M.C Jain, Chairperson:— By means of this appeal, the appellant initially challenged the final order dated 19.9.1997 passed by the Tribunal below in O.A in question as also the order passed by the Tribunal below on 31.1.2002 on the review application made later on, declining to review the final order.

2. By order dated 14.3.2007, my learned predecessor observed that in case of challenge to the final order passed by the Tribunal below, the appellant was required to make pre-deposit as envisaged under Section 21 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (for short “the RDDBFI Act”). If, however, he was choosing to challenge the order made on review application, compliance of Section 21 could not be insisted upon. He (the appellant) was required to elect as to which order he chose to challenge. By Miscellaneous Application No. 337/2007, the appellant chose to confine the appeal against the order dated 31.1.2002 So, the present appeal has been treated to be one against the order dated 31.1.2002

3. I have heard Mr. Om Prakash, the learned Counsel for the appellant as well as Mr. D.K Mehta, the learned Counsel for the respondent-Bank.

4. The O.A was decided on 19.9.1997 by a final order. The Bank's O.A was decreed for the recovery of Rs. 16,86,336.78 along with pendente lite and future interest @ 23.75% p.a from the date of filing of the suit till the date of actual realization of full amount against the defendants who were held to be jointly and severally liable. One of them, namely, Mr. R.K Tomar is the appellant before this Appellate Tribunal who figured as defendant No. 3 in the O.A After about three years, in July 2000, he made an application before the Tribunal below for the review of the final order dated 19.9.1997 contending that his signatures were forged on the deed of guarantee. The Tribunal below considered the application and held that he could not place the report of the handwriting expert for consideration of the Tribunal till the case was finally disposed of by order dated 19.9.1997 Through the review application, the final order was sought to be recalled on the ground that fraud had been committed on him by the Bank. It was held that the review application did not lie after the case was finally disposed of nearly three years back on 19.9.1997 If such pleas were allowed, the Tribunal below remarked, there would no end to litigation. The application was purported to have been made under sections 152 and 153 of cpc. The Tribunal below also pointed out that only the error which could be corrected by a Court/Tribunal under Sections 152 and 153, CPC related to clerical or accidental slips. So, considering the matter, the review application was rejected on 31.1.2002 where against this appeal was lodged on 21.3.2002

5. The learned Counsel for the respondent-Bank has raised preliminary objection that the appeal against the rejection of review application is not maintainable. He has relied on the case of Shanker Motiram Nale v. Shiolalsing Gannusing Rajput., (1994) 2 SCC 753.

6. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the appellant has urged that the appeal is well maintainable the matter being related to a special statute—Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993. He has relied on the following case laws:

(i) D.D.A & Anr… v. K.R Builders P. Ltd…., 119 (2005) Delhi Law Times 196 (DB).

(ii) P.K Saraswat, etc. v. Union of India, AIR 1999 Sikkim 16.

(iii) Mohd. Shahid v. Mohd. Saleem, 130 (2006) DLT 212.

(iv) Green View Tea and Industries v. Collector, Golaghat, Assam, II (2004) SLT 244 : I (2004) CLT 572 (SC) : (2004) 4 SCC 122 : AIR 2004 SC 1738.

7. I have given my anxious consideration to the matter and have gone through the case laws cited. It is significant to point out that Section 22(2)(e) provides that the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil Court under the CPC in respect of reviewing its decisions. It means that the provisions of CPC would apply on the matters relating to the review of the decisions by the DRT or DRAT. Further, Rule 5A of the Debts Recovery Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1993 provides, that any party considering itself aggrieved by an order made by the Tribunal on account of some mistake of error apparent on the face of the record desires to obtain a review of the order made against him, may apply for a review of the order to the Tribunal which made the order, but no application for review shall be made after the expiry of a period of sixty days from the date of the order. Order 47 Rule 7 of CPC provides that an order of the Court rejecting the application for review shall not be appealable; but an order granting an application may be objected to at once by an appeal from the order granting the application or in an appeal from the decree or order finally passed or made in the suit. It leaves not the slightest doubt that no appeal lies against the rejection of a review application. Since the provisions of the CPC have been made applicable in respect of the review by virtue of Section 22(2)(e) of the RDDBFI Act, the above provision as contained in Order 47 Rule 7, CPC would be attracted. To say in simple words, the appeal against the impugned order dated 31.1.2002 rejecting the review application is not maintainable.

8. Keeping in view Rule 5A of the DRT (Procedure) Rules, 1993 also, what could be the subject matter of review could only be a mistake or error apparent on the face of record. That is not the case here. Instead, the appellant started challenging the final order passed by the Tribunal below nearly three years back on the ground that his signatures on the letter of guarantee were forged. That could not be the subject matter of review, though it could be agitated in an appeal against the final order under section 20 of the rddbfi act. But for the maintainability of such an appeal, the condition of pre-deposit as per section 21 of the rddbfi act was to be met. The appellant wanted to escape this rigour and willingly chose to confine the appeal to the order dated 31.1.2002 rejecting the review application. Anyway, it was his own outlook with which this Appellate Tribunal is not concerned.

