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citation codes
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  • provisions of s. 23 of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969
  • provisions of the M.R.T.P Act.3. Sub-section (1) of s. 23 of the M.R.T.P Act
  • clause (a) or clause (b).6. Clause (v) of s. 2 of the M.R.T.P Act
  • section referred to is s. 2(g)(iii)(c) of the M.R.T.P Act.
  • ss. 391 and 394 of the Companies Act, 1956,
  • provisions of s. 394 of the Companies Act.
  • ss. 391 to 394 of the Companies Act
  • correct, s. 23 of the M.R.T.P Act
  • cl. (g) of s. 2 of the M.R.T.P Act.
  • provision of the M.R.T.P Act
  • s. 2(g) of the M.R.T.P Act.
  • s. 23 of the M.R.T.P Act
  • s. 20 of the M.R.T.P Act
  • section 2(g)(iii)(c)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of s. 23 of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969
  • provisions of the M.R.T.P Act.3. Sub-section (1) of s. 23 of the M.R.T.P Act
  • clause (a) or clause (b).6. Clause (v) of s. 2 of the M.R.T.P Act
  • section referred to is s. 2(g)(iii)(c) of the M.R.T.P Act.
  • ss. 391 and 394 of the Companies Act, 1956,
  • provisions of s. 394 of the Companies Act.
  • ss. 391 to 394 of the Companies Act
  • correct, s. 23 of the M.R.T.P Act
  • cl. (g) of s. 2 of the M.R.T.P Act.
  • provision of the M.R.T.P Act
  • s. 2(g) of the M.R.T.P Act.
  • s. 23 of the M.R.T.P Act
  • s. 20 of the M.R.T.P Act
  • section 2(g)(iii)(c)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

These proceedings involve two petitions under sections 391 and 394 of the Companies Act, 1956, seeking sanction for the amalgamation of Swastik Textile Mills Limited (the transferor company) with Apte Amalgamations Limited, formerly Phaltan Sugar Works Ltd. (the transferee company). The transferor company conducts textile processing business in Bombay, while the transferee company is primarily engaged in sugar manufacturing. Both companies agreed on a scheme of amalgamation, which was approved by the requisite majorities and submitted for court sanction. The Official Liquidator reported no prejudice to members or public interest in the transferor company's affairs. No objections came from shareholders or creditors, but the Union of India, represented by Mr. Rao, objected based on the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 (M.R.T.P Act), asserting that the amalgamation requires prior Central Government approval under section 23 of the M.R.T.P Act.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the provisions of Part ‘A’ of Chapter III of the M.R.T.P Act apply to the transferor and transferee companies, thereby requiring Central Government approval before sanctioning the amalgamation scheme under section 23 of the M.R.T.P Act.
  2. Whether the Court has jurisdiction to determine the question of the necessity of Central Government approval under the M.R.T.P Act when sanctioning a scheme of amalgamation under the Companies Act.
  3. Whether the 13 companies listed by the Central Government are “inter-connected undertakings” under the M.R.T.P Act, making the amalgamation subject to the Act’s approval requirements.
  4. Whether specific factual allegations regarding inter-connection between companies, particularly involving director relationships, satisfy the statutory criteria under section 2(g) of the M.R.T.P Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Union of India's Arguments

  • The amalgamation scheme cannot be sanctioned without Central Government approval under section 23 of the M.R.T.P Act because the companies involved are undertakings subject to Part ‘A’ of Chapter III of the Act.
  • The transferor and transferee companies, along with other entities, are inter-connected undertakings whose combined assets exceed Rs. 20 crores, triggering the applicability of the M.R.T.P Act.
  • Director relationships, specifically the role of M.S Hardikar as a director and chief executive in related companies, establish inter-connection under section 2(g) of the M.R.T.P Act.
  • The Court lacks jurisdiction to decide on the necessity of Central Government approval under the M.R.T.P Act when sanctioning amalgamation schemes.

