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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Acts
  • Section 10 (1) of the Delhi High Court Act (No. 26/66) of 1966 (hereinafter to be called the Act)
  • Section 104 read with Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter
  • Rule 19 of the Rules read with Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code
  • provisions of Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil
  • Section 104 read with Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code
  • Rules, the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code
  • Section 104 and Rule 1 of Order 43 of the Code.
  • Section 104 and Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code
  • Rule 19 applies the provisions of the Code
  • Section 10 (1) and Rule 19 of the Rules
  • Civil Procedure Code (Act VIII of 1859)
  • Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925,
  • Section 104 or Order 43 Rule 1
  • Section 4 in the Code of 1908
  • Section 588 of the 1882 Code
  • Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code
  • sub-section (2) of Section 5
  • Code of 1882 Section 588
  • Section 2 (9) of the Code
  • Section 115 of the Code
  • Section 4 of the Code
  • 43 Rule 1 of the Code,
  • Rule 19 of the Rules
  • PUNJAB COURTS ACT
  • Order 43 Rule 1
  • Rules.Rule 19
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Acts
  • Section 10 (1) of the Delhi High Court Act (No. 26/66) of 1966 (hereinafter to be called the Act)
  • Section 104 read with Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter
  • Rule 19 of the Rules read with Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code
  • provisions of Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil
  • Section 104 read with Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code
  • Rules, the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code
  • Section 104 and Rule 1 of Order 43 of the Code.
  • Section 104 and Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code
  • Rule 19 applies the provisions of the Code
  • Section 10 (1) and Rule 19 of the Rules
  • Civil Procedure Code (Act VIII of 1859)
  • Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925,
  • Section 104 or Order 43 Rule 1
  • Section 4 in the Code of 1908
  • Section 588 of the 1882 Code
  • Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code
  • sub-section (2) of Section 5
  • Code of 1882 Section 588
  • Section 2 (9) of the Code
  • Section 115 of the Code
  • Section 4 of the Code
  • 43 Rule 1 of the Code,
  • Rule 19 of the Rules
  • PUNJAB COURTS ACT
  • Order 43 Rule 1
  • Rules.Rule 19
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The case concerns whether an appeal by the University of Delhi, the defendant, lies under Section 10(1) of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966, against an order of a learned single judge holding that the suit for partition of the plaintiff's interest in respect of two khasra numbers out of four was maintainable. The plaintiff did not file an appeal regarding the other two khasra numbers, which were held not maintainable due to an evacuee's interest in the property. The defendant contended that the appeal was maintainable, but it was undisputed that if appeals lie only under the orders specified in Section 104 read with Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the present appeal would not be maintainable as the impugned order is not among those specified.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an appeal lies under Section 10(1) of the Delhi High Court Act against the order of a single judge exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction when the order is not specified under Section 104 read with Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
  2. What is the correct interpretation of the term "judgment" as used in Section 10(1) of the Delhi High Court Act with respect to appeals from a single judge's orders?
  3. Whether Rule 19 of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 1967, which applies the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure to proceedings on the original side, conflicts with Section 10(1) of the Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant contended that an appeal lies against any order of a single judge exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction if the order amounts to a "judgment" within the meaning of Section 10(1) of the Act.
  • The appellant argued that the meaning of "judgment" should be ascertained by applying the tests laid down by various High Courts interpreting the term under their Letters Patent.
  • The appellant challenged the validity of Rule 19 of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 1967, claiming it to be ultra vires and in conflict with Section 10(1) of the Act.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent contended that appeals lie only against those orders specified under Section 104 read with Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code and that the impugned order is not one of them.
