"It is unusual and inconvenient to allow a person, who might have applied before decree, to be joined as co-plaintiff after decree, even if it be lawful to do so, where no interest has devolved and no interest has been created since the institution of proceedings. The only section of the Code on which the learned counsel for the respondent can rely is the 32nd, which points to the joinder of parties whose presence may be necessary for the adjudication of questions raised in the suit. Here the period of adjudication has passed. Nevertheless, we are not prepared to say that the Subordinate Judge had not a discretionary power under Section 32 at any stage of the suit, and, although the widows are still engaged in litigation, prima facie they have an equal right to collect the debts."
6. Therein, the junior widow, who was a party, was equally entitled along with the senior widow to have the fruits of the decree obtained against the judgment-debtor of their husband. Further, the E. P. was pending before the Court which added the junior widow as party to the proceedings. The other decision relied upon by Mr. Seetharamayya is that of the Judicial Committee in Raghunath Das v. Sunder Das Khetri, AIR 1914 PC 129 at p. 131. The point in controversy was not decided by the Privy Council in that case, but it was only observed thus :- "It was suggested in argument that he might have been made a party to the proceedings either under Section 32 or under Section 372 of the Code (Civil Procedure Code, 1882) but even if these sections are applicable after final decree as to which there is considerable doubt......no proceedings seem to have been taken thereunder."
7. The above observations of the Judicial Committee are, on the other hand, against the view canvassed by the petitioners herein. In the case on hand, the appeal was already disposed of by us on 19-4-1972. Admittedly there is no proceeding now pending before us. It is only in cases or proceedings before us that the question of adding any party would arise, apart from the desirability or propriety of doing the same. In this case, we must hold that the provisions of Order 1, Rule 10 (2), Civil Procedure Code do not come to the aid of the petitioners to maintain this application in view of the admitted fact that no appeal or proceedings is pending now before us. This application, therefore, must be dismissed even on merits.
8. The only other provision of law under which this application can be filed, is Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. It is well settled that the inherent powers of the Court cannot be exercised in any case if there is a specific provision in the Code providing for the remedy. Even otherwise, Section 151, Civil Procedure Code can be invoked only in cases where there is abuse of process of the Court, or to secure the ends of justice. We do not find any justification in this application to invoke our inherent jurisdiction for the relief sought to be granted to the petitioners. Judged from any angle, this application (C. M. P. No. 8288/72) must be and is hereby dismissed with costs.
9. Before we part with this case, we may add that any observations made by us in this order should not be construed as our expressing any opinion on the merits relating to the rights, if any, of the petitioners herein. It is open to them to agitate for their rights and safeguard the same, in an appropriate proceeding. Order accordingly.