Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the Code)
  • cross-examination.8. Sub-section (1) of Section 162 of the Code
  • section 173(8) of the Code and section 3 of the Police Act.
  • Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872; (1 of 1872),
  • SECTION 145 EVIDENCE ACT
  • sub-section (1) of section 162 of the Code
  • Sub-section (8) of Section 173 of the Code
  • provisions of section 173(8) of the Code
  • provisions of section 162 of the Code
  • sub-section (1) of section 162.
  • section 162(1) of the Code.
  • section 173(8) of the Code.
  • section 161 of the Code
  • section 173 of the Code.
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the Code)
  • cross-examination.8. Sub-section (1) of Section 162 of the Code
  • section 173(8) of the Code and section 3 of the Police Act.
  • Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872; (1 of 1872),
  • SECTION 145 EVIDENCE ACT
  • sub-section (1) of section 162 of the Code
  • Sub-section (8) of Section 173 of the Code
  • provisions of section 173(8) of the Code
  • provisions of section 162 of the Code
  • sub-section (1) of section 162.
  • section 162(1) of the Code.
  • section 173(8) of the Code.
  • section 161 of the Code
  • section 173 of the Code.
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of Opinion — I.P. Singh, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a revision application under sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 directed against the order dated 12.12.1996 of the 4th Additional Sessions Judge, Aurangabad in S.T. No. 29/93. The impugned order dismissed an application made on behalf of the petitioner (the accused) under section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, seeking permission to draw the attention of P.W. 8 (Sumitra Devi Kuar) during her cross-examination to statements she had allegedly made earlier to the police.

P.W. 8 was examined on 10.12.1996. Earlier, during investigation, her statement had been recorded in writing by Sub-Inspector Nathuni Yadav of Apradh Anusandhan of Mahila Apradh Kosang (C.I.D). The Superintendent of Police (C.I.D) had been authorised by the Government of Bihar by an order dated 19.7.1989 to have cases investigated by C.I.D; under those orders Nathuni Yadav conducted the investigation and recorded P.W. 8's statement. The petitioner identified alleged major contradictions between P.W. 8's court testimony and her earlier written statements (including a Fardbeyan and the statement recorded by the Sub-Inspector).

The trial court (Additional Sessions Judge) refused the petitioner's request to confront P.W. 8 with the earlier written statements on several grounds (see below). The petitioner filed the present revision challenging that refusal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, under section 145 of the Evidence Act read with section 162 of the CrPC, the accused may cross-examine and contradict a witness by reference to a previous written statement allegedly recorded by a police officer of the C.I.D (Sub-Inspector Nathuni Yadav).
  2. Whether statements recorded by a C.I.D officer (Mahila Apradh Kosang) pursuant to orders for further investigation fall within "statements made to a police officer in the course of an investigation under this Chapter" (Chapter XXII of the CrPC) and hence are governed by section 162 and section 173(8) of the CrPC.
  3. Whether the absence of prior examination of the police officer who recorded a statement (here, Sub-Inspector Nathuni Yadav) prohibits the accused from confronting the witness (P.W. 8) with that earlier statement during cross-examination.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Appellant's) Arguments

  • The trial court misdirected itself in law in refusing permission to confront P.W. 8 with her earlier written statement.
  • The impugned order was contrary to section 173(8) of the CrPC and section 3 of the Police Act (as invoked in the petition), and therefore the Sub-Inspector of C.I.D (Nathuni Yadav) was competent to investigate and to record statements.
  • P.W. 8 admitted that C.I.D had investigated the case; even if she denied that the Sub-Inspector recorded her statement, the accused should still be allowed to draw her attention to any such written statement under section 145 of the Evidence Act.
  • Accordingly, the impugned order should be quashed and the petitioner permitted to cross-examine P.W. 8 about the alleged prior statements.

Learned Additional Sessions Judge / Grounds for the Trial Court's Refusal

  • The investigation by the C.I.D (Mahila Kosang) was not part of an investigation under Chapter XXII of the CrPC, so statements recorded by that unit could not be treated as police statements in the course of investigation under that Chapter.
  • Section 162 CrPC prohibits the use of statements made under section 161 CrPC for corroboration; hence the earlier statements could not be used to contradict the witness in the manner sought.
  • Only the Investigating Officer while acting under Chapter XXII can file a charge sheet under section 173 CrPC; since the F.I.R. was not recorded by Mahila Kosang nor the charge sheet submitted by that department, the Sub-Inspector's recorded statement could not be used under section 145 Evidence Act.
  • The Sub-Inspector of Police (C.I.D) who allegedly recorded the statement had not yet been examined in court; therefore the trial court rejected allowing the witness to be confronted with that statement.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Tahsildar Singh & Another v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 1012 Authority on the law regarding section 145 of the Evidence Act (the operation of cross-examination on previous statements and contradiction). The court relied on the principle from this Supreme Court decision to explain and confirm the two-part structure of section 145 (cross-examination on prior written statements and the safeguard applicable when prior statements are used for contradiction).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first set out the text of section 145 of the Evidence Act and analysed it as composed of two parts:

