Altamas Kabir, J.:—These two writ petitions have been assigned to this Court for hearing and have been taken up together for disposal as they concern the same premises and involve the same questions of fact and law.
2. While the matters were pending hearing, an application was made by the writ petitioner in C.O No. 13062(W) of 1996 for adding several persons as writ petitioners in the writ petition and to also add Satyam Properties and Vindhya Builders Pvt. Ltd. as respondents therein. The said application was allowed by an order dated 2nd August, 1996, and one Mr. Susanta Kumar Das, learned Advocate, entered appearance on their behalf. Ultimately, the added respondents did not take any further steps on the matter and no submission was made on their behalf at the final hearing of the two applications.
3. Admittedly, the first writ petition filed on the Appellate Side was prepared in a great hurry and leave was, accordingly, granted to the writ petitioners to file a supplementary affidavit which was affirmed and filed on 5th August, 1996.
4. Appearing in support of the writ petition, Mr. Sakti Nath Mukherjee submitted that the Distress Warrant, which is, in fact, the subject matter of the instant writ petitions, had not been issued in accordance with law and the authorities of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation, hereinafter referred to as the “Corporation”, were not, therefore, entitled to enforce or execute the same.
5. Mr. Mukherjee urged that Art. 265 of the Constitution specifically provides that no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law. Mr. Mukherjee pointed out that a distinction had been made between “levy” and “collection” of taxes. While s. 170 of the 1980 Act entitled the Corporation to levy taxes, the procedure for collection was provided under Ss. 216, 217, 219 and 220 thereof.
6. In this connection, Mr. Mukherjee referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Municipal Council, Khurai v. Kamal Kumar, reported in AIR 1965 SC at Page 1321, wherein while considering the provisions of Art. 265 of the Constitution, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the said provisions clearly implied that the procedure for imposing the liability to pay a tax has to be strictly complied with and where it is not so complied with the liability to pay the tax cannot be said to be according to law.
7. Reference was also made to a Bench decision of the Court in Prosad Kumar Mondal v. The Commissioners of Krishnanagore Municipality, reported in 1978 (1) CLJ at Page 276, where in the context of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932, it was held that since the Assessor in determining the annual values did not comply with the provisions of Rules 8(a), 9 and 10 of the Municipal Rules, such non-compliance rendered the valuation made by the Assessor ultra vires.
8. Mr. Mukherjee urged that a Distress Warrant could be issued under s. 219 of the 1980 Act only after the earlier provisions of Chapter XVI of the Act, which deal with payment and recovery of taxes, had been complied with. He then submitted that when any tax levied under the 1980 Act became due, a duty was cast upon the Municipal Commissioner under s. 216 of the said Act to cause presentation to the person liable for payment thereof a bill for the amount due. If the said bill was not paid within thirty days from the date of presentation thereof, the Municipal Commissioner could, under the provisions of s. 217, cause service upon the person liable for payment a notice of demand in such form as may be specified. Provision was also made for payment of simple interest on bills remaining unpaid after thirty days of presentation and penalty, in addition to the amount of tax and Notice fee.
9. Mr. Mukherjee urged that only after a bill had been duly presented to the person liable to make payment thereof and upon such person failing to pay the billed amount within thirty days of service of notice of demand under s. 217 of the 1980 Act, could, the Corporation invoke the provisions of s. 219 thereof for recovery of the outstanding dues from the person liable for making such payment.
10. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that only thereafter it would be lawful for the officer or other employee of the Corporation to whom a Distress Warrant issued is addressed, to act under s. 220 of the said Act and to distrain any movable property belonging to the person liable in the manner provided for. Mr. Mukherjee urged that there could not be any default in the absence of presentation of a bill, so as to warrant the issuance of a Distress Warrant.
11. Mr. Mukherjee urged that at every stage, from the stage of presentation of the bill till the issuance of Distress Warrant for recovery of the amounts due, it is the person liable to make payment to whom the bill and the notice of demand are required to be served and whose property could be distrained under Ss. 219 and 220 of the 1980 Act. Mr. Mukherjee urged that in cases where recovery of dues was required to be preceded by a notice, and such notice was not given, all steps taken to recover such dues would be void and illegal.
12. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that the aforesaid principle had been explained in decisions which have stood the test of time.
13. Referring to the decision of a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Purna Chandra Chatterjee v. Dinabandhu Mukherjee reported in 11 CWN at page 756, which was rendered in respect of a proceeding under the Public Demands Recovery Act, 1895. Mr. Mukherjee pointed out that it had been observed that a sale held without service of notice, as required under s. 10 of the said Act, is wholly without authority and is a nullity.
14. Mr. Mukherjee then referred to a Bench decision of this Court in the case of Subimal Ch. Chatterji… v. The Corporation Of Calcutta….*, reported in 51 CWN at Page 326, where the provisions of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923, for recovery of the occupier's share of the taxes were under consideration. Mr. Mukherjee urged that the provisions in the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923, for levy and recovery of taxes remained substantially unchanged both in the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 and the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980. He submitted that in the said decision it was held that presentation of a bill was a condition precedent to the institution of distress proceedings. In the said context it was also held, inter alia, that no one becomes a defaulter unless he has failed to pay the rate within the specified period after presentation of the bill.
15. Mr. Mukherjee next referred to a Bench decision of this Court in the case of Mrityunjoy Bhattacharyee v. Ashutosh De, reported in 58 CWN at Page 410, wherein it was held that under Ss. 155 and 156 of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932, a Distress Warrant could be issued only after the rate bill had been presented to the rate-payer in question to start with, and he had been further served with a notice of demand which was to be accompanied with a copy of the rate bill already served and when he had failed to pay up the arrears within fifteen days of the service of the demand notice. Their Lordships also observed that if, therefore, no rate bill had at all been presented to the rate-payer and if, further, no demand notice had been served, a Distress Warrant could not legally be issued, because the very basis of a Distress Warrant is the failure of the rate-payer to pay up the dues within fifteen days of service of a demand notice, after he had been served with a rate bill and the demand notice in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Their Lordships held that when the very basis itself was not available, the Distress Warrant would run the risk of being illegal or invalid, since the defects were not merely formal defects and irregularities curable by the provisions of s. 537 or 538 of the Act, but were far more serious ones, amounting to complete non-observation of the provisions of the statute or non-compliance of the requirements of the statute.
16. In this regard, reference was also made to the Bench decision of this Court in the case of Administrator, Uttarpara Kotrung Municipality v. Girija Prosad Pal, reported in A.I.R 1971 Calcutta at Page 207, wherein not only was the aforesaid principle reiterated, but it was also held that the owner of the premises in question must be served with notice of demand by the Tax Collector personally and service by registered post did not amount to sufficient compliance.
17. The next case referred to by Mr. Mukherjee is the case of Hakim Soban Ali v. Kanai Lal Sarma, reported in 60 CWN at Page 948, wherein a learned Single Judge of this Court, while considering the provisions of s. 155 of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932, held that, although, no bill or notice of demand had been presented to the petitioner, such non-presentation did not preclude the Municipality from recovering the amount due by suit under s. 162, but the effect of such non-presentation of the bill and the notice of demand was that the Municipality could not take recourse to the special procedure of levy by Distress provided under Ss. 156 to 164 of the said Act.
18. Reference was also made to the case of the Indian Hotels Co. Ltd. v. The Calcutta Municipal Corporation, reported in 1994 (2) CLJ at Page 491, wherein I had occasion to consider the provisions of Chapter-XVI of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980, relating to the scheme of recovery of rates and taxes and I had held that presentation of bill is a pre-condition for imposing interest and penalty and the provisions of s. 219 could be invoked only if a person liable for payment did not, within thirty days of the service of demand under s. 217, pay the amount due. Mr. Mukherjee pointed out that in the said case I had held that a bill has to be presented to the rate-payer within a specific time when the rate payable for a quarter becomes due, and, thereafter, the liability to pay is converted into a recoverable due and non-payment of the dues after presentation of the bill gives rise to the consequences mentioned in Ss. 217, 219, 220, 221, 221A, 221B, 223 and 228 of the said Act.