  • The respondent relied on the application of Rule 19 of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 1967, which incorporates the provisions of the Code into original side proceedings, restricting appealability to orders specified in the Code.
  • The respondent argued that the interpretation of "judgment" under Section 10(1) of the Act should follow the definition provided in the Code and not the varied and unsettled interpretations under the Letters Patent.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ganpati Wadgoo v. Pilaji Kothuji and others, A.I.R 1956 Nagpur 211 Letters Patent jurisdiction saved by Section 4 of the Code; appeals not limited by Section 104 of the Code. Distinguished as not applicable because Section 10(1) of the Act does not confer Letters Patent jurisdiction but original civil jurisdiction.
Bai Shri Arunkumari v. Jhala Harpalsingh Natwarshingh, A.I.R 1954 Saurashtra 152 Similar principle as Ganpati Wadgoo regarding Letters Patent jurisdiction. Distinguished on the same basis as above.
Justices of the Peace for Calcutta v. The Oriental Gas Co., (1872) 8 Beng. L.R 433 Early attempt to define "judgment" under Letters Patent jurisdiction. Referenced to illustrate longstanding judicial difficulty in defining "judgment".
Tuljaram Row v. Alagappa Chettiar, 35 Mad. (DC) Tests for interpreting "judgment" under Letters Patent. Quoted to show varied interpretations of "judgment".
Dayabhai Jiwandass and others v. A.N.M Murugappa Chettyar, A.I.R 1935 Rangoon 267 Judicial acknowledgement of unresolved controversy over "judgment" definition. Used to highlight unsettled nature of the term under Letters Patent.
Firm Shah Hari Diyal and Sons v. Messrs. Sohna Mal Beli Ram, A.I.R 1942 Lahore 95 Test for whether an order amounts to a judgment under Letters Patent. Considered as a guide but not comprehensive for the present case.
Manohar Damodar Bhoot v. Baliram Ganpat Bhoot, A.I.R 1952 Nag. 357 Definition of "judgment" with judicial caution. Referenced to emphasize difficulty and lack of uniformity in defining "judgment".
Central Brokers v. Ramnarayana Poddar and Co., A.I.R 1954 Madras 1057 Further commentary on the difficulty in defining "judgment". Supported the view that defining "judgment" under Letters Patent is problematic.
Asrumati Debi v. Kumar Rupendra Deb Raikot and others, A.I.R 1953 S.C 198 Supreme Court noted divergence in judicial opinion on "judgment". Noted as a significant authority recognizing the unsettled state of the law.
State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Dr. Vijay Anand Maharaj, A.I.R 1963 Supreme Court 946 Supreme Court recognition of differing definitions of "judgment". Confirmed the absence of reconciliation among various High Courts.
R.M.D Chamarbaugwalla and another v. Union of India and another, A.I.R 1957 S.C 628 Principles of statutory interpretation focusing on legislative intent. Applied to determine the meaning of "judgment" in Section 10(1) of the Act.
Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v. Management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate, A.I.R 1958 S.C 353 Statutory construction to harmonize words with legislative purpose. Used to support interpretation consistent with legislative intent.
Collector of Customs, Baroda v. Digvijaysinghji Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd., Jamnagar, A.I.R 1961 Supreme Court 1549 Rule of construction favoring smooth operation of the statutory scheme. Applied to reject interpretations that cause uncertainty or confusion.
Purushottamdas Dalmia v. State Of West Bengal, A.I.R 1961 Supreme Court 1589 Legislative approval presumed only when consistent judicial interpretation exists. Supported the rejection of applying inconsistent Letters Patent tests to Section 10(1) of the Act.
Patel Gordhandas Hargovindas v. Municipal Commissioner, Ahmedabad, 1964 (2) S.C.R 608 Interpretation of statutory terms based on legislative history and practice. Analogously used to interpret "judgment" in Section 10(1) of the Act consistent with existing law.
Begum Aftab Zamani and another v. Lal Chand Khanna and others, A.I.R 1969 Delhi 85 Clarification that the case did not decide the scope of "judgment" under Section 10(1) of the Act. Distinguished as not addressing the appealability issue central to this case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the statutory framework governing the jurisdiction and appealability of orders passed by a single judge exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction under the Delhi High Court Act, 1966. It noted that prior to the Act, the High Court did not exercise ordinary original civil jurisdiction, which was vested in subordinate judges. The Act introduced such jurisdiction to the High Court for cases exceeding a prescribed valuation.