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The transferor and transferee companies are not undertakings to which Part ‘A’ of Chapter III of the M.R.T.P Act applies, so no Central Government approval is required.
  • The affidavits filed by the Central Government lack factual basis and are mere opinions without evidential support for the alleged inter-connection of the 13 companies.
  • M.S Hardikar resigned as director of Apte Industrial and Management Services before the relevant date, negating the claimed inter-connection based on his directorship.
  • The Court has jurisdiction to determine whether Central Government approval under the M.R.T.P Act is necessary before sanctioning amalgamation schemes.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Union of India v. Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd (1971 74 Bom. L.R 1) Establishment of Court's jurisdiction to examine objections raised by Central Government under the M.R.T.P Act regarding sanction of amalgamation schemes. Used to reject the submission that the Court cannot determine the necessity of Central Government approval under the M.R.T.P Act.
In Re Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd. Similar principle regarding Court's jurisdiction over objections under the M.R.T.P Act in amalgamation petitions. Cited to reinforce the Court's authority to adjudicate on the applicability of the M.R.T.P Act to amalgamation schemes.
In Re Kril Standard Products Private Limited Application of Court's jurisdiction in cases involving objections under the M.R.T.P Act. Supported the Court's conclusion on jurisdictional matters in the present petitions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first rejected the objection that it lacks jurisdiction to determine whether Central Government approval under section 23 of the M.R.T.P Act is required before sanctioning an amalgamation scheme. It found no provision in the M.R.T.P Act or other law depriving it of such jurisdiction. The Court then examined the factual basis for the Central Government's contention that the 13 companies were inter-connected undertakings with combined assets exceeding Rs. 20 crores, triggering the applicability of the M.R.T.P Act.

The initial affidavit by the Regional Director lacked factual particulars and was merely opinion-based. A subsequent affidavit attempted to provide factual details, including claims that M.S Hardikar’s dual roles created inter-connection under section 2(g) of the M.R.T.P Act. The Court analyzed these contentions closely:

  • It rejected the presumption that Hardikar, as a director of one company and chief executive of another, would act under the directions of the latter’s directors without concrete evidence of such behavior.
  • It found that mere dual roles do not equate to control over board composition or management as required by the statutory definition of inter-connected undertakings.
  • The Court noted that Hardikar had resigned as director before the relevant date, weakening the inter-connection claim.
  • Other allegations in the affidavit were not pressed and thus not considered.

Consequently, the Court concluded that the petitioners' companies were not inter-connected undertakings as defined in the M.R.T.P Act and that the amalgamation did not require Central Government approval under section 23 of the Act.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court allowed the petitions, sanctioning the scheme of amalgamation between Swastik Textile Mills Limited and Apte Amalgamations Limited without requiring prior approval from the Central Government under the M.R.T.P Act.

Implications: The decision clarifies that the Court has jurisdiction to determine the applicability of the M.R.T.P Act's approval requirements in amalgamation petitions under the Companies Act. It establishes that inter-connection under the M.R.T.P Act must be supported by concrete factual evidence, not mere presumptions or dual roles, and that the factual situation at the time of sanction is determinative. No new precedent beyond the direct effect on these parties was established.

    Swastik Textile Mills Ltd., In Re

    Kania, J.:— These are two petitions under ss. 391 and 394 of the Companies Act, 1956, whereby the petitioners in Company Petition No. 684 of 1981 have prayed for being amalgamated with the petitioners in Company Petition No. 685 of 1981. The petitioners in Company Petition No. 684 of 1981 are the Swastik Textile Mills Limited. I propose to refer to them as “the transferor Company.” The petitioners in Company Petition No. 685 of 1981 are Apte Amalgamations Limited, formerly called Phaltan Sugar Works Ltd. which I propose to refer to as “the transferee Company”.

