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  • Indian Insolvent Act,, 1848 (11 and 12 Vi& c. 2I>, s. 7; Ex parte Bogem, 1881, 16
  • Acts, 1898, 3rd ed. p. '73.1 360
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Attorney(S)
Acts
  • Indian Insolvent Act,, 1848 (11 and 12 Vi& c. 2I>, s. 7; Ex parte Bogem, 1881, 16
  • Acts, 1898, 3rd ed. p. '73.1 360
Smart Summary

Case Summary — Jewun Doss Sahoo v. Shah Kubeer-ood-deen (1840), Moore Ind. App.

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns competing claims to certain mouzahs (villages) originally granted by royal firmans and perwanahs in the 18th century for the maintenance of a Khankah (a religious establishment). The grants were made to Sheikh Kubeer and his descendants (described as Altamgha/Enam grants). Over time Shah Shumsh-ood-deen, a later Sijjada-nashin (superior), executed a conditional conveyance (a conditional bill of sale/defeazance) in 1807 to Jewun Doss Sahoo for Rs. 23,501 as security for a loan, and subsequently (on 2 February 1810) executed what purported to be an absolute Ikrarnamah (conveyance) to Jewun Doss for a further Rs. 5,000. Shah Shumsh-ood-deen died shortly thereafter (3 February 1810), leaving an infant son, Shah Kubeer-ood-deen (the present respondent).

The respondent, after being appointed by Government as Mutwaly (manager/procurator) and Sijjada-nashin of the Khankah in 1819, brought suit on 17 September 1822 in the Provincial Court of Patna to recover the villages as Wukf (endowed, inalienable) property. The defendant (appellant here) pleaded that the sale was bona fide and relied on lapse of time (limitation). The Provincial Court issued differing decisions at stages (one judge treating the transaction as a mortgage and ordering accounts; another judge later dismissing the plaintiff's claim on limitation and bona fide sale grounds). The Sudder Dewanny Adawlut heard appeals and ultimately decreed in favour of the plaintiff (respondent), holding the lands to be Wukf and the alienations invalid. The present appeal to the higher appellate authority (their Lordships) considered whether the Sudder Dewanny Adawlut was correct and whether the respondent's claim was barred by limitation.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the property granted by the royal firmans/perwanahs was Wukf (a religious/charitable endowment) and therefore inalienable under Mahomedan law.
  2. If the property was Wukf, whether the respondent (as Mutwaly/Procurator appointed by Government) was competent to sue for recovery of the lands and to enforce the trust.
  3. Whether the respondent's claim was barred by lapse of time (the twelve-year limitation in the Bengal regulations) given the appellant's long possession and alleged bona fide purchase.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Jewun Doss Sahoo)

  • The grants (described as Altamgha/enam) conveyed a proprietary, hereditary interest to the grantees and their heirs; the word "Wukf" does not appear in the instruments and nothing in the documents created a trust or rendered the grants inalienable.
  • Even if the 1807 transfer was conditional, the transaction of 1810 (acceptance of a further sum of Rs. 5,000 and execution of a second conveyance) made the sale absolute; consequently the appellant became an absolute purchaser and entered into possession.
  • The appellant was a purchaser for valuable consideration without notice and held under a fair title and actual possession for upwards of twelve years before the suit—thus the plaintiff's claim was barred by the Bengal Regulations of limitation (Regulation III of 1793 and Regulation II of 1805).
  • Because revenue/collector registers treated entries as proprietary and the appellant's name was entered in public books, the sale should be treated as bona fide and protected by lapse of time.

Respondent's Arguments (Shah Kubeer-ood-deen)

  • The language of the firmans and perwanahs shows the grants were made for the maintenance of the Khankah and the expenses of travellers and frequenters; their tenor shows an appropriation for religious/charitable use that is Wukf in character despite not using the literal word "Wukf".
  • Under Mahomedan law (as explained in authoritative texts and prior decisions), a grant to a religious establishment or for purposes of the Khankah creates a trust/endowment; persons named in the grant are to be treated as custodians (Mutwalies) rather than absolute proprietors, and a Mutwaly has no power to alienate Wukf property.
  • The 1810 instrument was either invalid (fraudulent/close to death) or could not render an otherwise inalienable endowment alienable; therefore the defendant's alleged absolute title could not prevail.
  • The respondent was not a proprietor before his appointment as Mutwaly in 1819; the limitation period did not run against him while there was no party competent to sue for the endowment (and Government has a distinct role in protecting endowments), so the twelve years' bar did not apply.
  • Even if the appellant obtained possession, he took subject to the trust and could be bound as a trustee; the appellant's failure to raise the purchaser-for-value without notice defence in earlier pleadings was relied on by the respondent.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mussummat Kadira v. Shah Kubeer-ood-deen (3 Ben. Sud. Dew. Ad. Rep. 407) Holds that a grant may be a Wukf (religious appropriation) even if the term "Wukf" is not used; where the general tenor of the instrument shows an appropriation to pious/charitable purposes, the property is inalienable. The court treated this decision as directly on point and used it to support the conclusion that the firmans/perwanahs at issue created Wukf endowments and that alienations by the Sijjada-nashin were illegal. The Sudder Dewanny Adawlut's ruling that the property was Wukf relied on this authority and was affirmed.
Ali ... (2 Ben. Sud. Dew. Ad. Rep. 110) Establishes that the word "Wukf" need not appear in a grant for the grant to constitute a religious appropriation if the nature of the grant so indicates. Used alongside Mussummat Kadira to show that absence of the literal term did not prevent the grant qualifying as Wukf; contributed to the conclusion that the 18th-century grants were endowments for charitable purposes.
Mullruczy v. The East India Company (5 B. and Ald. 204) Principle (from English authority) that where there is no party competent to bring a suit, time (limitation) will not begin to run against the claim. Cited to support the respondent's position that, because he was not competent to sue until his appointment as Mutwaly in 1819, the twelve-year limitation had not begun to run against recovery of the Wukf property prior to that date.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by applying the governing principles of Mahomedan law as evidenced in native law authorities and prior decisions, and by interpreting the documentary record (the firmans, perwanahs and subsequent conveyances).

  1. Character of the grants: The court examined the language of the 1717 and 1762 instruments which repeatedly described the lands as granted "for the purpose of defraying the expenses of the Khankah" and for the "frequenters" and expressly exempted the lands from revenue. The court accepted the established rule (from prior decisions and native law texts) that a grant may constitute a Wukf by its tenor even if it does not use the technical word "Wukf." The Sudder Dewanny Adawlut relied on earlier decisions (notably Mussummat Kadira) and the authorities (the Hedaya and Macnaghten on Mahomedan law) to conclude the grants created a religious endowment (Wukf) and that persons named were to be treated as Mutwalies (custodians) rather than absolute proprietors.
  2. Validity of the alienations: Given the conclusion that the grants were Wukf, the court concluded that the transfers executed by Shah Shumsh-ood-deen—whether the 1807 conditional conveyance (which the lower court treated as conditional/mortgage-like) or the 1810 instrument purporting to be absolute—were illegal and void insofar as they attempted to alienate Wukf property. The Sudder Dewanny Adawlut held that a Mutwaly (procurator) has no authority to alienate Wukf property, so an absolute conveyance could not validate such an alienation.
  3. Limitation and competency to sue: The court examined the operation of the Bengal Regulations of limitation (Regulation III of 1793 and Regulation II of 1805). It accepted the position that the ordinary twelve-year bar did not run where there was no party competent to sue. The respondent was a minor at his father's death (1810) and was not appointed Mutwaly (government manager/procurator) until 1819; until his appointment there was no competent party to vindicate the public duty to protect the endowment. Consequently, the court concluded the twelve-year limitation did not bar his claim.
  4. Accounts and mesne profits: The appellate court reasoned that, because the alienation was illegal and the endowment was perpetual, and because the purchase-money had not been shown to have been applied for the benefit of the Khankah, the plaintiff (as Mutwaly) was not obliged to account for or to return the purchase-money. The Sudder Dewanny Adawlut therefore decreed in favour of the plaintiff and directed costs to be borne respectively.
  5. Standard of review and procedural observations: The judicial chronology shows different provincial judges reached different conclusions on questions of fact and limitation. The appellate court examined prior native-law opinions and previous similar decisions; where the provincial court had earlier treated the matter as a mortgage and ordered accounts, later provincial rulings treated the sale as bona fide—these conflicting provincial rulings were considered by the Sudder Dewanny Adawlut which ultimately resolved the legal principles in favour of the plaintiff. Their Lordships (the final court in the text) considered and affirmed that reasoning.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: Their Lordships affirmed the judgment of the Sudder Dewanny Adawlut: the royal grants in question constituted Wukf (religious/charitable endowment), the alienations by Shah Shumsh-ood-deen were illegal and void insofar as they attempted to alienate Wukf property, and the respondent (appointed Mutwaly in 1819) was competent to sue; the claim was not barred by lapse of twelve years.

Implications:

  • The direct effect is that the respondent (as Mutwaly/procurator and Sijjada-nashin appointed by Government) is entitled to recover the mouzahs and enforce the trust; the appellant cannot rely on the alleged absolute conveyance or the lapse of time to retain the property.
  • The court relied on the principle that the absence of the literal term "Wukf" in a grant does not preclude a Wukf being constituted if the tenor of the instrument demonstrates an appropriation for pious/charitable purposes; prior native-law decisions and texts were applied to reach this conclusion.
  • The decision confirms that where an endowment is public/perpetual and the Government (or its appointed manager) is the appropriate protector of the trust, limitations predicated on ordinary proprietary possession may not bar recovery where there was no competent suitor during the period of minority or absence of appointment.
  • No new general precedent beyond the application of established Mahomedan law principles and prior Sudder Dewanny Adawlut decisions was announced; the decision affirms and applies authorities and regulations (including the Hedaya, Macnaghten, and the Bengal Regulations cited in the opinion) to the facts of this case.

