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Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • Section 34 of the Specific 1 (2017)9 Supreme Court Cases 591 Priya 5 49 s 254412 with nms 260912o Relief Act.
  • Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act visavis Sections 7 and 8 of the Family Courts Act.
  • Hindu Marriage Act or the Priya 4 49 s 254412 with nms 260912o Special Marriage Act.
  • Sections 7 and 8 of the Family Courts Act. Priya 9 49 s 254412
  • provisions of Hindu Marriage Act or Special Marriage Act,
  • provisions of Sections 7 and 8 of the Family Courts Act.
  • Hindu Marriage Act and/or Special Marriage Act
  • Hindu Marriage Act or Special Marriage Act,
  • SECTION 34 SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT 1963
  • SECTION 8 FAMILY COURTS ACT
  • SECTION 7 FAMILY COURTS ACT
  • Section 34 1 (1968)3
  • Marriage Act, 1954.
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 34 of the Specific 1 (2017)9 Supreme Court Cases 591 Priya 5 49 s 254412 with nms 260912o Relief Act.
  • Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act visavis Sections 7 and 8 of the Family Courts Act.
  • Hindu Marriage Act or the Priya 4 49 s 254412 with nms 260912o Special Marriage Act.
  • Sections 7 and 8 of the Family Courts Act. Priya 9 49 s 254412
  • provisions of Hindu Marriage Act or Special Marriage Act,
  • provisions of Sections 7 and 8 of the Family Courts Act.
  • Hindu Marriage Act and/or Special Marriage Act
  • Hindu Marriage Act or Special Marriage Act,
  • SECTION 34 SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT 1963
  • SECTION 8 FAMILY COURTS ACT
  • SECTION 7 FAMILY COURTS ACT
  • Section 34 1 (1968)3
  • Marriage Act, 1954.
Smart Summary

High Court of Judicature at Bombay — Suit No. 2544 of 2012 (Preliminary Issue)

Factual and Procedural Background

The suit (Suit No.2544 of 2012) was filed by the Plaintiff (named in the record as Pearl Chesson / Plaintiff/Applicant) against multiple defendants including Defendant No.1 (the Plaintiff's husband), Defendant No.2 (the Plaintiff's father-in-law) and Defendant No.3 (the society in which the suit flat is situated). The Plaintiff is represented by Mr. Karl Tamboly. The Defendants were absent at the hearing and had been absent throughout; the suit had at one stage been transferred to the list of undefended suits.

Procedurally, a preliminary issue was framed by an order dated 16 January 2014. By order dated 5 October 2017 the court caused notices to be issued to the Defendants for hearing of that preliminary issue; despite the notices, none appeared. The preliminary issue framed for hearing was whether the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain and try the present suit having regard to Sections 7 and 8 of the Family Courts Act. The Plaintiff led documentary evidence on that issue.

On the factual side, the Plaintiff alleges that she and Defendant No.1 lived in Dubai throughout their matrimonial life and individually purchased two flats in Mumbai from their own funds: Flat No. I601 (purchased by Defendant No.1) and Flat No. I602 (purchased by the Plaintiff). There are registered Agreements for Sale in favour of the respective purchasers. The Plaintiff seeks a declaration under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act that she is the owner of Flat No. I602 and that neither Defendant Nos.1 nor 2 has any right to that flat, together with a consequential perpetual injunction.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether this court has jurisdiction to entertain and try the present suit, having regard to Sections 7 and 8 of the Family Courts Act?

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The suit is a proceeding for a declaration under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act 1963 seeking to establish title to property (Flat No. I602) purchased by the Plaintiff with her own funds.
  • The perpetual injunction claimed is consequential to the declaratory relief; the suit is a dispute over title and not a proceeding arising out of the Hindu Marriage Act or the Special Marriage Act.
  • The Plaintiff led documentary evidence on the preliminary issue (evidence of registered Agreements for Sale was placed on record).