    2. The facts necessary for the disposal of these petitions can be stated very shortly. The authorised capital of the transferee Company is Rs. 2,00,00,000 (Rupees Two Crores only). The paid-up capital of the transferee Company is Rs. 82,50,000 (Rupees Eighty two lacs fifty thousand only). The transferee company was incorporated on March 8, 1933 and its main business was to manufacture sugar. At one time the transferee company had vast agricultural lands from which it was obtaining a good part of its requirements of sugarcane, but it is now dependent on supplies of sugarcane from the Maharashtra State Farming Corporation. The transferor Company was incorporated as a public Limited company on October 22, 1946. The transferor company carries on business in Bombay mainly of processing of textile goods. It was considered desirable by the managements of the two companies that the two companies should be amalgamated by the amalgamation of the transferor company with the transferee company in order to carry on these businesses in a better manner. A scheme was formulated for such amalgamation and agreed to by the requisite majority of the members of the transferor company and the transferee company and the present petitions were made to this Court for sanctioning the scheme of amalgamation. The requirements of ss. 391 to 394 of the Companies Act have been duly carried out. The Official Liquidator has made a report stating that on the basis of the findings recorded by Messrs Chandabhoy & Jassoobhoy, Chartered Accountants, the affairs of the transferor company had not been conducted in a manner prejudicial to the interest of its members or public interest. This report was submitted in accordance with the provisions of s. 394 of the Companies Act. It may be mentioned that Messrs Chandabhoy & Jassoobhoy were the auditors appointed to scrutinise the books and papers of the transferor company and to submit a report to the Official Liquidator, after investigating into the affairs of the transferor company. There is no objection by any of the shareholders or creditors of either of the said two Companies to the amalgamation sought by them. There is, however, an objection raised by Mr. Rao who appears for the Union of India, pursuant to the notice issued under s. 394A of the Companies Act. It is this objection which has to be considered in disposing of this petition. The objection raised by Mr. Rao, very briefly put, is to the effect that in view of the provisions of s. 23 of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 (referred to hereinafter as “the M.R.T.P Act”), the amalgamation sought by the transferor and the transferee companies cannot be sanctioned as it has not been approved by the Central Government under the M.R.T.P Act. The submission of Mr. Rao is that the transferor and the transferee companies are undertakings to which the provisions of Chap. III, Part ‘A’ of the M.R.T.P Act apply in view of s. 20 there of and hence no scheme for merger or amalgamation of such undertakings can be sanctioned by the Court or recognised for any purpose nor can effect be given to it unless such scheme has been approved by the Central Government and no such approval has been sought for or granted in the present case. It is, on the other hand, the contention of Mr. Desai learned counsel for the petitioners that the transferor and the transferee companies are not companies to which the provisions of Part ‘A’ of Chap. III of the M.R.T.P Act can apply and hence no approval of the Central Government is necessary before a scheme for amalgamation in respect of the said Companies can be sanctioned. In order to appreciate these arguments, it is necessary to set out some of the relevant provisions of the M.R.T.P Act.

    3. Sub-section (1) of s. 23 of the M.R.T.P Act runs as follows:

    (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any oilier law for the time being in force:—

    (a) no scheme of merger or amalgamation of an undertaking to which this Part applies with any other undertaking.

    (b) no scheme of merger or amalgamation of two or mere undertakings which would have the effect of bringing into existence an undertaking to which clause (a) or clause (b) of section 20 would apply,

    4. shall be sanctioned by any Court or be recognised for any purpose or be given effect to unless the scheme for such merger or amalgamation has been approved by the Central Government under this Act.”

    5. The relevant portion of s. 20 in Part A of Chap. III of the M.R.T.P Act runs thus:

    This Part shall apply to:—

    (a) an undertaking if the total value of

    (i) its own assets, or

    (ii) its own assets together with the assets of its inter-connected undertakings is not less than twenty crores of rupees

    ….….….

    Explanation:— The value referred 10 in this section shall be:—

    (i) in the case of an undertaking referred to in clause (a) or clause (b), as the case may be the value of its assets on the last day of its financial year which closes during the calendar year immediately preceding the calendar year in which the question arises as to whether that Part does or does not apply to such undertaking; and

    (ii) in the case of an inter-connected undertaking, the value of its assets on the last day of its financial year which closes during the calendar year immediately preceding the calendar year in which the question arises as to whether this Part does or does not apply to the undertaking referred to in clause (a) or clause (b).