The court emphasized that Section 10(1) of the Act provides for an appeal from the judgment of a single judge to a Division Court but does not define "judgment" or specify which orders are appealable. The Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 1967, particularly Rule 19, apply the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure to original side proceedings, including Order 43 Rule 1, which enumerates appealable orders.

The court rejected the appellant's argument that Rule 19 is ultra vires, clarifying that Section 10(1) concerns the forum for appeal, while Rule 19 and Order 43 Rule 1 define which orders are appealable. It held that the legislature intended the term "judgment" in Section 10(1) to be understood as defined in the Code of Civil Procedure, thereby continuing the settled law that appeals lie only from orders specified in Section 104 and Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code.

The court reviewed the extensive and conflicting judicial attempts to define "judgment" under Letters Patent but found no consistent or authoritative definition. It reasoned that adopting the varied Letters Patent interpretations would introduce confusion contrary to legislative intent. Instead, the court favored a clear and settled definition as per the Code.

The court also dismissed concerns about potential prejudice to litigants due to the limitation on appealable orders, noting the availability of discretionary revision under Section 115 of the Code and the broader powers of single judges exercising original jurisdiction.

Ultimately, the court concluded that the impugned order is not one specified as appealable under the Code and hence does not constitute a "judgment" within the meaning of Section 10(1) of the Act, rendering the appeal incompetent.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal under Section 10(1) of the Delhi High Court Act against the order of a single judge in the exercise of ordinary original civil jurisdiction lies only in cases where the order is a judgment as defined in the Code of Civil Procedure, i.e., orders specified in Section 104 read with Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code. Since the impugned order is not among those specified, the appeal is incompetent and dismissed.

Implications: This decision affirms the continuity of the pre-existing legal framework regarding appealability of orders in original civil jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court, avoiding confusion and inconsistency. It limits appeals to those orders expressly enumerated in the Code, thereby providing clarity and stability in appellate procedure. No new precedent altering the scope of appealability beyond the Code's provisions was established. The dismissal of the appeal is without costs due to the important question of law raised.

    University Of Delhi And Another v. Hafiz Mohd. Said And Others S

    Rajinder Sachar, J.:— The question for decision before us is whether an appeal by the University of Delhi, defendant, lies under Section 10 (1) of the Delhi High Court Act (No. 26/66) of 1966 (hereinafter to be called the Act) against the order of learned single judge of this court holding that the suit for partition of plaintiff's interest in respect of two khasra numbers out of four, was maintainable; the plaintiff has not filed an appeal in respect of other two khasra numbers in respect of which the suit was held to be not maintainable, in view of the evacuee having interest in the property.

    It was not disputed that if an appeal lay only against those orders specified in Section 104 read with Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter to be called the Code) the present appeal would not be maintainable as the impugned order is not one of those mentioned in these two provisions.

    By an Act of the Governor General of India in Council (Act No. XXIII of 1865) the Chief Court of the Punjab was established and the Provinces of the Punjab and Delhi were subject to its jurisdiction. This position continued, till the Letters Patent constituting the High Court of Judicature at Lahore dated 21st March, 1919, was issued by which the High Court at Lahore was established for the provinces of the Punjab and Delhi, called the High Court of Judicature at Lahore. The Punjab High Court after 1947, continued to be governed by this Letters Patent and the Union Territory of Delhi continued to be within the jurisdiction of the Punjab High Court. Clause 9 of the Letters Patent conferred extraordinary original civil jurisdiction on the High Court. Clause 11 provided that the High Court of judicature at Lahore shall be a court of appeal from the civil courts of the provinces of the Punjab and Delhi. It is important to note that no ordinary original civil jurisdiction was conferred on the High Court under the Letters Patent.

