Prakash Narain, J.:— The petitioner was employed as a Laboratory Technician in the Willingdon Hospital, New Delhi, in the Directorate-General of Health Services, Ministry of Health and Family Planning. He was married to one Smt. Surjeet Kaur and being one professing the Sikh religion was governed by the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act. The petitioner claims that he is a Sikh at belonging to Bhatinda District and so, was also governed by custom in matters of marriage and divorce.

2. According to the petitioner his marriage with Surjeet Kaur was dissolved on June 5, 1966 in accordance with the procedure prescribed by customary law known as “Bedawa”. This custom it stated to be that a dissolution of marriage can take place between two parties by their making an open declaration in and before the “Biradari Panchayat” and other respectable members of the community assembled. Such dissolution of marriage can be effected by mutual consent in the above manner.

3. On June 28, 1966 the petitioner informed the Medical Superintendent, Willingdon Hospital by letter of that date that his marriage with Surjeet Kaur had been dissolved. Along with this letter he had submitted a certificate of dissolution of marriage issued by the Sarpanch of his village. The petitioner also informed the Medical Superintendent that he intended to remarry. On November 27, 1966 the petitioner married Smt. Tripta Mann who was a Staff Nurse in Irwin Hospital, New Delhi. It seems that some time toward the end of 1972 two complaints were received against the petitioner that he had married a second time while his first wife was still alive and the marriage with the first wife still subsisted. Accordingly, an enquiry was made about this from the petitioner by Memorandum dated December 18, 1972 issued to him by the Deputy Medical Superintendent of the Willingdon Hospital. He was required to state whether it was a fact that he had two wives and both of them were alive. The petitioner sent a reply denying the allegation by a communication dated December 23, 1972. Surjeet Kaur is stated to have thereafter made a formal complaint to the Medical Superintendent of the Willingdon Hospital the petitioner having married a second wife while his first marriage was subsisting. The petitioner was thereupon required to give detailed information about his two marriages and the alleged dissolution of marriage. The petitioner again denied the allegations. After holding a preliminary enquiry into this matter the petitioner was served a Memorandum dated June 6, 1973 issued by the Medical Superintendent of the Willingdon Hospital informing him it was proposed to hold an enquiry against him under Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, hereinafter referred to as the C.C.A Rules. The misconduct alleged against him was that he contracted a second marriage some time during the period from July 1, 1966 to January 4, 1972 with a girl named, Tripta, without seeking or obtaining the permission of the Government while his first wife, Surjeet Kaur, was still alive and not separated or divorced from the petitioner, this again being in violation of Rule 21 of the C.C.A Rules. Another charge preferred against the petitioner was that he had been neglecting his first wife and children by the first marriage in violation of the Ministry of Home Affairs Memorandum No. F. 25/16/59-Ests (A) dated September I, 1959 and Rule 3(1)(iii) of the CCA. Rules. Along with the charge-sheet a statement of imputation of misconduct in support of the charges preferred was also served on the petitioner. This statement disclosed that a complaint dated November 10, 1972 was received from one Baldev Singh, Panch, and Chand Singh Sarpanch of the village Panchayat of village Khilan and another complaint dated January 1, 1973 was received from Surjeet Kaur addressed to the Director-General of Health Services, New Delhi, complaining about the second marriage stated to have been contracted by the petitioner. The list of documents which were to be relied upon comprising of five documents was also supplied. It was also stated that the prosecution intended to produce six witnesses whose names were disclosed. The petitioner was asked to submit his written statement in reply to the said charge-sheet. The petitioner submitted a preliminary written statement dated August 31, 1973. In the meanwhile by an order dated August 14, 1973 the Medical Superintendent of the Willingdon Hospital appointed Shri S.P Jindal, Deputy Director Administration, Directorate General of Health Services, New Delhi, as the Enquiry Officer to enquire into the charges preferred against the petitioner. By a Memorandum dated August 22, 1973 the petitioner was informed that he could inspect the original documents referred to in the Annexure to the charge-sheet on August 23, 1973 in the office of the Administrative Officer of the Willingdon Hospital. He was also permitted to submit this reply to the charge-sheet by January 31, 1973.