Defendants' Arguments

  • The Defendants opposed the Plaintiff's interlocutory reliefs and contended that the suit is barred by the provisions of Sections 7 and 8 of the Family Courts Act.
  • They submitted that for disputes between parties to a marriage in respect of any property of the parties, the Family Court alone shall exercise jurisdiction exercisable by any District Court or Subordinate Civil Court, and that the Explanation to Section 7 brings the suit within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Family Court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Samar Kumar Roy v. Jharna Bera, (2017) 9 SCC 591 Discussed the scope of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act vis-à-vis Sections 7 and 8 of the Family Courts Act; held that suits under Section 34 for declaration are not barred by Sections 7/8, and that exclusive Family Court jurisdiction relates to suits filed under the Hindu Marriage Act or Special Marriage Act. The High Court relied on this Supreme Court decision to conclude that the present suit (a Section 34 declaration as to title) is not barred by Sections 7 and 8 of the Family Courts Act and therefore civil court jurisdiction is not excluded.
Dhulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1968) 3 SCR 662; AIR 1969 SC 78 Contains propositions considered by the Supreme Court regarding the scope of exclusion of civil court jurisdiction by the Family Courts Act; specifically, propositions in para 32 (Serial Nos. 2 and 7) were relied upon. The Supreme Court referred to this judgment in holding that Section 8(a) excludes civil court jurisdiction only in respect of suits filed under the Hindu Marriage Act or Special Marriage Act for annulment/dissolution/restitution etc., and not suits under Section 34; the High Court applied that reasoning to the present facts.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analysed the preliminary issue by focusing on the statutory source of the Plaintiff's claim and the scope of the Family Courts Act. The key steps in the reasoning were:

  • The court first noted that the present suit is not a proceeding arising out of the Hindu Marriage Act or the Special Marriage Act; rather it is a suit for a declaration under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act 1963 seeking to establish title to property (Flat No. I602).
  • The court observed that the perpetual injunction is consequential to the declaratory relief and that a suit of this character is a proprietor's action against persons denying title.
  • The court relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in Samar Kumar Roy v. Jharna Bera, which discussed Section 34 vis-à-vis Sections 7 and 8 of the Family Courts Act and held that exclusive Family Court jurisdiction applies to suits under the Hindu Marriage Act or Special Marriage Act, not to suits under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act.
  • The Supreme Court's reference to Dhulabhai (and the propositions in para 32 thereof) supported the conclusion that Section 8(a) excludes civil court jurisdiction only for suits filed under the matrimonial statutes for annulment, dissolution or restitution-related reliefs, and does not bar civil courts from entertaining Section 34 declaratory suits.
  • Applying those authorities, the High Court concluded that the present suit—being a Section 34 declaratory suit in respect of property—does not fall within Clause (a) of the Explanation to Section 7 of the Family Courts Act, and therefore Sections 7 and 8 do not bar civil court jurisdiction.
  • The court added a practical point: the suit is not only against the husband (Defendant No.1) but also against the father-in-law (Defendant No.2) and the society (Defendant No.3). The Plaintiff should not be required to split her cause of action between courts; a claim against the father-in-law cannot be prosecuted before the Family Court under Clause (c) of the Explanation to Section 7.
  • On this combined statutory and factual analysis, the court concluded that the preliminary issue must be answered in favour of the Plaintiff.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The preliminary issue is answered in the affirmative in favour of the Plaintiff — the Suit Court has jurisdiction; the suit is not barred by Sections 7 and 8 of the Family Courts Act.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The suit may proceed in the civil court. The court posted the interlocutory/application for final hearing on 31 January 2018.
  • Broader precedent: The opinion applies and follows the Supreme Court's reasoning (Samar Kumar Roy v. Jharna Bera and Dhulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh) to hold that Section 34 declaratory suits concerning property are not excluded from civil court jurisdiction by Sections 7 and 8 of the Family Courts Act. The High Court did not purport to lay down a new precedent beyond applying those authorities.

(Order dated 17 January 2018 by S.C. Gupte, J.; Plaintiff represented by Mr. Karl Tamboly; Defendants absent.)