Note: This summary is confined strictly to the facts, arguments, authorities and reasoning expressly contained in the provided opinion text.

    Jewun Doss Sahoo v. Shah Kubeer-Ood-Deen (India)

    until all tlie Cseditors were on an equal foot~ng% It is only a d ~ f f e ~ e n t ~ua l i~ca t io i i

    or ~ o d i f i c a ~ i o ~ ~ of the specific relief prayed.

    We are of opinion, therefore, that as the Plaintiffs had an equity to obtain son^

    relief under the Bill, the demurrer ought not to have been allowed, and the Order

    of the Court below must be reversed.

    [Mews’ Big. tit, ~ ~ ~ ~ R U ~ ~ C ~ , h 111. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ N ~ R ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ R ~ P E R ~ Y ,28” EL. iv., VIII. hi-

    DENDS, 1 ; tit. EXECUTOR AND ADMINlSTBATOR, X. ADMINISTRATION, d. ; tit..

    PAYMXNT, A, I. ; tit. PRACTICE, X W , PLEADING, b. S.C. 3 Moo. P.C. 98 ; 1

    Mont. I?. and D. 45; hllorton, 407. See Indian Insolvent Act,, 1848 (11 and 12

    Vi& c. 2I>, s. 7; Ex parte Bogem, 1881, 16 Ch. D. 665; c ~ ~ e , ~ e ~ v. ~ ~ o ~ o ? ~ ~ ~ ~

    ~ e ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ r ~ of Augos { ~ ~ 9 1 ) , k.C. 460; Coohe v, ~~~ r~~~ A . Togeler Co. { ~ 9 Q ~ ~ ,

    A.G. 102 j Dicey, Cloi@. of Lnu~s, 334, -736 ; Westlake, Priv. lm8. ZLZZV, 3rd Ed.

    253, 156, 157.1

    ~~~~~ DOSS S ~ ~ ~ ~ , - ~ ~ ~ e ~ ~ ~ ~ t ~ S ~ A ~ g U B E E I t - 0 0 D - D E E N , - ~ ~ ~ ~ o ~ ~ ~ e ~ z ~ *

    [Dec. 8, 9, 18405.

    On ~~~e~~ fvoom the , ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ e ~ I k E m q a y A ~ ~ w ~ u t &a ~ e q ~ ~ a ~ .

    The term *‘ Altarnyka ” or (‘ - ~ ~ ~ a n ~ ~ l ~ ~ - ~ ~ a ~ ~ 7 in a royal grant, does not, of ibselt’,

    convey an absolute p r o p r ~ e ~ a s y right to the Grantee ; n-here, from the general

    tenor of the grant, it is to be inferred, that a Wukf, or endowment to religious

    and c~~ar i tab le uses, was inte~~ded, and property so endowed cannot be alien-

    ated by the Grantee or his r e ~ ~ e s e n t a t ~ ~ e s t2 &loo. Ind. App. 4201.

    According to the Mahomedan Law, it is not necessary, in order to constitute iz

    ~ ~ u ~ ~ f , os e ~ i d o ~ m e n t to r e l ~ ~ ~ o u s and eharitable uses, that the term Wukf ”

    be used in the grant; if, from the general nature of the grant, such tenure

    can be inferred [ a Moo. Ind. App. 4217.

    An ~ n d o ~ m e n t for charitable and public purposes being a perpetual ~ ~ d o ~ v ~ n e n ~ ,

    i t is, by Ben. Reg XIX. of 1810, the duty of the Govern~ent o preserve its

    appl i~a t io~i J and being excepted by sec. 2. of Regulation 11. of 1805 from the

    general op~~ ,a t ion f the ~ e ~ u l a t i o ~ i of ~ ~ ~ i t a t ~ o ~ s , no suit for its recovery

    is barred, until at least the officer entitled to administer it has been in posses-

    sion of his office for twelve pears 12 Moo. Ind, App. 422, 4231.

    By a Pirman, or royal grant, of the 14th of March, 1717, in the fifth year of

    ~ ~ a h o m e d Feroksir, one lac @j1j of dams from F e r ~ u n n a h ~ a v i i l y Suhseram, in

    the Sooba Bahar, being equal to about Its. 1197, was granted in Altam~ha, or royal

    free gift, in perpetuity, for the purpose of defraying the expenses of the Khankah,

    a religious e s t a b ~ i s h ~ e n t of Sheikh Kubeex., Dervish, to descend to his heirs i r t

    success~on.

    In pursuance of this grant, Sheikh Kubeer received the revenue during his life,

    a p p ~ ~ ~ n g it for the purpose of meeting the charges of Travellers frequ&~~ting the

    ~ h a x ~ k a ~ i , of which he was the Si~jada-nash~n, or Superior. Upon his death he was

    succeeded in his office by his Son, Sheikh ~ h u ~ l e e i ~ o l l a .

    y a Sunnud from Nawab ~ u k h e r - o o d ~ d ~ n Bahadoor, on the 16th Sheban, and

    the f o u r t e e ~ ~ l ~ year of the reign of ~ahorned Shah Badshah (21st January, 1733),

    certain Mouzahs or villages in the Pergunnah Suhseram, in the Sircar or division

    RowtaI, Sooba Bnhar, with some Tutera aud Khankah lands, were a ~ p s o p r i ~ t e d for

    the purpose of meeting the expenses of Travellers, and of Sheikh ~ ~ u i l c e l ~ o l ~ a ~

    and freed from the Gover~ment charges and ~evenues. Upon the death of Sheikh

    ~ l ~ ~ ~ l e e l - o o ~ ~ ~ , ie wa8 succeeded, as S i j j a d a - ~ ~ ~ ~ l ~ ~ n , by Gholarn ~ ~ u r f - o ~ d - d e e ~ , h i s

    Son, who, on the 6th of July, 1744, obtained a royal Sunnud, and on the 4th of

    * Present : ~ e ~ b e r s of the ~~~~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ e , - ~ o r d ~ r o u ~ ~ a ~ , hlr. justice

    B o s a ~ ~ u e t , hlr. Justice Erskine, and the Right on our able Dr. bushing to^.

    Privy Councillor,--Assessur,--Xi r Edward Ryde East, Bart..

    -- ~ - -“x - - I -- ___- - ___ I_ - 111 __ ~ __

    348

    ’U. SHAH KUBEER-OOD-~EE~ [I8401 11 MOORE IND. APP., 392

    December in the same year a royal Perwaniiah, confirining him in the dams

    originally granted to his paternal Grandfather, Sheikh Kubeer.

    Shah Kaim-ood-deen succeeded his Father, Gliolam Shurf-ood-deen as Sijj ads-

    nashin, and obtained a like Pe r~ ,a r i i~a~ i to those granted to his Father and Grand-

    father, and by a Firman of Shah Alum, dated the 13th of October, 1762, a further

    grant of 2,81,000 dams from the Pergunnali Suhseram was made to hini in Altamglia-

    [392]-enam, for the purpose of defraying the expenses of the frequenters to arid

    from him, and all ranks were enjoined “ always to maintain aiid uphold the august

    order, and to relinquish the aforesaid dams to them to descend t u the offspring in

    succession, to be enjoyed by them,” free from all Government and revenue charges.

    On the 10th of January, 1764, Mahomed Jafir Khan augmented the revenues of

    the Khankah by rhe grant of certain Ayeema (charitable grants made by the Sovereign

    to religious ~ a ~ o ~ ~ i e d a r i ~ ) Decliauts, consist in^ of fourteen Mouzahs in thc s a ~ c

    Pergunnah; arid he executed a Sunnud for that purpose.

    Shah Kiani-ood-deen was succeeded as Sijjada-iiashin of the Khaiikah by l l i h

    Son, Shah Shumsh-ood-deen, who, on the 2’7th of January, 1807, soine tiriie after

    he had been in possession, entered into a contract with the Appellant, Jewu~i Doss

    Sahoo, for the loan of Rs. 23,501, and, as security for the repayment thereof, traris-

    ferred sixteen Xouaahs, comprised in and consti tutin~ part of the a b o ~ ~ ~ i n e ~ ~ t i o I i ~ d

    grants. AR tlie Revenue authorities did riot register mortgages or conditional con-

    veyances, Shah Shumsh-ood-deen a t the same time executed an absolute Bill of sale,

    conveying the Mouzahs to the Appellant, and the Appellant, as is usual in such

    transactions, executed a Meadi Ikrarnamah, or defeazance ; which provided, that if

    Shah Shurnsh-ood-deen repaid the sum advanced on or before a particular day, tlie

    sale should be void, but if he did not repay that sum within the stipulated period,

    tlien the Mouaahs should become the absolute property Qf the Appellaiit. Shortly

    after the execution of these instru~ients, the Appellant entered into possession

    of the Mouzahs.

    The loan was not repaid within the stipulated period ; but in consequence of the

    Appellant not having taken the course provided for by Ben. Reg. SVII. of 7806,

    the Mouzahs still remained in the possession of the Appellant, according to the terms

    of the conveyance above referred to, subject to the right of redeirtption by Shall

    S h u ~ s h ~ o d - d e e n , the Mortga~or.

    On the 13th of Magh, 1217, Fusly (2nd February, 1810, A.u.), Shah Shuiuslt-ood-

    deen, in consideration of i~ further sun? of Rs. 5000, executed aiiother Ilirai uaaiah,

    conveying the Mouzahs to the Appellant absolutely.

