R.A Mehta, Presiding Officer:— Both the appeals between the same parties arising out of the common order are being disposed of by this common judgment.
2. The facts in brief are as below:
The applicant Bank admittedly had advanced the loan to defendant Nos. 1 to 4 under the personal guarantee of defendant No. 5 in two accounts during the period from 8.11.73 to 9.10.86 Necessary documents including the mortgage deed were executed by the defendants in favour of the Bank from time to time. The balance confirmation letters were also duly executed in favour of the applicant Bank.
Initially the loans sanctioned at Jalandhar branch were subsequently transferred to Chandigarh branch.
It was alleged by the applicant Bank that the defendants committed default in paying the dues inspite of repeated demands. The Bank, therefore, filed civil suit in Chandigarh Court on 16.10.89 for the recovery of Rs. 2,47,58,876/-.
3. The suit came to be transferred to Debts Recovery Tribunal, Jaipur in pursuance of the provisions of Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, in brief as Act by the orders dated 23.9.1996 It is alleged by the applicant Bank that the Counsels were informed to appear before Debts Recovery Tribunal, Jaipur on 29.11.1996
4. The defendants admittedly were not present before Debts Recovery Tribunal, Jaipur on 29.11.1996 The evidence on behalf of the applicant (plaintiff) Bank was already recorded in Civil Court. On transfer of the proceedings and on hearing the learned Advocate on behalf of the Bank, the learned Presiding Officer passed the ex parte decree on 22.1.1997 directing the defendants to pay the decretal amount of Rs. 2,47,58,876/- alongwith future interest at the simple rate of 19% per annum from the date of filing of the suit till realisation of the amount.
5. The defendants when came to know about ex parte decree against them applied for setting it aside alleging inter alia that they were expecting the fresh notice from Tribunal and as such they did not remain present on 29.11.1996 This contention did not find favour with the learned Presiding Officer with the result that the application for setting aside the ex parte decree stood dismissed on 11.3.1997 The Review Petition filed by the defendants also stood dismissed on 26.3.1997
Aggrieved by this dismissal and the passing of the ex parte decree, the defendants have preferred Appeal No. 90/97 on 15.4.1997
Dissatisfied with the granting of simple interest instead of interest at quarterly rests, the applicant Bank has also preferred Appeal No. 73/97 on 17.3.1997
This is how both the appeals between the same parties and arising out of the same proceedings, are being disposed of by this common judgment.
6. On the basis of the submissions made before me the only point which arises for consideration is whether the defendants are entitled for the fresh opportunity to contest the suit and whether the learned Presiding Officer has committed an illegality in not awarding future interest with quarterly rests.
7. Mr. Singh, learned Advocate on behalf of the appellant Bank raised the preliminary objections that the three orders dated 22.1.1997, 11.3.1997 and 26.3.1997 passed by the Tribunal cannot be clubbed together particularly when the original order passed on 22.1.1997 was not the ex parte order but the order under Order XVII Rule 3 of CPC. I find my self unable to accept this contention. The defendants wanted to exhaust the available remedies; first of applying for setting aside the ex parte order and the second of review as contemplated under Section 22 of the Act. Against the last order of dismissal of Review Petition the defendants have preferred this appeal. The appeal is thus within limitation.
Looking to the nature of suit and the impugned order passed by Presiding Officer it cannot be said that the Presiding Officer had invoked the provisions of Rule 3 of Order XVII of CPC. In fact, he has not recorded any such finding even though the point was raised before him by the Bank. The impugned order was the ex parte order and as such the defendants were justified in applying for setting it aside. Assuming that the order passed falls within the purview of Order XVII of CPC, it is appealable. In that case the time spent in the litigation is liable to be excluded. The delay on that count is condoned. In any case, therefore, the preliminary objections merit no consideration.
