1. Seeking a declaration to the effect that Rule 5 of the Madhya Pradesh Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council Rules, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Impugned Rule’) is invalid and ultra vires the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act of 2006’), this writ petition has been filed and the prayer made in the writ petition reads as under:—
“7.1 Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction under Article 226 declaring that Rule 5 of the Madhya Pradesh Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council Rules, 2006 is ultra vires the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 as well as the Constitution of India and hence illegal and unenforceable;
7.2 Issue a writ of Certiorari or a writ in the nature of Certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction under Article 226 calling for the records of proceedings in or in relation to the letter dated April 2, 2016 - Annexure P/10, issued to the Collector, Noida by Respondent No. 2, initiating recovery proceedings against the Petitioner under the Impugned Rule and upon examining the same, be placed to declare such letter as illegal and unconstitutional and quash such letter and all the proceedings initiated thereunder or pursuant or consequent thereto;
7.3 Restrain Respondent No. 2 from taking any action pursuant to the letter dated April 2, 2016 issued to the Collector, Noida by Respondent No. 2; and,
7.4 Pass any other order(s) that this Hon'ble Court may deem fit in light of the facts and circumstances of the present case.”
2. Petitioner claims to be a Company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956. It is said to be fully owned subsidiary of Power Machines OJSC, Russia, a large power plant engineering company with worldwide subsidiaries. Petitioner claims to be engaged in power engineering including production, supply, erection, maintenance and modernization of equipment for thermal, nuclear, hydel and gas turbine power plants. Registered office of the petitioner is said to be situated in New Delhi. Respondent No. 3 - Laxmi Engineering Industries (Bhopal) Private Limited is also a company registered under the Companies Act with its registered office at 72-A, Sector 1, Govindpura Industrial Area, Bhopal, MP. It is engaged in the business of design, manufacture and supply of heat exchangers for power plants, refineries, fertilizer plants, petrochemicals, chemical plants etc. It is stated that between 2007-2009 petitioner issued Letter of Intent for three purchase orders as detailed in paragraph 5.7 of the writ petition, and filed as Annexure P/2 - collectively. After these purchase orders were issued, certain disputes arose between the parties; negotiation failed; and, thereafter the matter was taken up by the Madhya Pradesh Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council - respondent No. 2, in accordance to the procedure contemplated under the Act of 2006, for adjudication of the dispute. Finally, an award for Rs. 1,15,77,630/- (Rupees One Crore Fifteen Lakhs Seventy Seven Thousand Six Hundred and Thirty Only) has been passed and recovery proceedings in connection with the award have been initiated.
3. Various allegations are made in this writ petition with regard to passing of the award in question; illegality committed in the matter of passing of the award and other aspects of the matter. However, when recovery proceedings have been initiated in the matter under Rule 5 of the Act of 2006, this writ petition has been filed for declaring the rules as ultra vires to the constitution and the Act of 2006.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner invited our attention to Section 18 of the Act of 2006; sub-section (2) and (3) thereof, and argued that when a dispute arises, the same is adjudicated or resolved by respondent No. 2 under the Act of 2006, the entire dispute resolution mechanism undertaken is in accordance to the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act of 1996’) and under sub-section(2) of Section 18, it is stated and provided for that the conciliation proceedings and other dispute resolution would be undertaken as per the Act of 1996; and, further under sub-section (3) it is stipulated that the Act of 1996 shall apply to a dispute as if an arbitration proceeding is being held in pursuance to the Arbitration Agreement referred to in sub-section(1) of Section 7.
5. Accordingly, learned counsel for the petitioner by placing reliance on the following judgments-Ramesh Ramesh Conductors P. Limited v. M & Se Facilitation Council), 2015 SCC OnLine Mad 13110; Managing Director, Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation, Kumbakonam Limited v. Radhakrishnan Unnithan, MD, M/s. Rayamands Rubber (P) Ltd., 2015 SCC OnLine Ker 34011; and, v. , 2015 SCC OnLine Ker 21856, argued that the entire proceedings held for resolution of the dispute and the award passed with regard to the dispute is nothing but an award under the Act of 1996, and all the procedure contemplated under the Act of 1996 would apply in the matter of resolution of a dispute. Learned counsel for the petitioner refers to the judgments of the Madras High Court and the Kerala High Court, in the aforementioned cases, to say that the dispute resolution mechanism provided for in the Act of 1996 as per the judgments rendered by the Madras and the Kerala High Court is nothing but an arbitration award and once it is an award passed under the Act of 1996, the provisions of section 34, 36 and 37 of the Act of 1996 would become applicable and the only remedy available for enforcement of the award would be the one provided under Section 36 of the Act of 1996 and, therefore, the special procedure now contemplated under Rule 5 is ultra vires and inconsistent to the provisions. Rule 18(1) and (2) which clearly contemplates that dispute is an arbitration dispute adjudicated under the Act of 1996 and when entire procedure for resolution of dispute as provided in the Act of 1996 has been made applicable, the resolution of dispute and the recovery of the amount has to be as per the aforesaid Act of 1996 only and Rule 5, which provides for a special procedure for recovery by resorting to recovering the amount as if it is arrears of land revenue is ultra vires the provisions of Act of 2006.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Rules are framed by virtue of the powers delegated under the Act of 2006 and in view of the judgments of the Supreme Court in the cases of Dr. Mahachandra Prasad Singh v. Chairman, Bihar Legislative Council, (2004) 8 SCC 747; and, Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Birla Cotton, Spinning and Weaving Mills, Delhi, (1968) 3 SCR 251: AIR 1968 SC 1232, the delegatee cannot bring into force a Rule which is beyond the powers conferred or the Scheme contemplated under the Act of 2006. Accordingly, learned counsel argues that the Rule be declared as ultra vires.