    On the 3rd of February, 1810, the day after the execution of the above Ikrar-

    namah, Shah Shnmsh-ood-deeu died, leaving Mussuniat Kadira, his Widovi., and

    Shah Kubeer-ood-deen, the present Respondent, his Son, an infant of the age of

    twelve years, hereditary successor to the Sij jada-nashin.

    Shah Shun~sh-ood-deen attained the age of eighteen in the year 1816, nisen he

    preferred a petition to Mr. John Deane, the, Co~missioner of Batiar and Benares,

    asserting his right atid title to the whole of the lands above stated. Mr. Dean

    directed inquiries to be made by the local Agents, who, on the 10th of December,

    1818, reported in his favour, and thereupon orders were issued by the Governor-

    General in Council, on the 29th of February, 1819, and the 8th of Septeniber, 1522,

    that the ~ ~ ~ p o n d e n t ! Shah Shunish-ood-de~~i, should recover possession of the pro-

    perty by assistance of the Officers of the ~ ~ ~ ~ e r i i ~ ~ i ~ ~ ~ t .

    In consequence of these proceedings, the Respondent commenced two suits in the

    Provincial Court of Patna 13941 for the recovery of tlie villages which had beeu

    alienated from the Khankah. Some of these villages being in the postwsaion of one

    Mussumat Kadira, or Beeby Isniut, a suit was instituted against her ; and for the

    recovery of the Mouzahs taken possession of by Jewun Doss Snhoo, under the circum-

    stances above stated, a wit was brought against him on the 17th of April, 1822, 111

    tlie plaint filed in this latter suit, the Plaintiff set forth his title as already detailed,

    and insisted that the Mouzahs in question were Wukf (in Mahon~eda~t law, a bequest

    for pious uses) propaty, of which, neither a conditional nor bona fide sale could be

    made : he insisted also that the sale was in itself illegal, not being perfected according

    to Ben, ReguIation SVII. of 1806; and he prayed to be put in possession of tht.

    annual produce, being Rs. 3678. 10+, the eighteen-fold of qhich was Rs. 66,179. 3a.

    349

    11 BOORE INL). APP.* 596 dEWUN DOSS SAHOO

    On the 28th of June, 1822, and before any answer had been put in by the

    ~ ) e f e ~ ~ d a n t in this suit, the P r ~ v ~ n c ~ a l Court of Patna made a decree in the other

    su i t against Itfussurnat Kadira, or Beeby Ismut, whereby they declared, that it

    a p ~ ~ e a r e d from the d o c u ~ ~ e n ~ , a ~ ~ o n g which were the two royal ~ i r m a n s above stated

    and the evidence and opinions of the ~ a ~ f - o ~ c e r s of the Sudder Dewaany Adawlut

    in a cause therein referred to, that lands, which were Wukf, could i lot be alienated

    to any other persoit by sale or gift, nor could they be inherited as heritable property,

    or mortgaged o r sold condit~onally, The Court went on to declare, that i t was not

    in thc power of any of the former Sijjada-nashins to alienate the Altamgha and

    other darns, or the Dehauts, in favour of any one, or to sell or otherwise dispose of

    the property; a decree was, E3953 therefore, passed in that suit in favour of the

    P ~ ~ i I ~ t i ~ , the present Respoiide~t, from which decree ~ u s s u ~ a t Kadira afterwards

    appealed to the Sudder Dewanny Adawlut; but the decree was, on the 24th of

    hugu&, 1824, a f f i r~~~ed by the Sudder De~anI iy Adawlu~.

    On the 9th of Narch, 1824, the present Appellant put in his answer, ilrsisting

    upon the legality of the sale to him, that it was a hoim fide sale, and not within Ben.

    Regulation XVXI., 1806, and that, had riot the Dehauts been alienable, the Collector

    would not have entered the name of the ~ e f e n d a n t in the public Books, and he also

    set up the lapse of time as a bar to the Plaintiff‘s claim. We contended moreoves,

    that the conditioi~a~ sale had become absolute, and that a further advance of Rs,

    5000, having been made, a new con~eyance was executed to the. A ~ ~ p e l ~ a n t , aiid the

    power of redeini~tion ext~nguished, and insisted that the property in question was

    legally saleable.

    In his replication the Respondent relied upon his minority, to prevent the lapse

    of time from barring the claim.

    The suit between the parties to the present appeal being at issue, evidence wag

    produced by the Respondent c o n s i $ t ~ ~ g of the several documents already stated,

    ~ o r ~ i r ~ g aud cstabl~sli in~ his title, and proving thc nature of the Uehauts or villages

    in question, and the objects for which they were granted ; the different Perwannahs

    and ~uni luds c o n ~ r m i n ~ the ~espoi~dent’s ance~tors in the possess~on ; two opinions

    of the Lawofficers upon the tenure of the lands, showing, that by the ~ a h o m e d a n law

    the sale or rnortgage of TjVukf lands was illegal, and that the Iands in quest~on were

    of that description. The Defendant also produced documentary evidence, consist-

    ing of the instruments [39#j] by which the c o n d ~ t ~ o i ~ a ~ sale in 1809 was effected,

    and the document which he purported to be the absolute conveyance and sale relied

    upou.

    0x1 the 29th of December, 1825, the cause came 011 for hearing before Mr. Flerniirg,

    the Third Judge of the Provincial Court of Patna, when the following judgment

    was given :---“ That the ~ e f e ~ ~ d a i i t (present appellant^ admits, that the disputed

    ~ e h a u t s were sold to him coxid~t~onal~y, and yet he did not fulfil the condi~~ons of

    Ben. Regulation XVII., 1806, to render the transactions a 60% fide sale: and as to

    the second ~ ~ r a r i ~ a r n a ~ i , executed by Shah S h ~ s ~ - o o d - d e e n , the date of the execution

    of which is one day only before the death of the said Shah, which fact the Defendant

    does not deny, is invalid; in add i t~o r~ to which, accoi.ding to the decision pro-

    nounced by the Sudder Dewanny Adawlut, a conveyance like this is not legal, Upon

    a c o ~ ~ s ~ d e r a t ~ o n , therefore, of all the c ~ r c u ~ s t a n c e s attendant on this transact~on~

    the coIiditiona1 sale stands in the character of a mortgage ; it, therefore, becomes

    ~ ~ c c e s s a ~ y to take up an account of the produce of the said ~ e h a u t s , and the principal

    and interest that is receivable by the Defendant;” for which reason it was ordered,

    that the Uefendai~t should, within fifteen days, file the Wasilat {acco~~~i t s showing

    the mesne profits) papers from the Fusly years 1814 to 1832, agreeably to the intent

    and meaning of Regulation XV. of 1793.

    The Appellant, Jewun Doss Sahoo, dissatis~ed with this decision, presented a

    ~ e t ~ t i o ~ ~ to the r o v ~ n c i a l Court, praying that witnesses might be exam~~led touching

    the execution of the second ~krarK~amah. which the Court had in its decree held t a

    be illegal; but this a p p l i c a t ~ o ~ ~ was refused, as the ground on [s7] which the

    Ikrarnarna~ had been deemed invalid had been recorded in the previous proceedings

    of the Court.

    The Appellants took no steps to bring these decrees under appeal; but the

    ~ub$e(~ue~ i t proceedings in the Provincial Court, up to the decree of Mr. Steer, of

    330

    'U. SHAH KUBEEB-OOD-DEEN [1840] If XOORE ZND. APP., 398

    the 25th of June, 1827, related to the ~nquiries into the annual value of the pro-

    perty. The Appellant filed certain revenue papers called Junmia-bundi and J~mma-

    khureh, to show the collectioris received by him whilst he w a s in possession ; and

    these papers were referred to the Provincial Court of Benares (where the Defendant

    resided), in order that they might take the Defendant's acknowledg~e~~t of their

    genuineness arid accuracy. In pursuance of this reference, the Provincial Court

    of Beriares s u ~ ~ ~ o n e d th Appellant, who, after procuring a delay of fifteen days,

    put in a petition, wherein he again insisted on the ~enuineness and legality of the

    Ikrarnamah, but did not produce any evidence in support of the Jumma-bundi and

    Jumma-khurch papers, though he swore to the entries therein being just and true.

    On the 19th of September, 1826, the cause came on again before the Provincial

    Court of Patna, when an Order was made to suspend the proceedings for one week,

    to allow the Plaintiff to produce evidence to falsify the Jumma-bundi.

    During the prosecution of this cause in the Provincial Court, the Resporide~~t had

    also been prosecuti~~g against Sultana and Ru~~eex~-ood-a~e i~ nd otlters, a cauw

    (No, 803) in the same Court, relating to the Talook Ahunpore, which contained sonw

    of the Ilfouzahs originalIy granted for the expenses of the Khankah, and which were

    claimed by the ~ e f e n d a I ~ t s [398] in that suit, under an alleged sale by the P l a i n t i ~ ' ~

    father.

    That cause (No. 803) came on to be heard before William Steer, Esq., the fourth

    Judge of the Provincial Court, on the 25th of June, 1827, when, deeming the ease

    to be of the same nature as the present appeal, he proceeded to take both suitq inro .

    consideration, and after stating the various documents already set forth, pronounced

    the following judgment :-'' That i f the conditional sale writing had stood, in thrit

    case a bonac fide sale could not have been effected without acting up to the provisions

    of l~egulatio~i XVTI., 1806; but as the conditiond sale did not stand, but Shalt

    dhumsh-ood-deen having talren a further sum of Rs. 5000, returned to the Defendant

    the I k r a r ~ a ~ i a l i which this individual had executed, purporting to be a conditional

    sale, and eveu executed in the D ~ ~ e n d a ~ t ' s favour, another statement upon tthc

    subject thereof, which transaction made the affair terminate in a bo92a- fide sale, arid

    that, circunistan~e took place more than fifteen yeitrs, reckoning to the period thc

    suit was brought,-ju~t~ee IION demands, that after the lapse of so long a tirrte, the

    De~endant shall not be deprived of the full and &cvtaa f ide d e , and be dispossessed.