19. On this point Mr. Mukherjee lastly referred to a rather interesting decision of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of The Surat City Municipality v. Chhabildas Dharamchand, reported in 16 Bom LR at Page 749. The said appeal arose out of a suit filed by the respondent, Chhabildas Dharamchand for recovery of an amount realised from him by the Municipality on account of arrears of house tax by execution of a Distress Warrant. The respondent paid the amount in execution of the Distress Warrant under protest but filed a suit to recover the same. In the second appeal preferred by The Surat City Municipality, it was held that the bill, on the basis of which the Distress Warrant had been issued and served upon the plaintiff did not fulfil all the statutory requirements and the procedure followed, therefore, was not legal. It was observed that the whole right of Distress was dependent upon the observations of the statutory formalities. On the said ground alone it was held that the Distress was illegal and the degree of the Lower Appellate Court was confirmed.
20. Mr. Mukherjee then urged that a Distress Warrant issued under s. 219 of the 1980 Act was an action inpersonam and in respect of the movable property only of the person liable. Making a comparison between the provisions of s. 220 and s. 232 of the 1980 Act, Mr. Mukherjee pointed out that while under s. 220 a Distress could be levied against only the movable property of the person liable, under s. 232 the consolidated rates on lands and buildings due from any person would, subject to the prior payment of land revenue, if any, due to the Government, be a first charge upon the land and the building belonging to such person and also upon the movable properties, if any, found within or upon such land or building.
21. Mr. Mukherjee then referred to certain observations made by Duraiswami Aiyangar in his “Law of Municipal Corporations in British India” (2nd Edition), 1924, where in dealing with collection of taxes the learned author had observed that the procedures to be adopted for the collection of taxes due to Municipal Corporations is prescribed by the various statutes in detail and they were required to be strictly followed. The obligation to pay the taxes arises whether it is demanded or not, but proceedings for recovery cannot be taken unless there has been a demand and a neglect or refusal to pay. The learned author went on to observe that in the event the taxes remained unpaid, despite service of the bill and notice of demand, power had been given to the Municipal Corporations to recover the tax due by the distraint and sale of the movable property of the defaulter.
22. Mr. Mukherjee urged that without due compliance of the provisions of Ss. 216 and 217 of the 1980 Act, the Calcutta Municipal Corporation and its authorities were not competent to proceed under Ss. 219 and 220 of the said Act.
23. Having regard to the unchanged provisions relating to Distress proceedings in the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923, the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951, the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 and the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932, Mr. Mukherjee urged that the same amounted to legislative approval to judicial pronouncements on the said provisions from time to time and in that regard he also referred to the Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Renuka Pachal v. Chapa Guha Neogy & Ors., reported in AIR 1978 Calcutta at Page 457. Mr. Mukherjee urged that s. 224 of the 1980 Act which provides that any distraint proceeding should not be held to be unlawful for want of form, was not simply a matter of form but of substance, as was indicated in the case of Mrityunjoy Bhattacharyee v. Ashutosh De (supra).
24. It was then submitted by Mr. Mukherjee that in the instant case, although, the writ petitioners were admittedly in occupation of premises No. 3, Alipore Road, Calcutta, and the Distress Warrant, impugned in the writ petition, was attempted to be executed against the occupants thereof, neither were any bills presented to the writ petitioners nor was any notice of demand served on them under Ss. 216 and 217 of the 1980 Act which was a condition precedent for the issuance of such Distress Warrant.
25. Mr. Mukherjee urged that the said Warrant did not even indicate the names of the writ petitioners as being the persons liable whose movable goods were to be distrained under the said Distress Warrant. Mr. Mukherjee urged that except for the name of the bailiff and the number of the premises, no other particulars were given as to against whom and in respect of whose movable properties the Distress Warrant was to be executed.
26. Mr. Mukherjee urged that in the absence of the said particulars, the Distress Warrant was not capable of being executed against the writ petitioners.
27. Mr. Mukherjee also pointed out from the rate bills sent to Bajoria Properties Pvt. Ltd. that the same were addressed to Mackinnon & Mackenzie Co. Pvt. Ltd., who were shown in the Municipal records to be the owners of the aforesaid premises.
28. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that no bill having being presented to the petitioners and no notice of demand having been served on them as the persons liable to make payment of the outstanding dues, the Distress Warrant issued on the basis of the bill presented to Mackinnon & Mackenzie Co. Pvt. Ltd., could not be executed against the petitioners in respect of their movable properties.
29. Mr. Mukherjee pointed out that, although, the name of Bajoria Properties Pvt. Ltd, has been mutated in the records of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation by the Deputy Assessor by his order of 12th Decemeber, 1985, the notice of demand had been sent to Mackinnon & Mackenzie Co. Pvt. Ltd., under care of Bajoria Properties Pvt. Ltd.
30. Mr. Mukherjee lastly contended that the notice of demand under s. 217 of the 1980 Act had not also been served either on Bajoria Properties Pvt. Ltd. or on Mackinnon & Mackenzie Co. Pvt. Ltd. in keeping with the provision of s. 537 of the 1980 Act, which provides that where the person to be served is a Company, the document should be addressed to the Secretary of the Company at its registered office or at its principal office or place of business and is either to be sent by registered post or delivered at the registered office or at the principal office or place of business of the Company.
31. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that an objection filed on behalf of Bajoria Properties Pvt. Ltd. under s. 186 of the 1980 Act, regarding assessment of Municipal rates, was disposed of under Rule 9(2) of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation (Taxation) Rules, 1987, but no copy of the order disposing of the said objection was sent to the said Company which, however, has been paying all the bills which had been sent to it.
32. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that the Distress Warrant ought not to have been issued against the Company without an opportunity being given to the Company to challenge the decision in terms of Rule 9(2) of the above Rules read with s. 189 of the 1980 Act.
33. Mr. Anindya Mitra, who appeared in support of the writ petition filed by Bajoria Properties Pvt. Ltd. on the Original Side, adopted Mr. Mukherjee's submissions and added that the provisions of s. 224 of the 1980 Act were to indemnify persons authorised to execute Distress Warrants, in the event after execution thereof a defect in form was discovered. Mr. Mitra urged that the said provisions would not cure any initial defect in the Distress Warrant and would not apply in a case where such defective Warrant was yet to be executed.
34. Mr. Mitra also contended that since the notice of demand, as contemplated under s. 217 of the 1980 Act, had been addressed to Mackinnon & Mackenzie Co. Pvt. Ltd., the writ petitioner Company could not be said to be the person liable in respect of such notice and the Distress Warrant could not, therefore, be executed in respect of the movable properties of Bajoria Properties Pvt. Ltd, lying at premises No. 3, Alipore Road, Calcutta.
35. It was then submitted that an order of assessment made in respect of a premises under Rule 9(2) of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation (Taxation) Rules, 1987, read with s. 188(3) of the 1980 Act, is required to be served on the person making an objection and he would be entitled to file an appeal against such order under s. 189 of the said Act within forty-five days from the date of service of a copy of the order of assessment under s. 188 thereof. Mr. Mitra urged that the memorandum of appeal was required to be accompanied by a copy of the said order and since the same had not been served on the Company, no appeal could be preferred therefrom.
36. Mr. Mitra contended that the Distress Warrant disclosed in Court was an inchoate document, incapable of execution. Mr. Mitra urged that the Distress Warrant had been issued in a blanket form, which empowered the authority named therein to distrain the movables of anyone who happened to be present on the premises at the time of visit of the said authority.
37. Referring to the decision of this Court in the case of Md. Abdul Hai v. Gujraj Sahai, reported in I.L.R 20 Calcutta at Page 826, Mr. Mitra urged that the power of distraint is confined to movable property belonging to the person liable and the Warrant Officer cannot be vested with greater powers than that conferred by the statute. Mr. Mitra urged that the omissions in the Distress Warrant could not be said to be a defect in form but of substance.
38. Mr. Mitra also contended that the notice directing removal of the females from the premises was not authorised under the provisions of the 1980 Act and was wholly inconsistent with the provisions of s. 220 of the said Act and the respondents were not entitled to act on the basis thereof.
