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  • Section 302 of I.P.C,
  • Section 307 of I.P.C
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 302 of I.P.C,
  • Section 307 of I.P.C
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (as provided)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant Raju was prosecuted for offences arising out of an incident on 4 March 1989 at Mehkar in which a woman identified as "Baby" (daughter of Hasansha Fakir) sustained severe burn injuries allegedly when kerosene was poured on her person and she was set on fire. She was initially treated at the Rural Hospital, Mehkar, and later shifted to General Hospital, Buldhana, where she died on 9 March 1989.

On admission at the Rural Hospital a statement by the injured woman was recorded by P.S.I. Meghrajani (treated as an F.I.R. and initially registered as an offence under Section 307 IPC). The Executive Magistrate (P.W.1) also recorded a dying declaration at Mehkar. After the deceased died, the investigating officer added an offence under Section 302 IPC and submitted a charge-sheet to the court. The case was committed by the J.M.F.C., Mehkar, to the Sessions Court, Buldhana, as the offence was triable exclusively by the Sessions Court.

At trial the Sessions Judge convicted Raju under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The appellant appealed against that conviction and sentence.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the dying declarations relied upon by the prosecution can be accepted when there exists a dying declaration relied upon by the defence that points to an accidental cause of death.
  2. Whether the presence of multiple, apparently conflicting dying declarations (three implicating the appellant and one exculpatory) creates such doubt as to require acquittal of the appellant.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • The defence contended that there are multiple dying declarations: three which implicate the appellant and one (recorded by the defence witness D.W. Narayan Tandale) which exonerates him by stating the burns were accidental—caused by a falling kerosene lamp.
  • Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the existence of contradictory dying declarations should have led the trial court to acquit, or at least to give the appellant the benefit of doubt.
  • The appellant relied on various Supreme Court decisions and decisions of the court below to support the proposition that contradictory dying declarations may raise reasonable doubt (the opinion lists the authorities relied on by the appellant).
  • The defence led D.W.1 (Naib Tahsildar / Executive Magistrate Narayan Tandale) to produce a dying declaration stating the burns were accidental.

Respondent / Prosecution's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • The learned A.P.P. supported the judgment of the trial court and its reasons for accepting the prosecution's dying declarations and rejecting the defence dying declaration.
  • The prosecution relied on the dying declarations recorded by P.S.I. Meghrajani and by the Executive Magistrate P.W.1, along with supporting witness evidence (including the brother of the deceased and the medical evidence of 72% burns causing death).

Table of Precedents Cited

The table below lists the precedents expressly mentioned in the opinion and how they were treated in the judgment.

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
(2002) 2 SCC 556, Bhupan v. State Of M.P. Relied upon by defence counsel to support the contention that contradictory dying declarations may create doubt and require acquittal. The court found the authorities relied upon by the appellant distinguishable on facts because the prosecution's dying declarations were held to be acceptable and reliable; the precedent did not change the result here.
(1998) 9 SCC 353, Bholaprasad v. State Of Maharashtra Relied upon by defence counsel in support of the general proposition about treatment of multiple dying declarations. Distinguished by the court on facts: the court considered prosecution dying declarations proved and reliable, so the authority did not warrant acquittal here.
(2005) 9 SCC 769, State of Punjab v. Parveen Kumar Relied upon by defence counsel for principles relating to evaluation of dying declarations and conflicts therein. Found distinguishable; the court held that prosecution evidence was cogent and convincing and thus sustained the conviction despite the authority relied upon.
(2005) 9 SCC 113, Muthu Kutty v. State (by Inspector of Police, T.N.) Relied upon by defence to support submission on effect of contradictory dying declarations. The court held the facts different and observed the prosecution dying declarations were reliable here; the cited authority did not alter the result.
2005 ALL MR (Cri.) 1599, Suresh v. State of Maharashtra (this Court) Relied upon by appellant as an authority from this Court pertaining to dying declarations/conflicting statements. The decision was noted but treated as distinguishable on facts; the court found no infirmity in the trial judge's acceptance of prosecution evidence.
2006 ALL MR (Cri.) 1012, Prabhakar v. State of Maharashtra (this Court) Relied upon by appellant to support his argument about benefit of doubt arising from conflicting dying declarations. The court considered this authority but concluded that the prosecution dying declarations were acceptable and reliable and that the authority did not necessitate acquittal here.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis focused primarily on the evaluation of competing dying declarations and the contemporaneous supporting evidence. The reasoning proceeded along the following lines (as expressed in the opinion):