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    Pearl Chesson v. Sean Lawrence

    Priya 1 49 s 254412 with nms 260912o IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION SUIT NO.2544 OF 2012 WITH NOTICE OF MOTION NO. 2609 OF 2012 Pearl Chesson ... Plaintiff/Applicant Sean Lawrence and ors. ... Defendants Mr.Karl Tamboly i/by M/s Jayakars for the Plaintiff. CORAM : S.C. GUPTE, J. DATE : 17 JANUARY 2018. P.C. : . Heard learned counsel for the Plaintiff. The Defendants have been absent throughout at the hearing of the suit. The suit was at one stage even transferred to the list of undefended suits. Since, however, by an order dated 16 January 2014, a preliminary issue was framed in the suit, this court, by its order dated 5 October 2017, caused notices to be issued to the Defendants for hearing of the preliminary issue. Despite notice, none appears for the Defendants.

    2. The suit is placed on board today for hearing of the Priya 2 49 s 254412 with nms 260912o preliminary issue. The preliminary issue framed in the matter is in the following terms :

    Whether this court has jurisdiction to entertain and try the present suit, having regard to Sections

    7 and 8 of the Family Courts Act?

    3. The Plaintiff has led documentary evidence on the issue.

    4. The Plaintiff is the wife of Defendant No.1 and daughterin law of Defendant No.2. Defendant No. 3 is the society, in the building of which the suit flat is situated. It is the case of the Plaintiff that she and Defendant No.1, who lived in Dubai throughout their matrimonial life, had bought two flats in Mumbai through their own individual funds. Flat No.I601 in Defendant No.3society was bought by Defendant No.1, whereas Flat No.I

    602 was bought by the Plaintiff. There are registered Agreements for Sale in favour of the purchasers, namely, the Plaintiff and Defendant No.1, respectively, for flat Nos.I602 and I601. The Plaintiff claims a declaration that she is the owner of flat No.I602 (suit flat) and that neither of Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 has any Priya 3 49 s 254412 with nms 260912o right to the suit flat. As a consequential relief, the Plaintiff claims a perpetual injunction against both Defendants restraining them from dealing with the suit flat.

    5. The Plaintiff's notice of motion seeking interlocutory reliefs in respect of the suit flat is opposed by Defendant Nos. 1 and 2. It is the case of the Defendants that the present suit is barred on account of the provisions of Sections 7 and 8 of the Family Courts Act. It is submitted that for a suit between parties to a marriage with respect of any property of the parties, it is the Family Court which alone shall exercise jurisdiction exercisable by any District Court or Subordinate Civil Court under any law for the time being in force. It is submitted that since the Family Court has been established for the particular area and the suit is governed by the Explanation to Section 7 of the Act, no other courts including any District Court or Subordinate Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit.

    6. At the outset, it is important to note that the present suit is not a proceeding arising out of the Hindu Marriage Act or the Priya 4 49 s 254412 with nms 260912o Special Marriage Act. It is a pure and simple proceeding for a declaration under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act 1963, seeking to establish a right to property. It is a suit filed by the owner of the property against persons denying or interested in denying the former's title to the property. The perpetual injunction claimed in the suit is merely consequential to the declaratory relief sought in the main prayer. Such a suit cannot be said to be barred under the provisions of Sections 7 and 8 of the Family Courts Act.

    7. The Supreme Court in the case of Samar Kumar Roy Vs. Jharna Bera1 discussed the scope of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act visavis Sections 7 and 8 of the Family Courts Act. The Court held that essentially it is only the suits or proceedings between the parties to a marriage and concerning the provisions of Hindu Marriage Act or Special Marriage Act, which are made the subject of exclusive jurisdiction of the Family Courts established under the Family Courts Act. These suits are barred from being entertained by any District or other Civil Court and not suits for declaration of a legal character under Section 34 of the Specific