    A s to tlie Plea of the Plaintiff adduced a t this time, after the period of limitation has

    gom by, that the Ikrarnamah dated the 13th of Magh, 1217, F.S. (2nd of Pebruar)-,

    lSlO), was written only one day before the demise of Shah Shumsh-ood-~eei~, Itecauw

    of the return of the Ikrarnamah executed by the Defendant under date the Srd of

    the month of Magh, 1214, F.S. (27th of February, 1807), that cannot be admitted bp

    the Court. Had the assertion been founded on fact, it is certain that tlie objectioii

    would have been made a t about the ter-[399]-~~inat~on f the period of I i i ~ ~ i ~ a ~ i o I i ,

    or before that time. There can be no doubt, besides, that in the manner the Delrauts

    and lands that were litigated in cause 803 have been sold, the Dehauts litigated i i I

    the present suit have been sold, in tlie character of a born fide saIe after the period

    of the conditional sale expired, and the grounds on which those lands were deemed

    not to be a Wukf endowment have been recorded in the proceedings holden in t h ~ i

    caxise. For the above reason it is ordered, thnt the Z'Iaintiff's cIaim is d ~ ~ ~ r ~ ~ s s e a ,

    and he is rendered liable to pay the whole of the costs of suit."

    The Respondent appealed from this decision to the Sudder Dewanny Adawlut.

    and filed his petition on the 23rd of September, 1829.

    The Appellant, Jevviln Doss Sahoo, after objecting tu the security of the R t ~ -

    spondent, which was overruled, put in his answer to the appeal on the 30th ~ i '

    December, 1829.

    On the 18th of February, 1830, the cause, after some preliminary proceedings,

    came on for judgment before the Sudder Dewanny Adawlut, when the Court ordered

    and declared that the claim and appeal of the Appellant (the present R e s p o ~ ~ d c ~ ~ ~ ~

    should be decreed to him, and the dtqision of the Patna Provincial Court reversed ;

    that the Appellant (the present R ~ p o n d e n t ~ , without being subject to the paymerit of

    the ~ure l iase-n~one~, should be put in possession of the Mahal in dispute, and that

    rlxe costs of both parties should be defrayed respectively by each.

    From this decree the present Appellant appealed to His late Majesty in Council.

    35 1

    I1 MOORE IND. APP., 400 JEWUN DOSS SAIIOO

    Mr. Miller. Q.C., Mr. Wigram, Q.C., and Mr. Jackson, for the A p p e l l a i ~ t s . ~ ~ ~ ]

    This is a question of considerabIe importance, involving one of the most difficult

    points of Ma~ion~edan law: it i s the first of this nature that has been appealed to

    England. It resolves itself into three heads ; frst , whether the property which was

    purchased by the Appellant from the ltespondent’s Father vas of that description

    called .* Wukf,” which is altogether ina l~~nable , inasmuch as it is giren to an insti-

    tutian of a religious nature for charitable purposes ; secondly, assuming it to have

    been of thxit nature, whether the Respondent wtis competent to institute a wit for tlie

    recovery of the lands so alienated ; and, lastly, whether the Respondent was not

    pecluded and ltarred by the Appellatrt having held possession under a f:iir title, he

    being it purchaser for a. valuable CoI~siderat~cii~ without notice, for twelve years

    Iwfore the commencenient of tlie suit.

    I. It i s necessary, in order to arrive at a true conclusion of the tenure of ?his

    property, to look at the language of the Firmaxis and Sunnuds, by virtue of which

    the lands are held. The vords of the first grant by Mahonied Feroksir, dated the

    14th of March, 1717, are, “ that one lac of dams from Pergunnah Havilly Suhseram

    in Sooba Bahar are endowed and bestowed for the purpose of defraying the eipensas

    of the Kliankah of Sheikh Kubeer, Dervish,” as an Altamgha grant, for ’‘ him to

    manage and control, and to descend to his heirs in succession from remove to re-

    more.” Sow, it is clear that the expression contained in this grant, ‘‘ for the purpose

    of defrayiirg tlrc expenses of the Kliankah,” etc., is altogetlier destroyed by the

    limitation to the heirs : the grant is to Sheikh Iiubeer, in the same way of limitation

    from remove to remove. It seems strange that lands limited to heirs should have

    been treated by the Courts below 8s [401] lands necessarily given for charitable

    purposes. The second grant of the third year of Shah Alum is in term nearly similar,

    ?)eing granted as an “ Altamgha-enani t o Sheikh Kiam-ood-deen,” “ to descend to the

    offspring in succession to be enjoyed by them.’’ I t is apparent, therefore, that none

    of thew grants establish tlie fact that the property in dispute is Wukf: on the

    tbe very instruments themselves show that they were granted to difierent

    as an Altamgha-enam,” which i s a royal grant, perpetual and hereditary,

    ‘. to deocend to his (the Grantee’s) heirs in success~on~~-terms which clearly coiivey

    The term “ Wukf ” does not once occur iu the grams ; which,

    moreaver, coiitain iio declnratioii of trust whatever. The Court below has treated

    tliis iu a way quite inconsistent with the notion of its being a trust: the dwtriiie

    of a Court, of Equity is this-that if you want to fir a trust upon a property, you

    iuust s h o ~ that the object is certain, and that it i s given in such a way that the

    person to whoin it is given upon trust shall not have power to dispose of it for his own

    benefit. In the grant of the third year of Shah Aluni, it is said to be for the purpose

    of defraying the expenses of the frequenters to and froni him, the Grantee. Now,

    this expression is perfectly appropriate in a grant to a Dervish for his personal

    benefit, withouc implying a perpetual foundation for eleemosynary uses : indeed, the

    x-ords are mere co~imonplace terms, and, in the absence of any other expression, not

    sufficient to render the donation a Wukf endowment. No proof witatever hws been

    adduced, that the property in question was Wukf property.

    11. Xov, ~ d i ~ i i t ~ i n g this to have been ITukf, or [402] endowed property, and to

    have been in~lie€~able, still there is a fatal objection to the R~pondent’s claim; it

    never call be said, that if property is iiuproperly alienated, the party to urldo tlie

    t r a ~ ~ s a c ~ i o n s the person who conveyed it, or even those claim in^ under hiin, still

    more so when the Appellant insists, that he is a purchaser for ~t valuable considera-

    tion without notice. The Respondent had no right to sue at all, for if this property

    was granted for uliaritable purposes, and really is of the nature of Wukf, the Govern-

    ment, whose duty it is to provide that the endowments for pious and charitable

    purposes be applied according to their real inteIitions, done can SUB for the recovery

    of the hfouzahs.

    111. The claim of the Respondex~t is barred by section xiv. Regulation 1x1. of

    1193, and clauses first and third, section ili. of Regula~ion 11. of 1805 j ~ n a s ~ l i ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ its

    the property in dispute has been held under B f a i r title within the meaning of t]lose

    Regulations for upwards of twelve years before the institutioil of the suit, Tilese

    Regulations are analogous to our Statute of ~ i in i~a t ions , and by sectiori ii. of Regula-

    tion II. of 1805, it i s perfectly clear that twelve years is an absolute bar to everyttoclr

    352

    p r o ~ ~ i e ~ ~ r ~ right.

    0. SHAH K U ~ ~ E R - O ~ ~ - D ~ E ~ [1840] 11 BOORE IND. APP., Qo

    except the Government, who niay claim for sixty years. As there was no authority

    from the Government for the Respondent to sue for recovery of the Mouzalis, and

    the property was held, and possession had, by the Appellant for upwards of t%7elru

    pears before the comme~~ement of the suit, his claim is barred and concluded by thtk

    ~egulat ions of Limitation.

    Mr. Sergeant Spankie, Mr. E. J. Lloyd, and Mr. Edniund E‘. Moore, for the Be

    spondent.-The first question raised by the Appellants is, whe-[403]-thcr thib pro-

    perty is Wukf : that must be governed by the principles applying to grants of thi\

    nature provided for by the Mahairiedaii law.

    I. In reading the grant by Mahomed Feroksir of the 14th of March, 171’7, no orit’

    for 14 moment can doubt but that the land was given for religious purposes : the

    words are, ‘. A dignified and imperative Firnian has been issued, that one lac of

    danis from Pergunnah Havilly Su~iserani n Sooba Bahar, which yields the sum of

    hot it Re. 1 L79 to the Royal Treasury, are endowed and bestowed for the purpose of

    defraying the expenses of the Khankah of Sheikh Kutteer, as an Altmigha grant ‘‘

    The e~precs\ionc in the second grant are niush stronger, and s h o ~ that the royal

    Donor and Founder, who was a Mahoiuedan, intended it for religious purposes : it

    states that N certain sun1 is to *‘be fixed as ait A l t an~gha-ena~~ to the x a ? ~ c t i ~ u ~

    Sheikh Kiam-ood-de~n for the purpose of defraying the expenses of the frequenters

    to and from him, exempting the lands from the present assessment.” The words.