  1. Initial assessment: The trial judge had accepted the prosecution case because the dying declarations recorded by P.W.7 (P.S.I. Meghrajani) and P.W.1 (Executive Magistrate Ramesh Giri) implicated the appellant in unequivocal terms and were supported by other evidence (including the statement to P.W.4, the brother, and medical evidence).
  2. Medical evidence: The autopsy (P.W.2) established that the deceased died of septicemic shock due to 72% burns and that these injuries were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature—this fact was not contested.
  3. Reliability of prosecution dying declarations: The Executive Magistrate P.W.1 recorded a dying declaration in question-and-answer form, noted the deceased was fit to make the statement, recorded answers in the deceased's words, and obtained the deceased's thumb impression. On scrutiny, the court found nothing to suspect P.W.1 of deposing falsely in favour of prosecution. The P.S.I.'s contemporaneous statement to the police also implicated the appellant soon after the incident.
  4. Evaluation of the defence dying declaration (D.W.1 Tandale): The court examined D.W.1's testimony and highlighted multiple weaknesses:
    • D.W.1 admitted recording the statement in his own words rather than in the words of the deceased and was not consistent about using the question-and-answer form.
    • He forgot to mention crucial matters in his record (e.g., that a doctor had advised the deceased could not sign), and he did not produce the police requisition for recording the dying declaration.
    • He could not clarify whether the name he recorded ("Baby Raju") referred to the deceased's father or husband and recorded the statement as he "understood" the language used (mixture of Hindi/Urdu), with potential translation issues.
    • The doctor who allegedly certified fitness to give the statement and the police officer at whose instance it was recorded were not examined in support of D.W.1's version.
    Given these defects, the court held the D.W.1 dying declaration was not properly proved or reliable.
  5. Corroboration and absence of motive: The prosecution dying declarations were corroborated by the brother's statement and supported by the immediate police record. The court noted no plausible explanation from the appellant about his presence at Mehkar or motive for false implication.
  6. On the question whether the defence dying declaration had been deliberately suppressed by the prosecution, the court examined the circumstances and concluded that it could not be said the prosecution had deliberately suppressed it. However, even if it appeared later, the document was found not acceptable for strong reasons.
  7. Conclusion of analysis: Because the prosecution's dying declarations were found cogent, convincing and corroborated while the defence dying declaration was shown to be unreliable, the court concluded that the case was not one of mutually contradictory dying declarations creating reasonable doubt. Thus, the trial judge's acceptance of the prosecution case was held to be legally sound.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

APPEAL DISMISSED; conviction under Section 302 I.P.C. and the sentence of life imprisonment were upheld.

Direct consequences and implications:

  • The appeal failed and was dismissed; the appellant's conviction and sentence were confirmed.
  • The appellant's bail bonds were cancelled and he was directed to surrender within 30 days to serve the sentence.
  • The court found no reason to treat the prosecution as having deliberately suppressed the defence dying declaration; on the facts the defence version was held unreliable and distinguishable from the authorities cited by the appellant, so no change in legal principle was announced.
  • The opinion contains an administrative direction: the court observed an unacceptable state of affairs at the Rural Hospital, Mehkar (absence of medical officer and treatment by subordinate staff) and directed the A.P.P. to bring this situation to the notice of the Government to prevent endangering patients' lives in rural government hospitals.

Note: This summary strictly follows the content and reasoning expressed in the provided opinion. No information has been added beyond what appears in the text.

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    Raju v. State Of Maharashtra

    S.R Dongaonkar, J.:— This appeal of the appellant Raju is directed against the judgment of conviction and sentence delivered in Sessions Case No. 36/89 by the Sessions Judge, Buldhana, by which he was convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the I.P.C and was sentenced to suffer life imprisonment.

    2. The appellant was prosecuted for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the I.P.C on the allegations that he had set fire to one Baby d/o. Hasansha Fakir, R/o. Mehkar, on 4th March, 1989, by pouring kerosene on her person. She sustained burn injuries. It is alleged that her brother PW-4 Dilawarsha extinguished the fire. She was taken to hospital at Mehkar. It is alleged that she had made a statement to him that the appellant Raju, as he wanted to get rid of her, poured kerosene on her person and set her on fire. It is alleged that as the doctors were not available in the hospital, she was primarily treated by Waterman Narayan Mahure and one Smt. Magar, maid-servant. The information was given to the police Station Mehkar regarding her admission to the hospital. PW-7 P.S.I Meghrajani was at the police station. On receipt of information that a woman who had received burn injuries was admitted in the Rural Hospital, Mehkar, he issued letter of request to the Executive Magistrate for recording the dying declaration of the said woman and he went to the Hospital. He contacted the victim Baby in the hospital and on inquiry and on finding that she was in a fit condition to make a statement, he recorded her statement. He read it over to her and obtained her thumb print on the said statement, which was in turn treated as F.I.R, on which offence under Section 307 of the I.P.C bearing Crime No. 63/89 was registered against the appellant.