4. The enquiry commenced against the petitioner on October 11, 1973. By a letter dated October 16, 1973 the petitioner prayed that he may be allowed to engage a counsel to represent him before the Enquiry Officer. He submitted that as complicated question of law and interpretation of the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act as well as the Punjab Customary law were involved, he may be allowed to engage a counsel. This request was not acceded to. By memorandum dt. October 24, 1973 the petitioner was informed that representation by counsel was not permitted but the petitioner may take the assistance of any other Government servant to represent his case. Thereupon the petitioner by letter dated October 16, 1973 appointed Shri K.R Ramanujam Assistant Technical Officer, Civil Aviation Department, Santa Cruz, Airport, Bombay, as the Government servant to assist him and prayed that necessary arrangements may be made to call Shri Ramanujan. By this letter the petitioner also informed the Enquiry Officer that he would submit his list of defence witnesses after the prosecution witnesses had been examined aid in consultation with Shri Ramanujam. This gentleman, when asked to come to Delhi, informed the Enquiry Officer that he was not available till November 11, 1973. The petitioner also informed the Enquiry Officer by a letter dated November 11, 1973 that Shri Ramanujam would be available on November 14 and 15 and so, the hearing may be fixed for those days. The request for adjournment of the enquiry proceedings was, however, turned down and the enquiry was proceeded with.

5. In the course of enquiry thus held the petitioner was assisted by Shri G.L Dar, Upper Division Clerk Department of Tourism in the absence of Shri Ramanujam. The petitioner had pleaded not guilty. Five documents were produced in support of the charges, namely, letter dated November 10, 1973, from Baldev Singh, Panch, and Chand Singh, Sarpanch, letter dated January 1, 1973 from Surjeet Kaur, nomination for family pension made by the petitioner dated July 1, 1966 (possibly June 1, 1966) showing the nominee to be Surjeet Kaur, nominated for death-cum-retirement gratuity of the same date as above in favour of Surjeet Kaur and C.G.H.S Index Card dated January 4, 1972 showing Smt. Tripta as the wife of petitioner. The petitioner questioned the genuineness of the two complaints and claimed that the nominations for family pension and death-cum-retirement were made on June 1, 1966 and not on July 1, 1966. In these nominations he had shown Surjeet Kaur as his wife and two sons and one daughter as his children begotten from her. He admitted the C.G.H.S Index Card dated Januray 4, 1972 in which he had shown Smt. Tripta as his wife, one son begotten from her aged 41/2 years and his dependent father, aged 70 years. Regarding the charges the petitioner said that his first marriage having been dissolved on June 5, 1966 he was free to marry for the second time and inasmuch as the first marriage did not subsist he was not bound to maintain his first wife but he was looking after his children.

6. The petitioner had submitted a further written statement of defence on November 15, 1973. Sittings of the enquiry were held on November 1 and 15, 1973 and December 26 and 27, 1973 although initially the enquiry started on October 11, 1973.

7. Apart from production of the aforesaid five documents six witnesses, as noticed earlier, were cited in support of the charges preferred against the petitioner. On November 1, 1973 only Santokh Singh himself was a Head Constable in District Barnala from December, 1972 to July, 1973. He deposed that he did not know Surjeet Kaur but stated that a complaint was received from the members of the village Panchyat that the husband of Surjeet Kaur had left her and her children were not being maintained by her husband. He could not say whether the children were living with their mother. The petitioner declined to cross-examine this witness and reserved his right of cross-examination in view of his assisting officer not being present. The witness could not say whether there had been any separation between Surjeet Kaur and her husband.

8. None of the documents relied upon by the prosecution were proved by any witness nor did any witness depose about them. It is not clear why the remaining witnesses cited on behalf on the prosecution were not examined.

9. The petitioner along with his statement of defence had produced three documents and had cited five witnesses. Three documents produced by him were an attested copy of certificate dated June 19, 1966 issued by Zora Singh, Sarpanch. Gram Panchayat, Village Khilan, Tehsil Mansa regarding dissolution of the first marriage on June 5, 1966 according to the custom of ‘Bedawa’ an attested copy of declaration dated January 15, 1973 from Surjeet Kaur affirming the dissolution of marriage and unattested copy of letter dated June 28, 1966, addressed by the petitioner to the Madical Superintendent, Willingdon Hospital giving information about the dissolution of marriage etc. Out of the five witnesses cited by the petitioner four witnesses appeared before the Enquiry Officer on December 26, 1973. These were: Zora Singh, Sarpanch of petitioner's village, Balbir Singh Mann, Mohinder Singh Mann and S.P Sharma, a Laboratory Technician.