    “ t o descend to the offspring in succession, to be enjoyed by them,” does not corivey

    a proprietary right, for it clearly is a mere trust, I‘ for the purpose of defraying

    the expenses of the Khankah,” which specifies the object and purposes for which it

    va. granted to the offspring in succession as the mode in which it was to he held,

    as the establishment could not take care of itself. It is a grant for the Khaukali,

    and the frequenters of it ; a distinct ~ippropriat~on to religious and charitable

    purposes. very comnion in India, to the ~ i ~ e ~ ~ o r y of some eminently religious or holy

    person. Here an actual trust is created : the grant i s to Sheik Riam-ood-deen 8%

    Sij jada-nashin, the Superior of the endowed establishment, a corporation sole, in the

    nature [404] of a Trustee ; he has no right to apply a portion to his own use; he is a

    sorporation sole to carry on the estab1ishnrent : he is not the person to be benefited,

    he is only to give to i t the effect which the Founder intended, he is only entitled to

    i~articipate in its benefit &s Sij j~da -nas~~ i i i .

    The objection next raised by the Appellants, namely, that the specification Wukf

    is not to be found in the grants, is of an extremely strict and refined nature. I11

    Macnaghten’s Principles of Mahornedan Law, Wukf is defined to be endowment, that

    is, appropriation of certain property to religious or useful, or what we should call,

    generally, charitable purposes (Macnaghten, Mah. Law, pp. 69, 329, 338) : if land,

    as in this case, is the subject-matter, the profits are dedicated to religious objects.

    The Hediiya (Neduya, vol. ii., pp. 334 arid 344, translated by Hamilton ; see also Col.

    Galloway on the Law and C o n ~ t i t ~ ~ i o ~ ~ of India, p. 75), a Book of authority on tire

    ~ a ~ i o m e d a ~ t l w, treats largely upon Rukf , or appropriation, as i t i x there termed.

    which is declared, ‘‘ in the language of the law, to signify the appropriati6n of a

    particular article in such a manner as subjects it to the rules of divine property.

    rrhenue the Appropriator’s right in i t is extinguished, and it beconies a proi)ertp of

    God by the advantage of it resulting to his creatures.” But it is unnecessar~ to

    pursue thib argument further, as the case of Mussumnt ~ ~ a ~ i ~ ~ , alias ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ? ~ l ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

    l‘smat, v. Sftak ~ u b ~ ~ r - o o ~ ~ e ~ ~ ~ (3 Ben. Sud. Dew. Ad. Rep. 407), has already de-

    cided that this very property now under dispute was Wukf, or property appropri-

    ated to religious purposes ; that by the use of the word “ Enani ” in a royal grant,

    it did not necessarily follow that the property specified was [405] conveyed in

    absolute proprietary right, if froin the general tenor of the instrurnellt i t could be

    inferred, that a Wukf, or religious endowment, was intended, lid0 Ali fioospL21

    r. syf Ali (2 Beii. Sud. Dew. Ad. Rep. 110) was to the same effect. These Gaseh

    dispose of the whole qumtion ; they a re most distinct autliorities that the word ivukf,

    in a grant, is not necessary in order to constitute a religious appropriation for

    charitable purposes, provided the nature of the tenure i s to be inferred from tile

    iiature of the grant. The same principles preraiI in the Hindoo law, $jhowanpr

    f+mAad Chowdvee v. Ranee d2(&7L~106?iCC (4 Ben. Sud. Dew. Ad. Rep. 343 ; and see

    2 W. H. M ~ e n a ~ h t e n 7 s Hindoo Law, 305; 1 Strange’s Hindoo Law, 151 [2nd E&].

    P.C. VII. 353 12

    I1 MOORE IND. APP., 496 JEWUN DOSS SAHOO

    This, then, being the law a p ~ ~ ~ i c a b ~ e to this species of tenure, it follow that the

    Ikrarnan~ah, or deed of conveyarIce, whether conditional by way of xl?ortgage, or

    absolute by sale, by Shah S h u m s ~ - o ~ - d e e n was iflegal, and conse~uently void.

    11. The point raised, that the A~)peliant's Father was a purchaser for ~~a luab le

    ~ot~sideration without notice of the trust, is untenable, and cannot be insisted upon

    here, inasmuch as it was never raised in the pleadings in the Courts beloF. The

    Sppellant's Father had every opp~r tuni ty of investigating the title of the lands,

    alld seeing the nature of the grants creating the trusts ; if we can succeed in slmwing

    that this property is Wukf, or property devoted to charitable use, and irllpressed

    with a charitable trust ; if the Appellant purchased without notice of the trusts,

    even suppoeixig he gave a valuable consideration for the abject of Ihe purchase, he

    could only take it subject to the trusts, and would himself become a Trustee.

    111. The remaining question is the limitation, which [e061 is also untenable ; for

    i t is obvious that this property, being Wukf, comes within the exceptions contained

    ill Regulation KI. of 1805. It i s i ~ i ~ ~ ? o r t a ~ ~ t to consider the character of the %-

    spondent, which nzakes, as to him, the question of time immaterial. The R e s ~ o n d e n ~

    was not proprietor of the Mouzahs, his appoint~iient of ~ ~ u t ~ ~ a ~ y or Trustee of the

    ~ h a n k a h by ~ctvernment was not till the year 1819, when he alone hca ine com-

    petent to sue for the recovery of these litnda ; therefore, the ordinary linlitation of

    twelve years does nctt apply, as there was no one before that time conipetent to fulfil

    the trusts. It is clearly laid down, with reference to English suits, that i f there

    is no party competent to entertain a suit, no time will run. Mulrrczy v. The East

    indin Campamy (5 B. and Ald. 204). Xothirig appears in the proceedings to

    negative the presumption that the Respondent, the Plaintiff below, was d d y

    authorized to institute the suit on his appointment as Mutwaly ; and being so author-

    ized, he was competent to institute the proceedings in his own name as Mutwalp, or

    procurator of the Donor. Ben. Regulation XIX. of 1810, sec. 15.

    Mr. Justice Bosanyuet (Feb. 15, 1841).--TLe Respondent in this cme, on the

    17th of September, 1822, commenced a suit against the Appellant by plaint in the

    Provincial Court of Patna, to recover certain villages, alleged to have been inalien-

    ably appropr~ated 'by royal grant to the support of a Khankah or religious House,

    of which the Plaintiff was the Superior or S~j~ada"nashin.

    These villages, on the 27th of January, 1807, were transferred to the Defendant

    by Shah Shumsh-ood-deen, the Plaintiff's Father, then the Sij jada-nashin, E4073 as a

    security for the repayment of a loan of Rs. 23,501, which transfer was absolute in

    form, but of which a defeazance (Meadi-ikrarnamah) was executed on the same day

    by the Defendant, and provided, that if the sum advanced should he repaid on or

    before May, 1809, the sale should be void ; if not, that the villages should become the

    absolute property of the Defendant. On the 2nd of February, 1810, Shah Shurnsh-

    ood-deen, in consideration of a further sum of Rs. 5000, executed another instru-

    ment, called an Ikrarnamah, purporting to eoiivey the villages to the Defendant

    absol~~tely~ and on the 5th of the same month Shah Shumsh-ood-deen died.

    On the part of the Plaintiff i t was contended, that the property in question

    being granted for the i~iaintena~ice of a religious establishi~en~, was to be con-

    sidered as Wukf or appropi.iated, and, theref~re, ina~ienable ;that if not i n a l ~ e ~ ~ a ~ ) l e ,

    the transfer of 1807 was conditional in the nature of a ~iictrtga~e, which, by the

    Bengal ~egula t ion XVII. of the year 1806, could not be foreclosed o r made absolute

    without taking certain proceedings, which were admitted not to have bm313 taken i n

    this case; that the transfer of 1810, which purported to be absolute, in consideration

    of the payment of Rs. 5000, was fraudulent and void, having been made hy Shah

    Shunish-ood-deen in his last illness, and shortly before his death, and consequently

    that the transfer of 1807, mhi& was originally couditional, had never become

    ahsolute.

    On the part of the Defendant, it was contended, that the property in question was

    not Wukf, but a proprietary interest given by royal authority to the Grantees and

    their heirs as hereditary property, which they were at liberty to dispose of j that

    the transfer of 1807, admitted to be conditional, had, by the sale of E4083 1810,

    become absolute, iiot~iithstanding the omission to take the proceedings prescribed

    hy Regulation XI%. of 1806, such sale of 1810 being bciaa $de; and fu r lha , that

    354

    92. SHAH K U ~ E E ~ - ~ ~ ~ - D E E N [1840J 11 1OOBE INn. APE'., 439

    having been made by Shah Shut~~sli-ood-dcer~, heir of the persons named iu the royal

    grant as Grantees, the right of the Plaintiff to sue for tlie recovery of the villages

    was barred by lapse of time, mare than twelve years having elapsed froin the time of

    the sale in February, 1810, to the commencement of the suit in 1822, for which Ben.

    Regulations, 111. of 1793. and 11. c3f 1805, were relied on.

    The Plaint~ff appears to have been under age at the death of his Fatfter in 1810,

    but in 1819 he was appointed by the Government to be Mutwaly or Manager of the

    establishment, and Sijjada-nashin or Superior thereof, at whicli time it is to be

    presumed that he had attained his majority.

    The villages in question were granted by two royal Firmans, the first by Mahoined

    Feroksir, 14th of aarch, 1717, the second by Shah Alum, 13th of October, 1762.

    The first of these instrunients states, that a Firrnan has been issued, that one lac of

    dams from Pergunnah Havilly Suhseram, in Sooba Bahar, which yields the sum of

    about Rs. 1179 to the Royal Treasury, are endowed and bestowed for the purpose of

    defraying the espenses of the Khaiikah of Sheikh Kubeer, Dervish, as an Altaxugha

    grant, and that i t shall be ~ t a b l i ~ l i e d according to the speci~catio~i made therein.

