Chamier, C.J:— This case has arisen out of a dispute between two Gayawals and the question for decision are of some interest and importance. The Gazetteer and other works give detailed accounts of the origin, history and customs of the Gayawals. A short summary must suffice here. According to the legend the holy ground of Gaya represents the body of the giant demon of that name he was overthrown by Vishnu. It is the sacred duty of every Hindu to visit Gaya and there perform the sradha or funeral ceremonies for the souls of his ancestors and so obtain for them deliverance from hell and admission to the paradise of Vishnu. Brahma is said to have incarnated the Gayawal Brahmans to assist in the rites to be performed. Whatever the origin of Gaya and the Gayawals may be, it is certain that for at least ten centuries Gaya has been a place of pilgrimage and priests known as Gayawals have been attending to the pilgrims there. On the way to Gaya the orthodox pilgrim gets himself shaved at the river Pun-pun [in connection with which see the case of Dwarka Misser v. Ram Protap Misser(1)] and on arrival at Gaya he goes to one of the many Gayawals. In charge of a representative of his Gayawal the pilgrim visits as many as possible of the vedis or sacred spots in Gaya, offers water and cakes of rice to the souls of his ancestors and performs certain bathing rites. At a vedi called Akshabat, a visit to which is compulsory, he offers gifts to his Gayawal and worships his feet. The latter then touches him on the back and blesses him by pronouncing the word Suphal, puts a garland on him, and sends him away assured that he has secured salvation for his ancestors and blessings for himself. According to the District Gazetteer, by tacit consent or immemorial custom the whole of India has been parcelled, out among different families of Gayawals. Formerly there were several hundred families but at the present time there are not more than 150. Each family keeps up a set of books in which are entered the names and addresses of its “clients”. In theory a pilgrim goes to the Gayawal to whom or to whose predecessor his ancestors went, but the family of his hereditary Gayawal may have become extinct, or the pilgrim may not know the name of his family Gayawal, or he may deliberately desert him, or he may be carried off to a wrong Gayawal by one of the many touts who infest Gaya. In theory Gayawals do not encroach on the jurisdiction of each other but in practice they do, competition is very keen and disputes are of constant occurrence. The books kept by the different Gayawals are referred to in cases of doubt or dispute and are the principal if not the only stock in trade of many Gayawals.
2. The principal families of Gayawals are said to have “gaddis”. “Gaddi” means literally and generally cushion, seat or throne, but when used with reference to Gayawals who have no fixed seat or throne, it means something like the authority or jurisdiction of a family. Many families of Gayawals instead of bearing the usual titles of Brahmans have peculiar names such as “Nakphopha” Bank” “Bethal” “Mahton”. In the present case we are concerned with the “Khoundouri” and “Thathwari” families and the principal question for decision is whether the plaintiff who is the occupant of the Thathwari gaddi is also exclusively entitled to the Khoundhouri gaddi, which claims jurisdiction over several districts in Bengal, Bihar and the United Provinces. There seems to be no objection to a Gayawal having two or more gaddis and from the pleadings and evidence in this case it is clear that for centuries past the position or the right such as it is of the holder of a gaddi has devolved according to the Hindu law of inheritance, just as if it were property or an hereditary office.
3. Many of the allegations of the parties to this case have been found to be false. The facts as found by the lower Appellate Court are as follows: Chotan Lal Khoundhouri, holder of the gaddi of that name, died about 40 years ago and was succeeded by his widow Mina Dai who died in 1883. She left a daughter Rama Dai who ought to have succeeded to the gaddi but was excluded by her son Chunni Lal, in whose favour Mina Dai had executed a will. Chunni Lal held the gaddi adversely to his mother till his death in 1901.
4. He was succeeded by his widow Rama Dai, who in 1913 shortly before her death transferred the gaddi to the defendant. The plaintiff is a brother of Chunni Lal and is the reversionary heir of both Chunni Lal and their maternal grandfather Chotan Lal. The defendant is in possession of the books of the Khoundhouri gaddi and has assumed the name of Khoundhouri and by holding himself out as being lawfully entitled to the Khoundhouri gaddi and by making use of the books of the gaddi is, or was, before the suit was brought, attracting to himself and receiving offerings from pilgrims who own allegiance to the Khoundhouri gaddi. The plaintiff claims: (1) A declaration that he alone is entitled to the Khoundhouri gaddi, its privileges and property, including the books. (2) A declaration that he alone is entitled to use the name of Khoundhouri. (3) A declaration that Rama Dai had no power to transfer the gaddi to the defendant. (4) A declaration that the defendant is not entitled use the name of Khoundhouri or the books of the gaddi of that name or to represent that he is the owner of that gaddi. (5) A decree for possession of the gaddi and its property, including the books; and (6) An injunction restraining the defendant (a) from using the name of Khoundhouri or the books of the gaddi and (b) from holding himself out as the owner of that gaddi. The Subordinate Judge decreed the claim except as regards the relief No. 6(b), and as regards some moveable property the existence of which the plaintiff failed to prove. The District Judge disallowed the plaintiff's claim to the exclusive use of the name Khoundhouri, but in other respects confirmed the decision of the Subordinate Judge. The defendant has appealed and the plaintiff has filed cross-objections.