8. The applicant Bank before transfer of the proceedings to Debts Recovery Tribunal had no doubt examined 10 witnesses in support of its case. When the suit was posted for recording the evidence of the defendants, the Act came into operation and the learned Civil Judge by his order dated 23.9.1996 directed the transfer of the case to Jaipur Tribunal. While directing the transfer, Counsels were no doubt directed to appear before the Tribunal on 29.11.1996 This is the material date with which we are concerned. Admittedly the defendants were absent on 29.11.1996 when the suit referred to as application came up before the Presiding Officer. The endorsement in the rojnama shows that the “suit was received on transfer, the defendants absent and that they were bound down”. This is how the matter proceeded ex parte thereafter. Immediately thereafter the application was posted for arguments and on hearing the arguments the ex parte order was passed on 22.1.1997 In the meanwhile of course the application was posted on 18.12.1996, 8.1.1997 and 14.1.1997 Original defendant No. 5 Ranjeet Singh died during the pendency of suit. His L.Rs were already brought on record. It was to be ascertained about the bringing of L.Rs on record because the original applications to that effect were found missing. However, On ascertaining on the basis of the submissions made on behalf of the Bank the suit proceeded. The arguments which were incomplete on 8.1.1997 were completed on 20.1.1997 and the final order came to be passed on 22.1.1997 The knowledge of transfer of suit to Jaipur Tribunal in view of the provisions of the Act can very well be fastened to both the parties. So far as the Bank is concerned the further question of appearance does not arise. Because the Bank did appear on 29.11.1996 The question was only about the defendants and their absence on 29.11.1996 The mere knowledge of transfer cannot be extended to mean that the defendants who were expected to appear on 29.11.1996 were negligent in remaining absent. The defendants according to them were expecting fresh notice from the Tribunal. If this expectation is totally baseless and ill founded then of course defendants can be said to be negligent in remaining absent. Mr. Singh the learned Advocate on behalf of the applicant Bank relying upon the provisions of Section 31 read with Section 19 of the Act urged that no such fresh notice is contemplated in case of transferred suit/The provisions in my opinion do not bear any such strain of interpretation. The provisions are to be construed so as to facilitate equal opportunity and particularly when the Tribunals are governed by the principles of natural justice. In fact, the principles of natural justice cast more responsibility on the Tribunals for affording reasonable opportunity even in case of transfer of suits from Civil Court to Tribunal. Denial of opportunity cannot be the intent of any statute. After all the defendants were not present when the order of transfer was passed on 23.9.1996 Their absence on 23.9.1996 is besides the scope of dispute. The Counsels who were present were nodoubt informed that the parties were expected to appear on 29.11.1996 Inspite of it if the Counsels and particularly the Counsel on behalf of the defendants entertain the belief as affirmed by Advocate Navdeep Singh Sandhu (page 118 of the paper book) that the fresh notices would be issued to the parties it cannot be said to be unreasonable. It was a bona fide belief and there is nothing wrong in entertaining such belief. Many a time the same Advocates do not appear when the matters are transferred from one Court to other. From this point of view also it was a bona fide belief and as such the defendants cannot be branded with negligence in not remaining present before the Tribunal on 29.11.1996 Remand is thus inevitable. Only the defendants shall be given an opportunity to adduce evidence.
9. The learned Advocate on behalf of the defendants tried to urge on merits viz. mortgage of only one property vis-a-vis the issue framed, period of redemption and statement of accounts, etc. Mr. Singh tried to reply them by relying upon the rulings reported in AIR 1963 SC 884, (1969) 3 SCC 821 : AIR 1970 SC 659, and 1994 (1) PLR 373. The question of recording any findings on merits does not arise when the ex parte order is liable to be set aside.
10. The transactions continued from 8.11.1973 The suit was filed on 16.10.1989 If interest liability is calculated the decretal amount, prima facie would be much more than the suit claim. The further protraction cannot also be ruled out. The defendants were directed to pay Rs. 50 lacs by the order of this Tribunal on 15.4.1997 Order was duly complied with. Defendants have also paid Rs. 25 lacs on the day of hearing of appeal. The draft was handed over to Mr. Singh, learned Advocate on behalf of the applicant Bank. Looking however to the prospects of further liability particularly when the transactions are admitted in the written statement, the ends of justice require further condition of directing the defendants to deposit Rs. 25 lacs more within one month from today as per the final order.
11. So far as the appeal preferred by the applicant Bank, it is restricted to the limited question of quarterly rests. In the normal course there was no difficulty in affirming the said part of the final order based on the discretion vested under section 34 of cpc. However, when the matter is being remanded back, I do not think it expedient to express any opinion or to record the finding even in respect of the claim of quarterly rests. The parties are at liberty to address the Presiding Officer even on that point when the matter would be heard on merits.
12. The result is that even the appeal preferred by the applicant Bank deserves to be allowed with the direction that the question of awarding simple interest or with quarterly rests including the rate of interest shall be considered afresh.
I thus pass the following order.
Appeal No. 90/97 (Avi Autos v. Punjab and Sind Bank) is hereby allowed. The order passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Jaipur is set aside and the transferred application (suit) shall be decided on merits afresh by giving opportunity to defendants to adduce their evidence provided they deposit or pay directly to the applicant Bank additional amount of Rs. 25 lacs within one month from today. No further extension of time would be granted. Period of one month is condition precedent. On failure, the question of granting opportunity to defendants would not arise. The original order of 22.1.1997 shall stand restored.
On deposit if any the application on remand shall be proceeded with. The matter was already part heard. Witnesses examined on behalf of the applicant Bank shall not be re-called for further evidence. They were duly cross-examined. Defendants alone shall be allowed to adduce their evidence.
Appeal No. 73/97 (Punjab and Sind Bank v. Avi Autos) is also allowed and the matter is hereby remanded back for fresh consideration of awarding interest with quarterly rests or the simple interest including the rate of interest.
Parties to bear their own costs.
Inform DRT, Jaipur. Hearing to take place after one month from today. Hearing thereafter shall be expedited..
Appeals allowed.