  • The first part permits cross-examination as to previous statements made in writing or reduced into writing without the writing being shown or proved (i.e., non-contradictory cross-examination).
  • The second part governs cross-examination that takes the form of contradiction and requires that, if it is intended to contradict by reference to the writing, the attention of the witness must first be called to the parts to be used for contradiction.

The court explained that section 145 does not require that the earlier written statement was made specifically in the course of a police investigation; it may have been made before any body. Where the earlier statement was made to a police officer in the course of investigation, however, section 145 must be read together with section 162 CrPC.

The court then examined section 162(1) CrPC and its proviso (allowing parts of a prior statement reduced to writing to be used by the accused to contradict a witness in the manner provided by section 145), and emphasised that section 162 generally prohibits the use of statements made to police officers in the course of investigation except as provided in the proviso.

Applying these provisions to the facts, the court considered the trial court's conclusion that the Sub-Inspector Nathuni Yadav of Mahila Kosang could not be regarded as investigating the case under Chapter XXII. The revisional court noted that the Superintendent of Police (C.I.D) had been authorised by the Government of Bihar (order dated 19.7.1989) to get cases of Mahila Apradh Anusandhan investigated by C.I.D, and that the Sub-Inspector acted under orders of the Superintendent of Police.

The court relied on the newly added sub-section (8) of section 173 CrPC (referred to in the opinion) which makes provision for further investigation ordered by a superior police officer. The court concluded that where such further investigation is ordered by a competent superior officer, the officer who conducts that investigation (here, Nathuni Yadav) cannot be said to have not been investigating the case; statements recorded by him would therefore be statements made in the course of investigation.

The revisional court rejected the trial court's view that the fact an F.I.R. was not lodged with Mahila Kosang or that the charge sheet was not submitted by that department precluded treating the Sub-Inspector's statement as part of the investigation. The court held that section 173(8) permits re-opening or further inquiry irrespective of where the F.I.R. was lodged or who submitted the charge sheet.

The revisional court also rejected the trial court's position that the accused could not confront P.W. 8 with the earlier statement because the police officer who recorded that statement had not yet been examined. The court held that there is no legal requirement that the person who recorded an earlier statement must first be examined before the accused may rely on that earlier statement to contradict the witness.

On the law summarized: (a) section 145 allows cross-examination on prior written statements irrespective of who recorded them; (b) the second part of section 145 and the proviso to section 162(1) CrPC together impose the safeguard that the witness must be confronted with the relevant parts of the prior written statement when it is used for contradiction; and (c) where a competent superior officer has ordered further investigation under section 173(8), statements recorded by officers conducting that investigation are statements made in the course of investigation and fall within the scope of section 162(1) (subject to its proviso).

The court concluded that the impugned order of the Additional Sessions Judge was legally unsound on the points raised and therefore liable to be set aside.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Revision allowed and the impugned order dated 12.12.1996 is quashed.

Implications / Consequences:

  • As a direct and immediate consequence, the petitioner (accused) is permitted to cross-examine P.W. 8 with respect to any contradictory statements allegedly made by her earlier and recorded by Sub-Inspector Nathuni Yadav (Apradh Anusandhan, Mahila Apradh Kosang, C.I.D).
  • The court found the trial court's stated grounds for refusal to be without foundation: (a) C.I.D investigation conducted under orders of a competent superior authority can constitute investigation under Chapter XXII for the purposes of sections 162 and 173; and (b) there is no requirement that the police officer who recorded an earlier statement be examined before the accused can confront the witness with that statement.
  • The opinion does not provide an extended discussion of broader precedential effects beyond the disposal in this case; the direct effect is limited to allowing the accused to confront P.W. 8 with the identified prior statements and quashing the impugned order.

End of summary — prepared strictly from the content of the provided opinion.

    Ram Bilash Singh v. The State Of Bihar Opp. Party.

