By this common order. I propose to dispose both Civil Revision No. 83 of 1991 and M.A (F) 20 of 1991.

2. The revision petition (Civil Revision No. 83 of 1291) has been filed by the State of Assam under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (‘C.P.C’) against an order passed by the Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Kokrajhar under section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (the 1988 Act) awarding a sum of Rs. 7,500/- by way of compensation in respect of permanent disablement resulting from an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle. The owner of the vehicle, the insurance company, namely, the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. and the claimant were arrayed as opposite parties. Notice of motion was issued on them. In response there to all of them appeared through their respective counsel. The petitioner, the State of Assam was represented by Mr. B.B Narzary, Government Advocate. The owner of the vehicle was represented by Mr. S.N Bhuyan and Mr. U. Bbuyan, Advocates, the claimant was re-presented by Mr. B.P Bora, Advocate and the Insurance Company by Mr. S. Dutta, Mr. B.K Jain and Mr. K.K Dey, Advocates.

3. The appeal (M.A(F) 20 of 1991) has been filed by United India. Insurance Co. Ltd. against an order passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Cachar in another case awarding compensation under section 140 of the Act. This appeal was also pending admission. The appellant insurance company and the respondents all wanted that the said appeal might also betaken up along with the revision petition as the questions of law falling for determination in the revision petition had a bearing on the maintainability of their appeal also. The prayer was allowed. On behalf of the insurance company, Mr. S.S Sarma, Mr. D.K Bhatra and Mr. B.K Jain, Advocates entered appearance. The respondent was represented by Mr. N. Choudbury, Advocate. They were heard, both on the preliminary questions of law regarding maintainability as well as the merits.

4. Before dealing with the facts of the two cases, it may be expedient to decide the following two questions of law that arise for consideration. These are:

(1) Whether the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is a Court subordinate to the High Court and whether the High Court has jurisdiction to interfere in revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (‘C.P.C’) with any order passed by it.

(2) Whether an order passed under section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, (1988 “1988 Act”) directing payment of compensation in case of death or permanent disablement on principle of no fault is an award of the Claims Tribunal and whether appeal lies against the same under section 173(1) of the Act.

5. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the opposite parties in the Civil Revision and the appellant and the respondents in the appeal which has also been taken up together for hearing.

6. Evidently on both the questions there is a sharp cleavage of opinion between different High Courts. However, before referring to the decisions of the different High Courts, it may be worthwhile to refer to some of the relevant provisions of the C.P.C Section 115 of the C.P.C which deals with the powers of revision of the High Court provides that “the High Court may call for the records of any case which has been decided by Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto…….”, if it appears to it that, such Court has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested or has acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. The expression “Court” has not been defined. Section 3 of the C.P.C, however, deals with subordination of the Courts. It provides — “For the purpose of this Code, the District Court is subordinate to the High Court, and every Civil Court of a grade inferior to that of a District Court and every Court of Small Causes is subordinate to the High Court and District Court.”

7. Looking at the first question in the light of provisions, it appears that it has to be dealt in two parts. Firstly, it has to be decided whether the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is a “Court” or not. If it is held to be so, the second question that will fall for determination is “whether it is subordinate to the High Court.” If the answer to both the questions is in the affirmative, revision will lie subject however to the answer to the next question whether an appeal lies to the High Court under section 173 of the 1988 Act against an order of the Tribunal under section 140 of the Act. If no appeal lies, the revision will be maintainable.

8. On the question whether the Claims Tribunal under the Motor Vehicles Act is a Court or not, the earliest decision appears to be that of the Judicial Commissioner of Goa, Daman and Diu in British India General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Chanbi Shaikh, AIR 1968 Goa 78 where it was held:

“The Claims Tribunal cannot be regarded as a civil court for the purpose of interference in revision under S. 115(c) of the Civil P.C and S. 8(2)(b)(i) of the Goa, Daman and Diu (Judicial Commissioner's Court) Regulation, 1963. It can, however, be regarded as a Tribunal for the purpose of supervisory jurisdiction vested in the High Court under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India.”

