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Judgment Summary — VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J. (ORAL)

Factual and Procedural Background

This petition under Section 115 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) challenged the trial court's order dated 11.9.2013 which had disallowed an application for amendment filed by the petitioner (the defendant/counter-claimant). By that amendment application the petitioner sought to claim possession of six wooden boxes (pattas) located in shop no. 5329, Gali Petiwali, Ghas Mandi, Gandhi Market, Sadar Bazar, Delhi, and mesne profits/charges for their user.

Procedural history and pertinent factual chronology as stated in the opinion:

  • The original suit concerning the six wooden boxes was filed by the present respondent (then plaintiff) in 1992 seeking injunctions; an interim order directed the respondent to pay interim charges for use of the wooden boxes (interim order was for about one year around 1993).
  • The respondent withdrew that suit in 2005 and later resisted payment of charges, asserting that withdrawal extinguished the interim obligation.
  • The petitioner (counter-claimant) filed an amendment application to her written statement/counter-claim on 23.1.2012 seeking the relief of possession and mesne profits/charges against the respondent's continued use of the boxes.
  • The trial court by order dated 11.9.2013 disallowed the amendment application, which led to the present petition. At the request of counsel the petition under Section 115 CPC was converted into a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
  • Material factual assertions by the petitioner include that the six wooden boxes were given to the respondent on a leave-and-licence (daily storage) basis, not as a tenancy; the petitioner (and earlier her deceased husband) ran the business of letting out such boxes for daily use by traders; the respondent paid charges only for the interim period around 1993 and thereafter continued to use the boxes without payment for a period of over 20 years.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the trial court erred in disallowing the petitioner's application to amend the written statement/counter-claim to claim possession and mesne profits/charges in respect of the six wooden boxes.
  2. Whether the proposed amendment is barred by delay and laches, given that the counter-claim and suit were filed in 1992 and the amendment application was filed on 23.1.2012.
  3. Whether, as a matter of form and substance, relief sought as possession should instead be treated as a prayer for mandatory injunction where the relationship is one of leave and licence rather than tenancy.
  4. What period of mesne profits/charges (if any) may properly be claimed in view of limitation principles.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The six wooden boxes were given to the respondent only on a leave-and-licence (daily storage) basis, not as tenancy; the petitioner retained exclusive possession of the shop containing the boxes.
  • The respondent used the boxes for storage and paid daily charges; after about 1993 the respondent continued to use the boxes without paying charges for a period of some 20 years.
  • Accordingly the petitioner is entitled to recover charges (mesne profits/damages) for the respondent's illegal use and to reclaim the boxes; the amendment application was filed to seek these remedies and should have been allowed by the trial court.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The amendment application filed on 23.1.2012 is barred by delay and laches because the suit and counter-claim date back to 1992; reliance was placed on a Single Judge decision in Bal Bhagwan v. Balbir Singh & Ors. (2012) DLT 258 to support dismissal for delay and laches.
  • Allowing the amendment would convert the nature of the suit from a claim for perpetual and mandatory injunction into a suit for possession, altering the substance of the proceedings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. R.P. Khaitan, 79 (1999) DLT 555 (SC) Substance over form: the heading of a petition is immaterial; substance must be examined to determine the true nature of the remedy sought. The court converted the petition under Section 115 CPC into one under Article 227 of the Constitution, relying on the principle that substance governs over the heading of the petition.
Sant Lal Jain v. Avtar Singh, (1985) 2 SCC 332 A suit for mandatory injunction lies against a leave-and-licencee; mandatory injunction can operate as the appropriate remedy in such relationships. The court treated the petitioner's proposed relief of 'possession' as effectively a prayer for 'mandatory injunction' against a leave-and-licencee and allowed substitution of the word 'possession' with 'mandatory injunction' in the amendment.
Bal Bhagwan v. Balbir Singh & Ors., S 189 (2012) DLT 258 Delay and laches are valid grounds to dismiss an application for amendment; factual circumstances determine whether delay/laches apply. The court acknowledged the principle but distinguished the facts: on the pleadings (specific averments of leave-and-licence, exclusive possession and non-payment) the delay/laches argument did not merit dismissal of the amendment application in the present case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in several inter-related steps, each grounded in material averments and authority cited in the opinion:

  1. Procedural posture and conversion: At the request of petitioner’s counsel, the court converted the petition under Section 115 CPC into a petition under Article 227, relying on the Supreme Court's dictum that the form or heading of a petition is immaterial and substance must be looked at (Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. R.P. Khaitan).
  2. Nature of relationship and remedy: The court examined the pleaded facts in the counter-claim which specifically alleged that the respondent had the boxes only on a leave-and-licence (daily storage) basis, that the petitioner was in exclusive possession of the shop where the boxes lay, and that the respondent was not a tenant. On that basis and in view of the authority in Sant Lal Jain v. Avtar Singh, the court concluded that a prayer for mandatory injunction is the proper form of relief against a leave-and-licencee and that a change in heading from 'possession' to 'mandatory injunction' would not change the substance of the cause of action.
  3. Delay and laches: The court considered the respondent’s contention—supported by the Bal Bhagwan decision—that the amendment was time-barred by delay and laches. However, the court found that factual averments in the counter-claim (specifying leave-and-licence, exclusive possession and non-payment) meant the delay/laches argument could not be sustained on the present facts; each case must be decided on its own facts and the cited authority did not mandate dismissal here.
  4. Limitation on mesne profits/charges: The court accepted that claims for unlawful user are subject to limitation and therefore limited any claim for mesne profits/charges to three years prior to the filing of the amendment application. The court explicitly set aside the trial court’s dismissal of the amendment but observed that charges older than three years prior to the amendment application would be barred by limitation.
  5. Relief granted and consequential directions: The court allowed the amendment application, directed that the word 'possession' in the amendment be read as 'mandatory injunction' (a substituted prayer already present in the counter-claim), permitted all consequential amendments, and imposed costs of Rs. 50,000 on the respondent for harassing the widow-petitioner. Payment of those costs was made a condition precedent to the respondent pursuing his defence in the counter-claim.
  6. Findings of fact relied on in reasoning: The court noted that the interim order in the original suit required payment of charges for a short period (around 1993) and that the respondent paid charges only for that period but thereafter used the boxes without payment for around 20 years. The court characterized the respondent's conduct as dishonest and unfairly harassing the petitioner.

Holding and Implications

Core holding: The impugned order dated 11.9.2013 dismissing the petitioner's amendment application is set aside and the amendment application is allowed, subject to the modifications and limitations stated by the court.

Specific operative consequences:

  • The word "possession" in the amendment application is to be treated as the expression "mandatory injunction" and the petitioner is permitted to make all requisite and consequential amendments to the counter-claim to reflect that relief.
  • The petitioner may claim mesne profits/charges only for the three years prior to the filing of the amendment application (claims for earlier periods are barred by limitation).
  • The respondent is ordered to pay costs of Rs. 50,000 to the petitioner for harassment; payment of these costs is made a condition precedent to the respondent pursuing his defence in the counter-claim.

Broader implications: The decision resolves the dispute between these parties by permitting amendment and limiting recovery of charges to the three-year limitation period. The opinion treats the matter largely as one of applying established principles (substance over form; mandatory injunction against a leave-and-licencee; limitation) to the facts. The court did not purport to lay down any novel legal principle beyond the application and reconciliation of existing precedents to the case facts.

If any particular item above appears abbreviated, it reflects the court's own focus in the provided opinion and the requirement to summarize only what the opinion explicitly states.

    Tara Devi Petitioner v. Prahlad Rai

    VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J (ORAL)

    1. This petition under Section 115 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) impugns the order of the trial court dated 11.9.2013 by which the trial court has disallowed the application for amendment filed by the petitioner/defendant/counter-claimant to the written statement/counter-claim. By the amendment application, the petitioner/defendant/counter-claimant sought to claim the relief of possession of the six wooden boxes/pattas, as shown in red colour of the site plan in the shop no. 5329, Gali Petiwali, Ghas Mandi, Gandhi Market, Sadar Bazar, Delhi.

    2. Certain facts are required to be stated and understood before dealing with this petition, and which are stated hereinafter, but at the outset, at the request of the counsel for the petitioner, this petition under Section 115 CPC is converted into a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, and which I am entitled to do so because heading of the petition is immaterial and substance has to be seen vide judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. R.P Khaitan 79 (1999) DLT 555 (SC).