    I.P Singh, J.:— This application in revision under sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short ‘the Code’) is directed against the order dated 12.12.1996 passed by the 4th Additional Sessions Judge, Aurangabad in S.T No. 29/93, whereby he dismissed the application filed on behalf of the petitioner under section 145 of the Evidence Act wherein the petitioner had prayed that he may be permitted to draw the attention of the P.W 8 (in the course of her cross examination) to her contradictory statement made before the police.

    2. From the petition it appears that P.W 8, Sumitra Devi Kuar was being examined as a witness in S.T No. 29/93 before the court on 10.12.1996 Earlier she was examined and her statement was recorded by the Police Sub Inspector, Nathuni Yadav attached to Apradh Anusandhan of Mahila Apradh Kosang, Bihar, Patna at the instance of Superintendent of Police (C.I.D). It further appears that the Superintendent of Police (C.I.D) was authorised by the Government of Bihar by an order dated 19.7.1989 to get the case investigated by C.I.D Under the orders of the Superintendent of Police, Sub Inspector, Nathuni Yadav accordingly conducted the investigation in respect of this case and had also recorded the statement of P.W 8, Sumitra Devi Kuar, which was reduced into writing by him. The petitioner who happened to be the accused in the case found major contradictions in the statement of this witness as given before the court to her earlier statement recorded by this Sub-Inspector of Police in the course of the investigation. Also some major contradictions were found in her evidence as given in the court to her earlier written report submitted before the police. Her statement made in her Fardbeyan also differed with her statement made before the Sub-Inspector of Police, Nathuni Yadav. Accordingly, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner wanted to draw the attention of P.W 8 to her contradictory statements as recorded by Sub-Inspector, Nathuni Yadav under the provisions of section 145 of the Evidence Act. However, the learned Additional Sessions Judge rejected this prayer of the petitioner on the ground that the investigation by the C.I.D (Mahila Kosang) is not a part of investigation under Chapter XXII of the Code. Further ground of the rejection of the prayer of the petitioner was that section 162 of the Code prohibits the use of the statement made under section 161 of the Code for the purpose of corroboration. It has also been mentioned in this order that the C.I.D (Mahila Kosang) was entrusted with the investigation of the case under this Chapter of the Code. The learned court below also held that under law it is only the I.O while acting (sic—under?) this Chapter of the Code that he can file the charge sheet under section 173 of the Code. Also the learned court below has taken the stand that since the F.I.R in this case was not recorded by the C.I.D the statement made by P.W 8 before Shri Nathuni Yadav, Sub Inspector of police (C.I.D) cannot be used for contradicting this witness under the provisions of section 145 of the Evidence Act. Also the learned Additional Sessions Judge thought it fit to reject this prayer of the petitioner on the ground that Sub Inspector of Police (C.I.D) was not as yet examined.

    3. On behalf of the petitioner it has been submitted that there is absolutely no merit in any of these grounds mentioned above as taken by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. The learned court below has completely mis-directed itself with respect to the provision of law as contained in section 145 of the Evicence Act. The impugned order is also contrary to the law as contained in section 173(8) of the Code and section 3 of the Police Act. In her evidence P.W 8 has admitted that the C.I.D had also investigated this case but has denied that her statement was ever recorded by the Sub Inspector C.I.D Even if it be accepted for a moment that the statement recorded by Sub Inspector, Nathuni Yadav, is not part of the investigation of the case still the attention of P.W 8 could be drawn to the statement made by her before the Sub Inspector of Police, Nathuni Yadav. On these grounds it has been contended that the impugned order be quashed.

    4. The parties have heard in detail about the questions of law raised in this petition. It appears that on behalf of the petitioner attention of P.W 8 was sought to be drawn to her alleged earlier statement made before the police under the provisions of section 145 of the Evidence Act. In this view of the matter I will firstly proceed to examine the scope of section 145 of the Evidence Act. It runs as follows:—

    “145. Cross examination as to previous statements in writing.—A witness may be cross-examined as to previous statements made by him in writing or reduced into writing, and relevant to matters in question, without such writing being shown to him, or being proved; but, if it is intended to contradict him by the writing, his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him.”