The next important case where this aspect was elaborately discussed is the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Barkat Singh v. Hans Raj Pandit, AIR 1985 Punjab and Haryana 263. In this case, a Division Bench of that Court considered the decision of the Full Bench of the same Court in Shanti Devi v. The General Manager, Haryana Roadways, AIR 1972 Punj. & Har. 65 and the decision of a single Judge in Delhi Bhiwani Transport Co. v. Ram Niwas Surekha, 1980 ACC. CJ 207 (Punj. & Har.). In the Full Bench decision in Shanti Devi (supra), the High Court had held that the proceedings before the Claims Tribunal closely resembled the proceedings in the Civil Court. Relying on the aforesaid observation, the learned single Judge in Delhi Bhiwani Transport Co. (supra) held that the Claims Tribunal was a Civil Court for the purpose of section 115 of the Code. The Division Bench considered both the Full Bench and Single Bench decisions and in Barkat Singh (supra) observed as follows:

“No doubt, the Claims Tribunal acts as a court when he adjudicates upon a claim for compensation but it is not a court in the technical sense of the term and is not part of heirarchy of the Civil Courts recognised by the Constitution. It is only a quasi-judicial Tribunal exercising judicial functions and powers specifically conferred on it.”

It was accordingly held that the Claims Tribunal, while deciding the claim applications filed under the Act, is not a Civil Court subordinate to the High Court for the purpose of section 115 of the C.P.C and the orders passed by the Claims Tribunal are not amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court.

9. The Madhya Pradesh High Court has taken the contrary view in the matter. In Krishan Gopal v. Dattatraya, AIR 1972 Madhya Pradesh 125, the third Judge to whom the case was referred on a difference of opinion between the two Judges of a Division Bench, held that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is a Court subordinate to the High Court and, as such, its orders are revisable under section 115 of the C.P.C While arriving at the aforesaid decision, the Court referred to the earlier Division Bench decision of the same Court in Hayat Khan v. Mangilal, AIR 1971 Madhya Pradesh 140 where it had been held that the Claims Tribunal was a Civil Court.

10. There is a recent decision of the Rajasthan High Court reported in AIR 1990 Rajasthan 152 (Dushyant Kumar v. R.S.R.T Corporation). In this case it was held that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is a Tribunal subordinate to the High Court. It was observed:

“….the nomenclature given to the Motor Vehicles Tribunal that it is a Tribunal will not take it out of the purview of the Civil Court.”

It was accordingly held that a revision petition against the order of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal was maintainable.

11. I have referred to some of the decisions of the different High Courts which have taken different views in the matter. Reference may also be made to a Division Bench decision of this Court in Madan Chandra v. Mukheswar Phukan, AIR 1951 Assam 88 where dealing with a case under the Workmen's Compensation Act, it was held that the Commissioner acting under that Act is a Court and is subject to the revisional jurisdiction.

12. On carefully going through the reasonings given in the various decisions referred to above and on careful consideration of the provisions of the C.P.C and the various decision, I am inclined to hold that the Claims Tribunal constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act is a “court” for the purpose of section 115 of the C.P.C I do not propose to discuss the reasons for this conclusion of mine as I find that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Bhagwati Devi v. I.S Goel, 1983 A.C.J 123 the question whether Motor Accident Claims Tribunal constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act is a Civil Court or not is no more open for debate. It was a case for transfer of the claim applications from one Motor Accident Claims Tribunal to another in exercise of powers under section 25 of the C.P.C The Supreme Court, following the observations in one of its earlier decisions in State of Haryana v. Darshan Devi, 1979 A.C.J 205 (S.C) held:

“…we are of the view that the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act is a Civil Court for the purpose of section 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure.”

