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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The case arises from a dispute over control of a family company, Ahuja Tyres (P.) Ltd., founded in 1972 by Asa Nand Ahuja and incorporated in 1974. After the death of the founder in 1976, a conflict emerged between his four brothers and the heirs (his widow and two sons) over management and shareholding control. The heirs held less than 40% of shares, while the brothers and their wives held more than 60%. Despite the heirs holding the largest single block of shares, the managing director was appointed from the heirs’ group. Disputes escalated through board meetings, allegations of oppression, and competing claims of control leading to parallel management factions. Several petitions and suits were filed, including petitions under sections 397/398 of the Companies Act, a civil suit for injunction, and a criminal application for perjury. The court was approached to resolve the deadlock and conflicting claims of control and shareholding.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the managing director and other directors appointed by the heirs’ group had valid authority to exclude the brothers’ representatives from the board.
  2. Whether the additional allotment of shares to the heirs’ group was valid or null and void.
  3. How to resolve the deadlock between the two factions and determine which group should retain control of the company.
  4. The determination of a fair value for the shares held by the heirs and the terms for buyout by the brothers or vice versa.
  5. The appropriate mechanism for payment to the outgoing group and protection of their interests until full payment.
  6. Measures to ensure proper management and supervision of the company during the transition period.
  7. Consequences of default in payment or refusal to exercise buyout options, including possible winding up of the company.

Arguments of the Parties

Brothers' Arguments

  • They collectively hold over 60% of the issued capital and thus claim preferential right to retain control of the company.
  • They have been associated with the business since its inception and have contributed significantly to its development.
  • The heirs already operate an independent competitive business and can afford to be bought out.
  • They expressed inability to buy out the heirs by an outright payment but were willing to pay in reasonable installments.
  • Suggested that the heirs might be liable to pay compensation for damage to the company’s reputation and business.

Heirs' Arguments

  • Claimed entitlement to retain control based on the deceased founder’s legacy and their sentimental attachment to the business.
  • Asserted the managing director’s position and majority shareholding after alleged allotment of additional shares.
  • Filed a civil suit seeking injunction against interference by the brothers in management.
  • Agreed to valuation of shares by an independent chartered accountant and to buyout arrangements subject to fair price.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court recognized the irreconcilable differences between the two factions and the impossibility of their continued collaboration in managing the company. It observed the typical pattern of factional disputes in closely held companies, including parallel meetings, contested share allotments, and mutual allegations of illegality. The court found it unnecessary to delve into detailed adjudication of alleged acts of oppression or mismanagement due to the parties’ agreement that one group must hold exclusive control. It accepted the principle that in closely held companies, ownership and management are intertwined and that deadlock makes it unfair to force a minority to retain shares against their will.

Considering the parties’ respective claims and circumstances, the court concluded that the brothers, holding a majority share and having longer association with the business, should have the first option to buy out the heirs. The court emphasized a fair valuation by an independent chartered accountant and structured installment payments to balance the heirs’ need for funds and the brothers’ financial capacity. To protect the heirs’ interests pending full payment, the court ordered restrictions on alienation of assets, appointment of an independent chairman to oversee management, and payment of interest on deferred amounts. The court also provided mechanisms for completion and audit of accounts, asset delivery, options in case of default, and eventual winding up if no resolution occurred.

Holding and Implications

The court’s final decision was to dispose of C.P No. 17 of 1979 by ordering that the brothers have the first option to buy out the heirs’ shares at a fair value determined by an independent chartered accountant. Payment is to be made in installments with safeguards for the heirs’ interests until full payment. The court appointed an independent chairman to oversee company affairs during the transition and imposed restrictions on alienation of assets. The transferred civil suit and interlocutory appeals were dismissed as infructuous, and the criminal proceeding was discharged. Each party was to bear its own costs.

The direct effect is the structured resolution of the deadlock in management and ownership of the company, providing a practical mechanism for buyout and transition. No new legal precedent was established beyond the application of established principles relating to oppression, management deadlock, and buyout rights in closely held companies.