7. Shri Samdarshi Tiwari, learned Deputy Advocate General; and, Shri Shashank Shekhar, learned counsel for respondent No. 3, refute the aforesaid contentions. They took us through the purpose for which the Act of 2006 was incorporated and argued that this Act was incorporated to give certain benefit to the small scale industries and the entire Act of 2006 and the dispute resolution mechanism provided under Chapter V, in the matter of delayed payment to micro and small enterprises is a dispute resolution system incorporated with the sole purpose of early disposal of dispute, so that delay in resolution of the dispute should not result in financial crisis to the small scale industries. They argue that with the aforesaid intention in mind, the Act was enacted and Rule 5 has been incorporated for the purpose of speedy recovery of the amount as awarded under the dispute resolution mechanism.
8. Learned counsel for the respondents argue that Rule 5 only provides for a mechanism for recovery of the amount after the award passed had attained finality, in as much as the appeal filed has been decided and the award has attained finality. They argue that if for the purpose of enforcement of an award or a decree passed, an additional mode of recovery is provided for under the Rules in addition to the one available under the Act of 1996, the Rule cannot be termed as ultra vires. It is said that the Rule in question has been framed by virtue of the powers conferred under section 30 read with section 21(3) and as both these sections empower the Rule making authority to make the Rule for implementing the purpose for which the Act and the Rules have been framed, the same cannot be termed as ultra vires to the Constitution.
9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and have perused the record.
10. The Rule in question reads as under:—
“5. Recovery of amount due as arrears of land revenue:
If a buyer does not file any appeal under section 19 of the Act for setting aside any decree, award or other order made either by the council itself or by any institution or centre or if such appeal is dismissed, in that situation such decree, award or order shall be executed by the Collector of the District concerned and the amount due shall be recovered as arrears of land revenue.”
11. This Rule has been incorporated by the Government of Madhya Pradesh by virtue of the powers vested in it under section 21(3) read with section 30 of the Act of 2006. There is no dispute that the Rule has been made by virtue of the powers and the jurisdiction available to the competent legislative authority in the State of MP. The only grievance of the petitioner that once the Act of 2006 and section 18(2) and 18(3) thereof contemplates that the dispute resolution mechanism is to be undertaken in accordance to the procedure contemplated under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and when the dispute is said to be one referred for arbitration as if it is by virtue of the arbitration agreement as is provided for in sub-section (1) of Section 7 and when the judgments of the Madras and Kerala High Courts say that an award passed is an award under the Act of 1996 and all the provisions of the Act of 1996 apply and when there is a specific provision for execution of the award under section 36 of the Act of 1996, further mechanism provided contrary to this section is ultra vires the Act of 2006, as it is inconsistent to the main Act. This is in sum and substance the contention of the petitioner.
12. However, nothing is brought to our notice to indicate as to why there cannot be two sets of recovery proceedings in a matter after the dispute resolution mechanism has come to an end and the award passed as per the dispute resolution mechanism has attained finality. The Act of 2006 was enacted to give benefit to small scale industries, to provide for reservation of items, exclusively to be manufactured by such industry and for bringing into place a composite statutory policy to enable the growth of small and micro industry establishment by adopting better and higher level of technology and to achieve higher production and to enable such industry to remain competent in a fast globalization area. It provides for various mechanism and facilities to be granted to the small scale units for uplifting them and for granting them certain benefits to stay in the competitive world in this age of globalization. With that purpose in view, the National Board for Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises has been created and various provisions have been made to grant benefit to such class of industries under the Act of 2006. Under Chapter V of the Act of 2006, specific provisions have been made where a buyer from these Industries is required to ensure payment of dues and a special procedure is contemplated for resolution or adjudication of any dispute in this regard by the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council. Sub-sections (1) to (5) of Section 18 contemplates a procedure which is the dispute resolution mechanism and as indicated hereinabove, the said mechanism contemplates that a dispute for which settlement is not arrived at has to be adjudicated by utilizing the services of arbitration or by following the procedure for arbitration and such arbitration is deemed to be a proceeding under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996.