    The ehifdren of the Sovereign, tShe Ameers, and those who transact the agairs of

    State, s ad the Jaghiredars and their successors, are enjoined to relinquish She said

    dams to the aforenamed individiral for Irim to manage and control, and to descend

    to his heirs in succession from remove to remove, and they are [409] required to

    consider the grant in every respect exempt from all contingencies, and not to demand

    from the said person a fresh Sunnrid annually. Upon this instrument a mernor-

    andurn is endorsed, that one lac of dams have been granted by His Majesty as an

    dltamgha, for the use and expenses of tlre Klianliah of Sheikh Eubeer, Dervish.

    1~ 1744, on the petition of Sheikh Gholam Sliurf-ood-deen, the Grandson of Sheikh

    Kubeer, who had succeeded him as the Sij~ada-nashin, a Perwannah was granted by

    Nahomed Shalt, enjoining the Chowdarries, cultivators, etc., to consider the said one

    lac of dams as an Altanigha-enam, by virtue of the Perwannah of His Majesty, for

    the purpose of heing appropriated to the charges of the Trarellers to and from the

    Rhankah of the said Sheikh Kubeer, as it stood before, to descend to the offspring in

    succession, and to refrain from taking from the said Gholam Shurf-ood-deeh, as wna

    the rule before, the true and fair revenue payable to the State, and the Dewanny

    tares, and enjoining them not to deviate from wliat may he for the beaefit of tlie

    person in qnestion.

    The term expressing the grant, to have been made for the purpose of meeting the

    cliarges of the Khankah and the travellers wlio frequent the Sheikh Kubeer, Dervish,

    are repeated several timeis in the endorsement.

    A similar Perwannah was granted on the petition of Sheikh Kiam-ood-deen, the

    Son of Sheikh Gholam Shurf-ood-deen, after the death of his Father, and it is

    declared that Sheikh Kia~ii-ood-deeI~ is establislied in the Sij j~da-nasliin in the same

    manuer as his Father and Grandfather were.

    The second instrument of the third year of Shah Alum, about the 18th of October.

    1762, is a grant, E4101 nearly siniilar in form, of two Iacs and eighty-one thousand

    darns, the produce of which is Rs. 3000, to be fixed as an Al tam~ha-ena~i~ to the

    sanctified Sheikh Kiam-ood-deen, for the purpose of defraying the expenses of the

    frequenters to and from him, exempting the lands from the present assessmmt, and

    from all that may be realized thereout by liia good management; and the childrexi

    and Viziers, etc., of the Sovereign are enjoined always to maintain and uplmId the

    said order, and .to relinquish the aforesaid dams to them, to descend to the offi;I>ring

    in succession to be enjoyed by them, and deeming this grant free from the con-

    tingency of alteration or change, the public Officers are not to deniand anything

    from them upon the score of revenues or charges, and to consider the grant free of

    all Uewanny taxes, o r for any writings whatever made on account of ttle State.

    Deeming this a full and positive injunction, they are not to demand a fresh Stinrlud

    annually, nor deviate from the80 royal and ~ ~ ~ n i ~ c ~ n t orders.

    Upon this instrument, a memorandum was endorsed that 281,000 dams have been

    granted by His Xajesty in Pergunnah Suhseram, etc., as an Altam~lia-enam ta

    S h e i ~ ~ r Kaini-ood-deen for the charges of the Fakeers.

    The proceedings in another suit coniizicnced bv the Plaintiff on the 6th of April,

    1521, against Mussumat Beeby Isnrut, the Widow of Shah Shumsh-ood-deen. to re-

    3.55

    I1 MOORE IND. APP., 411 JEWUN DOSS SAHOO

    cover from her certain other villages comprised in the same royal grants, and claimed

    as Wukf property, were put in with tlie decree of the Sudder Dewanny Adawlut of

    the 24th of August, 1824, in which proceedings were set forth certain opiniolls of

    native la^ officers respecting the nature of Wukf property taken under the authority

    of t!ie Court.

    [411] The prereiit cause being brought before Mr. Fleming, the Third Judge of the

    Piovinclal Court of Patna, on the 29th o f December, 1825, he determined, that as

    thc disputed villages had been sold conditionally, and the conditions of Regulatioli

    XT-11. of 1806 not fulfilled, the transaction could not be considered a bona fide sale ;

    that the second Ikrarnamah, executed by Shah Sliumsh-ood-deen, the date of which

    (he said) was one day only before the death of the said Shah, which fact, he says, the

    Defendant does not deny, is invalid, in addition to which, according to the decision

    yroiiounced by the Sudder Dewanny AdawIut ( i -e . in the suit against Beeby Isniut), a

    coiiveyance like this is not legal. On consideration, therefore, of all tlie circum-

    stances. tie considered the conditional sale to stand in the character of a riiortgage,

    that it was, therefore, necessary to take an account of the produce of the villages and

    of the principal and interest received by the Defendant, and, therefore, ordered him

    to file the VVasilat papers.

    On the 2nd of February, 1826, the Defendant presented a petition to the Pro-

    vincial Court, that witnesses might be examined in regard to the second Ikrarnamah.

    The cause coming on again before Mr. Fleming on the 19th of September, 1826, he

    determined, that as the grounds on which the Ikrarnamah in question had been

    rendered null and void had been recorded in the proceedings holden on the 29th of

    December, 1825, no further orders could be passed on that head; but on the Plaintiffs

    stating that the accounts of the Defendant were erroneous, it was ordered that the

    proceedings should be suspended : and Mr. Fleming having on the 18th of November,

    1826, exprebsed suspicion respecting the genuineness of the accounts, thought proper

    24121 to give time to the Plaintiff to falsify them, and as he was going the circuit, lie

    directed the cause to be brought on before the Fourth Judge, before whom another

    cause coiinected p1 it21 the present was pending.

    On the 25th of April. 1827, Mr. Steer, the Fourth Judge, ordered that an inquiry

    into the account8 should be made through the Collector of Zillah Shahabad, and a

    return was made by the Collector, the particulars of which i t is not necessary to

    notice.

    On the 26th o f June, 1827, Mr. Steer proiiounced the following judgment :-That

    if the conditional sale writing had stood, in that case a bona fide sale could not have

    been effected without acting up to tlie provisions of Regulation XVIT. of 1806 ; but

    as tlie conditional sale did not stand, by Shah Shumsh-ood-deen having taken a

    further sun1 of Rs. 5000, and returned to the Defendant the Ikrarnamah which this

    individual had executed, which circumstance had taken place more than fifteen years,

    reckoning to the period the suit was brouglit, justice demanded that, after the lapse

    of EO long a time, tlie Defendant should not be deprived of the fuLI and final borro @de

    sale; that after the period of limitation had gone by, the plea that the Ikrarnamah,

    dated the 2nd of February, 1810, was written only one day before the demise of Shah

    Shu~sli-ood~deen, could not be admitted; that the villages had been sold in the

    character of a houn fide sale after the period of a conditional sale expired ; and that

    the grounds on which these lands were deemed not to be a Wukf eudowment had been

    recorded i n tlie proceedings holden iii a cause No. 803. For these reasons he drdered

    that tlie Plaintiffs claim should be dismissed n it11 costs of suit.

    Tire Plitiiitiff having appealed from this judgment [413] to the Sudder Dewanny

    Adawlut, the appeal came on before Mr. Ross, Judge of that Court, on the 30th of

    JanuarF, 1830, who, after stating the conditional and absolute bills of sale to the

    Defendants, tlie death of Shah Shumsh-ood-deen, and that after his death his Widow,

    Musmmat Kadira (Beeby Ismut), held possession of the villages mentioned in tlie two

    Firmans till 1819, together with other property of the deceased as Malikeh or pro-

    prietress ; that in the year 1819, the local Agents knowing the villages mentioned i n

    the two Firmans to be Wukf property, appropriated to religious purposes, appointed

    the Plaintiff to their ~nana~en ien t as Procurator. who instituted a suit against her

    for these villages and others acquired by the profits of them ; and that having proved

    their appropriation, to religious endowment (Wukf), he obtained a decree. which

    decree, as proof of the property being an appropriation (f;5Tukf), was affirmed by the

    366

    ‘U. SHAH K U ~ ~ E R - O ~ ~ - ~ E E N [1840] 11 BOORE END. UP., 424

    Sudder Den-anny Adawlut : and after stating the proceedings instituted in tile

    present suit, he proceeded thus:-As the villages in dispute were of the number

    mentioned in the two Firmans, according to which Firmans, on proof of the villages

    being Wukf (appropriated), the case No. 2910 (Mumumat Eadira, Appellant, against

    Shah S~iums~~-ood-deen, Respondent), was decided by this Court on the 24th of

    August, 1824, hence in this case two points demand colisideration :-

    First, whether Shah Sl~umsh-ood~dee~~, the villages in question being Wukf (ap-

    propriated) property, had or had not the right of alienating such Wukf (appro-

    priated) property, either by Bye-bil-wuff a (conditional sale), by Bye-meady (absolute

    sale), or by any other sort of assignment. As to which he says, “ The Futwa (law

    opinion) of the law officers of this Court 14141 makes this point clear and manifest,

    viz., that a Mutwaly (Procurat,or~) has no right to alienate Wukf (or appropr~ated}

    proper’ty by Bye-bil-wuEa (conditional sale) or by any other kind of transfer.”

    Secondly ; he says, ‘‘ That from the 2316 of February, 1810, the date of the Ikrar-

    namah (agreement Bond) executed by Shah Shunisli-ood-deen, more than twelve

    years liad elapsed ; that ussu sum at Kadira his Widow, as ~ ~ a l i k e h (pro~rietress), held

    possewion of the property that had been seized of the aforesaid Shah, and that Shah

    Kubeer-ood-deen, in the month of April, 1819, had been appointed Mutwaly (Pro-

    curator), agreeably to the orders of the local Agents.”

