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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • 1983 Income Tax Act (not mentioned in the excerpt, but included as it is a common format)
  • Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • 1983 Income Tax Act (not mentioned in the excerpt, but included as it is a common format)
  • Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute involves a brother (appellant/Defendant 1) and sister (Respondent 1/plaintiff) from a Muslim family over landed and house properties situated at Village Satara, District Aurangabad, Maharashtra. The properties were originally held by their late father, Sheikh Noor Mohammed.

Respondent 1 filed Civil Suit No. 120 of 1994 before the IInd Joint Civil Judge (Junior Division), Aurangabad, seeking partition and separate possession of her share. The appellant resisted the claim, asserting that the property was his self-acquired asset purchased under a registered sale deed (Ext. P-1) and, alternatively, that he had perfected title by adverse possession.

The trial court dismissed the suit on 24-12-1999. On first appeal (RCA No. 59 of 2000), the District Judge, Aurangabad, on 30-11-2001 decreed partition in favour of Respondent 1. The appellant’s second appeal (SA No. 875 of 2009) to the Bombay High Court (Aurangabad Bench) was dismissed in limine on 09-02-2010 for want of any “substantial question of law”. Aggrieved, the appellant sought special leave before the Supreme Court, resulting in the present judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court erred in dismissing the appellant’s second appeal at the admission stage without formulating and deciding substantial questions of law, as required by Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
  2. Whether questions concerning (a) the ownership status of the suit property under documentary evidence and (b) the corresponding inheritance rights of the parties under Mohammedan law, constituted substantial questions of law warranting consideration.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court found the High Court’s summary dismissal to be jurisdictionally flawed. It held that:

  • The nature of the dispute—determining whether the property was self-acquired by the appellant or part of the father’s estate—involves interpretation of documentary evidence, which squarely raises questions of law.
  • Under Section 100 CPC, the High Court must first identify and frame the substantial questions of law, notify the respondents, and then decide the appeal on those framed questions. Failure to do so violates the statutory mandate.
  • By not examining the exhibits or the concurrent findings of the lower courts, the High Court failed to discharge its duty, thereby committing a jurisdictional error.

The Supreme Court expressly refrained from commenting on the merits of the property dispute, limiting its intervention to the procedural flaw.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED; IMPUGNED ORDER SET ASIDE; MATTER REMANDED.

The High Court is directed to:

  • Admit the second appeal.
  • Frame specific substantial questions of law with reference to the pleadings, documentary exhibits, and findings of the courts below.
  • Decide the appeal on merits expeditiously, preferably within six months.

The Court encouraged the parties to explore an amicable family settlement before final adjudication. The ruling sets no new substantive precedent but re-emphasises the mandatory procedure under Section 100 CPC for second appeals.

To access the original judgment, please Sign In or Subscribe.

    Sk. Bhikan v. Mehamoodabee

    Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.— Leave granted. This appeal is filed against the final judgment and order dated 9-2-2010 passed by the High Court of Judicature of Bombay, Bench at Aurangabad in Sk. Bhikan v. Mehamoodabee 2010 SCC OnLine Bom 2183 whereby the second appeal filed by the appellant herein was dismissed at the admission stage.

    2. We herein set out the facts, in brief, to appreciate the issue involved in this appeal.

    3. The appellant herein is the first defendant and Respondent 1 herein is the plaintiff whereas Respondents 2 to 8 herein are Defendants 2 to 8 in the suit.

    4. The dispute in the appeal arises between the members (brother and sister) of one Muslim family. It relates to landed and house properties situated at Village Satara, District Aurangabad (Maharashtra) as detailed in Para 1 of the plaint (hereinafter referred to as “the suit property”).

    5. Respondent 1 is the real sister of the appellant. She filed a civil suit against the appellant and Respondents 2 to 8 (pro forma defendants) in the Court of IInd Jt. Civil Judge (JD) at Aurangabad being Civil Suit No. 120 of 1994 and prayed therein the relief of partition by metes and bounds of the suit property and, in consequence, also claimed her separate possession in the suit property qua the appellant.

    6. According to Respondent 1 (plaintiff), the suit property was owned by their late father Sheikh Noor Mohammed and on his death, Respondent 1, by virtue of inheritance and being one of his legal heirs, got share in the suit property as per the shares defined in the Mohammedan Law. Respondent 1 alleged that since her father died intestate leaving behind Respondent 1 and the appellant being sister and brother, she is entitled to claim partition of the suit property and its separate possession as tenant in common as against her brother (the appellant herein).

    7. The appellant denied the case set up by Respondent 1 and contended, inter alia, in his written statement that the suit property is his self-acquired property because he purchased the same by his own efforts by a registered sale deed (Ext. P-1) and hence, neither his late father had any right, title or interest in the said property and, in consequence thereof, nor Respondent 1 could inherit any right, title or interest in the suit property through her father as his legal heir. The appellant also set up a title by alleging his adverse possession over the suit property to the exclusion of all including Respondent 1.