In view of this decision of the Supreme Court it has to be held that the Mator Accident Claims Tribunal is “a Court” within the meaning of the expression used in the C.P.C

13. The next argument is that the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court is no authority for the proposition that the Claims Tribunal, even though Court, is subordinate to the High Court. The contention is that it was a case of exercise of power of transfer of suits, etc. by the Supreme Court where it is enough if the proceedings are pending in any High Court or a Civil Court. It is in this context that the Supreme Court held that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is Civil Court. But for the purpose of exercising power by the High Court under section 115 of the C.P.C the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal being a “Court” is not enough. It must also be “Court subordinate to the High Court”. It was contended that the Tribunal is not subordinate to the High Court. Reliance was placed on section 3 of the C.P.C which deals with subordination of the Courts. It was pointed out that section 3 does not take within its sweep the Mator Accident Claims Tribunal. The submission of the counsel for the petitioner is that the question of subordination of a Court to the High Court has to be examined in a proper perspective and not in the narrow confines of section 3 of the C.P.C

14. I have considered the rival submissions. I have also perused section 3 of the C.P.C To my mind section 3 of the C.P.C is only illustrative. It is not exhaustive. The question whether the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is subordinate to the High court or not has to be examined on a careful consideration of the entire scheme of the Act and the various provisions relating to appeals, etc.

15. This aspect regarding subordination of one Court to another was elaborately discussed by the Calcutta High Court in Sailaja Kanta v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1971 Calcutta 137. In this case also referring to section 3 of the C.P.C it was contended that a court not falling within the Courts referred to in the said section would not be “a Court subordinate to the High Court.” The Court, referring to its earlier Full Bench decision in Khetridas Gangaram v. First Land Acquisition Collector, AIR 1946 Cal 508 F.B repelled this contention and held:

“……………. The object of Section 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not to define or enumerate Courts which are subordinate to the High Court, but simply to declare the order of subordination, for the purpose of the Code, as respects the ordinary hierarchy of the Courts established under the Civil Courts Act.”

Dealing with the question whether the Arbitrator under Defence of India Act comes within the expression “any court”, it was observed:

“…………. Within the expression ‘any Court’ in section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the relevant Bengal Rules already discussed, comes the Arbitrator, which is a Court and nonetheless a Court of original civil jurisdiction, but not a ‘Civil Court’ within section 3 of the Bengal, Agra, Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887 and not even every Civil Court of a grade inferior to that of a District Court’ within Section 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure”.

It was held that even though “any Court” in section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not a Civil Court either within Section 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure or within section 3 of the Bengal, Agra, Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, still any Court in section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure may be and is “a Court subordinate to the High Court” within section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was also held that if a Court was subordinate to the High Court for the ‘purpose of appeal, it was also subordinate to the High Court for the purpose of revision within section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

16. Reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Jugal Kishore v. Sitamarhi Central Co-op. Bank, AIR 1967 SC 1494 where it was held that a Registrar exercising powers under the Bihar and Orrissa Co-operative Societies Act is a Court subordinate to the High Court. Referring to section 48 of the aforesaid Act it was observed that the Registrar is, to all intents and purposes, a Court discharging the same functions and duties in the same manner as a Court of law is expected to do. It was held that the Assistant Registrar functioning under the said Act was a Court subordinate to the High Court for the purposes of section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act. In this case a distinction was, however, drawn between subordination for the purpose of section 3 of Contempt of Courts Act and subordination under the hierarchy of Courts under the Civil Procedure Code or the Criminal Procedure Code and it was held that subordination for the purpose of section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act means judicial subordination. Reference may also be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Shankar v. Krishna, (1969) 2 SCC 74 : AIR 1970 SC 1 where referring to section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code, it was held:

“When the aid of the High Court is invoked on the revisional side it is done because it is a superior Court and it can interfere for the purpose of rectifying the error of the Court below. section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure circumscribes the limits of that jurisdiction but the jurisdiction which is being exercised is a part of the general appellate jurisdiction of the High Court as a superior Court. It is only one of the modes of exercising power conferred by the Statute; basically and fundamentally it is the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court which is being invoked and exercised in a wider and larger sense.”

17. In a recent decision of the Rajasthan High Court in Dushyant Kumar v. R.S.R.T Corporation, AIR 1990 Rajasthan 152, dealing with the question whether the Claims Tribunal under the Motor Vehicles Act was subordinate to the High Court or not, it was held:

“… the powers of appeal given under the Motor Vehicles Act will definitely lead to a conclusion that it is subordinate to the High Court….”

18. A careful consideration of the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court and the High Courts clearly goes to show that the Claims Tribunal constituted under the Motor Vehicles Act is subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of section 115 of the C.P.C Revision will, therefore, lie to the High Court against any order passed by any such Tribunal.