    1 (2017)9 Supreme Court Cases 591 Priya 5 49 s 254412 with nms 260912o Relief Act. The case before the Supreme Court concerned a suit filed by one Samar Kumar Roy against once Jharna Bera. The suit was instituted for a declaratory decree under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act and also claimed a perpetual injunction under section 38 of that act. According to the plaintiff, he was a junior employee under the same Directorate where the defendant was working and by blackmail and coercion, a show of marriage was arranged by the defendant's father with the plaintiff by registration of the purported marriage under the Special Marriage Act, 1954. The plaint averred that there were no ceremonies of a Hindu marriage performed and there was no consummation of the marriage, and accordingly, the defendant was not a legally married wife of the plaintiff and had no right to claim him as her husband. The case, in short, was that the alleged marriage between the Plaintiff and Defendant was not legally valid or tenable in law. Simultaneously, the plaintiff claimed a perpetual injunction against the defendant restraining her from claiming him to be her husband or disturbing him at his office or on his way to the office or back home. The argument before the court was that the suit being a proceeding between parties to a marriage for a Priya 6 49 s 254412 with nms 260912o decree of nullity, or declaration as to the validity, of the marriage, the Family Court alone had the jurisdiction in the suit; that the suit fell within the Clauses (a) and (b) of the Explanation to Section 7 of the Family Courts Act. The Supreme Court held that it was obvious that a suit or proceeding between the parties to a marriage alleging nullity, etc. referred to in Sections 7 or 8 was a suit or petition filed under Hindu Marriage Act and/or Special Marriage Act for such reliefs. There was no reference whatsoever in Sections 7 and 8 to suits filed for declaration of a legal character under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. The Court referred to Dhulabhai Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh1 and after considering the various propositions of law laid down therein, and in particular, the propositions laid down in Serial Nos. 2 and 7 of para 32 of that judgment, held that Section 8(a) of the Family Courts Act excluded the Civil Court's jurisdiction in respect of only those suits or proceedings between parties to a marriage, which were filed under Hindu Marriage Act or Special Marriage Act, for annulment or dissolution of marriage or for restitution of conjugal rights, etc., and not those suits which were filed under Section 34

    1 (1968)3 SCR 662: AIR 1969 SC 78 Priya 7 49 s 254412 with nms 260912o of the Specific relief Act for a declaration as to the legal character of an alleged marriage. The Court also noted in this connection that exclusion of the jurisdiction of a civil court cannot be readily inferred. The Court in that case held that given the line of judgments referred to by the High Courts, and given the fact that a suit for declaration as to a legal character which include the matrimonial status of parties to a marriage, when it comes to a marriage which allegedly has never taken place either dejure or defacto, the Civil Court's jurisdiction to determine such legal character is not barred either expressly or impliedly by any law.

    8. Coming now to the facts of our case, it is clear that the present suit does not arise out of or in any way concern any of the provisions under Hindu Marriage Act or Special Marriage Act. Though the parties here simply happen to be husband and wife, the suit is in respect of a property, which is owned as an individual by the Plaintiffwife. In the suit, she is seeking a declaration as to her title or right to the property against two individuals, who happen to be her husband and fatherinlaw, both of whom are interested in denying that title or right to her. The suit is typically Priya 8 49 s 254412 with nms 260912o a suit under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act and not a proceeding between a husband and a wife relating to property coming within Clause (a) of the Explanation to Section 7 of the Family Courts Act. The suit not being covered under the provisions of section 7, it cannot be said to be barred under Section 8 for the civil courts to exercise their jurisdiction.

    9. Secondly, it is also important to note that the suit is not only against the Defendanthusband, but also against the fatherin law of the Plaintiff, who is also interested in denying the Plaintiff's title to the suit flat. The Plaintiff cannot in such an action be asked to split her cause of action and take a part of it before the Family Court and prosecute the other part before the Civil Court. As far as the Defendantfatherinlaw is concerned, the suit claiming a declaration and perpetual injunction against him obviously cannot be filed before the Family Court under clause (c) of the Explanation to Section 7 of the Act.

    10. Looked at from any point of view, the present suit cannot be said to be barred under Sections 7 and 8 of the Family Courts Act. Priya 9 49 s 254412 with nms 260912o The preliminary issue is accordingly answered in the affirmative, that is to say, in favour of the Plaintiff.

    11. Post the notice of motion now for final hearing on 31 January 2018. (S.C.GUPTE J.)

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    Pearl Chesson v. Sean Lawrence
    (Jan 17, 2018)