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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of Judgment — Hemant Gupta, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This order disposes of four Letters Patent Appeals (Nos. 236, 237, 243 and 244 of 2009) arising from a Single Judge's judgment dated 01.04.2009 that decided a group of writ petitions challenging the Preliminary Examination conducted by the Haryana Public Service Commission in 2008 for recruitment to Haryana Civil Services (Judicial Branch).

An advertisement dated 14.09.2008 invited applications for 78 Civil Judges (Junior Division) posts. 6,381 candidates applied, 5,170 appeared in the preliminary examination, and 830 candidates were shortlisted in the result declared on 18.11.2008. Several writ petitions challenging the Preliminary Examination were filed (two in January 2009 and others in March 2009).

The primary challenges were: (1) that certain questions were out of the syllabus for the examination, and (2) that answers to certain questions (including Question No. 108 on the life of a Presidential Ordinance) were incorrect, rendering the examination unfair.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether certain questions (45 identified by the appellants) in the Preliminary Examination were "out of syllabus" and therefore should be excluded from consideration in determining eligibility for the Main Examination.
  2. Whether the key answers to certain questions (including Question No. 108 on the life of a Presidential Ordinance) were incorrect such that candidates were prejudiced and entitled to relief.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • Certain questions (45 enumerated in an annexure) were outside the prescribed syllabus; these questions related to subjects such as Constitution of India, International Law, Jurisprudence, Criminology, Arbitration Act, Law of Torts, Negotiable Instruments Act and Freedom of Information Act, and therefore should not have been considered in shortlisting candidates.
  • Certain specific questions (Nos. 62, 72, 73, 108 and 111) had incorrect official answers (keys), and thus the examination process was unfair and unreasonable.
  • Regarding Question No. 108 (life of a Presidential Ordinance), an appellant contended that "three months" was the correct answer because the President can withdraw an Ordinance at any time; reliance was placed on Article 85 of the Constitution to support that position.
  • Appellants relied on precedent(s) (including Abhijit Sen v. State of U.P., Surjit Saurabh v. High Court of Delhi, and Special Reference No. 1 of 2002) to support their contentions on syllabus scope and the correctness of key answers.

Commission's Arguments

  • The Commission produced the original answer sheets showing that the appellants had attempted the contested questions; several of the allegedly wrongly-keyed questions had been attempted correctly by appellants themselves, so they could not claim prejudice arising from the alleged incorrectness of keys.
  • Instruction No. 4 to candidates stated that each question has four responses and only one is "most appropriate" — the Commission argued that the selected key need not be absolutely precise, only the most appropriate choice under the instructions.
  • Specifically on Question No. 108, the Commission maintained that "six months" was the most appropriate key answer, relying on the constitutional provision that no gap of more than six months can intervene between two sessions of Parliament (Article 85), and therefore six months was an appropriate operational answer for the question posed.
  • The Commission and its counsel relied upon authority (L. Lokanadham v. Chairman, Telecom Commission) to emphasize the limited role of courts in revisiting examination keys and that relief cannot be granted merely on assumptions.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Abhijit Sen v. State of U.P., (1984) 2 SCC 319 Cited by appellants (specific legal principle relied upon by appellants is not detailed in the provided text). The opinion records that appellants relied on this precedent, but the court's reasoning does not record any adoption of its principle; no specific application by the court is described in the text.
Surjit Saurabh v. High Court of Delhi, W.P.(C) 8028 of 2008 (Division Bench decision dated 01.12.2008) Cited by appellants in support of their contention (text does not set out the exact rule relied upon). The court held that this decision has no application to the present facts because the advertisement and instructions provided here clearly contemplated the scope of the Preliminary Examination; the court therefore rejected reliance on this decision.
Special Reference No. 1 of 2002, (2002) 8 SCC 237 : AIR 2003 SC 87 Cited by appellants to contend that a six-month gap between sessions is not a mandatory requirement (as relevant to Question No. 108). The opinion notes appellants' reliance on this reference but does not adopt it; instead the court treated the six-month rule as supporting the key answer (six months) for the question on life of Ordinance in the context of Article 85.
L. Lokanadham v. Chairman, Telecom Commission, (2008) 5 SCC 155 Authority for the proposition that courts have limited jurisdiction in matters of examination keys and that ambiguities ought to be cleared by expert bodies; relief cannot be granted on assumptions. The court applied and relied upon this observation to conclude that it should not act as an appellate examining body to reassess key answers and that only those who could not answer a question owing to being outside syllabus or ambiguity might be entitled to relief; this supported dismissal of the appeals.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court conducted a step-by-step examination of the contesting points based on the advertisement, instructions, answer sheets, and authorities cited:

  1. The court reproduced and closely examined Clause 12 (Scheme of Examination) of the advertisement and Instruction No. 11 (syllabus reference) which stated that Preliminary Examination questions "shall be from the syllabus prescribed for the main examination" and that candidates "shall be expected to have a general and basic knowledge of the main subjects" and the ability to answer questions on current events and Indian Legal and Constitutional History and governance.
  2. On the "out of syllabus" contention, the court found that the subjects of the 45 contested questions (Constitution, International Law, Jurisprudence, Torts, other statutes, etc.) were not unrelated to the purpose of the examination. Given the advertisement's language requiring general and basic knowledge of main subjects and legal/constitutional history and governance, such questions could not be treated as out of syllabus. The court noted that these are not subjects alien to a judicial recruitment examination (e.g., not physics or chemistry) and therefore rejected the argument that the 45 questions were out of syllabus.
  3. The court observed that the learned Single Judge had not recorded a categorical finding that any question was out of syllabus; although some directions were issued, there was no categorical finding supporting appellants' contention.
  4. With respect to alleged incorrect answers, the court relied on (a) the fact that appellants themselves had attempted and, in many cases, answered the contested questions correctly, and (b) Instruction No. 4 which stated that among four responses "only one is most appropriate." The court interpreted this instruction to mean that the selected key need not be precisely the only conceivable correct formulation but the one that is most appropriate in the context of the examination. Therefore, excluding such questions from marking where appellants themselves answered them correctly would be meaningless and would not show prejudice.
  5. On Question No. 108 (life of a Presidential Ordinance), the court considered the appellants' argument that "three months" was correct because a President can withdraw an Ordinance at any time. The court held that the appropriate key answer was "six months," reasoning that Article 85 prevents an interval of more than six months between two sessions of Parliament, and thus six months was the appropriate answer to the question "How long can a President's Ordinance remain in force?" The court expressly held that the key answer was not "palpably incorrect, demonstrably erroneous or absurd" such as to justify exclusion.
  6. The court relied on the Supreme Court's observation in L. Lokanadham to emphasize the limited role of courts in reviewing exam keys and to underscore that clarifications should come from expert bodies; courts should not grant relief on assumptions. Applying that principle, the court concluded that it should not act as an appellate body to re-evaluate key answers and that appellants were not entitled to relief on the grounds advanced.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Letters Patent Appeals Nos. 236, 237, 243 and 244 of 2009 are DISMISSED.

Direct consequences: The court found no merit in the challenges to the Preliminary Examination — the 45 questioned items were not out of syllabus in the circumstances, the contested key answers (including Question No. 108) were not so manifestly wrong as to warrant exclusion, and the appellants had not shown prejudice warranting relief. The order directs that a copy of the order, under the signature of the Special Secretary of the Court, be given dasti to counsel for the parties.

Broader implications: The opinion emphasizes the limited role of courts in re-evaluating examination keys and follows the principle (as stated in L. Lokanadham) that ambiguities should be resolved by expert bodies; the judgment does not purport to establish new law beyond applying these established principles to the facts of these appeals.

Disposition: Appeals dismissed.

    Khatri Saurabh Satyapal v. Haryana Public Service Commission And Another

    Hemant Gupta, J.:— This order shall dispose of Letters Patent Appeal Nos. 236, 237, 243 and 244 of 2009 arising out of judgment of learned Single Judge dated 01.04.2009 deciding bunch of writ petitions challenging the Preliminary Examination conducted by the Haryana Public Service Commission (for short “the Commission”) in the year 2008 for recruitment to the Haryana Civil Services (Judicial Branch).

    2. An advertisement was published by the Commission on 14.09.2008 inviting applications for 78 posts of Civil Judges (Junior Division) in Haryana Civil Service (Judicial Branch). 6381 candidates applied for the said posts. 5170 candidates appeared in the preliminary examination required to be conducted in terms of the advertisement so issued. Out of said candidates, 830 candidates have been shortlisted in the result declared on 18.11.2008 in respect of said 78 vacancies. Two writ petitions i.e CWP No. 678 and 180 of 2009 were filed in the month of January, 2009 whereas all other writ petitions were filed in the later half of March, 2009. The challenge to the Preliminary Examination-2008 is primarily on two grounds. Firstly, certain questions were out of syllabus contemplated for the examination and, therefore, the entire process of examination is not proper. Secondly, i??? a writ petition filed by the appellant in LPA No. 236 of 2009, the allegation was that answer to one question in respect of life of Presidential Ordinance is incorrect, therefore, the examination process is not fair and reasonable.