    Krishan Lal Ahuja And Others v. Suresh Kumar Ahuja And Others

    Anand, J.:— This judgment would dispose of C.P No. 17 of 1979, C. As. Nos. 164, 322 of 1979 and Criminal (Original) No. 3 of 1979 in C.P No. 17 of 1979 and Transferred Civil Suit No. 157 of 1979.

    2. The proceedings are a sequel to the scramble for the control of a family company between four brothers on the one hand, and the heirs of the fifth on the other. Asa Nand Ahuja, the eldest of the five brothers, for short, the deceased, started the business of retreading and vulcanising of tyres in 1972. In course of time, the four brothers, for short, the brothers, joined him in the business and the resultant family partnership entitled Ahuja Tyres was eventually incorporated in 1974 as Ahuja Tyres (P.) Ltd. Almost the entire issued capital was held by different members of the family. The company maintained steady progress and all went well until the deceased died on March 6, 1976. He was survived by a widow and two sons, for short, the heirs. The total holding of the heirs on the date of death was less than 40%. The brothers and the wives of two of them between them held more than 60%. On the date of death, Suresh Kumar Ahuja, eldest son of the deceased, was a young man of about 24 years pursuing his Post Graduate studies but nevertheless, either on account of their sentiment for the elder brother, or in recognition of the fact that the deceased was the originator of the business and the heirs admittedly held shares constituting the largest single block, a question on which there was some controversy, Suresh Kumar Ahuja was unanimously appointed managing director of the company. Three of the brothers were the other directors of the company. It may be pointed out that one of the four brothers, Shiv Prakash Ahuja, and the deceased had married real sisters. The new set up did not appear to have a smooth sailing because problems were thrown up in November, 1977, and two of the brothers came to this court on a petition under ss. 397/398, being C.P No. 104 of 1977, complaining of acts of oppression and of attempts by Suresh Kumar Ahuja and his mother to exclude Krishan Lal Ahuja, one of the brothers. The petition was disposed of by an order of December 7, 1977, which was in the nature of a consent order, and by which the position was sought to be stablized. The differences between the four brothers, on the one hand, and the heirs of the fifth on the other, however, appeared to have survived the attempt at stabilization leading to a virtual scramble for the control of the company between the four brothers and the heirs. The appointment of one of the brothers, Bhim Sen Ahuja, as technical director of the company was apparently taken as an act of affront by the managing director and gave the signal for further trouble. The adverse reaction of the managing director led to a retort by the brothers, when they carried out in the next meeting of the board, said to have been held on October 16, 1978, the election of the wives of the two brothers as additional directors raising the strength of the board from 4 to 6. This is said to have caused a violent reaction and led, inter alia, to an ugly incident, which was allegedly reported to the local police. The matters having thus come to a head, what had happened thereafter followed the normal pattern of happenings in private or even closely held public companies, a pattern which is made popular by the events of a decade or more in the Indian polity. The pattern is very simple. The dissatisfied faction goes out but claims to be the real party or the company, as the case may be, and goes about taking unilaterally all such steps as may be necessary to get rid of or to neutralise the strength of the other. In the course of time, two parallel bodies are functioning in the same name creating a deadlock and confusion. If one faction is in a minority in the board it seeks to expand the board by the addition of its own nominees to neutralise the strength of the other. The faction which is in minority in the company seeks to improve its position by the issue of further capital, if necessary. Both the factions invariably claim to have sent notice of meetings to the members of the other faction through certificate of posting. Such notices are shown as duly sent with the case with which their receipt is invariably denied. That such certificates can be easily obtained is now common knowledge. That the law still recognises such a mode of service only shows that in the race for supremacy between the law and its breakers, the breakers are far ahead of the law. It is necessary to apportion blame in this case, because what has happened has more or less followed the set pattern. Both factions held meetings. The meeting on the side of the four brothers, excluded the representatives of the other group from the board and the meeting sponsored by the heirs doing one up by not only eliminating the other side from the board but also neutralising their majority hold on the company by the issue of further shares to themselves for consideration other than cash on account of advances said to have been made by them to the company in the past, a matter about the existence of which there was no dispute but the parties were at variance with regard to the quantum of it. Parties have attributed to each other a number of illegal and improper actions but without going into the details, it is sufficient to say that when the matters came to this court, the heirs claimed that while their nominee continued to be the managing director, their group holding the majority shares, Krishan Lal Ahuja, one of the four brothers ceased to be the director of the company. On behalf of the four brothers, it was claimed that they held between them more than 60% of the holding and that the son of their deceased brother had been removed as a managing director of the company. It was in this setting that the four brothers and the wives of two of them sought the intervention of this court under ss. 397/398 of the Act by C.P No. 17 of 1979 to declare that Suresh Kumar Ahuja had ceased to be a director of the company, his mother and their other nominee had also ceased to be the directors, the additional allotment of shares issued on October 16, 1978, was null and void and for certain other reliefs. By C.A No. 164/79, interim protection of this court was sought. Meanwhile, the heirs caused a suit to be filed, being suit No. 157 of 1979, in the name of the company and one of them for a permanent injunction in the District Court and obtained an ex parte interim order on December 26, 1978, from the Additional District Judge, Delhi, restraining two of the brothers and son of one of the brothers from interfering in the management of the company. The suit was eventually transferred to this court for trial. Among the controversies between the parties, one is, whether one of the brothers, S.P Ahuja, who is also related to the heirs through the widow of the deceased, attended certain meetings and signed the attendance register and certain other documents. It appears that at one stage, S.P Ahuja was inclined to side with the heirs in preference to the brothers but had second thoughts. The explanation of S.P Ahuja with regard to his purported signatures on certain documents by the heirs provoked an application for proceedings for perjury against him, being Criminal (Original) No. 3 of 1979. Aggrieved by the injunction issued by the District Court, the brothers sought its vacation by C.A No. 322 of 1979.