10. The Enquiry Officer submitted his report dated February 7, 1974. According to this report it was held that the petitioner had violated Rule 21 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 and had committed gross misconduct in neglecting his first wife. Surjeet Kaur and children by the first wife. On February 18, 1974 the petitioner was served a notice to show cause by the Medical Superintendent of the Willingdon Hospital as the disciplinary authority. In this notice to show cause it is stated that the Medical Superintendent agreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer. The petitioner was informed that the penalty of dismissal was proposed to be imposed upon him and he may show cause against the proposed penalty within 15 days of the receipt of this memorandum. A copy of the enquiry report was enclosed with the show cause notice. The petitioner submitted a representation on March 21, 1974. After consideration of the same the disciplinary authority imposed the penalty of dismissal on the petitioner by an order dated April 10, 1974. This order has now been challenged by means of the present writ petition.

11. The contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner are:—

(i) The findings of the Enquiry Officer are vitiated as he had no jurisdiction to give a declaration about the civil status. This matter could only be disposed of by the courts of the land and not in an administrative enquiry under any rules of service:

(ii) The rules of service having been framed under Article 309 may govern the conditions of service of government servants but cannot govern status of those who are not in government service, like Surjeet Kaur. In other words a rule like Rules 21 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 is not warranted by the provisions of Article 309 of the Constitution:

(iii) Rule 21 aforesaid is ultra vires various provisions of the Constitution including Article 309 of the Constitution as it affects the life and liberty of a citizen besides being a matter not contemplated by the expression recruitment and conditions of service of government servant;

(iv) The findings of the Enquiry Officer are perverse and based on no evidence; and

(v) Reasonable opportunity was not given to the petitioner to defend himself in the enquiry proceedings;

12. Rule 21 of the Central Civil Service (Conduct) Rules, 1964 was in the following words:—

“21(1). No. Government servant who has a wife living shall contract another marriage without first obtaining the permission of the Government, notwithstanding that such subsequent marriage is permissible under the personal law for the time being applicable to him.

(2) No female Government servant shall marry any person who has a wife living without first obtaining the permission of Government.”

13. It may be noticed that this rule was amended in 1968. We are, however concerned with the rule as reproduced above.

14. The charge against the petitioner, as noticed earlier was that he had contracted a second marriage without obtaining permission from appropriate authorities and that he had been neglecting his first wife and children from the first marriage, the first was said to be a violation of rule 21 aforesaid and the latter violation of Rule 3(1)(iii) of the aforesaid Conduct Rules. The petitioner had pleaded not guilty as according to him, his first marriage had been dissolved according to customary law. In this situation obviously an enquiry had to be made as to whether the first marriage subsisted or had been dissolved. This naturally resulted in an enquiry being made into the existence of the custom pleaded by the petitioner. The whole matter thus became extremely complicated which did affect civil rights only of the petitioner but also of Surjit Kaur. It has been urged that when such a situation arose the parties should have been left to the matter decided by the appropriate civil courts of the country instead of an Administrative Tribunal commenting upon or deciding the status of the petitioner and Surjeet Kaur as to whether their marriage subsisted or had been dissolved.

15. In Magiti Sasamal v. Pandap Bissol, A.I.R 1962 Supreme Court 547, the Supreme Court was concerned with interpreting Section 7(1) of the Orissa Tenants Protection Act 1948 and deciding the scope and effect of that provision. It was held that the disputes; contemplated by that provision were disputes between a tenant and a landlord and a decision on such disputes was within the jurisdiction of the Collector to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil Court. However, this section postulates the relationship of tenant and landlord between the parties and a dispute as to the relationship of tenant and landlord was not contemplated. In other words on a construction of the section it would be unreasonable to hold that the dispute about the status of the tenant fell within the purview of that section. Disputes that could be determined in Section 7(1) were those specified in the section. It refers to the tenant and landlord as such. A dispute regarding the existence of the relationship of tenant and landlord could not be determined under Section 7(1).