19. The next question for determination is whether against an order under section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (section 92A of the 1939 Act) appeal lies to the High Court or not. There appears to be a controversy in this regard also. Appeal is provided under section 173 of the 1988 Act against an “award” of the Claims Tribunal. “Award”, as such, has not been defined in the Act. Its meaning, may be extracted from section 168 of the Act which requires the Claims Tribunal on receipt of an application for compensation to made an award determining the amount of compensation payable by the insurer or owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident or by all of them. The proviso to sub-section (1) thereof makes it clear that the said sub-section shall not apply to a claim for compensation under section 140 in respect of death or permanent disablement of any person which shall be disposed of in accordance with provisions of chapter X. It may be observed that section 168 finds place in chapter XII which deals with applications for compensation and the powers of the Claims Tribunal to dispose of the claim finally and to make an award. Section 140 forms part of Chapter X of the Act which deals with liability without fault in certain cases. The procedure for determination of such liability laid down in Chapter X is different from the procedure for disposal of claims under Chapter XII of the Act. The procedure in Chapter X is summary in nature and the object is to give interim relief in case of death or permanent disability as quickly as possible. Against an award made under section 168 in Chapter XII an appeal has been provided under section 173 which also forms part of the very same chapter. But no appeal has been provided against an order under section 140 in Chapter X.

19A. Mr. N. Choudhury, learned counsel for the respondent in the appeal took me through the various chapters of the Act to show that in each chapter, wherever the legislature wanted to confer right of appeal against any order passed under that Chapter, specific provision has been made to provide for appeal against such orders passed thereunder. Chapter IV (containing sections 39 to 65) which deals with the registration of motor vehicles provides for appeals against orders passed under various sections of that chapter. This has been done by enacting section 57. Similarly, in Chapter V which deals with grant of permits, etc., appeal has been provided in section 89 of the same chapter. The submission of Mr. Choudhury was that from the perusal of the scheme of the Act, it is evident that wherever the Legislature contemplated to provide an appeal against any order passed under any chapter, it has done so by specifically providing for an appeal against the same. As the legislature did not contemplate any appeal against an order granting interim compensation under section 140 of the Act, no appeal was provided in Chapter X, whereas against an award under Chapter XII, appeal has been specifically provided in section 173.

20. I have carefully considered the submissions of Mr. Choudhury. I find force in the same. So far as case law is concerned, on the question whether appeal lies against an order under section 140 of the Act of 1988 or not, there appears to be a divergence of opinion between different High Courts. The Madhya Pradesh and Kerala High Courts seem to have taken the view that an appeal lies against an order under section 140 of the Act of 1988. This has been done by construing the order under section 140 as an “award”. In Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pritam Lal, 1990 (1) T.A.C 185, the question referred to a Division Bench of the High Court was whether an order awarding compensation under section 92-A of the 1939 Act (section 140 of the 1988 Act) on the principle of no fault liability is appealable under section 110D of the said Act (section 173 of the 1988 Act) or only revision under section 115 C.P.C is tenable against the order granting such compensation. It was held that the order of compensation passed by the Claims Tribunal under section 92-A of the 1939 Act (140 of the 1988 Act) is in the nature of passing of an award and the same is appealable under section 110D of the 1939 Act (173 of the 1988 Act.) The Court relied on the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Sant Ram v. Surya Pal, 1986 ACJ 202. In Sant Ram (supra), the Allahabad High Court on consideration of the scheme and the relevant provisions of the 1939 Act held that though the procedure and the scope of the enquiry in the two sets of provisions, namely, section 92-A dealing with interim compensation and section 110-A and 110-B dealing the determination of final compensation is different, the direction to pay interim compensation under section 92-A (140 of the 1988 Act) constitutes an award and, therefore, appeal would lie against such order also.

21. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Padmavathy, 1990 (2) T.A.C 187 at 189, the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court scanned through the various provisions of the 1939 Act as well as the 1988 Act to ascertain whether an appeal would lie under section 173 against an order granting compensation under section 140 of the Act, and held that such an appeal was maintainable. The reason for this conclusion is as follows:—

“It is thus clear that a claim under section 140 must also be disposed of through an award. Such an award can be passed only after the opposite party or parties concerned filed their written statements or objection or at least after affording a reasonable opportunity to them to file their written statement and after hearing them. The Claims Tribunal must be satisfied that conditions specified in section 140 have been substantiated to make an award under the section. In this view, we have no doubt that the Claims Tribunal has to pass an award under section 140. Hence an appeal is maintainable under section 173.”

22. To the contrary are the decisions of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court and Rajasthan High Court. The High Court of Jammu and Kashmir in Oriental Fire & General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Maya Devi, 1989 ACJ 1040 held that an order passed under section 92-A of the 1939 Act (section 140 of the 1988 Act) is not appealable under section 110-D (section 173 of the 1988 Act) the reasoning given was that in the absence of any specific provision in the statute providing for appeal, right of appeal cannot be inferred. This decision was followed by the same High Court in Janak Raj v. Union of India, 1989 ACJ 1148.

23. I have considered the aforesaid judgments in the light of the scheme of the Act and its relevant provisions. It is well settled that right of appeal is not an inherent right. It is a creature of statute Outside the statute there is no right of appeal. It is open to the legislature to give or not to give right of appeal against any decision made by the authorities under a particular enactment. Such right of appeal, however, must be expressly conferred. It cannot be extended by inference. Or in the words of the Supreme Court in Durga Sankar Mehta v. Raghuraj Singh, AIR 1954 SC 520 at page 522; “there can be no inherent right of appeal from any judgment or determination unless an appeal is expressly provided for by the law itself.” The Supreme Court in Ganga v. Vijaya, (1974) 2 SCC 393 : AIR 1974 SC 1126, reiterated this well settled legal position by observing “a right of appeal inheres in no one and therefore an appeal for its maintainability must have the clear authority of law and that explains why the right of appeal is described as a creature of statute”. In the background of the well-settled legal position in regard to right of appeal set out above, the question whether an appeal lies against an order under section 140 of the 1988 Act may now be examined.

24. The power of the Claims Tribunal to order payment of interim compensation on account of death or permanent disablement is contained in section 140 of the Act which forms part of Chapter X. This chapter deals with the liability to pay compensation without fault in certain cases. It comprises of five sections. Section 140 deals with liability to pay compensation in certain cases on the principle of no fault. Section 141 makes it clear that the right to claim compensation under section 140 is in addition to any other right to claim compensation in respect thereof. It also lays down the manner of disposal of claim under section 140. Section 142 defines permanent disablement. Section 143 makes this chapter applicable to certain claims under the Workman's Compensation Act. Section 144 gives overriding effect to the provisions of this chapter over other provisions of the same Act or any other law for the time being in force. This chapter ends with section 144. Unlike other chapters it does not contain any provision for appeal against an order passed under section 140. Section 173 which provides for appeal against an award to the High Court finds place in Chapter XII of the Act. An award is passed under section 168 of the Act. Both these sections are part of Chapter XII.

25. The question is whether an order directing payment of interim compensation passed under section 140 of the 1988 Act can be termed as an “award” for the purpose of an appeal under section 173. The answer appears to be in the negative. The reason is simple. The scheme of the Act shows that the legislature has considered the nature of orders contemplated under each chapter separately and wherever it intended to confer a right of appeal against any such order, it has done so in express terms by making specific provision, to that effect in that chapter itself. No such provision has been made in Chapter X which deals with interim compensation in certain cases, but in Chapter XII it has conferred right of appeal against the award of a Claims Tribunal in express terms. This is so because of the nature of the two orders. The nature of orders under section 140 is completely different from orders under section 168. The enquiry for order under section 140 is more or less summary in nature, the object being to give to the victim or his relatives minimum compensation as expeditiously as possible in certain circumstances. A regular appeal in such cases would frustrate the very purpose of such a provision. If the legislature intended to provide an appeal against the same, it would have done so in Chapter X itself in express terms. Besides, if the object of the legislature was to treat-orders under section 140 at per with an award under section 168, there was no necessity of a separate chapter like chapter X to deal with claims for interim compensation. The power to grant interim compensation could have been incorporated in section 168 or Chapter XII itself by inserting a proviso to section 168 or otherwise. That has not been done. On the other hand, by the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 168, it has been made clear that claim under section 140 shall be disposed of not in accordance with Chapter XII but in accordance with the provisions of Chapter X.