    3. While the parties joined issues on a number of questions of fact and law, it was common ground that the parties had irretrievably fallen from each other and it was generally agreed that their continued collaboration in the management of the company was out of question. While a vague suggestion was made with regard to the partitioning of the land and factory to enable both the groups to continue the business separately, parties were not unaware of various difficulties that may come in the way of such a solution of the problem. There was, therefore, some dialogue as to the best manner to resolve the difficult situation. Both parties laid claim to buy out the other, the claim by the brothers being based on the fact that they collectively held over 60% of the holding. Similar claim by the heirs was based on the admitted fact that the deceased was the one who had laid the foundation of the business. Various other reasons were attributed why one or the other of the parties would be entitled to buy out the other. On behalf of the brothers, it was said that the heirs had already started their independent competitive business and were, therefore, able to look after their needs. The ability of the heirs to pay off the four brothers immediatety was canvassed as a good reason to let the heirs buy out the brothers. The brothers, while anxious to retain the management of the company, with or without the admitted holding of the heirs, expressed their inability to pay off the heirs immediately, if they were to be bought out, but agreed to submit to all reasonable directions that may be made so that, pending the payment of the consideration to the heirs, their interests were fully protected and the payment of the balance was suitably assured. Parties were more or less agreed with regard to some of the requisite modalities, such as completion and audit of the accounts of the company, accountability of the two groups to the company and to the members of the other with regard to the income and expenditure during the turbulent period, when both the factions were operating parallel management, the determination by an independent person of the true worth of the share for the purpose of buying out of one group by the other and the need of an appropriate machinery to safeguard the interests of the outgoing group until it shall be paid as also to ensure the payment of the balance. With a view to a smooth change over and to facilitate the transition, parties even exchanged names of prospective chairman or nominee directors and of the chartered accountants for the purpose of evaluation even though leaving it to the court to make the necessary nominations in that behalf. There was a vague suggestion on behalf of the brothers that the circumstances leading to the precipitate situation rendered the heirs liable to pay compensation to the brothers on account of damage done to the reputation and business of the company.