16. In State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha, A.I.R 1969 S.C 1297 the jurisdiction of the Commissioner and the Collector to decide the question of title was questioned in a challenge to the order of the Commissioner setting aside the order of the Collector granting permission to the petitioner in the case to use the land in question in non-agricultural purposes in an enquiry under Section 65 and 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1897. It had been urged that the impugned order was contrary to the provisions of the sanad by which the grant had been made of the land in question. The Commissioner's order was struck down on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to change the terms of the sanad or pass an order contrary to the terms contained therein. It was also held that the Commissioner should not have gone into the question of title. The Court observed that when the title of an occupant is disputed by any party before the Collector or Commissioner and the dispute is serious, the appropriate course for the Collector or Commissioner is to refer the parties to competent court and not decide the question of title himself against the occupant.

17. In R. v. Fulhan etc., Rent Tribunal, 1951 (1) A.E.R 482 while commenting upon the jurisdiction of a Rent Control Tribunal determining a dispute between two parties who are landlord and tenant and where this relationship is questioned, Devlin, J. observed as under:—

“Although tribunals may, in my view, and in default of any alternative, have to determine for themselves in the first instance the extent of their jurisdiction, nothing that I have said means that they should take on themselves unnecessarily the examination of questions such as those in R. v. Hackney, Islington and Stoke Newington Rent Tribunal……………. While they will not allow every empty threat to their jurisdiction to deter them from their proper business of fixing reasonable are not by their nature equipped for the trial of matters which in the ordinary civil court would be determined after pleading and discovery had been given and evidence on oath tested by cross-examination, and possibly, also, after trial by jury. The tribunal cannot be required to determine summarily such an issue if it involves point of substance, and, if one or other of the parties is willing to have it determined in the ordinary civil courts, an adjournment can always be granted to allow that to be done. This will avoid an inconclusive inquiry by the tribunal and safeguard the tenant against the danger of being presented with an order which may afterwards turn out to be illusory………”

18. Relying on the above authorities it has been urged on behalf of the petitioner that an administrative tribunal could not decide the status of the petitioner and Surjeet Kaur or hold whether their marriage subsisted or not. This is a civil dispute which should have been referred to the competent Courts of the land. Rule 21 of the conduct Rules could only be said to have been violated if there was in fact a subsisting marriage between the petitioner and Surjeet Kaur or such a marriage was admitted to be subsiding. In that face of the plea of the petitioner that the said marriage had been dissolved according to customary law the Inquiry Officer had no option but to let that matter be determined by courts of competent jurisdiction and if it was ultimately held that the marriage subsisted to proceed against the petitioner for violation of Rule 21.

19. As against this contention it has been urged that it being a condition of service that a government servant could not contract a second marriage except after taking permission and as, admittedly, no permission was taken, an enquiry could be held into this aspect and a decision taken as to whether the rule had been violated. To give a finding whether Rule 21 had been violated the Enquiry Officer had to go into the question about the subsistence or dissolution of the previous marriage. His decision is not a judgment in rem and is not binding on anybody except the government officer concerned. Reliance was placed on decisions under the Delhi Rent Control Act where relationship of landlord and tenant is disputed and it has been held that in order to get jurisdiction the Rent Controller may give a prima facie finding as to the relationship. For example, the observations of P.N Khanna, J. in Mercurry Electronic Corporation (P.) Ltd. v. L.K Vedi, 1970 R.C.R 779 were relied upon.

20. In my opinion the sine qua non of an enquiry on the ground that Rule 21 of the conduct Rules has been violated is that the government servant concerned contracts a second marriage without permission from the appropriate authorities despite the first marriage or the previous marriage subsisting. If such a situation is admitted to exist Rule 21 is obviously violated. But if the plea is that the previous marriage does not subsist then the enquiry cannot proceed without a competent finding as to the subsistence of the previous marriage. The Enquiry Officer would have no jurisdiction to go into matters which affect civil rights. The only situations in which an enquiry as to the violation of Rule 21 can proceed departmental or in what are called disciplinary proceedings are:—

(a) Where subsistence of the first marriage is admitted;

(b) Where subsistence of the first marriage can be established without entering into complicated questions of law and fact;

(c) Where a Court of competent jurisdiction has held that the previous marriage subsists; and

(d) The dissolution of the previous marriage alleged by the officer/official charged with violation of Rule 21 can on the very face of it be held to be a false plea.