26. In the light of the foregoing discussion, I am of the clear opinion that no appeal lies to the High Court under section 173 against an order passed by the Claims Tribunal under section 140 of the 1968 Act.

28. To sum up, the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal constituted under the 1988 Act is a Court subordinate to the High Court and, as such, orders passed by it are amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code and, no appeal lies against the order of the Claims Tribunal passed under section 140 of the Act. Appeal under section 173 lies only against an award under section 168 of the Act. In the light of these conclusions the questions arising in the Civil Revision as well as in appeal may be examined. I shall take up the civil revision first.

28. So far as the maintainability of the revision petition is concerned, from the foregoing discussions it is evident that the revision petition under section 115 C.P.C is maintainable. Turning to the merits of the case, the facts are simple and brief. The vehicle involved in the accident belonged to a private person. It was requisitioned by the State Government for law and order duty and continued to be under requisition at the time of the accident. The claimant was a handyman of that vehicle. While the said vehicle was proceeding to Karigaon from Kohrajhar on P.W.D road with police personnel, it got involved in an accident near about Amguri village as a result of a bomb blast and the claimant suffered injuries resulting in permanent disablement. The Claims Tribunal directed the State of Assam to pay a sura of Rs. 7,500/- by way of interim relief. This was done in exercise of power under section 104 of the Act. The direction to pay was issued to the State of Assam as the vehicle, at the relevant time, was in absolute charge and control of the State Government by virtue of the requisition order and the owner thereof had no control over it. So far as the Insurance Company is concerned, it was not held responsible in view of a clause in the insurance policy which specifically provided that no compensation would be payable by the Insurance Company in the event of an accident taking place while the vehicle is under requisition by the State Government. This order has been challenged by the State of Assam. Its contention is that the Claims Tribunal was not justified in directing the State Government to pay the amount as it was neither the owner nor the insurer. Another contention is that the claim was not payable as the accident took place as a result of bomb blast not the negligent driving and/or any such cause. Both these contentions have been countered by the counsel for the claimant and the Insurance Company. The case of the Insurance Company is that the insurance policy is between the owner and the Insurance Company and is subject to the terms and conditions thereof. There is a specific clause in the Insurance policy which exonerates the Insurance Company from liability to pay any compensation on account of accident taking place during the period the vehicle is under requisition by the State Government. Reliance is placed on a decision of the Orissa High Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Durdadshya Kumar, AIR 1988 Orissa 229. In this case also there was a clause in the insurance policy which provided that the Company shall not be liable under the policy in respect of any accident, loss or damage or liability sustained or incurred during the period of requisition or commandeering by the Government for any purpose. I have perused the aforesaid decision. In this case also the vehicle had been requisitioned for the purpose of election duty and was in the charge of the Collector at the time the accident took place. It was held by the Orissa High Court that when a vehicle had been requisitioned the Collector for the purpose of liability becomes the owner of the vehicle. It was further held that in a vehicle requisitioned, the driver remains under the control of the Collector and by such driving the vehicle he can be accepted to have been employed by the Collector. Thus, the Collector would be vicariously liable for the negligent act of the driver in such a case. While arriving at the aforesaid finding the Court also held that the word “owner” in such a case should be liberally interpreted. Dealing with the clause in the insurance policy the Court held that insurance under the Motor Vehicles Act is a guarantee to the owner of the vehicle that in case of any claim with respect to the vehicle concerned, the insurer shall discharge the liability of the owner under the terms of the policy. It is a contract between the parties. It was also observed. It is not a universal guarantee for the vehicle whosoever becomes the owner”.