    3. Respondent originally was the plaintiff in a suit for injunction as regards the six wooden boxes. The dispute pertains to the six wooden boxes which are lying in the shop no. 5329. The respondent/erstwhile plaintiff/defendant in the counter-claim had claimed that he should not be dispossessed from the six wooden boxes which are being used by him and lying in the shop no. 5329. In this suit there was an interim order directing the respondent/erstwhile plaintiff/defendant in the counter-claim to pay certain interim charges for use of the wooden boxes. The respondent/erstwhile plaintiff/defendant in the counter-claim, thereafter, withdrew the suit and claimed that since the interim order for direction of payment of charges was made in his suit for injunction, which no longer continued, he was no longer liable to pay the charges. I may note that the suit was filed in the year 1992 and it was withdrawn by the respondent/erstwhile plaintiff/defendant in the counter-claim, in the year 2005. It is thereafter that the present counter-claimant/erstwhile defendant/now plaintiff moved the subject application for amendment of the counter-claim to seek relief of possession and mesne profits.

    4. The case of the petitioner/counter-claimant/now plaintiff is that the respondent herein was not a tenant, but he was given the six wooden boxes on leave and licence basis, and which boxes are placed inside the shop. It is the business of the counter-claimant and before her of her deceased husband to give out wooden boxes for storage to various traders who come to the city of New Delhi on daily basis. These traders use the boxes to keep their purchases and when they go away from the city of New Delhi, they vacate the wooden boxes after paying the daily charges/bhadas. In sum and substance these boxes are like ‘vaults’ for storage of items purchased by traders on payment of charges for use of the boxes.

    5. A reading of the application for amendment filed by the present petitioner shows that the basis given for seeking amendment is not wholly correct and only partially correct, because, the petitioner for seeking amendment seems to rely upon the entitlement pursuant to the interim order passed in the suit for injunction of the respondent-erstwhile plaintiff, when really the cause of action and entitlement of the petitioner/counter-claimant/now plaintiff is that since the six wooden boxes were only given on daily storage basis to the respondent herein, and since the respondent is continuing to use the same, the respondent is liable to pay the charges of user of these boxes and also give them back to the petitioner. I am informed with respect to the interim order passed in the suit of the respondent for injunction, only for one year in and around 1993, the respondent has paid charges, but from 1993 till date i.e for over 20 years, the respondent is using the six wooden boxes without paying any charges to the petitioner-widow. Obviously, this is height of dishonesty to say the very least. The petitioner, therefore is, surely, entitled to charges on account of illegal user and non-payment of user charges by the respondent herein of the six wooden boxes kept in the shop owned by the petitioner herein, and for which purpose, the amendment application was filed and which has wrongly been disallowed by the trial court.

    6. Surely, for illegal user, a person in illegal possession is liable to pay the necessary charges, whether called damages or mesne profits or any other nomenclature. The impugned order of the court below dismissing the amendment application for claiming charges is therefore illegal and is hence set aside, subject however, to the observation that the claim of charges will only be for a period of three years prior to the filing of the application for amendment because charges prior to the three years would have become barred by limitation.

    7. That takes us to the second aspect as to whether the petitioner/counter-claimant/now plaintiff on account of delay is barred seeking amendment of the counter-claim to claim the relief of possession. Learned counsel for the respondent states that the subject suit was filed in the year 1992, thereafter, the counter-claim was also filed in the year 1992, and therefore the amendment application which is filed on 23.1.2012 is barred by delay and laches. In support of this proposition, reliance is sought to be placed upon a judgment of learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Bal Bhagwan v. Balbir Singh & Ors…. S 189 (2012) DLT 258. It is also argued that besides the aspect of delay and laches, allowing the amendment will cause to convert the nature of the suit into a suit for possession from a counter-claim of perpetual and mandatory injunction.