21. In all other circumstances an enquiry as to the subsistence or dissolution of a previous marriage would so adversely affect civil rights of parties that it cannot be held that such an enquiry would be competent on a charge under Rule 21 being preferred.

22. Turning to the facts of the present case the existence or otherwise of a custom was a complicated question of law and facts which could more appropriately be decided in civil courts and could not be effectively decided in disciplinary proceedings. It is true that the decision of the Enquiry Officer cannot operate as a judgment in rem. But all the same the status of the petitioner and Surjeet Kaur was being determined which the Enquiry Officer could hardly be regarded as competent to determine when the plea was a dissolution of marriage by custom. This alone, however, is not conclusive of the matter. The Enquiry Officer has not only gone into the question of whether custom pleaded by the petitioner stands proved but has adverted to certain other salient features of the case to come to a conclusion that the plea of the petitioner about the dissolution of marriage could not be held to be correct. He has referred to, in particular, the nominations by the petitioner for the family pension and death-cum-retirement gratuity. There was some dispute as to whether these two documents bear the date 1st June or 1st July, 1966. The contention of the petitioner was that these were filled on June 1, 1966 which date has been wrongly changed to July 1, 1966. The Enquiry Officer has observed that assuming that the petitioner is correct in his submissions it is hardly likely that he filled in the nominations in favour of Surjeet Kaur on June 1, 1966 and dissolves his marriage with her on June 5, 1966. In writ proceedings it is not for the courts to hold whether the finding is correct or incorrect. All that the court has to see is whether the finding is a plausible finding in view of the circumstances and evidence adduced. If a finding has given could not be given by any intelligent person then the finding has to be struck down but if the finding is such which could be given then even though the Court may have a different view on the matter the finding is not to be disturbed. In my view ignoring the technicality of customary law on which comments have been made by the Enquiry Officer the finding that the dissolution of marriage pleaded by the petitioner cannot be accepted to be genuine in view of the nominations for pension and gratuity made five days earlier is a possible finding in the circumstances of the case. Therefore, it cannot be said that on this aspect the finding is vitiated or is without jurisdiction. What, however, creates a little difficulty is that these documents were not deposed to by anybody and go contrary to certain other positive evidence on the record. That will be discussed hereafter when I consider the plea of the petitioner that the finding is based on no evidence. It is the petitioner's case that the short time lag between the dissolution of the marriage and the execution of the aforesaid two documents could have been explained but no opportunity for that was given. An explanation for that has been given by the petitioner in the reply to the show cause notice. In such circumstances I cannot but hold that the Enquiry Officer exceeded his jurisdiction in deciding civil rights of the petitioner and Surjeet Kaur and declaring on their status which was legitimately within the jurisdiction of the civil courts only.

23. I next advert to the argument that the rules of service like Rule 21 are not warranted by the provisions of Article 309 of the Constitution. It will be advantageous also to discuss along with this the contention that Rule 21 is ultra vires various other provisions of the Constitution including Article 309.

24. The first argument is that Article 309 of the Constitution postulates rules being framed regarding recruitment and conditions of service. No rules can be framed which affect a personal law or life of an employee.

25. In Agnani v. Badri Das, 1963 (1) L.L.J 684 the Supreme Court observed on the facts of the case that the Industrial Tribunal rightly held that the misconduct alleged against the employee did not constitute misconduct within the standing orders of the concern. In the absence of standing orders it would be open to the employer to consider reasonably what conduct can properly be treated as misconduct or as subversive of discipline. Acts which are subversive amongst the employees would constitute misconduct but then that will depend upon the circumstances of each case. Where the standing orders are framed there is no difficulty but in the absence of standing orders the question will have to be dealt with reasonably and in accordance with common sense. If the alleged misconduct is not so mentioned in the standing orders then what ha? to be seen is whether it, in any way, interfered with the discharge of duties of the employee.

26. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shardul Singh, 1970 (3) S.C.R 302, the term “conditions of service” was held to mean all those conditions which regulate the holding of a post by a person right from the time of his appointment till his retirement and even beyond, in matters like pension etc., and includes rules relating to the dismissal of an officer.