    5. As will appear from this section it is in two parts. The first part enables the opponent to cross examine the witness as to previous statement made by him in writing or reduced to writing without such writing being shown to him. The second part deals with a situation where the cross examination assumes the shape of contradiction; in other words both parts deal with cross examination; the first part with the cross examination other than by way of contradiction and the second part with the cross examination by way of contradiction only. As will become clear, the second part lays down that if it is intended that the deposition of the witness may be contradicted by his previous statement made in writing or reduced into writing the attention of the witness must be called to such a writing while under the first part of section 145 of the Evidence Act a witness may be cross examined at length as to the previous statement made by him in writing or reduced into writing and relevant to the matter in issue. This section further provides that if it intended to contradict a witness with respect to his previous statement his attention must be drawn to those parts of it which are to be used for contradicting him. The law on this point has been clearly laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Tahsildar Singh & Another. v. State Of U.P. (A.I.R 1959 S.C 1012).

    6. A perusal of section 145 of the Evidence Act clearly shows that so far as this section is concerned a witness may be cross examined as to his previous statements made by him in writing or reduced into writing and it is not necessary in order to attract the provisions of this section to show that the previous statements made by this witness was made in the course of the investigation. This section clearly shows that it is only a previous statement made by a witness in writing by him or reduced into writing that may be used for his cross examination irrespective of the fact whether such statement was made before the police in the course of investigation or otherwise.

    7. In the present case the attention of P.W 8 is sought to be drawn to her previous statements made before the police in the course of the investigation. Hence section 145 of the Evidence Act has to be read with section 162 of the Code. The proviso to sub-section (1) of section 162 of the Code runs as follows:

    “Provided that when any witness is called for the prosecution in such inquiry or trial whose statement has been reduced into writing as aforesaid, any part of his statement, if duly proved, may be used by the accused, and with the permission of the Court, by the prosecution, to contradict such witness in the manner provided by Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872; (1 of 1872), and when any part of such statement is so used, any part thereof may also be used in the re-examination of such witness, but for the purpose only of explaining any matter referred to in his cross-examination.”

    8. sub-section (1) of section 162 of the Code provides that

    “No statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of an investigation under this Chapter, shall, if reduced to writing, be signed by the person making it; nor shall any such statement or any record thereof, whether in a police diary or otherwise, or any part of such statement or record, be used for any purpose, save as hereinafter provided, at any inquiry or trial in respect of any offence under investigation at the time when such statement was made.”

    9. A reading of those two provisions of section 162 of the Code will clearly go to show that no part of the statement made by any person to a Police Officer in the course of investigation be used for any purpose except as provided in the proviso to section 162(1) of the Code. I have already noticed above that section 145 of the Evidence Act consists of two parts. The first part enables the accused to cross examine a witness regarding a previous statement made by him while the second part deals with a situation where the cross examination assumes the shape of contradiction. It also contains the safe-guard that before any earlier statement by way of contradiction of the evidence given by the witness in the court is to be used his attention must be drawn to his earlier statement said to have been made by him. The proviso to section 162(1) of the Code only enables the accused to make use of such statement to contradict a witness in the manner provided by the second part of section 145 of the Evidence Act. The cross examining counsel shall put the part or parts of the statement which runs contrary to what has stated in the evidence. It is well settled that the right of defence under section 145 of the Evidence Act is a valuable right so that where the defence is not allowed to cross examine the prosecution witness with reference to the statement under section 162 of the Code on the ground that it was a mere omission and not contradiction, the evidence of such witness not tested by the cross examination cannot be accepted as corroborating the evidence of other prosecution witnesses. I have tried to analyse the law on the subject and now I summarise the same as follows. section 145 of the Evidence Act per se does not require that the earlier statements made by the witness was made before the police in the course of the investigation. It may be made by a witness in writing or reduced into writing before any body and he can be contradicted with his earlier statements if he departs from the same in the course of his evidence in the court. However, the second part of section 145 of the Evidence Act provides that before any earlier statements can be used to contradict him in the course of his evidence his attention must be drawn to the same. This section read with section 162 of the Code also makes a similar provision as has been noticed in the proviso of sub-section (1) of section 162. In the aforesaid manner I have tried to analyse the law on the subject. I will not (sic—now?) proceed to examine how far the learned court below has been able to follow the same.