    4. Who, if any, is the aggressor, is an obvious first poser? Both parties have their own version of what happened and how the other was the agressor and they the victims. One of the parties approached the court in a regular civil action while the other invoked this court's jurisdiction under the Companies Act. That the holders of majority shareholding should complain of oppression by a minority holder is quite unusual but not difficult to imagine in the peculiar setting of this matter. For one or the other of the reasons canvassed by the parties, a representative of the minority group was entrusted with the reins of management of this company as the managing director. It is, therefore, quite conceivable that the managing director may have run rough shod over the affairs of the company and misused his position as such managing director to the annoyance or discomfiture, if not detriment, of the majority holders. It is also quite natural that having agreed to entrust the management to a comparatively inexperienced young man, the brothers relented and their effort to cut him to size produced violent reaction. Ordinarily, on a petition like this, the court would naturally go into the allegations and adjudicate the question as to whether there was an act of oppression or mismanagement before deciding as to the future course of action. Such an exercise, however, appears to be unnecessary in the peculiar circumstances of this case. Parties are closely related to each other and are reconciled to the idea of one or the other of them holding the company exclusively. The question as to which of them should hold it obviously could not possibly be determined with reference to who did what in the scramble for power that ensued the surfacing of differences between the groups. Once the scramble started, both the parties were caught in a vicious circle, obviously trying to outdo the other. That the meetings held on both sides on or after October 16, 1978, do not represent the normal functioning of the company but were motivated by the factional desire to exclude the other or to neutralise the strength of the other is so obvious from the decisions arrived at, if not the course preceding the holding of the meetings. Parties were also not averse to the idea of this court proceedings to deal with the matter on the assumption that meetings on both sides were not held on the fateful day in October 16, 1978, or on any date thereafter, and to treat the parties as having their respective holdings as on October 15, 1978. In that situation, it is unnecesary to consider who was appointed or ceased to be the director of the company and whether the allotment of additional shares was justified. It is also unnecessary to consider the rival versions with regard to the credit account of one or the other group in the books of the company or some of the other actions, notably the opening of a clandestine account in a bank by the heirs, its secret operation and the deposits and withdrawal made in relation thereto because parties were agreed that all these would have to be taken into account in the drawing up of the final account of the company and the parties would be accoutable to each other, as also to the company, with reference to all the transactions to which they were parties.

