Ors.…, reported in 1995 (1) PLJR 2.

    48. In (16) Amrit Banaspati Co. Ltd. v. State of Punjab, reported in (1992) 2 SCC 411, it has been held that promise or agreement which is prohibited by statute or is against public policy cannot be enforced in Court.

    49. Doctrine of promissory estoppel does not bring within its fold hope, expectation or anticipation. The said, doctrine is based on equitable considerations and is applicable only in the event the conditions precedent therefor are fulfilled.

    50. In this case, admittedly it had all along been stated that Shri Mishra can be permanently absorbed only upon finalisation the Recruitment Rules. Thus although the absorption of Shri Mishra was proposed no unequivocal promise was made to him. The doctrine of promissory estoppel may be made applicable in service jurisprudence, inter alia, in a case where a State held out certain specific promise as an inducement for the appellant to move to a new department which the employees acted thereon relying on the said representation, the State cannot back track on the said promise from giving the benefits which are promised to the employees. Shri Mishra admittedly was brought on deputation. The rules relating to deputation of a government servant applicable in his case. It is not and cannot be his case that the terms of deputation were not applicable to him. He had all along been informed that the question of his absorption would be dependent upon framing of new rules. Unless such rules were framed, the case of Shri Mishra was to be governed by the existing rules of his parent department.

    51. In dealing with the case of legitimate expectation the Supreme Court recently in (17) Madras City Wine Merchants' Association v. State of Tamil Nadu, reported in (1994) 5 SCC 509 has held:—

    “From the above it is clear that legitimate expectation may arise:—

    (a) if there is an express promise given by a public authority; or

    (b) because of the existence of a regular practice which the claimant can reasonably expect to continue;

    (c) Such an expectation must be reasonable.

    However, if there is a change in policy or in public interest the position is altered by a rule or legislation, no question of legitimate expectation would arise.”

    52. Same principles apply in case of promissory estoppel also.

    53. However, there cannot be any doubt that where an action on the part of the State is wholly unreasonable or arbitrary; the court has a right to hold that the order of repatriation is had in law.

    54. In (18) Kamal Kanti Chatterjee v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Calcutta being FMAT No. 3064 of 1989, the learned Judges described Soni's case (supra) as ‘a short one page judgment’ and observed that although a person on deputation has no right to be absorbed in the deputation post but that gets them nowhere. The learned Judges compared the case of awarding of a government contract on the ground that although a person may not have any legal right to be awarded a contract as such a contract is required to be awarded to the lowest bidder.

    55. The division bench says:—

    “So also a deputationist may have to be absorbed in the deputation post, not because he has any right to it, but because a non-absorption on the part of the government would be unsustainable as, being say, irrational and wholly unreasonable”.

    56. The learned Judge further observed:—

    “Today a public body may be successfully sued not only in a duty-right situation, but also, under appropriate circumstances in a privilege-no-right situation as well.”

    57. With utmost respect to the learned Judges, in my opinion, the reasonings are fallacious. While interfering with in a matter of grant of contract no right is conferred by a Court where there is none but because an award of contract to another person may be directed to be cancelled on the ground that the same is arbitrary and thus violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The administrative action of State is subject to judicial review only if any illegality, irrationality or procedural impropriety is committed by the State in its decision making process. There are well defined limitations under which a Court can strike down as administrative action See (19) Tata Cellulor v. Union of India, reported in (1994) 6 SCC 651.

    58. Mr. Ukil, learned Govt. Pleader appearing on behalf of the State, however, has drawn our attention to the note of the Service Book of the petitioner, maintained by the Principal Orientation and Study Centre, Kalyani wherein it was stated:—

    “If Shri Mishra has at any time to come back, he will be provided in the same position in O & S.C, Kalyani from which he was released in terms of Order No. 4448-CDP/8p-3/75 dated 3.4.1979 of Panchayat & C.D (CD) Department.”