    6. Clause (v) of s. 2 of the M.R.T.P Act defines the word “undertaking” as follows:

    “‘undertaking’ means an undertaking which is engaged in the production, supply, distribution or control of goods of any description or the provision of service of any kind”.

    7. Clause (g) of s. 2 defines the term “interconnected undertakings”. The definition shows that several types of undertakings are covered within the definition. What is material, however, is that under expl. I it is provided that for the purposes of the said Act, two undertakings, owned by bodies corporate, shall be deemed to be under the same management, inter alia, if one such body corporate holds not less than one-third of the equity shares in the other or controls the composition of not less than one-third of the total membership of the board of directors of the other. The said expl. also, inter alia, provides by cl. (ix) thereof that the same shall be the position if the directors of one such body corporate are accustomed to act in accordance with the directions or instructions of one or more of the directors of the other or if the directors of bodies corporate are accustomed to act in accordance with the directions or instructions of an individual, whether belonging to a group or not. It may be mentioned that where the undertakings are owned by bodies corporate, they are said to be inter-connected undertakings under sub-cl. (iii) of cl. (g) of s. 2, if one manages the other.

    8. On behalf of the Central Government affidavits opposing the aforesaid two petitions have been filed by Surendra Kumar, Regional Director, Company Law Board, Western Region, Bombay. In both the petitions the affidavits filed are identical. In the affidavit filed by Surendra Kumar on December 15, 1982, it was contended by him that on the basis of the data as on January 1, 1982 furnished by the amalgamating companies and other companies, the 13 Companies which have been mentioned in exh. T to the said affidavit were inter-connected companies and the total assets of these inter-connected companies according to him, came to over Rs. 20 crores. It is curious that in this affidavit no particulars whatsoever were given as to the factual basis on which these companies were alleged to be inter-connected companies. I may at this stage set out the names of 13 companies, which were alleged to be interconnected companies. The said names are as follows:

    (1) Swastik Textile Mills Ltd. (Transferor Company).

    (2) Phaltan sugar Works Limited (Transferee Company).

    (3) Frozen Foods Private Limited.

    (4) Matalors Private Limited.

    (5) Plasto Crafts Industries Private Limited.

    (6) Apte Industrial & Management Services Private Limited.

    (7) Laxmi Vishnu Textile Mills Ltd.

    (8) Real Estate Sales Agency.

    (9) V.S Apte & Sons.

    (10) Automobile Products of India Limited.

    (11) Technical Services Private Limited.

    (12) Gaikwad Printers Private Limited, and

    (13) Pratap Investment Private Limited.

    9. In the affidavit in rejoinder filed by one Muragendra S. Khadbai in Company Petition No. 684 of 1981 and the affidavit in rejoinder filed by Arvind D. Gupta in Company Petition No. 685 of 1981 it was contended that these affidavits filed by Surendra Kumar were of no value whatever as no factual particulars were given in the same and a mere opinion was expressed that the aforesaid 13 undertakings were inter-connected undertakings. Thereafter, in the course of the hearing, on January 13, 1983, Surendra Kumar filed a further affidavit giving the factual particulars on the basis of which it is contended by him that the aforesaid undertakings are inter-connected. It is the correctness of this basis which will have to be examined.

    10. Before examining whether the facts contained in the affidavit of Surendra Kumar on January 13, 1983 sustain the contention that the said 13 undertakings are inter-connected, I may mention that a preliminary objection was taken by Mr. Rao to the maintainability of the petitions on the ground that once it is contended by the Central Government that the approval of the Central Government under s. 23 of the M.R.T.P Act is required before the sanction of a scheme of amalgamation, that question cannot be determined by the Court at all and the Court has no jurisdiction to go into that question. In my view, this submission is altogether devoid of merit. In the first place, Mr. Rao was unable to point out any provision of the M.R.T.P Act or any other provision of law whereby the Court was debarred from going into the validity of this contention in deciding whether to sanction a scheme of amalgamation. Moreover, if this contention were correct, the result would be to drive the parties to a petition for amalgamation to apply for an approval of the Central Government, whether it is required under s. 23 of the M.R.T.P Act or not, once a contention to that effect is taken by the Union of India. In fact, as pointed out by Mr. Desai, such objections against sanction of the schemes of amalgamation have repeatedly been taken in Courts by the Central Government and decided by the Courts, which would necessarily imply that the Court has jurisdiction to determine the said objections. (See Union of India v. Tata Engineering and Locomotive Co. Ltd. . 1971 74 Bom. L.R 1., judgment of a Division Bench of this Court In Re Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd.2, and In Re Kril Standard Products Private Limited3,)

