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Turnbull v. Turnbull.
Factual and Procedural Background
The case concerns a legal principle regarding the approbation and reprobation of deeds, illustrated by a dispute arising from two deeds executed by an individual shortly before his death. The individual executed two deeds in one context: one concerning his moveable property and another concerning his heritage. In the deed related to moveables, a legacy of ₤50 was burdened on the disponee for the heir at law. The heir at law brought a reduction ex capite lecti against the disposition of the heritage and succeeded. Subsequently, the heir sought to claim the legacy contained in the other deed. The court had to decide whether the heir could both reject (reprobate) part of the deeds while accepting (approbate) another part.
The Lord Justice-Clerk Ordinary found on 21st July 1775 that the two deeds constituted one settlement of the entire estate. The pursuer could not both approbate and reprobate the deeds; having reprobated the assignation by reduction, he could not claim the legacy in the other deed. The Lords adhered to this interlocutor and awarded expenses on 21st February 1776.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a party can both approbate and reprobate two deeds that are part of the same transaction and made with reference to one another.
- Whether the heir at law, having successfully reduced one deed, could claim a legacy under the other deed executed by the deceased.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
---|---|---|
Turnbull v. Turnbull (February 1776) | Principle that one cannot approbate and reprobate the same deed or related deeds made in reference to one another. | Applied to hold that the two deeds constituted one settlement; the heir could not both reject one deed and claim benefits under the other. |
Dundonald (20th February 1729) | Supporting precedent for the principle against approbation and reprobation. | Cited in support of the defender’s position. |
Pringle (1st February 1671) | Supporting precedent for the principle against approbation and reprobation. | Cited in support of the defender’s position. |
Cunningham (17th January 1758) | Supporting precedent for the principle against approbation and reprobation. | Cited in support of the defender’s position. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court reasoned that the two deeds, though separate in subject matter (moveables and heritage), were executed in one continuous context ("unico contextu") and with reference to one another, thereby constituting a single settlement of the entire estate. The legal principle that a party cannot both approbate and reprobate the same deed or related deeds was central. Since the heir had successfully reduced the disposition concerning the heritage (thus reprobating that deed), he was precluded from claiming the legacy under the deed concerning the moveables. The court emphasized the unity of the deeds and the necessity of consistent treatment of related transactions.
Holding and Implications
The court upheld the interlocutor of the Lord Justice-Clerk Ordinary, ruling that the pursuer could not claim the legacy after having reduced the other deed. The decision effectively barred the heir from selectively accepting parts of the settlement while rejecting others.
The direct effect was that the heir’s claim to the legacy was denied, and the costs of the extract were awarded. No broader legal precedent beyond the reaffirmation of the established principle against approbation and reprobation was set.
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