    5. Which of the two groups should, in the circumstances, be asked to go, is the next question that falls for determination. In what has been said before and the formulation of this question is implicit an assumption that the exclusive control of management by one group and the retention of its holding by the other could not, in the peculiar circumstances of this company, co-exist. Corporate management today is, no doubt, getting more and more divorced from corporate ownership and the corporate ownership is progressively being confined to the indirect participation in management by the medium of exercise of right to vote at the general meeting, as indeed the right to partake, to an extent, of the growing fortune of the company in the form of dividends, bonus or rights issues and the corporate ownership is, therefore, not necessarily synonymous with corporate management. That is, however, by and large, true of widely held companies. Private joint stock companies and even closely held public companies are recognised exceptions as in the present stage of the development of corporate management in this country, they are no better than glorified partnerships, where the holding does not represent mere investment for gain but has for its motivation the desire to be directly associated with the course of management. In such cases where there is a deadlock, it would be unfair to compel a minority holder to retain his holding against his wish and run the risk of being deprived of not only the return on the investment but also the benefit of direct participation in management and certain peripheral benefits arising out of it. In the circumstances, it would be unfair to compel the heirs to retain their holding in the fond hope that their investment would bear fruit or would in course of time attract accretions to it. Ordinarily, open bidding ensures the best price. The highest bidders hould, a fortioir, be entitled to stay. Such a method may be all right where the property is to be sold to a third person. Where, however, the property is to be sold to one of the two existing owners, such a method may, in certain circumstances, work out to be inequitable. In such a situation what is necessary is that the group that has to go out must be paid by the group that retains control, a fair price. This also eliminates the inequity that the right to buy out is determined by the capacity to buy out. What then are the other factors which would be determinative of the right to retain? Both the groups have articulated the points in support of the rival claim of retention. The brothers claim the preferential right over the. heirs for a number of reasons. Their group holds collectively over 60% of the issued capital. Their retention would ensure continuity of maintenance by the unit of four family units represented by four brothers. Each of the brothers had been associated with the business for varying years since almost its inception and, in any event, since its incorporation. Some of the brothers, who are nearing their fifties, had already put in their best in the development of the industry. They do not have any independent unit or other source of business while the heirs have a competitive unit of their own. The claim of the heirs to the right to retain is justified on the sole ground that the deceased was the founder of the business and they have, therefore, more than anything else a sentimental attachment to it. Having regard to all the circumstances, the brothers should have the first choice to buy out the heirs. Apart from the other reasons referred to above, the eldest son of the deceased is still young and would, therefore, be better equipped to develop a new venture or to expand an independent competitive unit already run by him. To disturb the heirs would mean only disturbing one family unit while to allow them to buy out the brothers would have the effect of disturbing four family units. There is considerable disparity between the two groups in the matter of time put in by them in the development of the business. That the heirs have an independent unit of their own and are, by and large, reconciled to the idea of being bought out, if a fair price is ensured, to an extent, relieves much of the burden of this court in giving the first choice to the brothers.

    6. What then is the basis on which the fair value of a share and the total holding of the heirs may be determined? Parties had at one stage explored the possibility of arriving at a mutually acceptable valuation or in the alternative a formula which may help the determination of the fair price. The efforts, however, did not fructify in spite of the best efforts of the parties and particularly their respective counsel. Parties are, however, nevertheless agreed that the true value of the total holding of the heirs be determined by an independent firm of chartered accounts, with or without the assistance of any valuer, assessor, architect or other specialised agency. Parties had also exchanged a list of chartered accountants but were unable to arrive at an agreed name and, therefore, desired that the court may nominate any firm of chartered accountants of proven competence and integrity for the purpose and their estimate of the fair value would be acceptable to the parties, subject to any direction that this court may make in that behalf. The rider was necessary with a view to enable the parties to obtain the directions of this court, if any of the parties genuinely felt that the valuation deserved to be modified one way or the other, since the parties, perhaps otherwise, would not have a right of review with regard to the determination of value.

    7. There is then the question of the manner of payment to the outgoing group.

    8. The brothers categorically expressed their inability to buy out the heirs by an outright payment, whatever be the value of their holding. Such an arrangement was apparently beyond their financial capacity and was, in any event, likely to cause financial difficulties in the existing industrial activity. Counsel for the brothers, therefore, made no secret of the anxiety of the brothers to pay the entitlement of the heirs by reasonable instalments, even though it was conceded that in fixing the instalment the court would obviously not ignore the fact that the heirs would need funds for the development of their independent venture, as also of the desirability that until the entire entitlement shall have been paid the heirs' interest in the company and their right to receive the balance are suitably ensured, inter alia, by the appointment of nominee-director or an independent chairman and by making the amount payable to the heirs a charge over the property, and, by other directions such as restraint on alienations except in the ordinary course of business. Having regard to the compulsions of the need of the heirs, on the one hand, and the constraints on the financial capacity of the brothers, on the other, the following schedule of payment would appear to represent a reasonable balance between the conflicting claims:

    (i) 25% within three months of the communication of the consent by the heirs of their acceptance of the value determined by the chartered accountant.

    (ii) 25% within a year of the payment of the 1st instalment.

    (iii) 25% within one year of the payment of the 2nd instalment.

    (iv) The balance within a year of the payment of the last instalment.