    11. Before going to the specific averments in the affidavit of Surendra Kumar dated January 13, 1983, I propose to refer passingly to the relevant previous correspondence. By their letter dated October 7, 1981 addressed to the company prosecutor for Regional Director, the petitioners' Advocates, inter alia, set out that the petitioner companies in the said two petitions were not registered under the M.R.T.P Act. By their letter dated November 18, 1981 addressed to the said company prosecutor, Grade I, for Regional Director, the petitioners' Advocates stated that the following companies, viz. The Phaltan Sugar Works Ltd., the Swastik Textile Mills Ltd., Frozen Foods Private Limited, Plasto Crafts Industries (Private) Limited, Matalors Private Limited, and Apte Industrial and Management Service Private Limited were the inter-connected undertakings within the meaning of the said term under the M.R.T.P Act. The Regional Director by her letter dated February 16, 1982 addressed to the advocates for the petitioners contended that 14 companies, including the 13 companies set out earlier, and one Messrs Pratap Investment Private Limited were inter-connected companies, but gave no factual basis on which this inter-connection was alleged. In the further correspondence, which followed, the petitioners' advocates pointed out that the Regional Director had not given any basis on which the allegation of inter-connection of the aforesaid 14 companies was made. In the course of that correspondence the petitioners' attorneys discussed the possible grounds on which it might be contended that there was inter-connection between the said companies and sought to refute those grounds.

    12. Although the affidavit of Surendra Kumar dated December 15, 1982 contained the allegation that the aforesaid 13 companies were interconnected, as aforesaid no facts were set out therein on the basis of which it could be said that the said companies were inter-connected. Such factual basis, as I have already pointed out, was sought to be given by Surendra Kumar in his affidavit dated January 13, 1983. It is only to the facts averred and contentions raised in that affidavit that I need, therefore, refer. The factual allegations in that affidavit are contained in els. (a) to (f) of paragraph 1. In fact that is the only paragraph numbered as such in the said affidavit. The allegations contained in els. (a) to (c) pertain to companies which are admittedly inter-connected. However, it is common ground that the total value of the assets of the said companies does not exceed Rs. 20 crores, even on the footing of the said value being taken as set out in the affidavit of Surendra Kumar dated December 15, 1982. I need not, therefore, consider these allegations at all. Clause (d) of the said paragraph of the said affidavit is material and it runs as follows:

    “Shri M.S Hardikar, one of the two directors of Apte industrial and Management Services is the Chief Executive of Laxmi Vishnu Textile Mills. These two are, therefore, inter-connected under Explanation clauses (ix) and (iii) to section 2(g)(iii)(c) of the said Act.”