    3. However, during the pendency of writ petitions, on production of question paper, the appellant in LPA No. 237 of 2009, pointed out that 45 questions were out of syllabus, whereas in respect of five questions, the answers were incorrect. It was pointed out by the appellant in Annexure P-7 that most of the said 45 questions pertain to Constitution of India, International Law, Jurisprudence, Criminology, Arbitration Act, Law of Torts, Negotiable Instruments Act and Freedom of Information Act but such subjects were not part of the syllabus. Therefore, 45 questions enumerated in Annexure P-7 could not have been taken into consideration in determining the eligibility of the candidate for appearing in the Main Examination. It is also pointed out that Question No. 62, 72, 73, 108 and 111 had wrong answers.

    4. On the other hand, Mr. Dhindsa, learned counsel appearing for the Commission, has produced the original answer sheets of the appellants. He has pointed out that the appellants in LPA No. 236 and 237 of 2009 have attempted the four questions, the answers of which the learned Single Judge has found to be incorrect as well as Question No. 108 in respect of life of Presidential Ordinance. It is contended that having attempted to answer the questions, it is not open to the appellants to raise an argument that the answers were incorrect. It is further pointed out that had the appellants not answered the questions and come out with a plea that the answers are incorrect, one can understand the prejudice caused to the appellants but having attempted the questions and correctly as well, it cannot be said that any prejudice has been, caused to the petitioners. It is pointed out that Mr. Gaurav Jain, appellant in LPA No. 237 of 2009 has attempted two question correctly out of four questions as well the answer to question No. 108 was attempted correctly. The appellant in LPA No. 236 of 2009, attempted three questions correctly but the question No. 108 was answered incorrectly i.e Life of Presidential Ordinance was said to be three months as against key answer of six months. Similarly, Harkirat Singh Ghuman-appellant in LPA No. 243 of 2009 and Parveen Chauhan-appellant in LPA No. 244 of 2009, have attempted three questions correctly out of four questions found to be incorrect answers by the learned Single Judge and the fourth question was answered wrongly by both the candidates. The answer to question No., 108 was answered by both these candidates correctly as well. Therefore, after implementing the directions of the learned Single Judge, in fact, overall marks of the appellants stand reduced as to what was granted by the Commission earlier. Mr. Dhindsa has also pointed out that, in fact, one of the instructions which were communicated to all the candidates were to the following effect:—

    “4. Each question has four responses and of these, only one is most appropriate, which is required to be marked by blue/black point/gel pen by the candidate by darkening appropriate circle completely.”

    5. On the strength of such instruction, it is argued that the “most appropriate” answer was to be marked by a candidate. In other words, it was argued that it need not be precisely correct. Answer to Question No. 108 as Six months is the correct key in view of the fact that there could not be gap of more than six months between two sessions of Parliament and, therefore, six months is the most appropriate answer of Question No. 108.

    6. Mr. Sehrawat, learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon Abhijit Sen v. State of U.P, (1984) 2 SCC 319 and also relied upon a Division Bench decision of Delhi High Court in Surjit Saurabh v. High Court of Delhi, W.P (C) 8028 of 2008 decided on 01.12.2008, in support of his argument. Mr. Sehrawat has also relied upon judgment of Supreme Court reported as Special Reference No. 1 of 2002, (2002) 8 SCC 237 : AIR 2003 SC 87 to contend that gap of six months between two sessions of Legislative Assembly is not a mandatory requirement and, therefore, six months period as the key answer is not the correct option. Mr. Dahiya, on the other hand, relied upon the following observation of the Supreme Court in L. Lokanadham v. Chairman, Telecom Commission, (2008) 5 SCC 155:

    “……… Furthermore, assuming there was some ambiguity in the prescribed syllabus, it would have been for an expert body to clear the same and in the event it is found that any question has been put out of syllabus, only those who could not answer the same might have been entitled to any relief. No relief in case a case of this nature could have been granted on assumptions. It was not for the Tribunal to pass an order only on the supposition that the appellant did not prepare themselves well owing to some misunderstanding in regard to the extent of syllabus.”

    7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at some length, we do nt fnd that the appellants are entitled to any indulgence in the present appeals. Before we examine the arguments raised by learned counsel for the appellants that 45 questions were out of syllabus, relevant clause from the advertisement needs to be reproduced:—

    “12. Scheme of Examination:

    The examination shall be conducted in three stages, namely, (i) Preliminary Examination, (ii) Main Examination, and (iii) Viva Voce,

    (a) Preliminary Examination:—

    The Preliminary Examination will be of two hours duration and will have 120 question. Each correct answer will carry four marks and for every wrong answer one mark will be deducted. However, no credit or discredit will be given for the questions not attempted. Questions in preliminary examination shall be from the syllabus prescribed for the main examination in terms of broad rubric of five papers for the main examination. Candidates shall be expected to have a general and basic knowledge of the main subjects and also the ability to answer questions on current events of National and International importance, Indian Legal and Constitutional History and goverance. Candidates shall also be tested for their analytical skills and aptitude. The candidates equal to 10 times the number of vacancies, on the basis of their performance in the Preliminary Examination, will be admitted to the main examination.”