    What measures would be necessary to protect the interest of the heirs until the amount of their entitlement has been finally paid to them? In the first instance, it would be necessary that neither the company nor any of the brothers are allowed to alienate any of their assets, except in the ordinary course of business, or with the prior permission of this court, until the entire payment has been made. Secondly, there is need to supervise the conduct of the affairs of the company so long as there is any balance. This could be ensured by appointment of an independent chairman charged with the duty to oversee the conduct of the business of the company even though in view of the fact that the heirs are the competitors of the brothers, it should not be necessary to put a nominee of the heirs on the board. The heirs would, however, be entitled to approach the chairman, as indeed the court, for such action or directions as may be considered by them to be necessary to ensure proper conduct of the affairs of the company in the context of the interest of the heirs. Fourthly, having regard to the fact that a substantial part of the payment would be deferred, the brothers are required to pay reasonable interest on the reducing balance to the heirs to compensate the heirs for the blockage of funds. Interest at the rate of 10% would appear to be reasonable if the company does not declare dividend. If the company declares dividend at a rate less than 10% the interest would be payable at a rate by which the dividend falls short of that percentage.

    9. There are a number of other matters which deserve to be dealt with as a consequence of the proposed course of action with regard to the company.

    A. Completion and audit of accounts:

    (i) Parties are agreed that the books of account of the company be completed and suitably audited so as to, inter alia, ensure that both the groups have accounted for whatever business they had conducted for and on behalf of or in the name of the company and the realisations made by them and the withdrawals made out of the existing bank accounts or the new account or accounts that may have been opened by one or both of the groups since the disputes came to surface and the accountability of the parties to each other and of all of them to the company and of the company to each of them individually is determined. Once these accounts are completed and audited, the parties would make payment to each other and to the company or the company would make payment to such of them, who may be entitled in accordance with the balance-sheet and the profit and loss account as prepared and audited. Parties are also agreed that if on such audit, the heirs are held liable to pay to the brothers or to the company any amounts, the same may be set off against the entitlement of the heirs on account of the value of their holding and this would be regularised by making such entries in the books of account of the company as may be necessary and the schedule of payment referred to above would then he confined to the balance of such entitlement. In case the heirs are entitled to receive from the brothers or from the company any amounts, such amount would be paid to the heirs within two months of the audit and the schedule of payment referred to above would be confined to the entitlement of the heirs to the value of their holding. Both the groups would co-operate with the auditors in the completion of the accounts and in its audit and would make available to the auditors such books of account or documents such as vouchers, counterfoils, etc., as may be in their respective possession.

    B. Assets :

    (ii) Any property of the company which may be in the possession of any of the brothers or any of the heirs would be made over to the company through its principal officer. While the possession of the brothers would be suitably regularised by appropriate entries, the heirs would either deliver possession of such assets to the principal officer of the company or if such a course is agreed to by the brothers account for its value by appropriate adjustment. The assets would include, in particular, a van said to belong to the company and still in the possession of the heirs. If the heirs have in their possession any property belonging to the customers of the company, such as the tyres for retreading or retreaded tyres for delivery to the customers, the same would either be restored to the principal officer of the company, or with the consent of the company be restored to the customer concerned. All the assets would be delivered or accounted for within four weeks from the date of this order.

    C. Damages :

    (iii) There can be no doubt that the interfaction disputes must have caused injury to the company, both material and in its reputation. In view, however, of the manner in which it is proposed to resolve the disputes, it is unnecessary to apportion blame or take the matter any further.

    D. Option :

    (iv) It may be possible that on the value being determined, the brothers may not be interested or even if interested may not be in a position to exercise the first option to buy out the heirs. In such an eventuality, it would be open to the brothers to exercise the option to be bought out on the same terms and conditions. In such an event the heirs would be entitled to buy out the brothers on the same terms and conditions. Such an option could be exercised within a week of the receipt by the brothers of the acceptance by the heirs of the valuation.