    Under these c~rcumstari~es, he states ths question to be, whether the suit of the

    Plaintiff is or is not worthy of being entertained by the Court ; and pronounces his

    opinion, that if from the date of the seizin by a person who believed the seller to have

    power to sell, and no usurpation or fraud was imputable to the seller, the right of

    the person seized would be well founded, agreeably to section iii. of Regulation I T . of

    1805, and he states that section xiv. of regulation 111. of 1793 would apply to his

    case; that the absolute sale of the 2nd of February, 1810, was fully proved, and

    neither the Plaintiff nor any one for him, during the twelve years, demanded his

    right, nor did Defendant admit it or promise payment, nor did the Plaintiff advancc

    his claim in auy Court ; that the Plaintiff did not appear to have been prevented by

    minority, having attained the age of majority in 1819, when he was ap~oin ted the

    superintendeI~t of the Wukf property, three years before the conimencement of the

    suit, and that with reference to section. siv. of Regulation 111. of 1193, his claim RBS

    beyond the limit of cognizance. [416] As in this case, hoxever, Government was

    neither P l a i ~ t i ~ , nor had the Appe~lax~t its ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ t i # n for i n s t i t ~ t ~ n g the suit, hence,

    in his judgntcnt, section ii. of the 12egulation IT. of 1805 cannot be applied to this

    case. btill, although the Government was not Plaintiff, yet in consequence of the

    property in question being Wukf, or appropriated property, and the Plaintiff

    appointed Mutwaly (Procurator) by Government, for the management of the Wukf

    (appropriated) property, which i s consecrated for the entertainment of travellers, lie

    thought there was reason to question whetfier the provisions of section ii. ~ e ~ u l a t i o ~ ~

    11. of 1805, could affect such a case or not ; that up to the present period, no cave of

    the kind had ever been tried by the Court, consequently the passing of a final Order

    in this case by one Judge did not appear expedient. It was, therefore, ordered, that

    the papers for a final Order should be laid Lofore the two other Judges of the Court.

    Mr, Turnbull, another Judge of the Sudder 13cnaiinv ddawlut, before xhorn the

    ~ a u s c was brought, having differed in opinion from Mr. Ross, on the 1 ltlt of February,

    1830, ordered the papers to be laid before another Judge. Accordingly it came

    before Mr. Leicester and himself on the 18th of February, 1830, who afler stating

    their opinion, that Mr. Steer had no power to decide the case singly in opposition to

    the opinion of Mr. Fleming, but that he ought either to have postponed the case till

    the return of hIr. Fleming, or if he thouglrt the inquiry by Mr. Fleniing incomplete, to

    have recorded his opinion, and referred the case to the final Order of another Judge ;

    that his decision, founded on the autlienticity of the Ikrarnamah of the 2nd of

    February, 1810, which he p ~ o n o u ~ ~ c e d to be aut~~entic, without evidence, and of the

    verity of which strong E4163 suspicions appeared. was indeed extraordinary : since,

    therefore, the decree of the Provincial Court could not be sanctioned, it became

    Iieiwwtry to inquire into the merits of the Plaintiff’s claim, and with that view to

    consider, first, whether an inquiry in regard to the Ikrarnaniah of the 2nd of

    February, 1810, in order to remove the objection of the Respondent by calling for

    evidence of its authenticity, was or was not necessary. AR to which they say. ‘‘ In

    357

    11 MOORE IND. APR., Ql? JEWUN DOSS SAHOO

    our op~nion, an inquiry in regard to the instrument in ~ u ~ t i o n is either n ~ e s s a r y

    nor b e ~ e ~ c i a l to the cause of the Defendant; for in the ewnt of the ~ n ~ r u ~ e n t in

    question on inquiry proving Tralid and a u t ~ ~ e n t ~ c , yet the sale by the late Shah

    S h u ~ ~ ~ o d - d e e n of the villages ~ e n t i o n e d in tshe ~ns t run~ent in q u ~ t ~ o n is alto-

    gether improper and illegal; for the villages in question are proved to be of the

    number of the Wukf or ~ p p r o p r ~ a t e d villages. In such a case the deceased Shah had

    no power by law to alienate them.” Secondly, whether the claim of the Plaintiff,

    on side ring the lapse of twelve years from the date of the I k r a r n ~ ~ a h , was ~ogn~zab le

    by the Court. On this question their opinion was, “That independentl~ of the

    ~ ~ r c u ~ s t a n c e , that up to the present date the I k r a r n a ~ a h of Bye-bat { a ~ s o ~ u t e sale)

    has not been proved in such wise as to change the aspect of the first or Bye-bil-wuffa

    (cond~tional sale), and that there appears not necessity to take evidence in regard to

    its authentic~ty, in con~ideration of Shah Shumsh-ood”deen having no power to

    alienate the villages in d~spute, yet the ~ k r a r ~ a ~ a l i in question, even if it were

    proved aut.hentic, could not bar the claim of the A ~ p ~ l a n t , because the Appellant was

    itppointed by the local Agent% to tfis offices of tha ~ u t ~ a l y ( ~ r o c u r a t o r ~ and

    Si j j ada-~ias~~in S u p e s i o r ~ of the K h a n ~ a h or m o ~ ~ a ~ ~ r ~ of [437] Sheikh Kubeer,

    Dervish, in 1819.” It i s obvious, therefore, they say, that front the date of h is

    ~ p p o ~ I ~ t ~ e ~ t , only the superi~~tendence of the Wukf ~ a p p r o p r i a t ~ ~ villages apper-

    t a ~ n ~ n ~ to the Rhankah in question, devolved to his care, and previous to that time

    he had 110 coxicern whatever with that matter. In such a case, agreeably to the

    in~entions of section xiv. of ~egu la t ion 111. of 1793, the claim of tho A p p e l ~ a ~ ~ t in

    every x-ay appears worthy of being e~testained by the Court. Thirdly, they say,

    ‘’ AIthouglr, according to usage in cases of Bye-bil-wuffa (conditional sale) it behoves

    that the purchase-money of Bysbil-wuff a should be caused to be paid by the PIaintiff

    to the Defendant, after the latter shall have accounted for the Wasilat (mesne profits)

    of the villages in dispute, yet as the estate in question was 1 , a ~ i r ~ j or rent free, and

    a p r o ~ t a b ~ e one, and has ~1~oreover been in the p o s s ~ s i o i ~ of the ~ e s ~ o n d e n t ever

    since the year 1806-7 tip to the present time, a period of sistwn years, it i s presum-

    able that in such a length of time the ~urchass~~toney , principal and interest, niust

    have been realized by the ~ e € e ~ d a n t from the Mahal (~ is t r ic t ) in que~ ion . For this

    reason, aiid also in considerat~on of the seisin of the Defendant in the p r o ~ e r t y in

    question being iIIep1, and the payment not lying in the Plai~tiff , who i s the ~ u t w a l y

    ( p r o c ~ ~ r a ~ r ) and superintendent, an a s ~ e ~ a i ~ ~ e n t of the ~ a s i l a t (mesne profits) is

    deemed u n n ~ e s s a ~ ; but rather with a view of putting an end to the dispute, and

    the s u ~ e r ~ n g of the parties, it is deenied proper that neither the purchase-n~on~y be

    oaused to be paid by the ~ l a ~ n t i ~ to the Defendant, nor the ~ a s i ~ a t money be

    demanded of the Defendant by the PlaintiE.”

    [418] The Court, therefore, decreed in favour of the Plaintiff’s claim, reversing

    the decision of the Patna Court, and directed the coats of the parties in both Courts

    to be defrayed respectively by each.

    Such being the d e t e r ~ ~ i n a t ~ o n of the Court of appeal, their ~ ~ r d s ~ ~ i ~ s are $0

    consider, whether that Court has determined rightly. First, that villages contained

    ranta were to be considered as Wukf, and, therefore, ~ n a l ~ e n a b ~ e in any

    manr~er wha~oever. Secondly, that n o t w ~ t ~ t a n d i n g the lapse of time, the ~laint i f f ,

    in the character of ~ u t ~ a l y , ta which he had been appo-inted by Government in 1819,

    was entitled t o recover those villages. Thirdly, that as the possession of them by t he

    ~ e f e n d a n t was illegal, and as the ~ ~ a i n t i f f was not the Debtor of the ~e fendan t ,

    he was not bound to repay the money advanced. With respect to the determinatio~

    that the ~ l a ~ n t i f f ought not to have any account of the mesne profits, as the P~aintiff

    himself has made no e o ~ ~ p l ~ i ~ t , it is ~ ~ n ~ e c e s s a r y to consider it-

    The question, whether the ~ r o p e r t y mentioned in the two royal grants was to be

    considered as Wukf, or as a proprietary right, was much discussed in the above-

    mentioned case of Kubeer-ood-deen (the present Plaintiff) against Mussurrimat

    Kadira : and the opinions of the nati~7e law-o~cers taken in that cause beiikg found

    to be c o 3 ~ t r a d i ~ t o ~ , it ’became n ~ e s s a r y to consult the ~ u t w a s of Lawyers in eases

    formerly decided by the Court r e s p e c t ~ ~ ~ g Wukf endowment^, and the decision of the

    Sudder ~ e w a n n y Adawfut of the 1st of Xarch, 1814, in the case of Iiillb Ali ~ ~ ~ i ~ ~ ~ e ~ ~

    v. YgJ AT& to~ether with a ~ u t ~ ~ a of a former ~ ~ ~ ~ i - ~ o l - ~ o u ~ e t of the Sndd r ~ ~ T ~ a ~ ~ I ~ y

    Adawlut, and of the Moofti of that Court, were referred to.