    3. P.W.7, P.S.I Meghrajani then conducted the investigation by visiting the spot and preparing the spot panchnama, Ex. 40. He also recorded statements of witnesses. He also requested Tahsildar, Mehkar, to draw the sketch map of the spot of incident. He also got recorded the dying declaration of Baby through the Executive Magistrate. Later on patient Baby was shifted to General Hospital, Buldhana, where she succumbed to the burn injuries on 9.3.1989 So, P.S.I Meghrajani added offence under section 302 in this case. During investigation, he sent articles to Chemical Analyzer, Nagpur, for report. He received the report Ex. 20. He after due investigation submitted the charge sheet in the Court of J.M.F.C Mehkar, for the aforesaid offence against the appellant.

    4. Learned J.M.F.C Mehkar, having found that the offence punishable under Section 302 is exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, committed the case to the Sessions Court, Buldhana.

    5. Learned Sessions Judge, Buldhana, framed the charge against the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 of I.P.C, which later was amended to some extent by his successor Sessions Judge, Buldhana. The appellant pleaded not guilty to the same. His defence is that of total denial. It may be mentioned that he has stated that a false case is filed against him.

    6. In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, prosecution has led evidence of 7 witnesses. P.W-1 Ramesh Giri, Ex. 25, is the Taluka Executive Magistrate, who has recorded the dying declaration of the deceased at Mehkar as per Ex. 26. P.W-2 Ashok Surushe, Exh.27, was working as Medical Officer at General Hospital Buldhana. He conducted autopsy on the dead body of deceased Baby on 9.3.1989 He has tendered his report regarding his findings and opinion regarding the cause of death of the deceased as per Exh. 28. According to him, the deceased had died due to Septicemic shock due to 72% burn injuries. According to him, these injuries were sufficient to cause her death in the normal course of nature. P.W-4, Dilawarsha, Ex. 31, is the brother of the deceased. He had come to the spot of incident when deceased Baby was in flames. He picked up the quilt which was spread for drying and put it around the deceased. Then he brought a push-cart, put deceased on it and took her to the Hospital. In the hospital, he had asked her as to what had happened, to which deceased had stated that appellant Raju came from Khamgaon, she asked her about the marriage, he declined, he took container of kerosene, poured kerosene on her person and lighted a match stick, therefore, she suffered burn injuries. P.W-5, Narayan Mahure, Exh.32, is the waterman working in Rural Hospital, Mehkar. As the Medical Officer in that Rural Hospital was not present at the relevant time, he attended the deceased by taking her in operation theatre and administered her I.V saline. He had sent a report to the Police Station regarding the admission of the deceased in the Hospital. He has also deposed regarding the recording of Dying Declaration by Shri. Ramesh Giri, P.W.1 P.W-6, Sk. Manwar, Ex. 36, is the witness to the spot panchnama, however, he has not supported the prosecution. P.W-7, P.S.I, Meghrajani, Exh. 38, had recorded the statement of the deceased which was in turn treated as F.I.R in the Hospital at Mehkar for registering the offence under Section 307 of I.P.C against the appellant as per Ex. 39. He conducted further investigation and also registered offence under Section 302 of the I.P.C against the appellant as the deceased had expired due to burn injuries.

    7. Appellant, while raising the defence of false implication, has led the evidence of one Naib Tahsildar/Executive Magistrate, D.W Narayan Tandale, to show that at General Hospsital, Buldhana, on the requisition of Police, he had recorded dying declaration of the deceased to the effect that she had suffered accidental burns when she was sleeping in her house. Chimni (Kerosene lamp) which was hanging against the wall, fell on her person, because of which she caught fire at once.

    8. The learned trial Judge has arrived at the conclusion that the evidence led by the prosecution as regards the appellant causing death of the deceased by pouring kerosene on her person is acceptable. He has also found that the evidence led by the defence is not trustworthy. In the opinion of the learned trial Judge, D.W-1 is irrresponsible officer and he also opined that henceforth the work of recording dying declarations involving great responsibility should not be entrusted to him. Thus, the learned trial Judge has accepted the dying declarations of the deceased which are in favour of the prosecution and rejected the dying declaration which is purported to have been made to D.W Tandale. As such he has held the appellant guilty of the offence punishable under Section 302 of I.P.C Accordingly, he convicted and sentenced him to suffer life imprisonment.