9. It may further be pointed out that even as per Rule 5A of the DRT (Procedure) Rules, 1993, the review application could be made not later than sixty days from the date of the passing of the order and that too, as I said earlier, on the limited premise of a mistake or error apparent on the face of record.

10. The learned Counsel for the respondent-Bank has rightly relied upon the direct pronouncement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shanker Motiram Nale v. Shiolalsing Gannusing Rajput., (supra), upholding the legal position that an appeal against the order of the Court rejecting the review is not maintainable as provided by Order 47 Rule 7, CPC.

11. Coming to the case laws cited by the learned Counsel for the appellant, I should point out that the rulings referred to at SI. No. (i) i.e D.D.A & Anr… v. K.R Builders P. Ltd…. (supra) and Sl. No. (ii) P.K Saraswat, etc. v. Union of India (supra), have no bearing on the matter at hand. So far as rulings at Sl. No. (iii) Mohd. Shahid v. Mohd. Saleem (supra) and Sl. No. (iv) Green View Tea and Industries v. Collector, Golaghat, Assam (supra) are concerned, it is significant to note that in none of these cases, this question was raised, considered and decided that in spite of the embargo of Order 47 Rule 7, CPC, an appeal does lie against the rejection of a review application before the Appellate Tribunal in cases where CPC applies wholly or in limited sphere of review. Though the RDDBFI Act is a special statute, but on the matter of review, CPC has been made applicable by Section 22(2)(e) and, therefore, the embargo of Order 47 Rule 7 CPC would have full play.

12. So far as the ruling at Sl. No. (iii) Mohd. Shahid v. Mohd. Saleem (supra) is concerned, it is also not clear whether the matter pending before the Hon'ble Delhi High Court was an appeal or a writ petition. In the said case, the Hon'ble Delhi High Court held that when dual remedy is available with the petitioner, he could have availed of either filing of appeal or review. Having chosen to file review, same is to be disposed of on merits. The order under challenge was one passed by Civil Judge dismissing the application only on the ground that the same was not maintainable. Hon'ble High Court held that it was not correct. The order passed by the Civil Judge was set aside and the matter remanded to the Civil Judge for disposal of the application on merits. It is to be pointed out that it is not clear whether the order was passed in appeal or in writ petition.

13. The ruling at Sl. No. (iv) Green View Tea and Industries v. Collector, Golaghat, Assam (supra) would also not come to the rescue of the appellant for another reason. In the said case, there was an SLP pending before the Hon'ble Supreme Court which was dismissed as withdrawn. The review petition was filed during the pendency of SLP which was also dismissed by the High Court taking the view that there was no error apparent on record. Another SLP filed thereafter challenged the order passed in review petition. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that when review petition was filed much prior to filing of SLP against main judgment of the High Court, the review application ought to have been considered. The judgment of the High Court was set aside and the matter was remitted for the consideration of the review application by the High Court in accordance with law. There is another reason as to why this case law would not come to the rescue of the appellant. It is Section 109, CPC which relates to the appeals to the Supreme Court. It reads as under:

“Subject to the provisions in Chapter IV of Part V of the Constitution and such rules as may, from time-to-time, be made by the Supreme Court regarding appeals form the Courts of India, and to the provisions hereinafter contained, an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of a High Court, if the High Court certifies—

(i) that the case involves a substantial question of law of general importance; and

(ii) that in the opinion of the High Court the said question needs to be decided by the Supreme Court.”

14. Articles 136 and 142 of the Constitution of India are contained in Chapter IV of Part V (referred to in Section 109, CPC). To be short, appeals to the Hon'ble Supreme Court are regulated by the above provisions. Needless to say, the powers of the Hon'ble Apex Court are unfettered. Article 136 says that not withstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any Court or Tribunal in the Territory of India. Not only this, Article 142 provides as under:

“(1) The Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it, and any decree so passed or order so made shall be enforceable throughout the territory of India in such manner as may be prescribed by or under any law made by Parliament and, until provision in that behalf is so made, in such manner as the President may by order prescribe.

(2) Subject to the provisions of any law made in this behalf by Parliament, the Supreme Court shall, as respects the whole of the territory of India, have all and every power to make any order for the purpose of securing the attendance of any person, the discovery or production of any documents, or the investigation or punishment of any contempt of itself.”

15. The crux of the matter is that the remand of the review matter by the Hon'ble Supreme Court to the High Court through judgment at Sl. No. (iv) cannot be taken as an authority on the matter that the Appellate Tribunal shall entertain an appeal against the rejection of review application in spite of the bar created by Order 47 Rule 7, CPC.

16. In view of the above discussion, touching the matter on all its facets, the appeal is bound to be dismissed and is, accordingly, dismissed.

17. No costs.

18. A copy of the order be supplied to the parties and be also sent to the Tribunal below.

Appeal dismissed.