    8. It may be noticed that instructions were issued and supplied by the Commission to the candidates along with the application form. Instruction No. 11 deals with Syllabus of the main examination which is as per Rule 9 of Part C of Rules relating to the appointment of Civil Judge (Junior Division) in Haryana. Clause 12(a) of the Instructions reproduced above shows that questions in preliminary examination shall be from the syllabus prescribed for the main examination but also the candidates shall be expected to have a general and basic knowledge of the main subjects and also the ability to answer questions on current events of National and International importance, Indian Legal and Constitutional History and governance. According to the appellants, the questions which are said to be out of syllabus relate to the Constitution of India, International Law, Jurisprudence, Torts and other statutes. It cannot be said that such questions are out of syllabus as the candidates were made aware that they should have the ability to answer questions on current events of National and International importance, Indian Legal and Constitutional History and goverance. It may be noticed that such examination is for recruitment of Judicial Officers in the State of Haryana. The questions are about the Constitution of India or other statutes. It cannot be said that such questions are pot relevant to determine the aptitude and analytical mind of a candidate. The questions asked are not of physics, chemistry or economics unconnected with the syllabus or the purpose for which examination is being conducted. Therefore, we are unable to agree with the arguments raised by learned counsel for the appellants that 45 questions were out of syllabus.

    9. Reliance of the appellants on the judgment of the Delhi High Court has no application to the facts of the present case when the instructions clearly contemplate the scope of Preliminary Examination. Therefore, the first argument raised by the learned counsel for the appellants that certain questions were out of syllabus is without any merit. In fact, learned Single Judge has not recorded any categorical finding that any of questions is out of syllabus. Though before parting with the judgment, learned Single Judge had issued certain directions but in the absence of any categorical finding of any question out of syllabus, the argument raised by learned counsel for the appellants lack any substance.

    10. In respect of the argument that answers to certain questions were incorrect, suffice it to say that the appellants have attempted most of the questions and attempted them right. To argue that such questions should be excluded from the marking of all the candidates would be meaningless when the appellants themselves have attempted most of the questions correctly. Even otherwise, Instruction No. 4, as reproduced above, clearly stipulate that one of the answers is most appropriate which need not be precisely the correct answer. Therefore, we do not find that the appellants have suffered any prejudice on account of alleged wrong answers to the questions coulled out by the learned Single Judge.

    11. Another argument needs to be examined, which is vehemently raised by Mr. Sehrawat. The said argument is in respect of Question No. 108 i.e Life of Presidential Ordinance. Relying upon the provisions of Article 85 of the Constitution of India, the argument is that all the questions are correct in as much as the President can withdraw the Ordinance at any time, therefore, three months period as life of an Ordinance by the appellant in LPA No. 236 of 2009 is the correct answer and, thus, the key answer is incorrect.

    12. The argument raised by the learned counsel for the appellants is the argument so as to interpret the constitutional provisions in the court of law. The key answer of six months was the appropriate answer as the short abstract question was “How long can a President's Ordinance remain in force ?” Since more than six months cannot intervene between two sessions of Parliament in terms of Article 85 of the Constitution of India, key answer of six months is the appropriate answer. Therefore, it cannot be said that the key answer was palpably incorrect, demonstrably erroneous or absurd which is liable to be excluded from the purposes of determine suitability for the main examination. As a matter of fact, Supreme Court in judgment reported as L. Lokanandham (supra) has held that the Courts have limited jurisdiction in these matters and it for the experts to clear that ambiguity and that no relief can be granted on assumptions. It was found that a candidate who could not answer incorrect questions would be entitled to any relief. While exercising the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution, this Court is not to act as an appellate examining body to go into the details of determination of key answers. Appellants in LPA Nos. 236 and 244 of 2009, have attempted Question No. 108 incorrectly; whereas appellants in LPA Nos. 237 and 243 of 2009 have given correct answer as per key. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid judgment, the appellants are not entitled to any indulgence in the present appeals.

    13. In view of the above, we do not find any merit in these Letters Patent Appeals. The same are dismissed. A copy of the order, under the signatures of Special Secretary of this Court, shall be given dasti to learned counsel for the parties.

    14. Appeals dismissed.

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    Khatri Saurabh Satyapal v. Haryana Public Service Commission And Another
    (Apr 6, 2009)