    The Punjab Courts Act, 1918 (as in force in Delhi) provides, for different classes of civil courts, the court of District Judge shall be deemed to be the District Court or principal civil court of original jurisdiction in the District. Subsequently jurisdiction to be exercised in original civil suits was conferred on three classes of subordinate judges, with class I subordinate judges exercising the jurisdiction without limit as to the value of the cases.

    It will thus be seen that in the Union Territory of Delhi prior to the coming into force of the Act the ordinary original civil jurisdiction was exercised by the subordinate judges and the High Court did not at all exercise any ordinary original civil jurisdiction.

    Section 5 (2) of the Act provided that notwithstanding anything in any law for the time being in force, the High Court shall also have in respect of the said territories ordinary original civil jurisdiction in every suit the value of which exceeds twenty-five thousand rupees (the said valuation has now been raised to fifty thousand rupees vide Act 37 of 1969).

    Section 16 of the Act provided that all proceedings pending immediately before the appointed day in any subordinate court in the Union Territory of Delhi in or in relation to any such civil suit as is referred to in sub-section (2) of Section 5 shall on that day stand transferred to the High Court of Delhi which shall proceed to try, hear and determine the matter as if it had been pending therein.

    Thus for the first time by the passing of the Act, in the Union Territory of Delhi, High Court came to exercise the ordinary original civil jurisdiction above certain valuation. The suits regarding the valuation below the prescribed valuation continued to be tried by the Subordinate Judges. As the ordinary original civil jurisdiction was being conferred on the High Court for the first time Section 7 of the Act also provided that the High Court of Delhi shall have all such powers to make rules and orders with respect to practice and procedure as are immediately before the appointed day exercisable by the High Court of Punjab and shall also have powers to make rules and orders with respect to practice and procedure for the exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction.

    Section 10 of the Act provided that where a single judge of the High Court of Delhi exercises ordinary original civil jurisdiction conferred by sub-section (2) of Section 5, an appeal shall lie from the judgment of the single judge to a Division Court of that High Court.

    Section 122 of the Code gives power to the High Court to make rules regulating their own procedure and empowers it by such rules to annul, alter or aid any of the rules in the First Schedule.

    section 129 of the code further empowers the High Court to make rules not inconsistent with the Letters Patent or order or other law establishing it to regulate its own procedure in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction.

    By virtue of powers conferred by Sections 122 and 129 of the Code and Section 7 of the Act, this court framed Rules known as Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 1967 (hereinafter called the Rules).

    Rule 3 states that all proceedings on the original side of the court instituted or transferred pursuant to provisions of the Act or any other law shall unless ordered by the Court be governed by these Rules.

    Rule 19 provides that except to the extent otherwise provided in these Rules, the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code shall apply to all proceedings on original side.

    Thus Rule 19 applies the provisions of the Code in terms to the proceedings on the original side except to the extent provided otherwise in the Rules. It is not the case of the appellant that Order 43 Rule 1 has been made inapplicable to the proceedings on the original side of the High Court by the Rules. If that be not so it is apparent that Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code will apply to the proceedings on the original side with the result that an appeal shall lie only from those orders of the single judge which are mentioned in Section 104 and Rule 1 of Order 43 of the Code. The argument that Rule 19 of the Rules is ultra vires, as being in conflict with Section 10 (1) of the Act, has no merit. Section 10 (1) only provides for an appeal against the judgment of a single judge to a Division Court. It does not indicate which orders are to be appealable nor is there any definition of the word ‘judgment’ in the Act. It is not therefore, correct to say that because by the application of Rule 19, the orders which are appealable are restricted to those mentioned in Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code there is a conflict between Section 10 (1) and Rule 19 of the Rules as the two provisions deal with different matters. Section 10 (1) deals with the forum of appeal whereas Rule 19 of the Rules read with Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code indicates the orders which are appealable. Thus by the application of Rule 19 which in terms also applies the Code to the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of this court, an appeal under Section 10 (1) of the Act would be competent only if it falls within Section 104 or Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code.