    13. The section referred to is s. 2(g)(iii)(c) of the M.R.T.P Act. In this regard it must be pointed out that if this contention is correct, s. 23 of the M.R.T.P Act would undoubtedly be brought into play because the total assets of the admittedly inter-connected companies combined with the total assets of Laxmi Vishnu Textile Mills would certainly exceed Rs. 20 crores. The question, however, is whether the contention is justified. Before going into the merits of this contention, I may point out that it was contended by Mr. Desai that at present M.S Hardikar was no longer a director of Apte Industrial and Management Services, and hence the entire contention was misconceived. It was pointed out by him that Hardikar resigned from the directorship of the said concern on January 27, 1982. The fact of the resignation was not disputed by Mr. Rao but it was contended by him that the position, which has to be taken into account, is the position as prevailed at the time when the petitions were presented, or as on January 1, 1982. It was, on the other hand, contended by Mr. Desai that for the purpose of determining the question of inter-connection one must examine the facts as they are to-day. In support of that contention Mr. Desai placed strong reliance on the language of s. 23, which clearly suggests that it is at the time of the granting of the sanction that the factual situation regarding interconnection has to be considered. It is true that s. 20 of the M.R.T.P Act lays down the dates on which the value of the assets of the undertakings in question has to be considered, but the determination of inter-connection and the determination of valuation are different questions. There appears to me to be, therefore, considerable substance in the contention of Mr. Desai. However, it is not necessary for me to determine that question because, in my view, even accepting the position at the relevant time was as set out in cl. (d) of paragraph 1 of the said affidavit, it could still not be said that the petitioner companies were inter-connected with Laxmi Vishnu Textile Mills. The first contention of Mr. Rao in this regard was that because M.S Hardikar was a chief executive of Laxmi Vishnu Textile Mills, it must be presumed that in his capacity as the director of Apte Industrial and Management Services, he would act in accordance with the directions given to him by the directors of the Laxmi Vishnu Textile Mills, and hence the case is covered by sub-cl. (ix) of Explanation I to s. 2(g) of the M.R.T.P Act. The said sub-clause has already been set out earlier and what that sub-clause contemplates is that the directors of one body corporate are accustomed to act in accordance with the directions or instructions of one or more of the directors of the other body corporate. Whether certain persons are accustomed to act in a particular manner or not is something which can be shown by instances of past behaviour or other material facts and not by mere presumptions, as suggested by Mr. Rao. Moreover, not a single instance has been given of Hardikar having acted in his capacity as a director of Apte Industrial and Management Services pursuant to the directions given to him by the directors of Laxmi Vishnu Textile Mills-Hence I fail to see how it can be said that he was accustomed to act in accordance with such directions in his capacity as a director of Apte Industrial and Management Services. Even apart from this, merely because Hardikar is the chief executive of Laxmi Vishnu Textile Mills, I fail to see how it can be presumed that in his capacity as a director of Apte Industrial and Management Services, he would act in accordance with the directions given by the directors of Laxmi Vishnu Textile Mills. This contention of Mr. Rao must, therefore, be rejected.

    14. The next contention of Mr. Rao was that there were only two directors in Apte Industrial and Management Services, Hardikar being one of them, and thus it could be said that Laxmi Vishnu Textile Mills controlled the total membership of the board of directors of Apte industrial and Management Services, and hence the case would be covered by sub-cl. (iii) of Expl. I to cl. (g) of s. 2 of the M.R.T.P Act. In my view, this contention is also totally unsustainable. Merely because a chief executive of one company is one of the two directors in another company, I fail to see how the first company could be said to control one-half of the membership of the board of directors of the second company. It must be realised, as I have already pointed out that the two capacities, in which Hardikar was acting, were completely different and there was nothing to show that in his capacity as a director of Apte Industrial and Management Services he was acting in accordance with the directions given by the directors of Laxmi Vishnu Textile Mills of which he was the chief executive. Moreover, merely because company A can control a director of company B it could not be said that company A controls a part of the membership of the board of directors of company B. Such a situation arises only when a company is in a position to nominate a certain number of directors or control the election of certain number of directors in the other Company. It is only in such a case that the former company can be said to control the total membership or a part of the membership of the board of directors of the latter company. No such case is made out in cl. (d) of the aforesaid paragraph. This contention of Mr. Rao must also be rejected.

    15. Although some allegations are made in els. (e) and (f) of paragraph 1 of the said affidavit of Surendra Kumar, no contention has been raised before me on the basis of those allegations and it is wholly unnecessary for me to consider the contentions set out in the said clauses.

    16. In the result, in Company Petition No. 684 of 1981 there will be an order in terms of prayers (a) to (e) of the petition, and in Company Petition No. 685 of 1981 there will be an order in terms of prayers (a) to (d) of the petition. The petitioners in the aforesaid two petitions to pay Rs. 300/- each to the Central Government as costs.

    17. Petitions allowed.

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    Comments

    Swastik Textile Mills Ltd., In Re
    (Jan 14, 1983)