39. Mr. Mitra then urged that in 1986 a major portion of premises No. 3, Alipore Road, Calcutta, had been transferred in favour of Satyam Properties & Finance Pvt. Ltd. to raise a multi-storeyed building to be known as “Satyam Towers”, Mr. Mitra urged that the transferee had applied for mutation to the Calcutta Municipal authorities, but the said application was yet to be disposed of.
40. Mr. Mitra submitted that on the basis of the assessment made of the old building retained by Bajoria Properties Pvt. Ltd. the rates and taxes payable would be about Rs. 3,240/- per quarter, whereas the bills were raised for Rs. 4,320/- per quarter in the name of Mackinnon & Mackenzie Co. Pvt. Ltd., but were being regularly paid by the petitioner Company.
41. Mr. Mitra urged that the Distress Warrant was not capable of being executed, more so against the petitioners, and was liable to be quashed together with the notice dated 1st August, 1996.
42. Appearing for the Calcutta Municipal Corporation and its authorities, Mr. Asoke Das Adhikary, learned advocate, firstly urged that under sub-s. (1) of s. 183 of the 1980 Act whenever the title of any person to any land or building is transferred, both the transferor and transferee of such land or building are required within three months after the execution of the instrument of transfer or after its registration, or if no instrument is executed, after such transfer is effected, give notice of such transfer in writing to the Municipal Commissioner. Mr. Das Adhikary then submitted that in the absence of any such notice under sub-s. (4) of s. 183 the transferor continued to be liable for payment of the consolidated rates and penalty, if any, together with the transferee.
43. Mr. Das Adhikary urged that even if Bajoria Properties Pvt. Ltd. had transferred a major portion of the premises in question to Satyam Properties and Vindhya Builders Pvt. Ltd., in the absence of any notice of such transfer it continued to remain liable for payment of the consolidated rates and taxes and penalty along with the transferees. Mr. Das Adhikary urged that the same principle would be equally applicable in the case of the petitioners in the writ application of Ratanlal Agarwala and Others, and they were all liable for payment of the consolidated rates and taxes and penalty imposed thereupon.
44. Mr. Das Adhikary urged that in view of the aforesaid provisions in the 1980 Act, a duty and/or obligation had been cast on a transferee of a land or building or a portion thereof to apply for mutation or his/her name with the Calcutta Municipal Corporation irrespective of whether a formal conveyance had been executed and registered or not in favour of the transferee applicant.
45. Mr. Das Adhikary also referred to the provisions of sub-s. (4) of s. 178 of the 1980 Act which, inter alia, provides for the mutation of sub-divided portions of a building, if the same is divided into separate shares, or for amalgamation if such shares are united into one ownership. Mr. Das Adhikary urged that the petitioners, as the owners of the sub-divided portions of the newly-constructed building at 3, Alipore Road, Calcutta, should have applied for mutation of their names in respect of the portions of the building occupied by them.
46. Mr. Das Adhikary then urged that under s. 232 of the 1980 Act, the consolidated rates on lands and buildings were to be a first-charge upon the land or the building and upon the movable property, if any, found within or upon such land or building.
47. It was also submitted that the Distress Warrant which was to be executed in respect of the movable properties of the petitioner at Premises No. 3, Alipore Road, Calcutta, could not be said to be defective, as claimed on behalf of the petitioners, in the absence of the particulars of the petitioners thereupon in view of the provisions of s. 232 referred to above. Mr. Das Adhikary submitted that the Distress Warrant issued under s. 219 of the 1980 Act, was issued, not against a person but against a property and the movable properties kept therein and since the premises had been described in the Distress Warrant, it was sufficient for the purposes of Ss. 219 and 220 read with s. 232 of the 1980 Act.
48. Reference was also made to the provisions of Ss. 224 and 227 of the 1980 Act which provides that distraint shall not be unlawful for want of form and taxes levied would not be deemed to be invalid for defect of form. Mr. Das Adhikary urged that the tax assessed in respect of the premises in question could not be altered, except by way of appeal, merely because of a defect in form, which was not of a substantial nature.