27. In O.K Ghosh v. E.X Joseph, 1963 (Suppl. 1) S.C.R 789 the right of government servant to form a union guaranteed by Article 19 was considered in the context of Article 33 of the Constitution. In a departmental proceeding against one Joseph for contravention of Rules 4A and 4B of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules the validity of those rules was questioned. The High Court held Rule 4A to be valid but quashed the proceedings under Rule 4B holding it to be invalid. The Supreme Court struck down both the rules as violative of Article 19 of the Constitution.

28. Rule 21 of the conduct Rules is challenged and it is urged that it is invalid on the ratio of the above judgments. In my opinion the argument has no force. Rule 21 has been made in furtherance of a valid law, namely, the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The employer could lay down conditions on which he would employ a person, viz., that the employees will have only one living spouse but if a second marriage was intended permission had to be obtained before-hand. The rule cannot be said to offend the phrase “conditions of service” because an employer is at liberty to have such reasonable condition as he thinks fit on which he would give employment and retain people in employment, particularly when the condition is in accordance with the law of the land. A second marriage while the first is subsiding is no longer permitted by the law of the land affecting Hindus, as defined by the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The validity of that Act is not questioned and so, the rule must be held to be in support of a valid law of the land and not ultra vires any provision of the Act.

29. In Kharak Singh v. State of U.P, A.I.R 1963 S.C 1295 the expression “life” used in Article 21 of the Constitution was construed. It was observed that life cannot be confined to only taking away life, i.e causing death. Quoting from American decisions on what was life and liberty with approval, it was observed that personal liberty and life in Article 21 of the Constitution is a right of an individual to be free from restriction and encroachment on his personal whether those restrictions or encroachments were directly imposed or indirectly brought about by calculated measures. It has been urged that Rule 21 is an encroachment on the life and liberty of an individual which progressively has come to mean more than mere taking away of life by killing or putting fetters on liberty by imprisonment. In my view such an extended meaning cannot be given to the restraint put by way of conditions of service in Rule 21 for, as I have observed earlier, a restraint put in consonance with a valid law cannot be regarded as a restraint in contravention of Article 21 of the Constitution.

30. Coming now to the question of whether the findings of Enquiry Officer are perverse and based on no evidence, in my opinion, the enquiry proceedings and all the proceedings thereafter have to be quashed by upholding the contentions raised by the petitioner. As observed earlier, the prosecution did not produce any evidence except that of a Head Constable who has deposed on matters which are hardly germane to the enquiry. His deposition has already been noticed earlier. No other evidence was adduced on behalf of the prosecution. As against this the petitioner had produced four witnesses. This evidence has not even been discussed by the Enquiry Officer and he has merely gone on his interpretation of the customary law pleaded by the petitioner and the two nominations referred to earlier. The tenor of the report shows that the burden of disproving all charges was placed on the petitioner. The Enquiry Officer has not adverted to the certificate of dissolution of marriage produced by the petitioner issued to him by the Sarpanch of his village. He has also not adverted to the declaration of Surjeet Kaur dated January 15, 1973 in which she admits the dissolution of marriage. It is true that sufficiency of evidence cannot be commented upon in writ proceedings but than if the finding is based on no evidence and on merely conjectures the same cannot be upheld. It may be that there was not sufficiency evidence as to the existence of custom but then the existence of customary law was a complicated question of law and fact which the Enquiry Officer could not be held to be competent to adjudicate. I, therefore, hold that the finding of the Enquiry Officer and the consequent notice to show cause resulting in the order of dismissal are all based on an enquiry in which there was no evidence to justify that the charges against the petitioner were established. Indeed, the findings are based on no evidence in the eye of law. The approach of the Enquiry Officer can only be said to be one where he has based his findings on conjectures and surmises. In view of my findings above it is not necessary to dilate on the question as to whether the petitioner received adequate opportunity to defend himself.

31. During the hearing the petitioner had moved an application for leave to urge additional grounds. Reply was taken from the respondents. In my view since the grounds were purely legal and arose out of the facts already pleaded the application was to be allowed. I have already discussed the points raised by way of additional grounds in this application, C.M 1630 of 1974.

32. As a consequence of my findings above, I quash the enquiry report (Annexure K to the petition) dated February 7, 1974, the show cause notice dated February 18, 1974 and the order of dismissal dated April 10, 1974. I hold that Rule 21 of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 is a valid rule. The respondents, however, would be free to take further action in accordance with rules inasmuch as I am not quashing the charges preferred against the petitioner. In the circumstances of the case I make no order as to costs.