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2009 INSC 318
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citation codes
Case Number
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  • Section 302 of the Penal Code, 1860 (in short “IPC”)
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2009 INSC 318
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 302 of the Penal Code, 1860 (in short “IPC”)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant was tried for the murder of his wife, Satyawwa, who sustained 95% burn injuries in the early hours of 5 October 1999. According to the prosecution, the appellant, in an intoxicated state, poured kerosene on the deceased and set her ablaze inside their residence at Visa Pure Galli, Miraj. Neighbours transported both spouses—who also suffered burns on his hands while trying to remove her burning saree—to the Civil Hospital, Sangli.

Police Head Constable Subhash Koli (PW 3) recorded Satyawwa’s dying declaration between 6.30 a.m. and 7.00 a.m., after obtaining a fitness certificate from Dr. M.G. Madhu Kumar (PW 4). The declaration was treated as the First Information Report, leading to registration of Crime No. 194/1999. After investigation, a charge-sheet was filed under Section 302 IPC. The Trial Court convicted the appellant and sentenced him to life imprisonment plus a fine of Rs 100. The Bombay High Court affirmed the conviction. The present Supreme Court appeal challenged those concurrent findings.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the conviction for murder could safely rest on the deceased’s dying declaration without additional corroboration.
  2. Whether the medical evidence established that the deceased was in a fit condition to make a voluntary, reliable dying declaration.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The deceased was not medically fit to give any statement; therefore, the alleged dying declaration was unreliable.
  • The statement was the product of tutoring or prompting, rendering it untrustworthy.
  • In the absence of corroborative evidence, reliance on the dying declaration alone was impermissible.

Respondent State's Arguments

  • The doctor unequivocally certified that the deceased was conscious and capable of giving a statement.
  • The principles governing dying declarations permit conviction based solely on such a statement when it inspires confidence.
  • Both the Trial Court and the High Court had already subjected the declaration to thorough scrutiny; no ground existed to disturb their concurrent findings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Paniben v. State of Gujarat (1992 2 SCC 474) Consolidation of principles on evidentiary value of dying declarations. Provided the overarching framework within which the Court tested the declaration’s reliability.
Munnu Raja v. State of M.P. (1976 3 SCC 104) No legal or prudential rule prohibits conviction solely on a dying declaration. Reinforced that corroboration is not mandatory if the declaration is trustworthy.
State of U.P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav (1985 1 SCC 552) Court may base conviction on a truthful, voluntary dying declaration. Used to validate reliance on the uncorroborated declaration.
Ramawati Devi v. State of Bihar (1983 1 SCC 211) Same principle as above; voluntariness suffices. Cited for consistency with earlier rulings.
K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor (1976 3 SCC 618) Court must ensure declaration is free from tutoring or imagination. Guided scrutiny of possible external influence; none found.
Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P. (1974 4 SCC 264) Suspicious declarations require corroboration. Distinguished; Court found no suspicious circumstances here.
Kake Singh v. State of M.P. (1981 Supp SCC 25) If deceased was unconscious, any alleged declaration is inadmissible. Relied on medical evidence to hold deceased was conscious, making case inapplicable.
Ram Manorath v. State of U.P. (1981 2 SCC 654) Infirm declarations cannot ground conviction. Applied to test for infirmities; none detected.
State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu (1980 Supp SCC 455) Lack of detail alone does not vitiate a dying declaration. Shortness of statement accepted as assurance of truth.
Surajdeo Ojha v. State of Bihar (1980 Supp SCC 769) Brevity may enhance credibility of the statement. Supported acceptance of concise declaration.
Nanhau Ram v. State of M.P. (1988 Supp SCC 152) Eyewitness certification of fitness can outweigh contrary medical opinion. Although medical opinion was favourable, principle noted.
State of U.P. v. Madan Mohan (1989 3 SCC 390) If prosecution story conflicts with dying declaration, the latter cannot be used. Held inapplicable; no inconsistency found.
Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra (1982 1 SCC 700) When multiple declarations exist, the earliest prevails. Only one declaration existed; principle cited illustratively.
Gangotri Singh v. State of U.P. (1993 Supp 1 SCC 327) Restates the need for careful scrutiny of dying declarations. Offered additional support for the Court’s analytical approach.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court reaffirmed that a dying declaration, although untested by cross-examination, may constitute substantive evidence if it passes stringent judicial scrutiny. Referring to the catalogue of precedents, it reiterated that:

  • No rule of law requires corroboration where a declaration is deemed truthful and voluntary.
  • The decisive tests are freedom from tutoring, coherence, consistency, and the declarant’s mental fitness.