5. The learned District Judge held that the gaddi of a Giyawal was an hereditary office and that what the plaintiff complained of was what would be called in England slander of title. Slander of title is a tort for which damages may be claimed bub in an action for such damages the words complained of must be set out verbatim as in the case of libel and slander. Nothing of the kind has been done in the present case, which appears to me to have nothing in common with an action of slander of title. Nor is it clear that a Gayawals gaddi is an office A Gayawal is born a Gayawal but apparently may never have a gaddi. He has no duties which any one can compel him to perform. He is attached to no temple or other building or to any particular place. He has no right to compel any one to accept his ministrations and he cannot be removed from his position. His position appears to me to be not unlike that of a Pragwal at Allahabad or a priest at any other place of pilgrimage, who keeps books in which he enters the names and addresses of those who come to him, and has a hereditary connexion with different families but cannot compel members of those families to accept his ministrations or prevent them from resorting to other priests at the same place. A somewhat similar case is that of a prohit or mahabrahman. There seems to be some difference of opinion in Bombay on the subject, but it has been hold by the Calcutta, Madras, and Allahabad High Courts for many years that in the absence of a definite contract a prohit or mahabrahman is not entitled to a decree against a rival prohit or mahabrahman for a share in the offerings received by him from persons alleged to be jajmans of the plaintiff—the ground of the decision being that voluntary offerings may be given to any one to whom the jajmans choose to give them.
6. See Gourmani Debi v. Chairman of the Panihati Municipality(2), Dwarka Misser v. Ram Protop Misser, Oochi v. Ulfat(3) and Saripaka China Mahadeva Vazulu v. Mathura Suryapra kasam(4). One result of this view seems to be that the prohit or mahabrahman holds no “office”. There appear to me to be many difficulties in the way of holding that the occupant of a Gayawal gaddi has an office hereditary or otherwise, but it is an indisputable fact that for centuries past the gaddi of a Gayawal has been treated either as an office or as property devolving according to the Hindu law of inheritance and it is said that a curious custom of adoption has sprung up according to which a gaddi may pass to an adopted son. It appears to me that if the occupant of a Gayawal's gaddi has not an hereditary office he has a business and that his business is property capable of being inherited on his death. It is well known that Gayawals send out agents to collect pilgrims and bring them to Gaya. A Gayawal may do a good deal in the way of increasing the number of his clients and improving his “connection”. Attached to his business is what would be called a goodwill with reference to an ordinary trade or business. His books are an important part of his stock in trade and are a valuable asset. The result appears to be the same whether a gaddi is an hereditary office or a business. Chotan Lal was the undisputed occupant or holder of the Khoundhouri gaddi. On his death the gaddi passed to his widow Mina Bai and should have passed on her death to her daughter Rama Bai. There can be no doubt that Rama Bai could have maintained against Chunni Lal a suit for possession of the gaddi and its books, for a declaration that she was the lawful successor of her mother, and for an injunction restraining Chunni Lal from holding himself out as the lawful successor of Mina Bai.
7. Chunni Lal was however allowed to hold possession of the gaddi and on his death it passed to his widow. She died in 1913 only a few months before the institution of the present suit. Claiming as reversionary heir of his maternal grandfather the plaintiff would have had to meet a serious plea of limitation. Claiming as reversionary heir of his brother he is clearly within time. He brought a previous suit for possession of the books which was dismissed, but that suit was brought in the lifetime of Rama Bai and the dismissal of it cannot affect the present suit. The plaintiff is clearly entitled to a decree for possession of the gaddi and its books and to a declaration that he is the lawful holder of the gaddi and that Rama Bai had no power to transfer it to the defendant. The defendant is not a Khoundhouri and he is not entitled to the Khoundhouri gaddi. He is using the names and the books of the gaddi for the purpose of making it appear that he is the lawful holder of the gaddi. It is not denied that this must and does cause injury to the plaintiff. The English law recognizes the right of a man who has been carrying on business under a certain style or name to prevent another from using that style or name so as to deceive the public into thinking that the business carried on by that person is his. Difficulties arise when the name of that person happens to be the same as that of the plaintiff, but even in such cases relief may in certain circumstances be given (see cases cited in Halsbury's Laws of England Vol. 27, p. 744). The analogy between such cases and the case now before us is very close. The defendant has been guilty of wrongful acts done with the express object of benefiting himself at the expense of the plaintiff. I am of opinion that the Court may properly in such a case restrain a repetition of such acts by injunction. The case appears to come within Section 54 of the Specific Relief Act. It is closely analogous to the case given in illustration (w) to that section; the cross-objections do not however cover the relief numbered above us No. 6-(b).
8. In my opinion the District Judge was right in refusing to declare that the plaintiff was alone entitled to use the name Khoundhouri. The plaintiff has not proved that he alone is entitled to call himself a Khoundhuri. It is a family name and there may be and probably are others entitled to use it. I would dismiss both the appeal and the objections with costs.
9. Mullick, J.:— I entirely concur. In my opinion the gaddi which the plaintiff claims is not an office the essential of which is a duty to some person enforceable by law, custom or usage. Much less is it an office of a religious nature attached it a particular locality or place. The suit is therefore not in my opinion maintainable as a suit for an office.
10. But I agree that the gaddi is a business carried on under the name and style of Gaddi Khoundhouri, and the plaintiff has property in both the business and the name. In my opinion the result arrived at by the learned Chief Justice is correct.
V.S/R.K
11. Appeal dismissed.