    It is true that an appeal provided by the Letters Patent is not governed by section 104 of the code. It is, however, pertinent to note that in the Code of 1882 Section 588 which is analogous to section 104 of the code there was a difference of opinion amongst various High Courts about its interpretation.

    The High Courts of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras had taken the view that an order not appealable under Section 588 of the 1882 Code may still be appealable provided it amounted to judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the respective High Courts. The Allahabad High Court, however, took the view that if the order was not appealable under Section 588 it could not be appealed against under the Letters Patent of the High Court. In order to set at rest this controversy the legislature provided by Section 4 in the Code of 1908 by laying down that in the absence of any specific provision to the contrary nothing shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any special or local law now in force or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed, by or under any other law for the time being in force. Thus in view of Section 4 of the Code the right to appeal under the Letters Patent was saved and section 104 of the code was held not applicable.

    It is precisely for this reason that the appellant cannot derive any assistance from Ganpati Wadgoo v. Pilaji Kothuji and others (A.I.R 1956 Nagpur 211) (1) and Bai Shri Arunkumari v. Jhala Harpalsingh Natwarshingh (A.I.R 1954 Saurashtra 152) (2). Both these cases were decided on the ground that the Letters Patent being a special jurisdiction which was saved by Section 4 of the Code, cannot be affected by section 104 of the code.

    But it is then argued that the only criterion for ascertaining whether an appeal would lie against the order passed by a single judge when exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction is to find out whether his order amounts to a judgment and if it is so then by virtue of Section 10 (1) of the Act an appeal will lie against that order, the further corollary to this argument is that in order to find out the meaning of the expression ‘judgment’ one must apply the tests laid down by the various High Courts when interpreting the expression ‘judgment’ to be found in clause 15 of the Letters Patent of Bombay, Calcutta and Madras which provides that an appeal shall lie to a Division Court of the said High Court from the judgment of one judge of the said High Court.

    It is, however, pertinent to remember that the Letters Patent for the High Courts of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras which were almost in the same terms were enacted in 1862 and 1865 at a time when English law was still in a some-what fluid state. At that time the Civil Procedure Code (Act VIII of 1859) applicable to India did not even contain the definition of the term ‘judgment’. The term ‘judgment’ was defined for the first time in the Code of Civil Procedure of 1882 and this definition continues in the present Code. Thus when in the matters arising under the Letters Patent, the courts came to consider the meaning of the term ‘judgment’ they had necessarily to give an interpretation as the occasion arose keeping in view the facts of each case and the historical context and absence of any definition of it in the Letters Patent. The term ‘judgment’ thus not having been defined in the Letters Patent attempts have been made by the various High Courts to define the term, but it has unfortunately to be conceded that their efforts have not yet been successful, even after a period of hundred years.

    The earliest attempt to define the term ‘judgment’ was made as far back as (1872) 8, Beng. L.R 433 (Justices of the Peace for Calcutta V. The Oriental Gas Co.). (3) The observations of Sir Arnold White, C.J in Tuljaram Row v. Alagappa Chettiar (192) 35 Mad. (DC) have been often quoted. Page C.J, however, in the Full Bench decision in Dayabhai Jiwandass and others v. A.N.M Murugappa Chettyar (A.I.R 1935 Rangoon 267), (5), was constrained to observe that what the meaning of ‘judgment’ in Letters Patent of Indian High Courts is a question over which controversy has arisen in India for nearly 70 years, and is still unsettled, and that ‘the result has been that Sir Arnold White's judgment has not infrequently been interpreted in so elastic a sense that courts purporting to follow it have felt at liberty to treat as appealable any orders which the courts considered ought to be made a subject of appeal’.