    8. The trial court framed issues and the parties adduced their evidence. By a judgment/decree dated 24-12-1999, the trial court dismissed the suit filed by Respondent 1. Respondent 1 (plaintiff), feeling aggrieved, filed first appeal being RCA No. 59 of 2000 before the District Judge, Aurangabad. By a judgment/decree dated 30-11-2001, the District Judge allowed the appeal and decreed the plaintiff's suit and accordingly passed a decree for partition and separate possession of the suit property in favour of Respondent 1.

    9. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant (Defendant 1) filed second appeal being SA No. 875 of 2009 before the High Court. By the impugned order 2010 SCC OnLine Bom 2183, the High Court dismissed the second appeal in limine observing that the appeal does not involve any substantial question of law.

    10. Feeling aggrieved, Defendant 1 has filed this appeal by way of special leave before this Court.

    11. Heard Mr Shyam Divan, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant and Mr Makarand D. Adkar, learned counsel for the respondents.

    12. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we are inclined to allow the appeal and remand the case to the High Court for deciding the second appeal afresh on merits in accordance with law.

    13. The learned Single Judge while dismissing the appeal passed the following order: (Sk. Bhikan case 2010 SCC OnLine Bom 2183, SCC OnLine Bom paras 1 & 2)

    “1. The appeal is filed mainly against the findings recorded by the first appeal court that the respondent-plaintiff was entitled to 1/3rd share in the suit property being the daughter of Noor Mohammed who is also the father of the appellant. The fact that Noor Mohammed, the father of the parties held the suit properties at the time of his death is not in dispute so also Noor Mohammed died without leaving a testament is also an admitted fact. Thus, the appellant and the respondent being the brother and sister would take the property, left behind by their father as per provisions of the Mohammedan Law. The appellant, thus, would get two parts of the suit property, whereas the third part would go to Respondent 1-original plaintiff.
    2. The findings recorded by the learned Judge of the first appeal court are cogent. No interference in them is called for. There is no substantial question of law, arising in this appeal. The second appeal stands dismissed. Consequently, Civil Applications Nos. 4980 of 2005 and 9547 of 2003 also stand dismissed.”

    14. As observed supra, we do not agree with the reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the High Court in the impugned order. In our considered view, the appeal did involve the substantial questions of law and, therefore, the High Court should have admitted the appeal by first framing substantial questions of law arising in the case and then after giving notice to the respondents for its final hearing as provided under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”) decided the appeal on merits.

    15. As a matter of fact, in our view, having regard to the nature of controversy and the issues involved regarding ownership based on interpretation of documents (exhibits), the questions did constitute substantial questions of law.

    16. The questions as to whether the suit property is self-acquired property of late Sk. Noor Mohammad and, if so, whether Respondent 1 was entitled to inherit the same as his legal representative in accordance with the shares defined in the Mohammedan Law and secondly, whether the suit property is self-acquired property of the appellant (Defendant 1) on the strength of documents filed by him and, if so, whether it has resulted in excluding Respondent 1 to claim any share in such property as an heir of Sk. Noor Mohammad, was required to be decided by framing substantial questions of law in the light of proved documents filed by Defendant 1 because it was his case that the suit property was his self-acquired property. The High Court unfortunately did not examine any document for deciding the ownership issue in relation to the suit property.

    17. When the Court is called upon to interpret the documents and examine its effect, it involves questions of law. It is, therefore, obligatory upon the High Court to decide such questions on merits. In this case, the High Court could do so after framing substantial questions of law as required under Section 100 of the Code. It was, however, not done.

    18. The High Court, thus, in our view, committed jurisdictional error when it dismissed the second appeal in limine. We cannot countenance the approach of the High Court.

    19. In view of the foregoing discussion, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order is set aside. The case is now remanded to the High Court for deciding the appeal on merits in accordance with law.

    20. We, however, request the High Court to admit the second appeal, frame appropriate substantial questions of law as required under Section 100 of the Code, keeping in view the pleadings, findings of the two courts below and the documents (exhibits). Needless to say, the questions to be framed should be specific with reference to exhibits and the findings of the two courts below.

    21. Before parting, we consider it proper to mention here that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the controversy and confined our inquiry only to examine whether the second appeal involved any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the Code?

    22. We have noticed that the dispute is between the members of one family. It would, therefore, be in the interest of family that efforts should be made to settle the dispute amicably. Indeed, it was also stated by the learned counsel for the parties before us by giving some offer to each other. We grant this liberty to renew their respective offers before the High Court and explore the possibility for amicable settlement before finally hearing the appeal preferably within six months.

    23. Record of the case, if requisitioned, be sent back to the High Court forthwith by the Registry.

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    Comments

    Sk. Bhikan v. Mehamoodabee
    (Feb 20, 2017)