29. I have considered the rival submissions and also the decision of the Orissa High Court referred to above. I find myself in full agreement with the decision of the Orissa High Court. The legal position in regard to the control and the liability of the requisitioning authority in respect of requisitioned vehicle in Assam can be ascertained from the provisions of the Assam Requisition and Control of Vehicles Act, 1968 (Assam Act V of 1969). Section 3 of this Act empowers the State Government to requisition a vehicle for the purposes specified therein. Sub-section (4) thereof provides: “where the State Government has requisitioned any vehicle, it may use or deal with it in such manner as may appear to it to be expedient”. Section 5 of the Act provides for release from requisition. It empowers the officer or authority requisitioning a vehicle to release the vehicle at any time by issuing a notice contemplated therein. Sub-section (2) of the said section provides: “with effect from such date no further liability for compensation or payment of any kind shall lie with the officer or authority requisitioning the vehicle……….”. These two provisions clearly go to show that during the period the vehicle remains under requisition, the liability for compensation or payment of any kind lies with the officer or authority requisitioning the vehicle and not the owner. The reason is obvious. The vehicle is in absolute control of the requisitioning authority. The owner has no control whatsoever over the user of the vehicle during such period. The driver and/or other employees work under the directions and control of the requisitioning authority and not the owner. The vicarious liability, therefore, cannot be fastened to the owner. It has to fall on the requisitioning: authority. In that view of the matter, in my opinion, the Claims Tribunal was right in directing the State Government, as the requisitioning authority, to pay the amount determined under section 140 of the Act. The Insurance Company was equally not liable to pay the same inasmuch as the same was not covered by the policy of insurance. In fact such claim was excluded from the operation of the policy by incorporating a specific clause in the insurance policy to that effect. Under such circumstances, the Insurance Company also cannot be made liable to pay the claim. The only person liable to pay the same was the State Government and the Claims Tribunal rightly directed it to pay the amount. There is, therefore, no infirmity in the said order on that count.

30. The second objection to the order of the Tribunal granting interim compensation is based on the ground that the injury sustained by the claimant was the result of a bomb blast and not because of any accident caused by the vehicle. It is stated that the permanent disablement in the instant case did not result from any accident arising out of the motor vehicle. I have considered this submission. I would have discussed this aspect at length, but for the latest decision of the Supreme Court in Shivajidayanu Patil v. Vatshaluttam, (1991) 3 SCC 530 where the law in this regard has been well settled. In this case section 92-A of the 1939 Act (corresponding, to section 140 of the 1988 Act) came up for interpretation. The Supreme Court considered at length the object of enacting section 92-A and the language used therein. It was observed:

“…………Section 92-A was in the nature of a beneficial legislation enacted with a view to confer the benefit of expeditious payment of a limited amount by way of compensation to the victims of an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle on the basis of no fault liability. In the matter of interpretation of a beneficial legislation the approach of the courts is to adopt a construction which advances the beneficient purpose underlying the enactment in preference to a construction which tends to defeat that purpose…….”

[Emphasis supplied]

Referring to a number of decisions of the English Courts and the High Courts it was observed:

“…………In our opinion, the word ‘use’ has a wider connotation to cover the period when the vehicle is not moving and is stationary and the use of a vehicle does not cease on account of the vehicle having been rendered immobile on account of a breakdown or mechanical defector accident…….”

Interpreting the expression “arising out of” used in section 92-A of the 1939 Act in contrast to the expression “caused by” used in some other statutes, it was observed:

“………….as compared to the expression ‘caused by’, the expression ‘arising out of’ has a wider connotation. The expression ‘caused by’ was used in sections 95(1)(b)(i) and (ii) and 96(2)(b)(ii) of the Act. In Section 92-A, parliament, however, chose to use the expression ‘arising out of’ which indicates that for the purpose of awarding compensation under Section 92-A, the casual relationship between the use of the Motor vehicle and the accident resulting in death or permanent disablement is not required to be direct and proximate and it can be less immediate. This would imply that accident should be connected with the use of the motor vehicle but the said connection need not be direct and immediate. This construction of the expression ‘arising out of the use of a motor vehicle’ in Section 92-A enlarges the field of protection made available to the victims of an accident and is in consonance with the beneficial object underlying the enactment.”