Applying these principles, the Court noted:

  • Dr. Madhu Kumar certified the deceased’s competence, and no contrary medical evidence existed.
  • The declaration was promptly recorded (within roughly four hours of the incident) by a police officer in the doctor’s presence, reducing chances of fabrication.
  • The defence theory of accidental burns from a lantern was unsupported and had been rightly discarded by both lower courts.
  • No internal inconsistency or external contradiction undermined the declaration’s credibility.

Consequently, the Court found the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the High Court to be well-reasoned and unassailable.

Holding and Implications

The appeal was dismissed; the conviction under Section 302 IPC and the sentence of life imprisonment were affirmed.

Immediate effect: the appellant continues to serve the life sentence with the original fine and default stipulation intact. The judgment reinforces existing jurisprudence that a reliable dying declaration can singularly sustain a conviction; it sets no new precedent but underscores the rigorous evaluative standard for such evidence.

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    Satish Ambanna Bansode v. State Of Maharashtra .

    Dr. Arijit Pasayat, J.— Leave granted. The challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant who was convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Penal Code, 1860 (in short “IPC”) and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs 100 with default stipulation.

    2. The prosecution version in a nutshell is as follows: Satyawwa (hereinafter referred to as “the deceased”) aged 28 years at the time of the alleged incident was married to the accused about 15 years ago and it can be said that it was a child marriage. At the time of the incident, the couple was gifted with two daughters, namely, Renuka and Chandrawwa. But the daughters were staying in Indira Nagar locality of Sangli, where the parents of deceased Satyawwa were residing. Satyawwa and the accused were staying at Visa Pure Galli Miraj.

    3. The incident took place on the night of 4-10-1999 and 5-10-1999 at about 2.30 a.m on 5-10-1999. As stated by Satyawwa before her death, the accused husband was drunk, he abruptly woke up at about 2.30 a.m and started beating her and she got scared. The accused picked up the kerosene tin from the house, poured it on her person and ignited her by using a matchstick. She also stated that as the saree caught fire, she started shouting. At this juncture, her husband tried to remove the saree from her person and in that process, he suffered burn injuries on both his hands. The neighbours also gathered and both were taken to Civil Hospital, Sangli in a rickshaw.

    4. Subhash Koli, Police Head Constable (PW 3) attached to Vishrambaug Police Station, was posted on duty at Civil Hospital. After admission of Satyawwa at about 4.00 a.m, intimation was sent by the hospital to the police station and therefore, he was instructed by the police officials to record the statement of the patient.

    5. Subhash Koli (PW 3) accordingly, recorded the statement of Satyawwa, only after obtaining the opinion from Dr. M.G Madhu Kumar between 6.30 a.m to 7.00 a.m on 5-10-1999. Satyawwa succumbed to the burn injuries at about 10 a.m

    6. It appears that the dying declaration was treated as an FIR by Miraj Police Station and Crime No. 194 of 1999 was registered. The investigation was carried out in parts by PSI Shri Ramesh Bhokare (PW 6) and AIP Shri Baliram Waghchavre (PW 7).

    7. The dying declaration was treated as a first information report by Miraj Police Station and the case was registered. After completion of the investigation chargesheet was filed. The accused pleaded innocence, therefore, trial was held. It is needless to say that the trial ended in conviction by the judgment which was challenged before the High Court.

    8. Apart from (PW 3) Subhash Koli, Police Head Constable, Dr. Madhu Kumar (PW 4) Medical Officer was present when the patient was admitted and also when the dying declaration was recorded. Shabbir Gulab Mulla (PW 1) who is the neighbour of the accused and victim, and Mohd. Hanif Dastgir (PW 2), who is the landlord of the accused provided some details about the incident.