    9. This judgment of conviction is challenged by the appellant in this appeal.

    10. Learned counsel for the appellant, Shri. A.S Mardikar, has submitted that the learned Trial Judge has taken a wrong view of the matter. According to him, there are two sets of dying declaration in the case, 3 dying declarations are in favour of the prosecution as above, but one is in favour of the defence showing that the burn injuries of the deceased were caused due to an accident in which the kerosene lamp had fallen on her person in the house. Therefore, according to him, when all these dying declarations are tested on the principles of settled law in respect of accepting the dying declaration, there would be two contradictory dying declarations, one in favour of the prosecution and other in favour of the defence and therefore, learned trial Judge should have acquitted the appellant. This being a case of multiple dying declarations, wherein 3 are implicating the appellant and one is exonerating, the trial Court should not have picked up one dying declaration to convict the appellant. According to him, there is no reason to disbelieve the dying declaration recorded by D.W Tandale and therefore, at any rate, the appellant should have been accorded benefit of doubt and he should have been acquitted. He has relied on some decisions of the Apex Court to gain support to his contentions, i.e

    (1) (2002) 2 SCC 556, Bhupan v. State Of M.P.

    (2) (1998) 9 SCC 353, Bholaprasad v. State Of Maharashtra

    (3) (2005) 9 SCC 769, State Of Punjab v. Parveen Kumar

    (4) (2005) 9 SCC 113, Muthu Kutty v. State by Inspector of Police, T.N

    11. He has also relied on two decision of this Court i.e

    (1) 2005 ALL MR (Cri.) 1599, Suresh v. State of Maharashtra;

    (2) 2006 ALL MR (Cri.) 1012, Prabhakar v. State of Maharashtra

    12. As against this, Smt. A.R Taywade, learned A.P.P has supported the judgment of the lower Court for the reasons recorded by the learned trial Judge.

    13. The whole controversy in this matter revolves on the point as to whether the dying declarations pressed into service by the prosecution can be accepted vis-a-vis the dying declaration pressed into service by the defence for basing the conviction.

    14. On perusal of the reasons recorded by the learned trial Judge, it would be seen that the learned trial Judge has given cogent and convincing reasons as to why he has accepted the prosecution case as regards dying declarations made by the deceased against the appellant that he has poured kerosene on her person and set her ablaze. He has given convincing reasons as to why he is discarding the evidence led by the defence. In this case, it is not disputed that the deceased had died due to 72% burns, which has caused septicemic shock. In the opinion of the Medical Officer who conducted the autopsy, these injuries were sufficient to cause her death in the normal course of the nature.

    15. The crucial question is whether this is a case wherein, it can be held that there are two sets of dying declarations, which lead to different conclusions, one in favour of the prosecution and other in favour of the defence. In our opinion, this is not a case in which it can be said that the dying declaration which is pressed into service by the defence is acceptable so as to throw doubts on the dying declarations relied by the prosecution.

    16. We may now indicate our reasons. On perusal of the statement of the deceased recorded by P.W.7, P.S.I Meghrajani, within a short time after incident, it would be seen that deceased had implicated the appellant in unequivocal terms.

    17. Apart from this, when her dying declaration was recorded at Rural Hospital, Mehkar, the Executive Magistrate, P.W-1 Ramesh Giri, had clearly found that the deceased was in a fit condition to make a statement. He has deposed about the things which he had done while recording the dying declaration correctly. The said dying declaration has been recorded in questions & answers form. He states that she was able to understand the questions and he recorded her answers in her wordings. It is true that at that time Medical Officer was not there to certify that she was medically fit to give dying declaration. But, all the same, on close scrutiny of the evidence of this witness, we are unable to find anything by which it can be suspected that he has reason to depose false in favour of the prosecution. Deceased has named the appellant as a person who set her on fire. She has also stated as to how the incident had occurred and why. Her thumb print is also taken on the said dying declaration. In view of this, the said dying declaration cannot be said to be untrustworthy.

    18. It is also supported by the statement made to P.W.4, Dilawarsha, her brother. So also by the statement recorded by P.S.I Meghrajani. All these three witnesses cannot be said to have any grudge against the appellant, who was, at that time, residing at Khamgaon. Appellant seems to have been arrested at Mehkar. There is no plausible explanation placed by him on record as to why he had come from Khamgaon to Mehkar, at the relevant time and what was the possible reason for his false implication by taking advantage of alleged accidental fire.