49. Mr. Das Adhikary urged that the fact that taxes were payable for the new building could not be denied and in the absence of any information from the petitioners in keeping with the provisions of s. 183(1) and (4) of the 1980 Act, their names could not be included in the body of the Distress Warrant. In any event, inasmuch as, the premises had been properly described, the Warrant could not be deemed to be unlawful for want of form.
50. Reference was also made by Mr. Das Adhikary to s. 590 of the 1980 Act which generally provides that no notice, order, requisition, licence, written permission or any other document issued under the 1980 Act would be invalid merely by reason of defect of form. Mr. Das Adhikary submitted that in view of the aforesaid provision, the Distress Warrant in question must be deemed to be valid and lawful and capable of being executed against the petitioners.
51. On the question of service of notice of demand, as contemplated under s. 217 of the 1980 Act, Mr. Das Adhikary contended that the provisions of s. 557 of the 1980 Act relating to service of notices would have no application in such a case.
52. Mr. Das Adhikary, in fact, contended that the provisions of s. 557 would have no application for the purposes of Chapters XII and XVI of the 1980 Act where in different sections provision had been made for presentation of bills and service of notice under Certificate of Posting. Mr. Das Adhikary urged that since in some of the sections of the said two Chapters provision had been made for service under Certificate of Posting, it must have been the intention of the legislature that such mode of service would be applicable in all cases relating to the said two Chapters and the provisions of s. 557 would have no application thereto. Mr. Das Adhikary urged that in that view of the matter the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioners relating to service of the notice of demand in the manner prescribed under sub-s. (1) of s. 557, was wholly misconceived and without any substance.
53. Mr. Das Adhikary lastly referred to Rule 6 of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation (Taxation) Rules, 1987, which provides, with reference to s. 183(1) of the 1980 Act, that any transferee of any land or building or portion thereof is to give notice of such transfer to the Municipal Commissioner in Form D.
54. Mr. Das Adhikary pointed out that the said Form reiterated the provisions of sub-s. (4) of s. 183 of the 1980 Act, regarding the continuance of the liability of a transferor to pay penalty and tax on failure to comply with the provisions of sub-s. (1) thereof.
55. In support of his various submissions, Mr. Das Adhikary referred to and strongly relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Trigon Investment and Trading Private Limited, reported in 1996 (3) SCC at Page 630. As pointed out by Mr. Das Adhikary the same issue as that involved in the present case came up for decision before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the context of the provisions of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, which are identical to those of the 1980 Act. In the said case the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that in the absence of notice by a transferor or transferee their obligation to pay any penalty imposed together with the rates and taxes continued, irrespective of whether any formal deed of conveyance had been executed and registered or not.
56. Mr. Das Adhikary sought to impress upon the Court that since the liability to pay the rates and taxes, as also the penalty imposed for non-payment thereof, continued to be that of the transferor or the transferee, the Distress Warrant had been validly issued and was capable of being executed against them.
57. Referring to the decisions cited by Mr. Mukherjee in the case of Mrityunjoy Bhattacharjee (supra) and Hakim Soban Ali (supra), Mr. Das Adhikary submitted that they related to the provisions of the Bengal Municipal Act and not to the provisions of the Calcutta Municipal Act or the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act and could not, therefore, have any application to the facts and law involved in the present case. Mr. Das Adhikary also submitted that in the latter case it had been categorically held that under s. 155 of the Bengal Municipal, 1932, the rate is due before the bill and the notice of demand are presented. The rate due is a charge on the holding under s. 167 of the Bengal Municipal Act, 1932, as under the provisions of the s. 232 of the 1980 Act and service of the bill and notice of demand is not a condition precedent to the right of the Municipality to recover the amount due for the rate by suit under s. 162 of the 1932 Act.
58. Mr. Das Adhikary also urged that the Full Bench decision in the case of Renuka Panchal (supra) cited by Mr. Mukherjee had no relevance whatsoever to the facts of the present case, inasmuch as, the question involved therein related to the retrospectivity of the amended provisions of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, to pending suits or proceedings.