    9. Dr. Nandkurnar Banage (PW 5) was the Medical Officer attached to Civil Hospital, Sangli at the material time. He had performed autopsy and by post-mortem notes he has recorded his opinion regarding the cause of death due to “septicaemia” shock due to 95% superficial to deep burns.

    10. The stand of the appellant-accused before the trial court was that on the basis of the dying declaration the conviction should not have been recorded. Further, the deceased was not fit to make any statement and, therefore, the so-called dying declaration is not trustworthy. The trial court did not accept the plea. Before the High Court the plea taken before the trial court was reiterated which came to be rejected by the impugned judgment and the appeal was dismissed.

    11. In support of the appeal learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the evidence of the doctor clearly indicated that the victim was not in a condition to give dying declaration and that the statement was the result of tutoring. Learned counsel for the respondent State on the other hand supported the judgment.

    12. So far as the statement of the doctor is concerned, a hypothetical answer was given to a question regarding the effect of the patient who suffered burns of a very high percentage. The doctor has categorically stated that the patient who gave dying declaration was in a position to do so.

    13. The stand taken before the trial court and before the High Court was rejected as there was no accidental burn due to fall of small lantern. This plea is clearly without substance as rightly noted by the trial court and the High Court.

    14. “11. This is a case where the basis of conviction of the accused is the dying declaration. The situation in which a person is on the deathbed is so solemn and serene when he is dying that the grave position in which he is placed, is the reason in law to accept the veracity of his statement. It is for this reason that the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. Besides, should the dying declaration be excluded it will result in the miscarriage of justice because the victim being generally the only eyewitness in a serious crime, the exclusion of the statement would leave the court without a scrap of evidence.

    12. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its correctness. The court has to be on guard that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring, or prompting or a product of imagination. The court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once the court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction on the same without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. This Court has laid down in several judgments the principles governing dying declaration, which could be summed up as under as indicated in Paniben v. State of Gujarat (1992) 2 SCC 474
    (i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. (See Munnu Raja v. State of M.P (1976) 3 SCC 104)
    (ii) If the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. (See State of U.P v. Ram Sagar Yadav (1985) 1 SCC 552 and Ramawati Devi v. State of Bihar (1983) 1 SCC 211.)
    (iii) The court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had an opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. (See K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor (1976) 3 SCC 618.)
    (iv) Where a dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (See Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P (1974) 4 SCC 264)
    (v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. (See Kake Singh v. State of M.P 1981 Supp SCC 25)
    (vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. (See Ram Manorath v. State of U.P (1981) 2 SCC 654)
    (vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (See State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu 1980 Supp SCC 455.)
    (viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. (See Surajdeo Ojha v. State of Bihar 1980 Supp SCC 769.)
    (ix) Normally, the court in order to satisfy whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration looks up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitness said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail. (See Nanhau Ram v. State of M.P 1988 Supp SCC 152)
    (x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. (See State of U.P v. Madan Mohan (1989) 3 SCC 390.)
    (xi) Where there are more than one statements in the nature of dying declaration, the one first in point of time must be preferred. Of course, if the plurality of the dying declaration could be held to be trustworthy and reliable, it has to be accepted. (See Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra (1982) 1 SCC 700.)
    13. In the light of the above principles, the acceptability of the alleged dying declaration in the instant case has to be considered. The dying declaration is only a piece of untested evidence and must, like any other evidence, satisfy the court that what is stated therein is the unalloyed truth and that it is absolutely safe to act upon it. If after careful scrutiny, the court is satisfied that it is true and free from any effort to induce the deceased to make a false statement and if it is coherent and consistent, there shall be no legal impediment to make it the basis of conviction, even if there is no corroboration.”

    (See Gangotri Singh v. State of U.P 1993 Supp (1) SCC 327)

    15. When the evidence on record has been examined in great detail by the trial court and the High Court to place reliance on the dying declaration, the conclusions cannot be in any way faulted. The appeal is without merit, deserves dismissal which we direct.

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    Comments

    Satish Ambanna Bansode v. State Of Maharashtra .
    (Mar 5, 2009)