    59. The learned Counsel submitted that the Finance Department took exception to Shri Mishra's deputation for long period of 10 years and it opined to revert back to his parent department, if his absorption could not be finalised in a short time. By a letter dated 25th May, 1988 Sri Mishra prayed for his absorption pending finalisation of the Recruitment Rules by the Government on the ground that he had continuously working for more than 8 years. The joint Secretary, Govt. of West Bengal, in terms of his letter dated 11th June, 1990 observed:—

    “Considering the fact that the finalisation of recruitment rules of the Staff of ATI will still take a lot of time and that Shri Mishra's deputation to ATI for an indefinite period as well as his absorption in the deputation post will affect the promotion prospect of the regular staff of ATI, this Department suggests that Sri Mishra should immediately be repatriated to his parent Department and the vacancy so created should be filled up by deputation of suitable staff from State Government Department till the recruitment rules are finalised.”

    60. It is, however, beyond anybody's comprehension as to why a draft rule could not be finalised for a period of about 12 years.

    61. In this case the learned trial Judge held that Shri Mishra's parent department washed its hand off him.

    62. If this be the position, there cannot be any doubt, than an employee cannot be dealt with in such a manner. Either he should be absorbed in ATI or is sent back to his parent department but because of in-action on the part of the concerned department he cannot be permitted to suffer both ways.

    63. It is really unfortunate that the fate of a poor employee who had been working with all sincerity and whose performance had been stated to be outstanding was kept hanging for such a long time.

    64. Although Mr. Ukil submitted that Shri Mishra would be given his all benefits in the parent department, no such record has been produced before us.

    65. Rule 20(2) of the West Bengal Service Rules (part-I) reads thus:—

    “The lien of a Government servant on a permanent post which he holds substantively may be suspended if he is deputed out of India or transferred to foreign service, or, in circumstances not covered by sub-rule (1), is transferred whether in a substantive or officiating capacity, to a post in another cadre, and if in any of these cases there is reason to believe that he will remain absent from the post on which he holds a lien for a period of not less than three years.”

    66. The lien of the Private Respondent has been suspended in terms of the aforesaid rule. No order recalling the earlier order has been passed. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, it would be wholly unjust to repatriate him.

    67. In (20) T. Shantharam v. State of Karnataka, reported in (1995) 2 SCC 538, the apex court despite holding that the appellant before it was deputed on a higher post de hors the rules, in view of his 27 years satisfactory service, held:—

    “Under these circumstances though initially he might have mistakenly been deputed to hold higher post in the Food and Civil Supplies Department, since the appellant had obviously discharged his duties and higher responsibilities to the satisfaction of all concerned, at this distance of time, it is highly unjust to send him back to hold the post in the present department which he was entitled to hold.”

    68. It is, however, difficult to uphold that before passing the impugned order, Shri Mishra was entitled to have an opportunity of being heard.

    69. (21) Mm. Nilima Misra v. Dr. Harinder Kaur Paintal reported in (1990) 2 SCC 746 : AIR 1990 SC 1402 upon which strong reliance has been placed by the learned trial Judge has no application to the fact of the present case. As indicated hereinbefore, the law is now well settled that as a deputationist has no legal right to be absorbed in the department which he has been serving on deputation. Only because he may suffer from pecuniary loss by reason of an order of a repatriation, the same does not involve any civil consequences. Principles of natural justice are required to be complied with only in the event the administrative action of the State in relation to an employee is fraught with civil consequences or the same casts any stigma on the employee. Such is not the position here.

    70. It is, thus, not possible to uphold the decision of the learned trial Judge to the effect that even if Shri Mishra's appointment to the post of Head Clerk was irregular, he was entitled to get an opportunity of being heard.

    71. It is now well settled that a person acting on an officiating post has no right thereto and he can be reverted to a substantive post.