13. Thereafter, under section 19, provision for appeals have been provided and the appellate procedure is nothing but is the same procedure as is contemplated under the Act of 1996 i.e…. the procedure contemplated under sections 34 and 37. However, in the matter of recovery, Rule 5 lays down a specific provision and this provision can be brought into force only after the entire dispute resolution mechanism comes to an end, the award or the decree passed has attained finality.
14. This is the Scheme of the Act, and the same is to ensure early resolution of the dispute and recovery of the amount awarded so that financial hardship and financial crisis to a small scale industry is ruled out. Merely because a separate Rule for recovery under Rule 5 is contemplated under the Rules, in the absence of there being any conflict between the aforesaid Rule or the Constitution, we cannot declare the said Rule as ultra vires.
15. Petitioner wants this Court to hold that once the dispute resolution mechanism system under the Act of 2006 is the one contemplated under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, then enforcement of an award passed under this Act of 1996 has to be in accordance to the provisions of section 36. Section 36 contemplates that an award passed shall be enforced as if it is a decree under the Code of Civil Procedure. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact and it is an admitted position that for getting a decree executed by following the procedure under the Code of Civil Procedure, there are various procedural and other impediments and if taking note of all these aspects and in furtherance to the intention for which the Act of 2006 was enacted, if a specific Rule like Rule 5 is enacted, we find no reason to hold the same to be ultra vires. It only gives an optional choice to a claimant who has a decree in his favour on the basis of adjudication conducted under the Act of 2006, to get the decree enforced. He may take recourse to the remedy available under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act or can take recourse to the remedy of recovering the amount as if it is arrears of land revenue and in case any illegality is being conducted in the matter of recovery, the aggrieved person can always challenge the recovery proceedings. Merely because a dual procedure for recovery is contemplated under the Rules framed, we see no reason to interfere into the matter.
16. We may also profitably refer to various aspects pertaining to Principles of Statutory Interpretation of Statute in this regard. It is a cardinal principle of Interpretation of Statute that the Court should make all endeavour to give effect to the legislative intent for which a provision is made, harmonious construction should be evolved to reconcile the conflict, if any, between two provisions operating with regard to same aspects of the matter and when it comes to cases pertaining to procedure or statute regulating procedures, the Court has to ensure that the provision is interpreted in such a manner that it advances the cause of justice and as far as possible the intention of legislature in furtherance to the cause of justice should be given effect to. Inconsistency and repugnancy should be avoided and harmonious construction applied. In his book on Principle of Statutory Interpretation, Justice G.P Singh has discussed this aspect of the matter in Chapter II, in detail, and after referring to various judgments on the subject, the author lays down the principle by saying that the Courts should avoid a head on clash between two sections of the same Act or two provisions of two different Acts. Wherever it is possible to do so, the Court should construe the provision which appear to be conflicting in a manner so as to harmonize them. The author further says that the provisions of one section of a statute cannot be used to defeat those of another section until and unless it is impossible to effect reconciliation between the two. The author refers to certain observations made by Justice Gajendragadkar in this regard, which reads as under:—
“The sub-sections must be read as parts of an integral whole and as being interdependent; an attempt should be made in construing them to reconcile them if it is reasonably possible to do so, as to avoid repugnancy.”
17. Similarly, the author also refers to certain observations made by Justice Venkatarama Aiyar, which reads as under:—
“The rule of construction is well settled that when there are in an enactment two provisions which cannot be reconciled with each other, they should be so interpreted that, if possible, effect should be given to both. This is what is known as the rule of harmonious construction.”
18. The aforesaid observations are made by the learned Hon'ble Judges in the cases of Madanlal Fakirchand Dudhediya v. Shree Changdeo Sugar Mills Limited, AIR 1962 SC 1543; and, Krishna Kumar v. State of Rajasthan, (1991) 4 SCC 258 : AIR 1992 SC 1789.
19. It is indicated in the principle laid down that apart from resolving conflicts between two provisions of an Act, this principle can be used for resolving all conflicts between a provision in the Act; two different Acts or in the Act and a Rule made under the Act. In this regard, reference can be made to a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of The Bihar State Co-operative Marketing Union Limited v. Uma Shankar Sharan, (1992) 4 SCC 196 : AIR 1993 SC 1222, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 6 holds that validity of plural remedies can be prescribed under law. The Hon'ble Supreme Court applies the principle of election in such cases where two or more remedies are available to a person. It is held if the two remedies happen to be inconsistent, they can still continue and it is for the person concerned to chose amongst them and once he elects one of them and can commence action accordingly.
20. In the present case also, the position is akin to the aforesaid principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In view of the aforesaid also, we see no reason to allow the prayer made by the petitioner.
21. We are of the considered view that as Rule 5 is in strict conformity with the Act of 2006, and is in furtherance to the legislative intent for which the Act was brought into force, the Rule formulated in addition to the statutory rule for execution available under section 36 cannot be termed as ultra vires or illegal to the Constitution or the Act of 2006. The averments made by the learned counsel for the petitioner are misconceived.
22. Accordingly, the writ petition stands dismissed.