    358

    W. SHAH KUBEER-OOD-DEEN El8401 11 MOORE IND. APP., 419

    [419] The terms of the Firrnans of Aulun Gheer in that cause ran thus: “ As it

    has corne to the knowledge of His Majesty, that agreeably to a Sunnud, furnished by

    the Hakims, certain Mouzahs situate, etc., have been appropriated for the purpose

    of meeting the charges of Fakeers and Students of the Madrissa, and the Khankah

    and Musjid of Moolla Dervish Hoossein, Son of Moolla Gholam Ali, and the afore-

    said individual is hopeful for the royal munificence and favor, His Majesty’s royal

    coninlands are, that in the event of the aforesaid Mouzahs being in the occupation

    and enjoymentbf that individual, the whole of their Mouzahs shall continue as they

    formerly were at a jumma of 15,000 dams (from such a date), in the character of

    a Maddad Mash (aid for subsistence), according to the tenor of the grant; and in

    order that he may apply the produce of these lands to meet the charges of the

    Students of his Madrissa and Musjid, and the present and future Hakims, the

    Amils, etc., are enjoined to relinquish the Mouzah in question to that person’s occu-

    pation, to deem them Maaf (exempt froin tax), and blotted with the pen in every

    respect, and not to require of him a fresh Sunnud annually. Should that individual

    occupy anything in any other way, they are not to countenance him.” Upon read-

    ing the Firman, the Kazi-ool-Rouzat and the Moofti gave their Futwa as follows:

    ’’ As in the Firman it is written that the produce of the lands specified therein is to

    be applied to meet the charges of Students of Madrissa and Musjid of Moolla Dervish

    Hoossein, and as it is not written that the said Moolla shall appropriate the produce

    to meet t>he charges of his family and children, or that he shall enjoy the same with

    his family and children, it therefore appears to us, that the lands in question have

    been paid [420] as Wukf in the character of Maddad Mash, and are not liable to sale

    or gift.”

    Agreeably to the above Futwa, the Judge& of the Sudder Dewanny Adawlut

    decreed that the litigated lands contained in the Firman in question were a Wukf

    endowment, and were not disposable by sale or gift ; the grounds of which judgment

    (it is said) are fully stated in the decree of that eourt, under date, March Ist, 1824.

    It is to be observed, that the word “ Wukf ” was not mentioned in the Firman,

    and that the individual on whose application the grant was made, Moolia Efoosscin,

    was expressly named. In the report of this case (2 Ben. Sud. Dew. Ad. Rep. 1101,

    it is said tbat the terms of the Firman declared that the general superintendence of

    the resources shouid be confided t o Dervish Hoossein, and should remain rested i n

    him, his heirs, and successors; or other property to pious and charitable purposes

    is sufficient to constitute Wukf, without the express use of that term in the grant,

    and that the alienation of such property from the purposes intended i s illegal.

    After referring to this case, and the opinions of the law-officers, the $udder

    Dewanny Adawlut, in the case of Mussummat Kadara v. Shah Kubeer-ood-deen

    (3 Ben, Sud. Dew. Rep., 407), appear to have determined, that notwithstanding the

    use of the words Enam ” and “ Altamgha,” in the royal grants, and the mention

    therein of the person upoii whose petition the grants were made, yet as these grants

    appeared clearly to have been made (as expremed in the petitions) for the purpose of

    maintaining a charitable institution, the persons named were not to be considered

    proprietors : that the establish-[421]-ment (the Khankah) was the real Donee, and

    the persons named were only Xutwalies of the Khankah; that a Mutwaly has no

    right to alienate, and consequently that the transfer by gift or otherwise by Shah

    Shumsh-ood-deeiz was illegal.

    This decision is in accordance with the doctrine laid down in The EIedAya,

    Book xv., of Wukf or appropriation, Hamilton’s translation, vol. ii., page 334,

    where it is said ‘‘ Wukf ” in its primitive sense means “ detention.” In the language

    of the law (according to Haneefa), it signifies the appropriation of any particular

    thing, in such a way that the Appropriator’s right in it shall continue, and the

    advantage of it go to some charitable purpose, in the manner of a loan. According

    to the two Disciples, ‘‘ Wukf ” signifies the appropriation of a particular article in

    such a manner as subjects it to the rules of divine property, whence the Appro-

    priator’s right in it is extinguished, and it becomes a property of God, by the

    advantage of it resulting to his creatures. The two Disciples, therefore, hold

    appropriation to be absolute, though differing in this, that Aboo Yoosaf holds the

    appropriation to be absolute from the moment of its execution, whereas Mahomed

    holds it to be absolute only on the delivery of it to a Mutwaly (or Procurator). and.

    369

    *

    I1 MIOOBE IND, APP., 42% JEtVUN DOSS SAHOO 2'. SHAH, KUBEEN O O D - i ~ l I k 3 [1840]

    consequently that it cannot be disposed of by gift or sale, and that iniieritance

    also does not obtain with respect to it. Thus the term '' Wukf," in i t s literal sense,

    comprehends all that is ment~oned, both by Eaneefa, and by the two Disciples.

    Again (page 344) it is said, '( Gpon an appropriation becoming valid or abso~ute,

    the sale or transfer of the thirig a~propriated is unlawful according to at1 Lawyers:

    the transfer is unlawful, because of a saying of the Prophet, ' Bestow the actual

    iand itself [&2) in charity in such manner that it shall no longer be saleable or

    inheritable.' "

    If the decision in the case of Kubew-ood-deen v. ?lilussumma-t Kadzrri waq correct,

    it follows that the transfer in this case, whether condit~onal or a~solute, by the same

    person (~hurnsh-ood-de en^ to the Defendant, was illegal : also, secondly, with respect

    to the lapse of time, the P l a i n t i ~ , not being the proprietor, had no right to sue

    for the recovery of the villages as his own ; accordingly, he preferred his suit as

    ~ i j j a d a " i ~ a s h ~ n , having been app~in ted Mut~fa ly in 1819. Had he s u c c ~ d e d as heir

    of his Father to a proprietary right in the villages, he might have been barred by

    the lapse of twelve years, according to section xiv. of regulation 111. of 1793 but

    having no right except as ~ ~ u t w a ~ y , he stood in a very different situat~on. The

    s u p e r i ~ ~ t ~ ~ ~ d e n c e of the Wukf villages devolved to his care from the date of his

    appo in t~~en t only. The Mut~valy i s the Procurator of the Donor, which, in this case,

    vas the Sovereign; and it appears, by Regulation XIX. of 12310, that it is the duty

    of every Government to provide, that the ei~down~ents for pious and beneficial pur-

    poses be applied according to their real intention : the local Agents are appointed

    to ascertain and report the names of Trustees, Managers, and superintendcnts,

    whether under the d~s igna t io t~ of Mutwaly or any other, and all racancies, and to

    r e ~ o ~ m e ~ ~ d fit persons where the nomination devolves on the Governnient, That

    the Board of ~ o ~ n i ~ s s i o i i e r ~ may appoint such persons or make such other p ~ o v ~ s ~ o ~

    for the superintendence, management, o r trust as may be thought fit. The Plaintif€,

    therefore, upon his a p p o i n t ~ e n t as ~ u ~ w a l y , became the ~ u t h o r i ~ e d Agent of the

    Government for the performance of the acknowledged E4231 duty of the Government

    to protect the endowment from misapplication; for, as it is said in the opinion of

    the ~ ~ a h o m e d a ~ i l wyers, "The endower and the Mutwaly are one and the same.'.

    The endowment in this case was a perpetual endowment, and the duty of the Govern-

    nient to preserve its applicat~on to the right use was a public and pe rpe t~~a l duty.

    By Regulation 11. of 1805, seetion ii., it, i s provided, that the limitation of twelve

    pears for the c o ~ ~ ~ r ~ i e ~ c e r n e ~ ~ t of civil suits shall not be considered applicable to the

    c'onimencenient of any suits for the recovery of the public revenue, or for any public

    rights or claims whatever which may be instituted by or on behalf of the Govern-

    ment, with the sanction of the ~ O ~ e r n o r - ~ e I ~ e r a l in Council, or by d i r ~ t ~ o ~ i of any

    public OBcer or OfEcers who may be duly authorized to prosecute the bame on the

    part of ~ o v ~ r n m e i ~ ~ . . The ~ l a ~ n ~ i ~ , who was neither heir nor personal repre-

    sentative of his Father, in respect of M7ukf property, had no right of action against

    the Defendant till his appoin~i~ient in 1819, and the Defendant could acquire no

    right against the Government, whose Procurator the Plaintiff was, at feast, until

    twelve years had elapsed from his appoi~itment.

    The endowment being a perpetual Wukf, and the alienat~on c o ~ s e q u ~ ~ ~ t ~ ~ illegal.

    and it not having been shown that the purchasemoney was applied to the use of the

    ~ ~ ~ a I ~ k ~ h , the P la in~~f f cannot be required to account for it-, even upp posing the

    Defendant, not to have been fully repxid by his long possession of the property.

    Their Lordships are, therefore, of opinion, that the judgineirt of the Sudder

    Dewanny Adawlut ought to be affirmed.

    [SCP now Indian 1 , i~~~i ta t io i~ Act (XT. o f I877), prixited as anlended Ckwerul

    Acts, 1898, 3rd ed. p. '73.1

    360

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Jewun Doss Sahoo v. Shah Kubeer-Ood-Deen (India)
    (Dec 9, 1840)