    In Firm Shah Hari Diyal and Sons v. Messrs. Sohna Mal Beli Ram (A.I.R 1942 Lahore 95) (6) a full bench remarked, ‘whether an order amounts to a judgment within clause 10 must be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case and the test propounded in 35 Mad. 1. But it is not, however, necessary to decide whether that test is comprehensive so as to exclude all other tests. It is sufficient to say that each case must be considered on its own facts and circumstances and while the tests propounded in Madras and in the Calcutta High Courts serve as a good guide for this court it is not necessary to hold that those tests are comprehensive and exclude other cases.’

    In a full bench case, Manohar Damodar Bhoot v. Baliram Ganpat Bhoot (A.I.R 1952 Nag. 357) (7) Hidayatullah J. (as he then was) defined the word ‘judgment’ with a warning, ‘I shall now attempt to define the term and I do so with considerable hesitation bearing in my mind that eminent judges have failed in the task’. Sinha C.J (as he then was) who agreed with the order proposed by Hidayatullah J. however, cautioned and stated:

    ‘Speaking for myself I would not attempt a definition which the legislature has not attempted so far, beyond saying that ‘judgment’ means the statement given by the judge of the grounds of a decree or order. That is a definition given by the Code of Civil Procedure, which may not be conterminous with the meaning attached to the term ‘judgment’ under the Letters Patent.'

    In Central Brokers v. Ramnarayana Poddar and Co. (A.I.R 1954 Madras 1057) (8), a full bench was again faced with the same problem and referring to the definition given by Hidayatullah J., Govinda Menon J. (as he then was) commented;

    ‘How difficult it is to define ‘judgment’ is manifest from the large body of case law in India.'

    Mack, J. was more forthright and observed:

    ‘I think any attempt to define the word ‘judgment’ in clause 15, Letters Patent, a difficulty rightly emphasised by my learned brother Govinda Menon J. can only lead to fresh controversy intensifying it further in this domain of law. I venture to express the hope here that no further attempt will even be made by any bench however full and however authoritative as in my view to define the word ‘judgment’ in the year 1954 as the framers of the statute intended the word to apply in 1862 is attempting an impossibility.'

    In Asrumati Debi v. Kumar Rupendra Deb Raikot and others (A.I.R 1953 S.C 198) (9) their lordships noticed the conflicting views of the various High Courts and observed;

    ‘In view of this wide divergence of judicial opinion, it may be necessary for this court at some time or other to examine carefully the principles upon which the different views mentioned above purport to be based and attempt to determine with as much definiteness as possible the true meaning and scope of the word ‘judgment’ as it occurs in clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Calcutta High Court and in the corresponding clauses of the Letters Patent of other High Courts.'

    Similarly the cleavage of opinion was again noticed by the Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Dr. Vijay Anand Maharaj (A.I.R 1963 Supreme Court 946) (10). But again their lordships did not attempt to reconcile the said decisions apart from merely observing that the definition given by the Madras High Court was wider than the one given by the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts.

    The result, therefore, remains that right upto the time when the Act was passed there was no authoritative pronouncement or precise definition of the term ‘judgment’ in the Letters Patent. It is in this context that we must attempt to find out as to what was the intention of the legislature when it used the word ‘judgment’ in Section 10 (1) of the Act.

    ‘Judgment’ is defined in Section 2 (9) of the Code to mean the statement given by the judge of the grounds of a decree or order. Section 96 provides for an appeal from a decree passed by a court exercising original jurisdiction and Section 104 and Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code provide for an appeal against the orders specified therein passed by the court and no others. It will thus be seen that prior to the Act in this part of the territory, the law as to which orders were appealable, was well settled. This depended solely on finding out whether the order was one of those falling within Section 104 and Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code. When legislature provided in Section 10 (1) of the Act that an appeal shall lie from the judgment of a single judge to the Division Court, it must have meant to refer to the expression ‘judgment’ in the same terms as defined in the Code and thus to continue the existing law and practice.