    72. In (22) Ramesh Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar reported in (1978) 1 SCC 37 : AIR 1978 SC 327, the apex court quoted its earlier judgment in (23) Muni Subrat Jain v. State of Haryana reported in (1977) 1 SCC 486 : (1977) 1 SCC 486 : AIR 1977 SC 276 at page 277 wherein it has been stated:—

    “A person can be said to be aggrieved only when a person is denied a legal right by someone who has a legal duty to do something or to abstain from doing something.”

    73. There is another aspect of the matter. A person's seniority can be counted only from the date of his regularisation in service and not from his ad hoc or purely temporary appointment.

    74. Reference in this connection may be made to (24) Masood Aktar Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in 1990 (5) SLR 639, (25) Ashok Gulati v. B.S Jain, reported in 1986 Supp SCC 597 : AIR 1987 SC 424, (26) Keshab Chandra Joshi v. Union of India, reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 272 : AIR 1991 SC 284 and a recent decision of the Supreme Court in (27) V. Sreenivasa Reddy v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh, reported in JT 1994 (6) SC 461 : 1995 Supp (1) SCC 572 : AIR 1995 SC 586. The apex court stated the law in the following terms:—

    “It is now well settled law that appointment/promotion must be in accordance with the Rules, direct recruitee takes his seniority from the date on which be starts discharging the duty of the post borne on the cadre while a temporary appointee appointed fie hors the rules or on ad hoc basis or to a fortuitous vacancy gets seniority from the date of regular appointment”.

    75. In (28) Puranjit Singh v. Union Territory of Chandigarh, reported in 1994 (69) FLR 1027, the Supreme Court observed:—

    “The petitioner's seniority has therefore, to be counted in his parent department which is the Engineering Department of the Chandigarh Administration, and he has also to earn his promotions in the said Department according to the rules and as and when the appointments are made to the vacancies which become available in that Department. He can neither count his seniority on the basis of his service prior to his fresh career as a direct recruit nor can be claim his promotion on the basis of the post or posts that he had held in the organisations to which he was deputed”.

    76. Moreover, it is now well known that if an appointment and/or promotion is made in violation of a mandatory provisions of the statute and/or Article 16 of the Constitution of India, the same would be a nullity. While an appointment is a nullity, the principles of natural justice are not required to be complied with and a declaration in that regard would be sufficient. Even in the matter an ad hoc promotion, Article 16 of the Constitution has to be complied with.

    77. In (29) Ex Capt. K. Balsubramaniam v. State of Tamil Nadu, reported in (1991) 2 SCC 708, it was held since the said orders were invalid, the petitioners would not claim any right on the basis of said orders and there was, therefore, no question of affording them of opportunity of hearing before passing the order dated 3rd March, 1980.

    78. In the instant case it is not disputed that the appellants and respondents had been appointed on the same scale of pay. It is, therefore, not a case where the post of Head Clerk and/or Accountant is of the same cadre, Shri Mishra was appointed on a lower scale of pay although the scale of pay of Accountant is higher. It is also not disputed that the appellant was also entitled to be promoted to the post of Head Clerk. If the post of Head Clerk is a promotional post for both Accountant as also Upper Division Clerk, non-consideration of the appellant's case for such post' violated his right under Article 16 of the Constitution and thus the order of posting of Shri Mishra to the post of Head Clerk on a permanent basis would be a nullity being in violation of appellant's right under Article 16 of the Constitution.

    79. In this case, there is absolutely no dispute that Shri Mishra has been sent on deputation. A person in order to claim promotion on a substantive basis in a borrowing department must first be brought in its cadre by absorbing him therein. The date from which such absorption shall take place is a matter which would fall for consideration of the concerned authority. Such an order must be passed upon taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case and on relevant consideration.

    80. For the foregoing reasons, I am of the opinion that all the questions should be considered afresh by the concerned authorities in accordance with law at an early date.

    81. S.K.G

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Director Of Administrative Training Institute & Ors. v. Sri Subhas Chandra Misra & Anr.
    (May 16, 1995)