    E. Default:

    (v) If the brothers make default in the payment of any of the instalments of the heirs' entitlement on account of their holding, the entire amount of the entitlement would become due and payable forthwith. If the brothers make further default in the payment of such amount forthwith, the brothers would forfeit the right of first preference to retain control and if within a week of such default the heirs notify their willingness to buy out the brothers, they would be entitled to do so on the same terms and conditions on which they were being bought out.

    F. Winding up:

    (vi) If on the opting out of the brothers or on their making default in the payment of the entire amount pursuant to the default in payment of any instalment, the heirs are not willing to exercise their option to buy the brothers or fail to do so, the company would be liable to be wound up and parties would have the liberty to take steps to obtain the directions of the court in that behalf. In such an eventuality, the parties would also have the liberty to make alternative proposals for the partitioning of the assets of the company.

    10. Having regard to all the circumstances, I would make the following directions:

    (a) The accounts of the company for the period from the close of the financial year, to which the last audited balance-sheet of the company relates to the end of December, 1979, would be completed and profit and loss account and balance-sheet prepared and duly audited within a period of two months. In case the financial year does not coincide with the end of the calendar year, the balance-sheet and profit and loss account would relate to the closing of the financial year in 1979 and a trial balance-sheet and profit and loss account would be prepared for the fraction of the year ending with December, 1979.

    (b) On the completion of the audit the groups would make payment to each other or to the company, as the case may be, within two months of the audit in terms of para. 10(i) above.

    (c) Parties do deliver and/or account for the assets in their respective possession in terms of para. 10(ii) above.

    (d) The true worth of a share of the company and of the total holding of the parties would be determined with or without the assistance of any valuer, assessor, architect or other specialised agency within three months.

    (e) The heirs would transfer their entire holding to the brothers or their nominees on the basis of the value so determined on payment of the first instalment in terms of para. 8 above. The transfer would be subject to the payment of the balance. In case the brothers opt out of the right to buy out the heirs, the heirs would make necessary transfer of their holding in favour of the brothers or their nominees as indicated above which would also be subject to the same conditions.

    (f) The accounts would be completed and audited and the value would be determined by V. Sankar Aiyar & Co., Chartered Accountants, for which they would be paid remuneration as may be agreed upon between the said Chartered Accountants and counsel for the parties, failing which by this court.

    (g) Shri S.L Bhatia, Senior Advocate, is appointed chairman of the company until the entire amount due and payable has been paid and the other rights and obligations arising out of the directions have been enforced and discharged, as the case may be. He would preside over all the meetings of the board of directors. of the company and generally oversee the conducting of its affairs. The company would not carry out for a week any decision of the board to which the chairman takes exception to enable the aggrieved party to obtain directions from this court. The chairman would be paid such remuneration as may be agreed between him and counsel for the parties, and failing that as fixed by this court.

    (h) The company and the brothers would not alienate any of its and their assets except in the ordinary course of business without the prior permission of the court until the entire amount in terms of the directions has been paid and the other obligations cast on the brothers have been duly discharged. In case the shareholding of the brothers is to be transferred to the heirs in terms of the option and default clause appearing hereinbefore, the direction with regard to alienation of assets would be applicable to the heirs and the assets of the brothers would in that case be discharged from this obligation.

    (i) Parties, as indeed the chairman, would be at liberty to seek such directions as may be necessary to carry out the various directions and to protect the interests that require protection.

    11. C.P No. 17 of 1979 is disposed of in these terms. In the circumstances, the transferred Civil Suit No. 157 of 1979 is dismissed as infructuous. The injunction granted by the trial court is hereby vacated. C. As Nos. 164 and 322 of 1979 do not survive and are, therefore, dismissed. No useful purpose would be served by pursuing Cr. (O) 3 of 1979 and notice issued in that is discharged. Parties would bear their respective costs.

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    Krishan Lal Ahuja And Others v. Suresh Kumar Ahuja And Others
    (Sep 21, 1979)