    When a question arises as to the interpretation of an enactment, what the court has to do is to ascertain ‘the intent of them that make it’; that must be gathered from the words actually used in the statute. To decide the true scope the court must have regard to all such factors as can legitimately be taken into account in ascertaining the intention of the legislature, such as the history of the legislation, the purposes thereof and the other provisions of the statute and to construe the language in the light of the indications furnished by them, (vide R.M.D Chamarbaugwalla and another v. Union of India and another (A.I.R 1957 S.C 628). (11).

    The words of a statute, when there is a doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature has in view; (Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v. Management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate A.I.R 1958 S.C 353). (12).

    It is one of the well established rules of construction that ‘if the words of a statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous no more is necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense, the words themselves in such case best declaring the intention of the Legislature.’ It is equally well settled principle of construction that ‘where alternative constructions are equally open that alternative is to be chosen which will be consistent with the smooth working of the system which the statute purports to be regulating; and that alternative is to be rejected which will introduce uncertainty, friction or confusion, into the working of the system;’ (vide Collector of Customs, Baroda v. Digvijaysinghji Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. Jamnagar: A.I.R 1961 Supreme Court 1549). (13)

    Keeping these principles in view can it be said that when the legislature used the word ‘judgment’ in Section 10 (1) of the Act it must be taken to have used the word in the sense it has been interpreted by the various High Courts under the Letters Patent ? We do not think so. The reason is because there has been no consistent and uniform interpretation placed on the word ‘judgment’ by different High Courts or even by different benches of the same High Court. The approval of the Legislature of a particular construction put on the provisions of an Act on account of its making no alteration in those provisions is presumed only when there had been a consistent series of cases putting a certain construction on certain provisions; (vide Purushottamdas Dalmia v. State Of West Bengal. (A.I.R 1961 Supreme Court 1589). (14).

    It seems to us, therefore, that there is no compelling reason to hold that the Legislature wanted the word ‘judgment’ in Section 10 (1) of the Act to be interpreted by reference to the tests given in various decisions given under the Letter Patent. To accept the contention of the appellant would be to impute illogical intention to the legislature and suggest that it wanted to create confusion and conflict in this area which had been free from it uptil then. In our view this conflict and confusion can readily be avoided if the meaning of the term ‘judgment’ under Section 10 (1) of the Act is interpreted as defined in the Code and we do hold accordingly.

    Reference may be made to Patel Gordhandas Hargovindas v. Municipal Commissioner, Ahmedabad (1964 (2) S.C.R 608. (13). In that case the meaning of the word ‘rate’ in the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925, was interpreted by taking into account the legislative history and practice which showed that the word ‘rate’ whenever used upto 1925 with reference to local taxes meant a tax on the annual value of land and building and not a tax on the capital value. The court observed:

    ‘It seems to us therefore that when in 1925 S. 73 (1) of the Act while specifying taxes which could be imposed by a municipal borough used the word ‘rate’ on buildings or lands situate within the municipal borough, the word ‘rate’ must have been used in that particular meaning which it had acquired in the legislative history and practice both in England and India before that date.

    Further if we find that the word ‘rate’ had acquired a special meaning in legislative history and practice in England and India before 1925 with reference to local taxation, it must follow that when the word ‘rate’ was used in cl. (i) instead of the general word ‘tax’ it was that particular kind of tax which was known in legislative history and practice as a rate which the municipalities were being empowered to impose.'

    This also supports our finding that when Section 10 (1) provided that an appeal will lie against the judgment of single judge the legislature being aware of the orders which were appealable under the Code meant to continue the existing practice regarding appeals against certain orders only and did not intend to make a complete break with the past and make the position vague and uncertain.