    19. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that there is no mention of the surname of the appellant in the dying declaration at the instance of Baby. However, considering the fact that she is illiterate and the appellant & the deceased belonging to two different religions, possibility of not knowing the surname of the appellant by the deceased, cannot be overlooked, more so considering their lower stratum in the society and totality of the circumstances of the case. Therefore, this fact by itself will not be sufficient to throw doubts on the said dying declarations.

    20. Learned counsel for the appellant has further submitted that it is not proper on the part of the Court to pick and choose one of the dying declarations for basing the conviction. Here is the case where there is no picking and choosing of one dying declaration to convict the accused. The evidence led by the defence about the dying declaration recorded by D.W Tandale is found to be totally unreliable, therefore, the prosecution case was accepted by the trial Court. The reasons given by the learned trial Judge for discarding the evidence led by the defence as unreliable, are found to be clearly acceptable. We are in agreement of same, for the following.

    21. On perusal of the evidence of D.W Tandale, it would be seen that in cross-examination, he stated that he had forgotten to mention the statement that doctor advised that she was not able to sign or give thumb impression. He further admitted that he had recorded many dying declarations. He was knowing the dying declarations to be recorded in questions & answers form. The woman was not in such a condition that she would have died any time within short period. He further stated that there was no difficulty before him in recording her answers in her own words. In examination-in-chief itself, he stated that he had not recorded the statement of that woman in the words she used, but he recorded her statement in his words as per her answers. He specifically stated that she was using the language which was mixture of Hindi and Urdu. She was not able to talk simple Marathi and he added, he put questions to her in Marathi and she was able to understand the same. He did not produce the copy of the requisition by the police for recording dying declaration of the deceased. In specific reply to the question in cross-examination, he stated that he has recorded the name of that woman Baby Raju, but he could not say whether the name Raju is that of her father or of her husband. He further stated that he had recorded the statement of the woman as he understood the meaning of the words she used. The Medical Officer who had certified that the deceased was conscious to make a statement and the Police Officer at whose instance the D.D was recorded, are not examined. The said D.D is not in questions and answers form and in the words of deceased Baby in contrast with the D.D recorded by P.W.1 Ramesh Giri.

    22. With such type of evidence, it cannot be said that the dying declaration recorded by D.W Tandale, is properly proved and is reliable so as enable to throw away the evidence of the dying declaration recorded by P.W.1 Giri, which is otherwise supported by the other evidence on record, outright as suspicious.

    23. Apart from this, as observed by the learned trial Judge, the facts of the case also do not tend to support the dying declaration recorded by D.W Tandale, inasmuch as the circumstances of the case do not show that there is possibility of the deceased being suffered the burn injuries by fall of the kerosene lamp in the house. The reasons recorded by the learned trial Judge in Para 28 of his judgment do show that the D.D recorded by D.W Tandale could not be true.

    24. We are aware of the fact that in this case the Dying Declaration recorded by D.W Tandale was not produced by the prosecution and it came on record only after the application was made by the defence to the Court, calling its production. However, considering the circumstances which are evident, it is not possible to say that the said dying declaration was deliberately suppressed by the prosecution and therefore, an adverse inference can be drawn against it. In fact, for the strong reasons, the said dying declaration is found to be not acceptable and reliable. As such this cannot be treated as a case of two dying declarations, contradictory to each other, one leading to the case of homicidal death and other leading to accidental death.

    25. The authorities cited by learned counsel for the appellant, as it is found that the dying declarations pressed into service by the prosecution are clearly acceptable, vis-a-vis the dying declaration brought on record by the defence, would be clearly distinguishable on facts. It goes without saying that when the dying declarations are found to be acceptable and reliable, the conviction can be based on the same and the learned trial Judge has rightly done the same. Therefore, we find that the judgment of the learned trial Judge does not suffer from any infirmity and as such the appeal fails and the same needs to be dismissed. It is dismissed.

    26. The bail bonds of the appellant stand cancelled. He is directed to surrender within 30 days to serve the sentence.

    27. Before parting with the case, we may mention about one disturbing aspect of working of the Rural Hospital, Mehkar, that has come to our notice. P.W-5 Narayan Mahure, who is working as waterman in the Rural Hospital, Mehkar, and Smt. Magar, maid-servant, had attended the deceased, as Medical Officer was out of station on that day. They had cleaned the wounds of the deceased and administered I.V saline to her. They have done all possible they could do, but such state of affairs is not expected in the Rural Hospitals. It would certainly endanger the life of patients who are required to go there. We, therefore, find it necessary to direct the A.P.P to bring this pathetic situation to the notice of the Government so that the lives of the patients in the Government Hospitals in Rural areas would not be at peril.

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    Comments

    Raju v. State Of Maharashtra
    (Apr 13, 2007)