59. In conclusion, Mr. Das Adhikary submitted that in the Trigon Investment case (supra) it had been observed that the Act placed an obligation upon the transferor to inform the Corporation of any transfer and also provides for the consequences resulting from failure to inform. The Act does not contemplate the Corporation going about enquiring whether and when a particular land or building is transferred and to whom. Any notices required to be issued by the Corporation could not, therefore, be validly issued to the transferor until intimation was given by him to the Corporation of the transfer and it would be a valid and sufficient service in law. The Hon'ble Supreme Court went on to observe that the transferee cannot contend that since he had not been served with the relevant notice, the assessment made or other action taken, is bad in law. Unless the transferee's name is recorded as the owner or as the person primarily liable, the Municipality could not be faulted for not sending the relevant notice to the transferee. The Hon'ble Supreme Court made it clear that the substantive liability of the “owner” to pay taxes could not be defeated by the non-intimation under s. 128 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act (s. 183 of the 1980 Act) or by the failure of the transferee to have his name entered into Municipal records.
60. From the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties, the first and foremost question which emerges for decision is whether the Distress Warrant issued by the authorities of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation on 30th July, 1996, had been validly issued and if validly issued, whether the same could be executed in respect of the movable properties of the petitioners.
61. There are certain connected questions relating to service of notice of demand which will be dealt with in the course of dealing with the principal question.
62. In the India Hotels case (supra), I had occasion to consider the provisions of Chapter XVI of the 1980 Act dealing with payment and recovery of taxes and I had, inter alia, held that sub-s. (1) of s. 216 of the 1980 Act, read with Rule 33 of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation (Taxation) Rules, 1987, is rather clear on the point that a bill has to be presented to the ratepayer within the specified time when the rate payable for a quarter becomes due and, thereafter, the liability to pay is converted into a recoverable due on presentation of such bill. I had also held that non-payment of the dues after presentation of the bill gives rise to the consequences mentioned in Ss. 217, 219, 220, 221, 221A, 221B, 223 and 280 of the 1980 Act.
63. In this case, we are at the subsequent stage, that is the stage contemplated under s. 217 of the 1980 Act. Under sub-s. (1) of s. 217 it has been provided that if the amount of tax for which a bill has been presented under s. 216, is not paid within thirty days from the presentation thereof, the Municipal Commissioner would be entitled to serve a notice of demand in the specified Form upon the person liable for payment of the same. Interest and penalty has been provided for in sub-ss. (3) and (4) in case of default in payment even after service of notice of demand.
64. This stage is followed by the stage involving issuance of Distress Warrant under s. 219 for recovery of the tax due. In order to better appreciate the position, the provisions of s. 219 of the 1980 Act are reproduced hereinbelow:
“S. 219. Recovery of tax—(1) If any person liable for payment of tax does not, within thirty days of the service of notice of demand under section 217, pay the amount due, such sum together with all costs, interest due and penalty may be recovered under a warrant, issued in such form as may be specified by the Corporation by regulations, by distress and sale of the movable property.
(2) Every warrant issued under this section shall be signed by the Municipal Commissioner or any other officer authorised by him in this behalf.”
65. From the said provision it will be seen that non-payment of the amount indicated in the notice of demand under s. 217 within thirty days of service of such notice (emphasis supplied) is the sine qua non for issuance of a Distress Warrant under s. 219. A Distress Warrant cannot, therefore, issue without service of a notice of demand under sub-s. (1) of s. 217 of the 1980 Act.
66. Section 220 of the 1980 Act provides for the manner in which the Distress Warrant issued under s. 219 is to be executed and indicates some of the movables which are exempt from the scope of the Warrant. What is relevant for our purpose is mentioned in the very opening words of sub-s. (1) which provides that it will be lawful for any officer or employee of the Corporation to distrain wherever it may be found in any place in Calcutta, any movable property belonging to the person liable
(emphasis supplied).
67. It is thus clear that not only is presentation of a bill for payment a condition precedent for issuance of a notice of demand, but service of a notice of demand is also a condition precedent for issuance of a Distress Warrant upon the failure of the tax-payer to pay the amount indicated in the notice of demand within the specified time.