    This view is not likely to lead to any prejudice to the litigant public. The only prejudice suggested was that whereas against those orders against which no appeal lies under Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code, an order was passed by the subordinate judge the same was subject to revision under Section 115 of the Code by this Court, no remedy will be left when the same kind of non-appealable orders are passed by this court when exercising ordinary original jurisdiction. In our view this grievance is more imaginary than real. It is well known that the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code is discretionary and limited to jurisdictional infirmities and it is not open to this court to interfere even if the decision is wrong in law. If the case is such in which this court will be competent to give relief even when exercising limited jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code, surely there can be no apprehension that the party will not be in a position to obtain the relief from the single judge having greater powers when exercising ordinary original civil jurisdiction.

    There is also no reason why it should be assumed that the legislature intended that those orders which were not appealable when passed by the Subordinate Judges should become appealable when passed by the High Court. This would attribute to the legislature an intention to treat the orders passed by this court as possessing less maturity and solemnity than those possessed by the Subordinate Judges. This consideration further reinforces our conclusion that Section 10 (1) of the Act was never meant to provide for appeals against orders which had never been held to be appealable in this territory at any time before.

    It was also suggested that there may be many orders which are not covered within Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code and which should be made appealable because of its consequences. It is unnecessary to go into this matter except to say that there is ample power vesting in this court under section 129 of the code to omit and add to the appealable orders provided under Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code if that is felt necessary.

    We were referred to Begum Aftab Zamani and another v. Lal Chand Khanna and others (A.I.R 1969 Delhi 85) (16) and it was urged that that case had decided that the term ‘judgment’ in Section 10 (1) of the Act cannot be restricted to those orders mentioned in Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code. In our view that case is clearly distinguishable. In that case the question whether the appeal was competent or not was not even in dispute as is clear from the following observations:

    ‘It may be observed that in the case in hand, the competency of the appeal is not in question, and indeed it is common ground that the judgment is appealable. The only question which arises for our consideration is whether the present is an appeal from a decree or from an order having the force of a decree or whether it is an appeal from a judgment which is neither a decree nor an order having the force of a decree.’

    In that case the only question that arose was about the court fee payable on appeal presented by an aggrieved party under Section 10 (1) of the Act against the judgment of a learned single judge of this court given in the exercise of ordinary original civil jurisdiction. The bench ultimately held that the judgment of a single judge contained all the criteria of a decree and, therefore, it fell within the purview of Article 1, Schedule 1 and was subject to payment of ad valorem court fee. The questions which orders are appealable under Section 10 (1) of the Act and what is the meaning to be given to the term ‘judgment’ were not even canvassed in that case. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the contention that that case lays down the proposition that the term ‘judgment’ in Section 10 (1) has to be interpreted by applying the tests laid down in various judgments given under the Letters Patent.

    Reference was also made by the learned counsel for the respondent to F.A.O (O.S) 38 of 1969 (Nem Chand Jain v. Moti Lal Jain and others) decided on 2-9-1969, (17) wherein a division bench of this court held that refusel to frame an additional issue was not appealable within Section 10 (1) of the Act. In the course of judgment it was observed:—

    ‘the impugned order is also not one of those orders against which an appeal lies under the provisions of Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure.’

    We feel that the interpretation that is being put by us has the merit of continuing the pre-eminently settled legal situation and also of avoiding the difficulties faced by other High Courts over a course of century.

    Our conclusion, therefore, is that an appeal under Section 10 (1) of the Act against the order of a single judge in the exercise of ordinary original civil jurisdiction to a Division Court lies only in those cases where an order is a judgment as defined in the Code. In other words apart from the orders which have the force of a decree, appeals will, therefore, lie only against those orders passed by the single judge which are mentioned in Section 104 read with Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code and no appeal will lie against other orders which are outside these two provisions. As the impugned order of the learned single judge is not one of those orders specified in Section 104 read with Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code the same cannot be held to be a judgment within the meaning of Section 10 (1) of the Act and hence no appeal is competent under this Section.

    The result is that the appeal is held to be incompetent and is dismissed but in view of the important question of law raised, there will be no order as to costs.

    Appeal dismissed.

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    University Of Delhi And Another v. Hafiz Mohd. Said And Others S
    (Mar 2, 1972)