    10. In the impugned order the learned court below has mentioned that the Sub Inspector of Police, Nathuni Yadav, can not be said to be investigating the case since he belonged to Mahila Kosang and was not the regular Police Officer to be entrusted with the investigation of a case. In this connection it appears that the learned court below has missed to notice section 173(8) of the Code. It is not in dispute that Nathuni Yadav the S.I of police had investigated this case and that he belonged to Mahila Kosang of C.I.D The question is whether he could have investigated this case or not. In the revision petition it has been stated that by an order dated 19.7.1989 the Superintendent of Police (C.I.D) was authorised by Government of Bihar to get the cases arising in Mahila Apradh anusandhan of Mahila Apradh Kosang to be investigated by the C.I.D In the present case, as has been contended on behalf of the petitioner Sub-Inspector of Police, Nathuni Yadav, of Mahila kosang was authorised by the Superintendent of Police (C.I.D) to further investigate the case. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 of the Code which has been newly added in the Code makes a provision for further investigation in a situation like this. If any such further investigation is made under the orders the Superintendent of Police (C.I.D) who appears to have been authorised by the Government of Bihar it cannot be said that the Sub-Inspector of Police, Nathuni Yadav, had not recorded the statement of P.W 8 in the course of the investigation. Thus it would appear that in the present case the Sub Inspector of Police, Nathuni Yadav, was investigating the case under the orders of the competent Officer authorised to pass such order for further investigation. If under this circumstance he records some statement of a witness in the course of the investigation how can it be said that any such statement was made by the witness before the Investigating Officer in the course of the investigation. Therefore, I do not find that the order of the learned court below is correct on this point.

    11. I will next proceed to examine the impugned order. The first ground taken by the learned Additional Sessions Judge is that the investigation by the C.I.D (Mahila Kosang) is not a part of the investigation under Chapter XXII of the Code. As noticed above section 173(8) of, the Code clearly provides that further investigation can be ordered under its provision by a superior Police Officer and the Superintendent of Police (C.I.D) is said to have been authorised by the Government to order further investigation. Under this circumstance it cannot be said that the investigation conducted by the C.I.D was not a part of the investigation under Chapter XXII of the Code. As such the defence could be allowed to contradict the previous statements made by P.W 8 before the Sub Inspector of Police, Nathuni Yadav, of Apradh Anusandhan of Mahila Apradh Kosang. Even if the witness does not accept that she ever made any statement before the said Sub Inspector of Police it was open to her to deny the same but nevertheless the prosecution could always cross examine and suggest that her statement was recorded by the Sub Inspector, Nathuni Yadav, in the course of the investigation which was reduced into writing even if she denied this fact. In the impugned order in paragraph 4 it has been stated that in this case the F.I.R was not lodged before Mahila Kosang nor the charge sheet was submitted by the police Officer of this Department. There is hardly any merit in this ground taken in the impugned order. The provisions of section 173(8) of the Code clearly provide that in a suitable case further enquiry can always be ordered by a superior Police Officer and the investigation can be re-opened irrespective of the fact before which Police Officer the F.I.R was lodged and who had submitted the charge sheet. Thus, this observation made by the learned court below is without any foundation; specially when P.W 8 in her evidence had accepted that the C.I.D had conducted an enquiry/investigation in the matter. Paragraph 5 of the impugned order shows that she had denied that her statement was recorded by the C.I.D Sub Inspector. It was open to her to deny having made any statement before the Sub Inspector of C.I.D This will, however, not mean that she cannot be confronted with any such statement recorded by the Sub-Inspector of Police C.I.D If the law would have permitted any such thing the easiest course to be adopted by a witness was to deny having made any previous statements and that could have put an end to the matter. If this view of the court below is accepted to be correct then section 145 of the Evidence Act will lose its utility and impact. However, this view taken by the learned court below is devoid of any merit.

    12. Another point taken in the impugned order is that P.W 8 could not be contradicted with her alleged statements recorded by the Sub Inspector, Nathuni Yadav, inasamuch as Nathuni Yadav was not as yet examined in the court. There is no such law that unless a person who has recorded the earlier statements has been examined before the court the attention of a witness to contradict him cannot be drawn to any such statement. It is not clear from where the learned court below could reject the prayer of the petitioner on the ground that since the Police Officer who has recorded the statement of the witnesses has not as yet been examined in the court P.W 8 could not have been confronted with her alleged contradictory statement made before the police (Sub Inspector Nathuni Yadav).

    13. From the detailed discussions made above it is clear that the impugned order has no merit at all and is liable to be set aside.

    14. In the result, this revision application is allowed and the impugned order is quashed. It will be open to the petitioner to cross-examine P.W 8 with respect to any contradictory statement made by her vis-a-vis her statement recorded earlier by the Sub Inspector of Police, Nathuni Yadav.

    15. With this observation this application is allowed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Ram Bilash Singh v. The State Of Bihar Opp. Party.
    (Mar 13, 2001)