    8. The arguments urged on behalf of the respondent herein may appear to have some reasoning at the first blush, however, when we examine the arguments in depth, the arguments are totally misconceived. Firstly, the form of relief in the plaint is immaterial and if we see the present counter-claim, the petitioner herein/counter-claimant has already prayed for mandatory injunction. Mandatory injunction is really in form, a claim for possession, and in fact, as against a leave and licencee there need not be a prayer for possession and mandatory injunction is sufficient vide the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Sant Lal Jain v. Avtar Singh (1985) 2 SCC 332. Therefore, the application for amendment is in a way futile, however, I would not like to dismiss the same on a technical ground of limitation or form, inasmuch as, once in fact, the relief in the counter-claim to claim back possession of the six wooden boxes from the present respondent, changing of the existing relief of mandatory injunction to a suit for possession in my opinion should not make any difference because it is really a change only in the heading without changing of the substance of the cause of action which continues to remain the same that the respondent was only given the boxes for being used during the day and for which he was paying daily user charges.

    9. So far as the judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Bal Bhagwan (supra) is concerned, no doubt it has rightly observed that delay and laches is a ground to dismiss an application for amendment, however, the facts of each case have to be seen in order to determine whether there is any delay and laches. When we look at the averments in the present counter-claim, it is clear that the present petitioner has used specific words in the counter-claim that the respondent had the six wooden boxes only on leave and licence basis. It is specifically stated in the counter-claim that the entitlement of the respondent herein was to use the six wooden boxes only during the day on payment of charges. It was denied that the respondent herein had any tenancy rights in the boxes. It is specifically stated in the counter-claim that the petitioner/counter-claimant is in exclusive possession of the shop in which the six wooden boxes are lying. This averment of exclusive possession was made because the respondent/now defendant was said to be a leave and licencee. Therefore, once the issue is looked at from the point of view of only of a proper heading of the suit being a suit for mandatory injunction or a suit for possession, and only substance is to be seen, the sum and substance of the suit is the illegal user of the six wooden boxes by the respondent herein and the object of the suit is to stop the illegal use by the respondent and to claim charges for user till the six wooden boxes are continuing to be used by the respondent/plaintiff.

    10. Though in my opinion, petitioner is well advised of not asking specifically for the relief of possession and seek only the relief which is claimed as mandatory injunction in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Sant Lal Jain (supra), however, this aspect is to be looked into by the petitioner. At this stage, on the request of the counsel for the petitioner, in the amendment application the word ‘possession’ is deleted and substituted by the word ‘mandatory injunction’ and which prayer for mandatory injunction already exists in the present suit. As already stated vide judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Sant Lal (supra) that a suit for mandatory injunction lies against a leave and licence and hence the oral prayer of petitioner is accepted and petitioner will make and is entitled to make all requisite and consequential amendments to the counter-claim.

    11. No doubt, all types of cases come up before Courts. In some cases there is a reasonable point to be urged, in some others strong issues, however, there are cases in which gross injustice is caused by one party to another. This is one such case where the widow/petitioner is being harassed by the respondent, when the nature of the user of the boxes makes is clear that there cannot be tenancy rights, and there is only a leave and licence right. Even with respect to the leave and licence right, the respondent is not paying any charges, but is continuing to use the boxes from at least around 1995 without payment of any charges viz for a period of now 20 years.

    12. In view of the aforesaid and considering the peculiar facts of this case, the impugned order dated 11.9.2013 dismissing the amendment application filed by the petitioner/counter-claimant is set aside and the application for amendment is allowed with observations that the word ‘possession’ used in the application for amendment will be treated as the expression ‘mandatory injunction’ and the mesne profits which would be claimed will now be claimed for three years prior to the filing of the application of amendment. The petitioner can make all necessary amendments to the counter-claim for such purpose.

    13. The petition is also allowed with costs of Rs. 50,000/- to be paid by the respondent for harassing a widow/petitioner because now as many as 20 years, no charges are being paid for the six wooden boxes and noting that the respondent who had filed the suit for injunction had withdrawn his suit for injunction unconditionally only so as to frustrate the interim order of the court directing payment of the interim charges for user of the six wooden boxes. Payment of costs by the respondent shall be a conditioned precedent to the respondent pursuing his defence in the counter-claim.

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    Comments

    Tara Devi Petitioner v. Prahlad Rai
    (Jul 24, 2014)