68. There is little doubt that in view of the provisions of sub-ss. (1) and (4) of s. 183, read with Rule 6 of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation (Taxation) Rules, 1987, the writ petitioners, as the allottees of their respective flats in the newly-constructed building, are liable to pay the rates and taxes and also the penalties imposed for non-payment thereof, and this has been admitted by the petitioners, which is all the more reason why they should have been presented with bills for payment of the arrear rates, taxes and penalties under s. 216 of the 1980 Act, and, thereafter, with notice of demand under s. 217 thereof. If the writ petitioners failed to pay the amount indicated in the notice or notices of demand, then the Corporation would have acquired the required authority in terms of s. 219 of the 1980 Act to issue the Distress Warrant.
69. In the instant case, except for Bajoria Properties (Pvt.) Ltd., admittedly none of the other writ petitioners were either presented with a bill, nor was any notice of demand served on them. Of course, they too had not given notice to the Corporation as contemplated under s. 183(1) of the 1980 Act. However, while sub-ss. (1) and (4) of s. 183 of the 1980 Act, makes it quite clear about the liability of the parties to a transaction involving transfer of interest in a land or building or portion thereof to pay the rates and taxes and penalty imposed thereon, but the Corporation is not absolved from its statutory obligations under Ss. 216, 217 and 219 of the said Act to present a bill or to serve notice of demand before proceeding to issue a Distress Warrant on the person liable for payment as per the terms of sub-ss. (1) and (4) of s. 183 thereof.
70. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Trigon Investment case (supra), on which a good deal of reliance has been placed by Mr. Das Adhikary, merely indicates the position envisaged under sub-ss. (1) and (4) of s. 183 of the 1980 Act and nothing more. The stage at which the parties had approached the Court in the said case was after an assessment of the tax liability had been made. Such liability had been denied by Trigon Investment and Trading Pvt. Ltd. in the absence of a conveyance and in such context it was held on an interpretation of s. 128 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, which is similar to sub-ss. (1) and (4) of the 1980 Act, that Trigon Investment was also liable for payment of the rates and taxes, even though no conveyance had been executed in its favour in respect of the portion of the building allotted to it.
71. What is also significant in the above case, is that a notice of demand had been made to Trigon Investments, which is not so in the instant case.
72. The law, as explained in the above case, is applicable to the facts of this case upto the point of fixation of liability to pay the outstanding rates and taxes, interest and penalty. Thereafter, the said decision is of no further help to the Corporation.
73. On the other hand, from the several cases cited by Mr. Mukherjee and the passage from Duraiswami Aiyangar, it is clear that the consistent view of our Courts is that steps for distraint cannot be taken unless there is default in payment by the person liable of the rates and taxes and penalty demanded. No bill having been presented to the writ petitioners and no notice of demand having been served on them, they cannot be said to be defaulters for the purposes of s. 219 pf te 1980 Act, and the Distress Warrant impugned in the instant writ applications cannot be executed in respect of their movables, either at 3, Alipore Road, Calcutta, or anywhere else in Calcutta.
74. Since the allottees of the different flats in the newly-constructed building are before the Court, the Corporation can now take further steps for recovery of its dues, having regard to the provisions of sub-s. (4) of s. 183 of the 1980 Act.
75. As to the notice dated 1st August, 1996, purported to have been issued under s. 239 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951, the same has not only been issued under a repealed Act, but the repealing Act does not also contain any similar provision. The said notice cannot be treated to be a statutory notice, but a mere intimation of the intention of the Municipal authorities to execute the Distress Warrant.
76. The writ applications, therefore succeed. The impugned Distress Warrant No. 004284 dated 30th July, 1996, issued to Shri Shiv Sankar Bari (bailiff) in respect of premises No. 3, Alipore Road, Calcutta, and the impugned notice dated 1st August, 1996, under s. 239 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951, are hereby quashed.
77. This judgment and order disposes of both the writ applications on the Original and Appellate sides.
78. Let a xerox copy of the judgment be kept with the Original Side records.
79. There will be no order as to costs.
80. Leave is given to the learned Advocates of the respective parties to communicate this order to the concerned respondents, who are directed to act on the basis of such communication.
Writ Petitions allowed impugned Distress Warrants quashed.
K.G