31. In the instant case the vehicle met with an accident due to bomb blast as a result of which the claimant suffered permanent disablement. The vehicle was in use at the time the accident took place. The permanent disablement of the claimant in the instant case resulted from the accident arising out of the use of the motor vehicle. The fact that there was a bomb blast as a result of which the accident took place may be relevant for the purpose of determining the fault of the owner or driver. It is not material for determining the “no fault” liability under section 140 of the Act. The relationship between the use of the motor vehicle and the accident in such a case might not be direct or proximate or immediate. That is however, not necessary for the purpose of payment of compensation under section 140 of the 1988 Act as held by the Supreme Court in Shivajidayanu Patil (supra). Undoubtedly there is a casual relationships between the two which is sufficient for the purpose of sec. 140. In the circumstances, it is clear that the permanent disablement arose out of the use of the motor vehicle.

32. In the facts and circumstances of this case, in my opinion the Tribunal was justified in holding that the injuries which resulted in permanent disablement of the claimant was due to the accident arising out of the use of the motor vehicle. In view of this finding, I do not find any infirmity in the order of the Claims Tribunal awarding interim compensation to justify interference by this Court. The revision petition, therefore, has no merit and the same is accordingly dismissed.

33. I may now take up M.A (F) 20 of 1991. This is an appeal under section 173 of the 1988 Act against an order passed by the Claims Tribunal under section 140 of the said Act granting compensation in respect of death resulting from that accident arising out of the use of the motor vehicle. The objection of the respondents was that the appeal is not maintainable, in the earlier part of this order it has already been held that appeal does not He. This appeal, therefore, is not maintainable. The learned counsel for the appellant in course of hearing submitted that in case it is held that the appeal does not lie against the impugned order but revision is maintainable, this appeal may be allowed to be converted into revision petition and considered accordingly.

34. As I have held that this Court can interfere with an order under section 140 of the 1988 Act in exercise of its revisional power, I think that for ends of justice the appeal should be treated as a revision application. This Court has the power to do so is not in dispute as it has been held by this Court in Himangshu Kumar Nath v. Mihir Kanti Nath, (1991) 2 G.L.R 46 as follows:

“……under section 151 C.P.C, the court has inherent power to treat a revision as an appeal or vice versa if the conditions laid down by the law are satisfied. This power, however, is discretionary and should be exercised only if it is necessary to do so for the ends of justice….”

In the instant case I find that the ends of justice require that the appeal should be treated as revision and I do so accordingly.

35. Turning to the merits of the case, I find that the alleged accident and the resultant death are not in dispute. The order of the Claims Tribunal awarding compensation of Rs. 25,000/- to the claimant has been challenged on the ground that the deceased was carried as a passenger in the truck in violation of terms and conditions of the policy. In that view of the matter it is contended that the Insurance Company is not liable to pay the same. The counsel for the respondents has placed a Full Bench decision of this Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Satyanath Hazarika, 1989 (2) GLJ 1 This is a judgment of five Judges Bench of this Court. The question that arose for consideration in this case was whether the Insurance Company is liable to pay compensation in respect of death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger. It was held that an insurer would be liable to indemnify the insured in respect of compensation awarded against him for the death or bodily injury to a gratuitous passenger also.

36. The learned counsel for the respondent-claimant also submits that the deceased was not an unauthorised passenger. According to him he was the owner of the goods which were being carried by the truck on hire and was accompanying the goods. His contention is that there is nothing unauthorised in such travel by a goods truck. Reliance is placed in this connection on the decisions in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. K.T Jose, (1990) 1 A.C.J 184 (D.B); Gujarat State Transport Corporation v. Malubai Menand; Abdul Razaq v. Sharifunnessa, 1984 A.C.J (D.B) and United India Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hemlata, (1986) 2 A.C.J 1085.

37. I have carefully considered both the submissions. As the first submission is fully covered by a five Judges Bench decision of this Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Satyanath Hazarika (supra) the claimant was entitled to get the interim compensation under section 140 of the Act. I, therefore, do not find that the Claims Tribunal committed any illegality in directing payment of compensation in respect of death of the deceased. In view of this finding it is not necessary to decide the next submission of the learned counsel.

38. In view of these findings I do not find any justification to interfere with the impugned order. The appeal which has been treated as a revision petition is accordingly dismissed.

In both the cases the parties shall bear their own cost.